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Globalization of the world economy brought to attention the issue of the process of 
internationalization and influence over investments abroad in a multicultural context 
and forced the need to establish new, adequate systems of influence and control over 
subsidiaries. The management control systems (MCS) literature has long recognized 
the importance of the issue of phenomenon of HQ’s influence over subsidiaries in the 
process of internationalization of multinational corporations MNCs. However, there is 
still not enough knowledge about the kind of mechanisms that enhance headquarters’ 
(HQ) influence over subsidiaries in the process of internationalization; how the interplay 
of these mechanisms occurs; and the way in which these mechanisms trigger the 
development of the process of internationalization;  and more research  is needed in this 
research field.
Using a qualitative framework, in which a case study has been carried out, the current 
research aims  to examine how HQ of  MNC  ”T” has exercised influence and control 
over its subsidiaries in the process of internationalization, how the top managers in the 
HQ have perceived the outcome of the control process, and how those perceptions have 
influenced changes in the design of HQs control mechanism over subsidiaries.
The study makes three major contributions. Firstly, the study contributes by describing 
use of controls mechanisms related to ownership, the role of BoD, the role expatriates, the 
corporate rules and the role of CEO of HQ and reveals that these controls are interplaying 
with each other as the configuration of control packages.  Secondly, the study shows 
how the configurations of controls as packages have been changed by “tuning” during 
the process of the internationalization aiming to achieve the high level of influence in 
subsidiaries. Thirdly, this research contributes to a renewal of the existing management 
control literature  by examining how the development of a control system as the 
configuration of control packages is a result of top managers’ perceptions of the outcome 
of control activities by discovering and presenting the phenomenon of “deprivation of 
control” as a driving force in the changes of the organization.  The study contributes to 
practitioners by providing a better understanding of the process of internationalization 
and to the renewal of knowledge about the activities of the MNC during international 
expansion.
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Globalization of the world economy brought to attention the issue of the process of internationalization 
and influence over investments abroad in a multicultural context and forced the need to establish new, 
adequate systems of influence and control over subsidiaries (Huemer, Boström, Felzenstein. 2009; 
Sheytt, Soin and Metz, 2010).  Norwegian multinational corporations (MNCs) invest actively in 
countries whose business cultures and traditions differ from those of Scandinavia. The link between 
influence and control mechanisms in  MNCs has become increasing  interest to scholars over recent 
decades, and at the same time, is leading to focus on the lack of knowledge related to the topic of 
interplay between the HQ and subsidiaries, based on the latest findings, especially from case studies 
(Chenhall, 2003;  Moilanen, 2007; Malmi and Brown, 2008; Bourmistrov and Mellemvik, 2013; 
Bourmistrov and Kaarbøe, 2013). How do MNCs deal with the issue of doing business in an 
intercultural context? What kind of challenges can MNCs expect in this connection, and do MNCs 
have influence over the subsidiaries abroad? The scholar literature has paid attention to the possible  
tensions between the HQ and subsidiaries, and it has been suggested that greater understanding of how 
MNCs approach different management control mechanisms is needed (Bourmistrov and Kaarbøe, 
2013), as well as an examination of the interaction between different parts in the control package 
(Malmi and Brown, 2008), in order to achieve influence and control in subsidiaries.  The management 
control systems (MCS) literature has long recognized the importance of the issue of phenomenon of 
HQ's influence over subsidiaries in the process of internationalization of MNCs. However, there is still 
not enough knowledge about the kind of mechanisms that enhance headquarters’ (HQ) influence over 
subsidiaries in the process of internationalization; how the interplay of these mechanisms occurs; and 
the way in which these mechanisms trigger the development of the process of internationalization;  and 
more research  is needed in this research field.   
The empirical story of this study shows that MNC “T” has faced dramatic changes during last decades 
after the internationalization process started in 1993 that necessitated establishment but also substantial 
revisions over time of several control mechanisms aiming to influence from HQ over its subsidiaries 
abroad. This  purpose of the current research is to examine how HQ of company "T" has exercised 
influence and control over its subsidiaries, in the process of internationalization of the MNC, how the 
top managers in the HQ of the MNC have perceived the outcome of the control process, and how those 
perceptions have influenced changes in the design of HQs control mechanism over subsidiaries. The 
study is guided by following three exploratory research questions:  1) How has the internationalization 
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of “T” happened? 2) What control mechanisms were in place during different phases of 
internationalization? 3) How have managers perceived the effects of controls established in the process 
of internationalization?  
These three research questions have been addressed, using a qualitative framework, in which a case 
study has been carried out. To address the mentioned above issues, an explorative case study of a 
Norwegian MNC, “T” was conducted of both its HQ and some of its subsidiaries abroad. Empirical 
evidence has been collected from 34 face-to-face interviews and 21 conversations, the documentary 
analysis, and from longitudinal observations from the field.  
The findings of the current study suggest that, first, the process of internationalization was a search for 
compromises between opportunities in international markets but also heavy constraints when it comes 
to financial resources, lack of knowledge, experience, impossibility of changing local legislation and 
local cultures. Second, a large part of the internationalization process was linked to the HQ’s search 
for influence and control over its subsidiaries. It was happening through use of and interplay between 
several control mechanisms such as, the ownership structure, the composition of the Board of Directors 
in the subsidiaries, the role of expatriates, establishment of the common corporate rules, and the role 
of the CEO of HQ. The study considers that the process of changes of the configuration of such controls 
(packages) was a dynamic development and happened by “tuning” and reconfiguring different 
packages in different phases of “T”’s internationalization aiming to achieve the high level of influence 
from HQ towards subsidiaries. Finally, this research discovers that the process of reconfiguring the 
control packages was guided by the dissatisfactions (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995; Poole et al., 2000) 
in achieved influence over subsidiaries leading to “deprivation of control” - a  recognition  that “T” 
was not getting what was considered necessary. In this sense, the deprivation of control was both the 
outcome of the chains of change processes and the driving force for the change processes. 
The study makes three major contributions. Firstly, the study contributes to literature on control 
mechanisms in internationalization settings by describing use of mentioned above controls 
mechanisms related to ownership (Chalos and O’Connor, 2004; Al Farooque et.at, 2010); related to 
the role of BoD : (Bisbe and Otley, 2004; Bijman, Hendrikse, van Oijen, Aswin, 2012; related to  the 
role expatriates: (Delios and Bjorkman, 2000; Chalos and O’Conner, 2004); related to the corporate 
rules: (Kurucz et al. 2008; Chow, Shileds and Wu, 2010) and the role of CEO of HQ:  Watson S., 
Weaver G. R. 2003; Collings, Morley and Gunnigle, 2008), and reveals that  these controls are 
interplaying with each other as the configuration of control packages.  Secondly, the study shows how 
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the configurations of controls as packages have been changed by tuning during the process of the 
internationalization aiming to achieve the high level of influence in subsidiaries. Thirdly, this research 
contributes to a renewal of the existing management control literature  by examining how the 
development of a control system as the configuration of control packages is a result of top managers’ 
perceptions of the outcome of control activities (Dermer & Lucas, 1986; Koeing et al., 1992; 
Bourmistrov and Kaarbøe, 2013; Seal & Mattimoe, 2014) , by discovering and presenting the 
phenomenon of “deprivation of control” as a driving force in the changes of the organization.   
The study contributes to practitioners by providing a better understanding of the process of 
internationalization and to the renewal of knowledge about the activities of the MNC during 
international expansion, in relation to strategy development, development of the control systems and 
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How did the idea of writing about “T”’s influence under the process of internationalization come to 
me?   
On 15th November 2014, the Norwegian newspaper, Klassekampen, published an article with the 
intriguing title “The payments were hidden in this way” (“Slik ble utbetalingene skjult”) 
(Klassekampen, 15.01.2014). The article presented materials, which, according to the journalists, 
could document the fact of corruption in the company, VCom (a private company registered in 
Bermuda, with its HQ in Amsterdam). With 43% of the shares in VCom, the Norwegian MNC “T” 
(54% Norwegian state ownership) is the substantial minority shareholder.  
From 15th November 2014, a large number of articles were published in both Klassekampen and other 
newspapers, accusing “T”’s subsidiary, VCom, of corruption in relation to business activities in 
Uzbekistan and the process for purchasing the mobile operation license in the country. The 
publications triggered a debate involving politicians, businessmen and journalists, asking questions 
about “T”’s activities abroad. Almost all the main players in the Norwegian media and the media 
abroad scrutinized the case.  
In the period from 2014 to 2016, the Chairman of the Board of Directors of “T”, the former CEO and 
several top managers involved in the handling of the VCom case had to leave “T”. The former CEO 
of VCom, a Norwegian by nationality, has been  under investigation by the Norwegian authorities (he 
had been an employee of “T” before being appointed to the position of CEO in VCom, at the beginning 
of the 2000s, and moved first to Moscow and then to the Netherlands). 
On 17th February 2016, VCom admitted the fact of the corruption and agreed to pay a penalty of 
almost 7 billion NOK.  The new CEO of “T” engaged the consulting company, “D”, to investigate the 
internal processes in “T”, in relation to the VCom scandal, which resulted in strong criticism of “T”. 
It was confirmed that “T”’s internal financial controllers had informed the company’s top 
management about the suspicious payments in VCom, but “T”’s top management had ignored the 
information, with a message stating that it was VCom’s case and VCom’s management should deal 
with it, not “T”. In September 2016, it was decided that “T” would sell its shares in VCom.  
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During the period 2014-2016, “T”’s managers confirmed several times that “T” did not have enough 
influence and control in VCom. VCom’s case woke an interest in me as a researcher and followed me 
to the scientific field of the phenomenon of influence, in the context of an MNC engaged in the process 
of internationalization.  
Reflecting on VCom’s case, I started to think about the historical retrospective of when and how “T”’s 
internationalization started. As a relatively unexperienced and small company from a small country in 
the early 1990s, when the company began its process of internationalization, was “T” prepared for 
the potential risks and dangers of the global business world?  Did “T” have an international strategy 
before starting its internationalization? Did “T” have knowledge about how to be an investor in those 
countries that are placed at the bottom of the list of Transparency International, as the most corrupt 
regimes in the world? Did “T” have experienced international managers that could support its 
international strategy? What did “T” do wrong in its internationalization, if VCom’s scandal could 
occur? Could internationalization have happened too fast? What should “T” have changed in its 
internationalization strategy and process, in order to avoid the above-mentioned challenges and retain 
its good image as an experienced and responsible investor?   
At the same time, it is important to mention that the “T”–VCom case is linked to another big issue, 
which was also discussed in the media – does the main stakeholder of “T” (the Norwegian state) have 
control of its portfolio? How can the state be an active and not sleeping owner that manages to control 
and influence an important portfolio? 
Understanding that all my questions are actually related to one big question – how to achieve and 
retain influence – and wishing to find the answers to my questions, I started an interesting retrospective 







Chapter 1: Introducing the background and purpose of the research 
1.1. Motivation for the research: Internationalization process of “T” – how to use 
opportunities and deal with the dilemmas? Did “T” always have influence and control? 
Globalization is forcing companies to look towards international expansion, which creates a demand 
to develop mechanisms of influence and control over subsidiaries (Huemer, Boström, Felzensztein, 
2009; Scheytt, Soin and Metz, 2010). The link between influence and control mechanisms in 
multinational companies has become increasing interest to scholars over recent decades.  
 
Focusing on multinational corporations1, the relationship between headquarters2 and subsidiaries in 
markets with different cultures (Mozley, 1996) has gained interest in the research literature. 
Management, strategic and management control literature have paid much more attention to the 
phenomenon of the HQ’s influence over its subsidiaries. The rapid processes of globalization and 
internationalization have had an impact on the development of the MNC in the global world, leading 
to an interest in the lack of knowledge related to the topic of interplay between the HQ and subsidiaries, 
based on the latest findings, especially from case studies (Chenhall, 2003;  Moilanen, 2007; Malmi 
and Brown, 2008; Bourmistrov and Mellemvik, 2013; Bourmistrov and Kaarbøe, 2013). Attention has 
been paid to the possible tensions between the HQ and subsidiaries, and it has been suggested that 
greater understanding of how MNCs approach different management control mechanisms is needed 
(Bourmistrov and Kaarbøe, 2013), as well as an examination of the interaction between different 
mechanisms as a package (Malmi and Brown, 2008), in order to achieve influence and control in 
subsidiaries. Greater attention should be paid to designing an adequate system of influence and control 
(Malmi and Brown, 2008), in order to minimize tensions between HQ and subsidiaries (Ahren and 
Mollona, 2007).  
 
What mechanisms should be developed in HQ, to achieve influence and control during the different 
stages of the process of internationalization in an MNC; how can – and why should – these mechanisms 
be embedded in the organizational practice in subsidiaries?   
                                                 
1 Multinational corporations – hereafter in the text, it will be used MNC 




Despite the increasing interest of researchers in the issue of the phenomenon of the HQ’s influence 
over subsidiaries and joint-ventures3 in the process of the internationalization of MNCs, it is necessary 
to mention that this topic is still in its infancy in the management control research domain, and more 
research is needed in this research field.   
 
At the same time, it is noteworthy that, as a practitioner, and having started to be interested in the 
academic research, I have realized that, during recent decades, academic researchers’ interest in the 
practical issues of management control has waned (Baldvinsdottir, Mitcell and Nørreklli, 2010).  
Realizing this fact, I have been extra motivated to use the findings from academic research in the 
practitioners’ world, and vice versa.  “The academic research will be poorer for the exclusion of 
practitioners’ judgments as practitioners are an intelligent audience with the capacity to provide the 
correction and guideline” (ibid., p. 81).  I hope that,  as a result of  this study,  the academic world  will 
benefit from the practical learning presented and analyzed  by a practitioner such as myself and, at the 
same time, the  world of  business and practical experience  will  be richer when the  research findings 
from the theoretical world are applied for the benefit of the practice and better understanding of the 
aspects of management control in the context of the process of internationalization.   Such an approach 
calls for the interaction between practical experience from theories and “its interdisciplinary links […] 
that has been missing from much of the management control research agenda” (ibid.). 
 1.2. Brief history of the Norwegian MNC “T” – from a small company to an MNC. 
In order to better understand the background of this research and the context for internationalization, 
a brief history of “T” will be presented. “T” Group provides tele, data and media services in the 
Nordics, Central and Eastern Europe, and Asia. The company’s revenues (2015: NOK 128 billion – 
annual report) come from the mobile operations in 13 markets, with an additional 14 markets through 
VCom4, making “T” one of the world’s major mobile operators with 208 million mobile subscriptions 
worldwide. With 36,000 employees worldwide, “T” Group is able to offer a wide range of telecom-
related services to consumers and enterprises. The 160-year history of “T” is closely connected to the 
development of the telegraph and telephone across the world. 
  
                                                 
3 Joint Venture – hereafter in the text, will be used JV 
4 VCom - a JV in “T” s portfolio 
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How the story of “T” began 
After 1844, when Samuel Morse became the first person in the world to construct a telegraph using 
only one wire, when he built a telegraph line in the USA. Telegraphy came to Europe when, in 1849, 
The Telegraph Company (now: B5) established its first telegraphy line. Early on, Norway started to 
build a telegraphy network.  In 1855, Den Norske Statstelegraf (Norwegian Telegraph 
Administration – now “T”) was founded. The first Norwegian telegraph line (between Oslo and 
Drammen) was opened the same year. 
 
Twelve years later – in 1867 – the first international telegraph line came into operation between 
Norway and Denmark; the telegraph connection between Norway and Great Britain was opened in 
1869, and, from 1870, Norway was one of the first European countries with nationwide telegraphy 
coverage.  
 
In 1901, the Telegraph Act was passed, giving the Norwegian state exclusive rights to run telephone 
services in Norway. The expanding Norwegian fishing industry was a driving force for the telephone 
companies in their fast development of telegraphy coverage and services. Telephone technology came 
to Europe in 1877, when the first public demonstration of the Bell telephone took place in a limited 
number of countries like Great Britain, Germany, France, Sweden and Norway, and the first Norwegian 
telephones were offered in the capital, Oslo, in 1878. A large number of private telephone companies 
were established in the following years, and, in the 1890s, Norway was one of the countries in the 
world with the highest density of telephones per inhabitant. 
 
In 1906, one of the first radio wave connections between different islands was established in the 
Lofoten area in Northern Norway. From then on, fishermen were offered the opportunity to connect 
with their sales organizations on the mainland when they came in from their fishing grounds, enabling 
the sales people to start selling the fish, while it was being transported on the last leg of its journey 
from the island to the mainland. 
 
Tlg6 (now: “T” Group) acquired the last private telephone company in 1973 but never decided to 
establish fixed line operations abroad, as happened with mobile telephony in the process of 
internationalization from the late 1990s, when “T” experienced the transformation from a state-owned 
enterprise to a state-owned company. 
                                                 
5 B. – a company from UK 
6 In 1969 Tlg changes the name to Tlv, and later in 1995 to “T” 
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The story of how “T” succeeded to be a company at the beginning of the 1990s. 
In one of the commentaries in the middle of the 1990s about a new “T”’s President and Chief Executive 
Officer 7 (he was on this position from earlier 90s to 2001), he was described as one of the most 
powerful people – or even the most powerful person – in Norway (NTB, 30.2.1994). This mostly 
caused a political debate around the changes in the organizational structure of “T”. The CEO’s first 
years in his new position resulted in him managing to change the attitude, among the political and 
bureaucratic elite in Norway, to the restructuring of “T” from an SOE8 to a PLE9. The Minister of 
Transport and Communications, many representatives of the Norwegian Parliament – the Storting – 
members of the Labor party, which was in government in the 1990s, and the Trade Unions were 
skeptical about the changes and wanted to retain “T” in its existing form.  It is interesting to note that 
the CEO himself underwent a change in his own understanding of the necessity for changing the 
management and organizational structure in “T”. When he was appointed the chief of “T” in 1991, he 
was not sure that “T” should be transformed into a private limited enterprise.  He acknowledged later 
that, prior to his position in “T”, he supported the idea that both “T” and an energy company, SKFT, 
should be public management companies or SOE. However, after a short time in his position, he 
understood “T”’s future challenges in connection with the coming liberalization of the 
telecommunication market, globalization and the need for international expansion. In order to meet the 
new situation in the world economy, it was necessary to transform “T” into an ordinary PLE (Interview, 
2014). The CEO used his political contacts both internal in Labor party and the Trade Unions, in order 
to gain approval for the changes in “T”. At the same time, he managed to build a broad alliance within 
the expert assessment in the Ministry of Transport and Communications. The State Secretary, the 
Secretary General in the Ministry of Transport and Communication, the Office of the Prime Minister, 
and the LO10 Union for Civil Service workers supported the CEO’s efforts (Lars Thue, Nye 
forbindesler. From Norsk telekommunikasjonshistorie, 3, Gylendal 2005). The Norwegian parliament, 
Storting, had to take the decision regarding the changes in “T”’s structure in 1992, and before the 
discussion with the telecommunication Minister, who insisted on the SOE organizational structure or 
“T” and has prepared the White Paper for the Storting, there were several important factors that 
influenced the process of change in “T”.  The CEO needed power of attorney from the minister, in 
order to meet the new competition in the market and the rapid development of telecommunication 
services in the world, in relation to the production of equipment, IT services and consultancy. The 
                                                 
7 Hereafter in the text, it will be used CEO 
8 State Owned Enterprise, hereafter in the text, it will be used SOE 
9 Public Limited Enterprise, hereafter in the text, it will be used PLE 
10 LO – Norwegian Trade Unions 
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power of attorney extended “T”’s PLE activities, even though the company was organized as an SOE. 
Based on the power of attorney, the CEO began the organizational changes in “T”.  
 
When the White Paper was discussed in the Storting, public opinion had already started to change to 
the CEO’s point of view. At the same time, substantial changes were happening in the 
telecommunication market and regulation. In 1993, the EU announced plans to open up the European 
telecommunication market to full competition across borders from 1st January 1998. In 1994, 24 
countries in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) decided to 
organize their national operators as incumbents; that led to organizational changes in the companies 
and, principle different competition situation – the operators were organized as business companies 
that could obtain access to different financial mechanisms, fresh capital and, at the same time, have a 
high level of freedom in business decisions.  The governmental report about “T” (“Rapport fra 
statssekretærutvalvget som har vurdert tilknytningsform for Tlv, Postverket og Norges Statsbanen”, 
februar 1994) stated that the liberalization of the telecommunication market in Europe had happened 
much quicker than indicated and would lead to substantial challenges for “T”, if it were to remain a 
form of SOE. 
The mobile phone era is connected with the internationalization of “T” 
As in other countries, the first mobile phones in Norway (so-called land-based mobile services) were 
established from the late 1950s. Mobile phones were large and heavy; they were scarcely portable, and 
most were built into cars. Typical use was in closed networks, in which the office could communicate 
with the company’s cars, and the cars could be connected to each other. 
 
In 1966, a research project was established between Tlg (later on Tlv, and now: “T”), the Norwegian 
Defense Research Establishment and a private company (Simonsen Radio), and the first so-called radio 
telephone was launched the same year. The main target group for this service was companies needing 
communication between fixed line services and cars, and vice versa. Some private individuals acquired 
such sets, but prices were very high – more than 30,000 NOK for a set. In 1969, Tlg changed the name 
of the service to mobile phone, and the usage was extended – mostly to boats and cottages, homes, etc. 
– as the sets became more portable. In the same year, the Nordic telecom companies gathered in 
Northern Norway and decided to establish Nordic Mobile Technology (NMT), with the goal of 
developing a commo n standard for more advanced mobile technology – now known as first-generation 
mobile services (1G). NMT was widely launched from the early 1980s, but the price of the telephone 
sets was still too high for most private individuals. 
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Tlv (now: “T”) also became a driving force in the development of the next mobile generation – GSM 
(Groupe Spécial Mobile or Global System for Mobile Communication), which was formally 
standardized in 1989, with Norway being one of the first countries to commercially launch GSM in 
1993. 
 
At the same time, Tlv decided to extend its operations to other countries, launching its process of 
internationalization. Minor operations started with local partners in northwestern Russia, and, in 1994, 
“T” became a part-owner in a Hungarian operator. The exciting mobile journey started bringing “T” 
to operations in 13 countries, with nearly 200 million subscribers 20 years later.  
“T”’s business, as 201511 
According to “T”’s website (2016), “T”’s main revenues come from its mobile operations and are 
concentrated in three geographic regions: the Nordics, Central and Eastern Europe, and Asia. 
 
In the Nordics, “T” developed operations in Norway, Sweden, Denmark, where it is a leading provider 
of mobile and fixed services, as well as having a strong position in the rapidly growing Scandinavian 
broadband market. 4G services have been launched in Norway and Sweden. “T” Group’s core business 
in the region includes “T” Broadcast, which is among the leading providers of television and satellite 
broadcasting services in the region and operates the national terrestrial broadcast network in Norway. 
 
In Central and Eastern Europe, “T” has activities in Hungary, Serbia, Montenegro and Bulgaria, where 
it has a strong position as a provider of mobile services.  
 
At the same time, “T” has an economic interest of 33% in VCom12 Ltd., offering mobile services in 
an additional 14 markets (VCom Ltd. offers mobile services in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Algeria, Bangladesh, Pakistan, 
Zimbabwe and Italy)13.  In Asia, “T” has activities in Thailand, Malaysia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, India 
and Myanmar. 
 
According to “T”’s website, the company explains its rapid success in internationalization as follows: 
“Our success is built on combining our global telecoms expertise with regional knowledge transfer and 
                                                 
11 This research is focusing on the period of “T”’s activities from 1992-2015 
12 JV in Russia 
13 The sale process of VCom was announced in 2017, and was continuing in 2018 and 2019. 
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local market insight to create value for different segments. We have achieved significant and rapid 
subscriber growth in all markets” (“T” website, 2016). 
 
Describing the company’s strategy, “T” stated that it positions itself as “the most efficient operator” 
(“T” website, 2016). Thus, “T” writes: “With diminishing growth in telco revenue and increased 
competition in services from internet players, ‘T’ needs to operate smarter and more efficiently. We 
will accelerate technology efficiency, pursue process simplification and deploy new operating models, 
to significantly reduce costs. We have established a global transformation program to drive the 
implementation of the strategy” (ibid.). 
 1.3. Purpose, research questions and contribution of the research 
Against the background, the purpose of the current research is to examine how HQ of company "T" 
has exercised influence and control over its subsidiaries, in the process of internationalization of the 
MNC, how the top managers in the HQ of the MNC have perceived the outcome of the control process, 
and how those perceptions have influenced changes in the design of HQs control mechanism over 
subsidiaries. The focus of the study is on how the top managers in the HQ of the MNC, during different 
phases of internationalization process, have perceived the outcome of the control process, defined as a 
degree of HQ’s influence over international subsidiaries, and how those perceptions have influenced 
changes in the design of HQs control mechanism over subsidiaries. Internationalization is an 
interesting research context because state of globalization is forcing companies experiencing 
international expansion to develop appropriate mechanisms of control that secure substantial influence 
over the subsidiaries that often operate in different regulatory and cultural environment then HQs 
(Scheytt et.al., 2010).   
 
To address the above issues, three exploratory research questions are raised designing the framework 
of this study’s theoretical lens, the methods applied, and the analysis of empirical data. It will be 
conducted an explorative case study of a Norwegian MNC to answer research questions set out on this 
study. 
 
The empirical narrative of this research is focusing on 23 years a retrospective review of a Norwegian 
MNC company “T”’ internationalization, presented as a story about four phases in the 
internationalization process from 1992 to 2015. The study demonstrates a dynamic interrelation 
between the internationalization behavior of the MNC, the changes of the internationalization strategy 
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influenced by antecedent conditions (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995; Poole et al., 2000), implemented 
mechanisms of controls and top managers’ perception of the outcome of the internationalization 
process in terms of HQ achieving of influence over its subsidiaries abroad. The following research 
question is therefore posed:  
1) How has the internationalization of “T” happened? 
Whereas previous research both in management control and  management literature  on 
internationalization has been dominated by  case  studies explored both the emerging markets and 
mature markets , with the spreading from Asia to Africa, Eastern Europe,  Australia, USA, Canada  
and Europe (accounting literature: Abernethy and Brownell, 1997; Child and Yan, 1999; Chalos and 
O’ Connor, 2004; Wickramasinghe and Hopper, 2005; Carney and  Gedajlovic, 2006;  Alvesson and 
Kärreman, 2004; Ahrens and Mollona, 2007; Adler and Chen, 2011; management literature: Butler 
and Anchor, 2000; Tahir and Larimo, 2004; Hitt, Ahlstrom, Dacin, Levitas, and Svobodina, 2004; 
Karhunen, Kosonen, and Leivonen, 2004), however, it can be seen that there are not so many cases 
studying the same phenomenon in  Norwegian context and  in different multinational settings. 
 
By describing the process of the internationalization of  the Norwegian MNC “T” as a context for this 
research, the current  study provides the insight  and better understanding about the process of 
internationalization in MNC by including  both the Norwegian context and the cases  from  different 
markets in the comparative perspective, and contributes by  introducing the new knowledge in  the  
research domain about the internationalization  both for the management control literature and 
management and strategy literature.  
 
The study explores further how a particular internationalization strategy is formulated and carried out, 
and that this process produces effects for the organization and managers, in terms of issues around the 
HQ’s influence using different control mechanisms over the subsidiaries in different phases of “T” ¨s 
internationalization.  The findings of the current study suggest that the process of internationalization 
is happening as the “tuning” the of controls, and that the outcomes of these processes have the further 
impact on the whole internationalization.    Hence, it will be investigated the changes of controls in the 




The second research question is as follows: 
2) What control mechanisms were in place during different phases of internationalization? 
The management control literature has long recognized the importance of use of mechanism of control 
in the international settings that allows achieving influence from HQ towards the subsidiaries.  The 
role of different control mechanism, in MNCs has been in the management research domain in several 
decades. Thus, the scholars analyzed how the following control mechanisms secure substantial 
influence over the subsidiaries: related to ownership (Mutinelli and Piscitello, 1998; Barbosa, and 
Louri, 2002;  Álvarez, 2003; Desaia,  et.al., 2004; Chalos and O’Connor, 2004; Al Farooque et.at, 
2010); related to the role of BoD14: (Mizruchi,1983; Geringer and He´bert, 1989; Bisbe and Otley, 
2004;  Chalos and O’Connor, 2004; Bijman, Hendrikse, van Oijen, Aswin, 2012; related to  the role 
expatriates: (Martinez and Jarillo, 1989; Delios and Bjorkman, 2000; Chalos and O’Conner, 2004); 
related to the corporate rules: (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Birkinshaw and Fry, 1998; Watson S., 
Weaver G. R., 2000; Kim, 2001; Geppert, 2005; Harzing and Feely; 2007; Kurucz et al. 2008; Chow, 
Shileds and Wu, 2010) and the role of CEO of HQ:  Smircich, 1983; Watson S., Weaver G. R. 2003; 
Collings, Morley and Gunnigle, 2008). However, it was not payed enough attention on the issue of 
interplay between the different control mechanism. This research draws upon the work published about 
the control mechanism in the process of the internationalization and seeks to contribute to the literature 
on accounting and management control by offering new knowledge by presenting configuration of 
control packages as mechanisms of influence from HQ towards subsidiaries. At the same time, the 
literature in research domain payed relatively little attention on issues of some management control 
mechanisms, as, for instance, the role of CEO and the corporate rules in influencing subsidiaries 
abroad. In this term, this study will contribute by including the broader perspective of understanding 
of which managerial tools can give the impact in achieving influence in the process of 
internationalization.  
 
Whereas  the management and strategy literature studied also the process of internationalization 
focusing  mostly on management  processes related to ownership, governance and business practice  
(Merchant, 1981; Yan and Gray, 1994; Hu and Chen, 1996; Mjoen and Tallman, 1997; Lee et al., 
1998;  Kumar and Seth, 1998; Ramasway et al., 1998; Banai et al., 1999; Child and Yan, 1999; Luo, 
2001; Beamish and Jiang, 2002;  Gong et al., 2007; Harzing, 2001; Legewie, 2002; Beamish and Jiang, 
2002; Quattrone and Hopper, 2005; Brouthers and Bamossy, 2006; Karhunen et al., 2008;  Lymbersky, 
                                                 
14 BoD – Board of Directors 
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2010;  Beamish, 2013;  Killing, 2013), this study  extend the existing  knowledge  to this research 
domain  in suggesting several mechanisms using  by managers in influencing subsidiaries. 
 
This study discovered that during the process of “T”’s internationalization the established management 
control mechanisms have been changed in different phases of the internationalization.  
 
The management accounting and control literature has long recognized the importance of exploring 
the issue of changes in management control systems (Burns and Scapens, 2000; e.g. Otley, 2016), and 
contributed to understanding of how internal and external factors and different institutional processes 
trigger changes in management control systems and further in organizations.  This research builds upon 
these studies and the idea, supported by the empirical findings, about the readjustments of the 
important processes in organizations.  However, despite of that, there is not enough studies which 
describe why and how the control mechanisms have been changed in the process of 
internationalization.  Thus, while the management control literature has analyzed, for instance, the 
issue of influence through the establishment of different controls in the organization (e.g.  Desaia, 
et.al., 2004; Chalos and O’Connor, 2004; Bisbe and Otley, 2004;  Delios and Bjorkman, 2000; Geppert, 
2005; Harzing and Feely; 2007; Kurucz et al. 2008; Chow, Shileds and Wu, 201; Collings, Morley and 
Gunnigle, 2008), less interest has been shown in exploring of the  dynamic changes in the context of 
internationalization, and there is the  tendency to present the controls mechanisms as a static 
phenomenon. This study differs from the previous studies about the role of the control mechanisms 
and how these mechanisms act and contributes by offering new knowledge to the research domain by 
showing the dynamism in readjustments of the mechanisms of control and the process of changes as 
“tuning” in the context of internationalization process. This study presents the process of “tuning” the 
configuration of control packages as one of the important processes in internationalization of “T” and 
contributes by that to the research domain in management control.   
  
In addressing the question about the managers’ role in the process of the changes of control system, 
this study as well contributes to management accounting and control and control change literature by 
examining how the changes of control system is a result of top managers’ perceptions of the outcome 




The third research question is therefor as follows: 
3) How have managers perceived the effects of controls established in the process of   
internationalization? 
Recently, there is an increasing attention towards extending the management control literature by 
examining the role of individual agency in producing institutional change in management control 
systems (e.g. Covaleski et al., 2013). At the same time, those studies have not examined the role of 
managerial perceptions of the control outcomes for making changes in the control mechanisms. 
There are previous studies that focus on how managerial perceptions of controls influence changes in 
the design of the control system (Bourmistrov & Kaarbøe, 2013; Seal & Mattimoe, 2014; Koeing et 
al., 1992; Dermer & Lucas, 1986), that gives opportunities provided by psychological research in 
understanding management accounting and control system change (Hall, 2016). 
This research has focus also on how the managers in the HQ of the MNC, during different phases of 
internationalization process, have perceived the outcome of the control process, defined as a degree of 
HQ’s influence over international subsidiaries, and how those perceptions have influenced changes in 
the design of HQs control mechanism over subsidiaries. In its turn, a perceived control situation can 
influence the choices made by managers at HQ, in respect of setting different configurations or 
packages of the mechanisms of control.  This study discovers that the changes were driven by a 
particular top managerial perception that we call “deprivation of control”. “Deprivation of control”, 
i.e. a phenomenon that describes the state of affairs, the management situation that is characterized by 
the inability of HQ to obtain what is considered a necessity:  such as, in this study, a high level of 
influence over its subsidiaries.  The process of “tuning” the configuration of control packages during 
the process of internationalization triggered by the “dissatisfactions” (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995) 
can be then understood as a top managerial quest to get rid of experienced “deprivation of control”. 
Understanding of managerial perceptions of controls are, thus, important because those perceptions 
influence the managerial judgment and beliefs about how the control system affects the relationship 
between the organizational behavior and its outcomes. For managers, those effects can also be 
formulated in respect of perceived control situations that can be reflected in terms of changing their 
mindset and behavior in relation to internationalization that further influence the strategy process and 
the process of designing the influence and control mechanisms. By describing this, the current study 
contributes by offering new knowledge about the changes of control mechanism to the research domain 
of the management control accounting and control. 
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1.3 The theoretical framework 
This study draws upon the literature published in research in progress theory (Van de Ven and Poole, 
1995; Poole et al., 2000; Mähring and Keil, 2008), specifically teleological framework, which enables  
that the progression in organizations happens as a development towards a goal that is socially 
constructed and cognitively shared as a common goal or end state, and considers the progress as “a 
repetitive sequence of goal formulation, implementation, evaluation and modification of goals based 
on what was learned or intended by the entity” (ibid., p. 156).  By studying the changes in company 
“T” as an organization, experienced dramatic changes in the process of internationalization during last 
decades, the current research seeks to contribute to the literature on process theory. This is achieved 
by the extension of the teleological model (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995; Poole et al., 2000) that 
presents a more complex picture of the process of changes in organization during its 
internationalization and defend that the motivation of  changes  are triggered by the “dissatisfactions” 
(Van de Ven and Poole, 1995), and the driving force of the changes s “tuning”  is a “deprivation of 
control”. 
 1.4. Methodological framework 
The study is based on a case study design in order to investigate the three research questions mentioned 
above.  The company forming the case study is a Norwegian MNC “T” that experienced its 
internationalization from early 90-es. Thus, the study has investigated a period of 23 years of “T”’s 
internationalization process; empirical data has been collected through interviews, from the 
documentary analysis, and longitudinal observations from the field. The analysis of data has been 
conducted by a qualitative approach for collecting and analyzing of empirical data.   
1.5. Structure of the dissertation 
In the following chapter, the theoretical framework of the study will be outlined. The chapter will 
present a literature review, in which the main concepts of the research, such as influence versus control, 
perceived behavior in an organization as a psychological aspect of influence and control, influence and 
control in the process of internationalization, will be highlighted. Chapter Two will close with a 
presentation of the model’s assumptions – regarding the evolution of influence and control under the 
internationalization process – and create an analytical framework of the research. 
15 
 
Chapter Three provides an overview of the research methodologies on which the study has been built. 
The philosophical paradigm of this research will be discussed from the ontological, epistemological 
and methodological perspectives.  Further, the research design will be presented; discussions are drawn 
in line with the research methods applied in the study.  This chapter will end with remarks presenting 
the reliability, validity, and ethical considerations of the research process and the study’s findings. 
As this research is based on a case study of a Norwegian MNC, “T”, by describing the four phases on 
the process of internationalization will be introduced in Chapters Four, Five, Six and Seven. These 
chapters present the four phases of the process of internationalization of “T”, according to the model’s 
assumptions; these include a description of the antecedent conditions that had an impact on the process 
of internationalization; the internationalization strategy developed in “T”; a presentation of influence 
and control mechanisms; and an overview of the perceived influence. Chapters Four to Seven introduce 
phases one to four, respectively. All phases present descriptive narratives about the process of 
internationalization and the changes of mechanisms of influence and control. 
 
Chapter Eight presents an analysis of the empirical findings related to the issue of influence and control 
in the process of internationalization of “T”, by discussing the choice of influence and control 
mechanisms as different configurations or “packages”. The chapter introduces “tuning” of the 
“packages” as a way the changes are happening and illustrates the dissatisfactions in the process of 
changes (Van de Ven and Poole’s, 1995) as a trigger for “tuning” the design of the “package”.  It will 
be presented the phenomenon of deprivation of control as a driving force of   the changes in the process 
of internationalization in order to achieve influence from HQ towards subsidiaries when the perceived 
challenges of influence lead to HQ ending up in situations in subsidiaries abroad without having 
control.   
 
The final chapter will present the concluding remarks on the research and suggest areas for further 






Chapter 2: Literature review and theoretical model 
 
In this chapter, I will present previous research on the phenomenon of influence under the process of 
internationalization, particularly the topic of the influence of the headquarters (HQ) of multinational 
corporations (MNC) on their subsidiaries and joint ventures (JV) abroad? The aim of the literature 
review is: to outline the knowledge gap to clarify the framework of my projects; to present findings 
and scholarly debates that will be used in the analysis and discussions; and to highlight certain 
scientific areas in previous and existing research where the findings point to the possibility for this 
thesis’ contribution. At the same time, the literature review introduces an in-depth analysis of scientific 
articles that cover the research phenomenon; presents the argumentation, applied methods and 
theoretical frameworks applied in the research context of this study; and presents the findings. 
2.1. Choice of concepts: influence, influence versus control, the aspect of perception 
The review starts with the presentation of definitions of the phenomenon of influence in both the 
management control and management research domains and then follows with a description of the 
variables related to the HQ of an MNC’s influence on foreign subsidiaries and JVs; this is finalized by 
the analysis of the presented materials. 
Definitions of the phenomenon of influence in research literature 
In this part of the literature review, I will clarify the issue of the definition of the phenomenon of 
influence. 
 
In spite of the  fact that there are many studies dedicated  to the phenomenon of influence, there is still 
a debate  that follows earlier discussions  on the definition of the phenomenon of influence, when 
scholars are  arguing about  both the issues  of definition of the phenomenon of influence and its role 
in organizational impact (Dunlap, 1934; Coch and French, 1948;  Hovland and Mandell, 1952; Mills,  
1956; Gilman, 1962; Cartwright, 1965; Kadushin, 1968; Knight, 1970; Laumann, Verbrugge and   
Pappi,  1974; Taylor, 1977; Berger, Fisek, Norman, and Zelditch, 1977; Markovsky, Willer  and 
Patton, 1988; Raven, 1992; Zelditch, 1992; Lawler, Ridgeway and  Markovsky, 1993; Huemer,  
Lovaglia and Houser, 1996; Willer, Lovaglia, and Markovsky, 1997; Martin and Beaumont, 1999; 
Pfeffer and Fong, 2005; Elias, 2008;  Boström, 2009; Felzensztein, 2009;  Ciabuschi, Martín and Ståhl, 
2010; Lucas and  Baxter, 2012;  Kynighou, 2014). 
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Despite the extensive attention paid by researchers to the issue of influence, I have noticed a 
misbalance in the covering of this topic in different research literature: literature from the psychology, 
management, human research, strategy, international management and scientific fields has paid much 





Influence can be defined as the ability to get someone to do something which that person would not 
otherwise do (Knight, 1970).   
Definition 2:  
 
Baxter and Lucas (2012, p. 49) describe influence as “compelling behavior change without threat of 
punishment or promise of reward—results largely from the respect and esteem in which one is held by 
others”.  
 
Both of these definitions will be used in this study, as they are, in my opinion, complementary to each 
other and, at the same time, give a more nuanced picture of the phenomenon of influence in 
organizations.  
 
Investigating the phenomenon of influence in organizations, Cartwright (1965) focused on the 
influence as an arrangement of interdependent parts of a whole, in which behavior is controlled and 
relatively predictable, and in which individual actions combine to lead to organizational 
accomplishments.  Cartwright underlines that one of the main characteristics of an organization is its 
state of being organized. The context of this study leads to the hypothesis about the important role of 
influence in MNCs and relationship between the HQ and its subsidiaries and JVs in other countries – 
how HQs “organize” operations abroad and influence the organizations and employees, in order to 
achieve their goals.  At the same time, Gilman (1962) paid attention to the linkage between the state 
of being organized and the exertion of some form of influence, which follows the discussion on the 
topic of possible tensions between the HQ and subsidiaries and JVs, and brought into focus the subject 
of how to achieve influence, working in a multinational context, when the issue of different values, 
norms and traditions is on the agenda.  In this connection, the topic of influence in an organization is 
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closely connected with the theme of social influence, that pays attention to how to affect attitudes and 
opinions and describes the ways in which actors modify their own opinions by the influencing of others 
(Friedkin, 1999).   
Social influence 
The concept of social influence attracts the attention of many scientists. In the context of this research, 
it could be interesting to look at the phenomenon of social influence, so long it describes influence via 
values and norms from in organization, and in our context as influence from the HQ towards 
subsidiaries and JVs.  Thus, Kahan (1997) defines social influence as how individuals’ perceptions of 
each other’s values, beliefs and behavior affect their actions. Social influence processes may be highly 
influential in general and can play out in different ways in different social groups (Rice et al., 1990).  
In the context of this study, the term “social group” can be understood to mean the different groups of 
employees, both in HQ and in the subsidiaries and JVs. Stogdill (1950, p. 1) wrote that “An 
organization is a group in which members are differentiated as to responsibility for tasks leading to a 
common goal” and underlined that “Leadership in organizations is a phenomenon of organizations, 
not groups as such, and the organization defines and delimits the scope of the leadership. Leadership 
must be viewed from the standpoint of influence on organizational activity, rather than on group 
members” (ibid.).   
 
At the same time, Bernard (1938) connected social influence with leadership and wrote that social 
influence emanates from individuals with leadership, and not necessarily because of the position they 
occupy. This view is in contrast to the position of Rice and Aydin (1991), who underlined that the role 
of an individual in an organization and its influence underlying that social influence is highly 
dependent on one’s position in a framework of a social structure, as position shapes exposure to 
influence attempts and their effects.   In this connection, the topic of social influence is closely 
connected with the topic of influence and power. 
 
Despite the different opinions describing the relationship between influence and leadership in scholarly 
literature, it is agreed that the phenomenon of influence in organizations links influence with the 
phenomenon of power (Yukl, 1989; Yukl and Falbe, 1990; Elias and MacDonald, 2006; Vecchio, 
2007). Aiming to achieve effectiveness in organizations, managers “must be able to influence their 
subordinates, peers, superiors, stakeholders and many other individuals both affiliated and unaffiliated 
with their organizations” (Elias, 2008, p. 267) and use power. Hence, this ability to influence is 
typically brought about, in a large part, through the use of social power (Wilensky, 1967). The 
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importance of understanding power in the workplace is in focus in the research literature (Dubin, 1951; 
Lee, 1997; Kouzes and Posner, 2002; Farmer and Aguinis, 2005). In order to give a more precise 
definition and understanding of the phenomenon of influence, many researchers look more closely into 
the relationship between influence and power. 
Influence and power 
As Willer, Lovaglia and Markovsky (1997, p. 574) presented, the “conceptions of power and social 
influence are fundamental in understanding the society” and organizations (March 1955; Cartwright, 
1965). According to March (1955), social influence and power occur when one's emotions, opinions, 
or behaviors are affected by others (March 1955). Hence, J. March (1981, 1986, 1991) linked influence 
that exerts power and decision-making to different important processes in an organization – the 
relationship between individuals, groups, organizations, companies and society. He explored factors 
affecting influence and the decision-making process, such as leadership, interests by stakeholders, 
political environment, the impact of organizational and individual learning and the challenges of 
balancing exploration and exploitation in organizations (March,1991); these components of the 
phenomenon of influence will be investigated further in the research process in the context of this 
project. 
 
According to Friedkin (1993), social influence network theory includes French’s (1956) formal theory 
of power. French and Raven (1959) focused on the notion that power and influence sometimes can be 
seen as two parts of the same process – power as a capacity to change behavior, and influence as the 
practice of using power to effect behavior change. That can be understood by the fact that there is a 
special link between power and influence when the actors in a power position can choose not to use 
influence, declining to use their power. Thus, Lawrence et al. (2005) recognized that both the 
supervisors and the subordinates – both those in the position of power and those without power – have 
the ability and tendency to influence one another.  
 
Lucas and Baxter (2012) continue the discussion about concepts of power, status, and influence, 
developing this concept in order to describe the matter of diversity in organizations. They define power 
as “the ability to impose one’s will even against resistance from others” (Lucas and Baxter, 2012, p. 
50), underlying the strong matter of pursuing in the concept of influence.  Power is the ability to get 
what one wants, even in the face of resistance (Weber, 1978; Markovsky, Willer, and Patton, 1987), 
but influence is the ability to get what one wants, even in the absence of fear of punishment or promise 
of reward (Rashotte and Webster, 2005).   
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Investigating the interplay between influence and power, some of the researchers describe that the 
terms can be used as interchangeable (Yang et al., 1998; Yang and Cervero, 2001), but   some scholars 
(Mechanic, 1962; Wrong, 1979) suggest that power and influence are used synonymously.  
 
Other scholars (Tannenbaum, 1968; Salancik and Pfeffer, 1977) have defined power and influence as 
synonyms and state that they are used interchangeably.  Nevertheless, most researchers look at 
influence and power as two concepts, which stand close to each other, with power being the potential 
influence, and influence being the actual use of power. Thus, according to some researchers (Kotter, 
1985; Bass, 1990), the effectiveness of managers depends on their success in influencing others.  Dahl 
(1957) suggests that, when power is used to get people to do things, power is often defined as influence. 
 
Following the discussions related to the interplay between power and influence, Dahl (1957) 
recognized that power is principally the result of a position in an organization (Emerson, 1972).  Those 
with higher status in groups have more influence over group decisions than do those with lower status 
(Sell et al., 2004). Lo, Ramayah and Wang (2015) argue with that;  investigating the process of the 
interplay of influence and social power in modern multifunctional organizations, they state that 
leadership is the ability of an individual to influence, motivate and make others contribute towards the 
effectiveness and success of their organizations investigating the process of the interplay of influence 
and social power in modern multifunctional organizations, they  state that leadership is the ability of 
an individual to influence, motivate and make others contribute towards the effectiveness and success 
of their organizations. The modern multifunctional organizations are contrary to the traditional 
organizations that are based on the corporate hierarchy, “moving along a horizontal structure where it 
is vital to fully understand employees’ perceptions of supervisors’ power” (Lo, Ramayah and Wang, 
2015, p. 3200), and subordinates have “considerable autonomy to set goals and evaluate output” (ibid.).   
 
On this occasion, the decision-making has been pushed onto lower-level management and, in order to 
have influence, the managers have established the new culture of sharing power with subordinates, and 
the issues of perceptions are important for the development of power.  According to Ragins and 
Sundstrom (1989), power is a matter of perception of someone’s position, and perceptions can 
influence relationships in an organization.  
 
These discussions are important in the framework of the context of this research, focusing on MNCs 
that are operating in the international arena, with many different social structures, and need to influence 
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subsidiaries and JVs, in order to achieve common business targets. To sum up the discussion about 
influence and power, several scholars link them together with control.  
Influence and control 
In order to support and widen the definition of influence, scholars look at the link between influence 
and control.  
 
Håkansson and Ford (2002) described the connection between influence and control when different 
controls can play an important role for an actor when one person is being influenced by another person. 
In the context of this research, which relates to HQ’s influence on subsidiaries and JVs and focuses on 
the link between influences and control, it is important to introduce the notion that HQ exercises greater 
control and influence over the local unit in an explicit attempt to protect its investment (Martin and 
Beaumont, 1999). 
 
Aiming to achieve a deeper understanding of the phenomenon of influence, it will be important to 
investigate how the linkage between influence, power and control is drawn in the management control 
research domain.     
 
Several scholars consider influence, power and control as synonymous (Mechanic, 1962) or draw the 
synonymy just between influence and control (Scheytt, Soin and Metz, 2010). “Control…takes place 
in everyday situations. The media, the state, the employer, the family exert control over one. Media 
presentation is able to influence and control the stance on different topics” (ibid., p. 526). At the same 
time, other researchers (e.g. Tannenbaum, 1968; Salancik and Pfeffer, 1977) connect influence, power 
and control to each other and suggest that these concepts cannot be used synonymously, that, in the 
interplay between influence and power, the concept of control is the important element which can be 
exercised through formal authority, in terms of using control mechanisms in order to achieve influence 
and power. In this connection, control can be described as the ability to exercise restrictions or 
direction over someone, or to be in a situation under the regulation or command of another (ibid.). 
Bennis (1959) described the linkage between concepts of influence, power and control as leadership 
that consists of power, a leader, and influence, when power is the perceived ability to control 
appropriate rewards; a leader is an agent who in fact wields these rewards or punishments; and 




Scheytt et al. (2010) introduce the concept that control “was seen to be quite empowering at different 
levels and, broadly speaking, as the power to influence others and one’s self,…control gives…the 
power to make decisions, influence others and outcomes” (ibid., 529). Huemer, Boström, Felzensztein 
(2009) underline that a close link between influence and control is explicit, and that control 
mechanisms are actions deployed to influence what others do. Control in organizations in general, and 
in the context of this study in MNCs, can be achieved via important tools, as through formal means, 
such as monitoring, surveillance and contractual arrangements and can influence organizational 
behavior (Huemer, Boström and Felzensztein, 2009).  Scholars have focused on the multiple roles of 
control, in terms of restricting, guiding, monitoring and supporting, linking it to influence (with the 
interplay between influencing and being influenced) (Huemer, Boström and Felzensztein, 2009).   
 
Sippola and Smale (2007) state that corporate influence over subsidiaries and JVs decreases, even 
though some control mechanisms, such as auditing and reporting, still prevail, in order to ensure that 
subsidiaries and JVs continue to perform at the required level. 
At the same time, many of the researchers extend the impact of control mechanisms and suggest that 
a certain type of control influences in a certain way, in order to achieve the different targets.  Hence, 
Yilmaz and Kabadayi (2006) point out that monitoring is a matter of perception that can be seen and 
interpreted as a sign of distrust, but, at the same time, a sign of attention to a relationship.   
Sewell and Barker (2006) introduced the notion that control often represents a discourse of coercion, 
but, at the same time, controls can also be interpreted as care, which may be introduced as liberty and 
not only as coercion. Taking into consideration the classical theory, Ouchi (1979), suggested that 
behavior-related controls lead more to compliance than to enthusiasm and initiatives and underlined 
that control as a result of the process of internalization of values may lead to higher commitment. Elias 
(2008) introduces different forms of control and links them to influence, in terms of restrictive control 
(refers to situations when a manager relies on an organization’s power structure in order to influence 
subordinates) and promotive control (refers to situations when a manager attends to subordinates’ 
opinions and provides them with the opportunity to have input during decision-making processes), and 
suggests that  different forms of influence can be implemented through the use of one or more controls. 
In the framework of this research, control will not be studied as a phenomenon but as tools used in the 
context of the phenomenon of influence, supporting its utilization. Hence, the more detailed overview 
of the interplay between influence and control as an interplay between the phenomenon and tools 
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supporting the investigation of the studied phenomenon of influence will be presented in the sector 
related to the research streams. That will give the correct balance in introducing the phenomenon of 
influence and the mechanisms for the realization of influence in the management control and 
management research domains dedicated to the processes of internationalization and influence from 
the HQ towards subsidiaries and JVs.  
To conclude, the presented definitions of the phenomenon of influence in the contemporary 
management control and management research domains are related to the research context, describing 
influence in organizations in terms of the relationship between HQs and subsidiaries and JVs in MNCs. 
In recent years, the research literature has shown an increasing interest in the phenomenon of influence. 
For the purpose of this research, 27 articles were selected that gave definitions of the concept of 
influence from different angles, depending on the field of the research literature. 
Here are the main findings: 
1). In order to describe the phenomenon of influence from the HQ towards subsidiaries and JVs in 
MNCs, two definitions were selected, in which influence is defined as the ability to get someone to do 
something which that person would not otherwise do (Knight, 1970) and as “compelling behavior 
change without threat of punishment or promise of reward” (Baxter and Lucas, 2012, p. 49). These 
definitions are complementary and introduce the phenomenon of influence, both on the level of the 
relationship of individuals and on the organizational level as the relationship between HQ and the 
subsidiaries and JVs.  
The concept of social influence, defined as how individuals’ perceptions of each other’s values, beliefs 
and behavior affect their actions (Kahan, 1997) is also important for this study, as it brings the 
perspective of influence via values and norms in the organization and – in our context – influence from 
HQ towards subsidiaries and JVs.   
2). The topic of the interplay between the phenomena of influence and power is the focus of several 
research articles. Influence and power can be seen as two parts of the same process –power as a 
capacity to change behavior, and influence as the practice of using power to effect behavior change 
(French and Raven, 1959).  Differences between influence and power are connected to the issue of 
pursuing in the concept of influence and imposing one’s will, even against resistance from others 
(Weber, 1978; Markovsky, Willer, and Patton, 1987; Rashotte and Webster, 2005; Lucas and Baxter, 
2012). Several scholars even suggest that influence and power can be used interchangeably (Yang et 
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al., 1998; Yang and Cervero, 2001); some scholars (Mechanic, 1962; Wrong, 1979) argue that 
influence and power are used synonymously. Nevertheless, the majority of scholars regard influence 
and power as two concepts, with the concepts of influence and power being close to each other: power 
is the potential influence, and influence is the actual use of power. The interplay between influence 
and power is important for both the modern multifunctional organization, where leadership is the 
ability of an individual to influence the success of the organization, and traditional organizations that 
are based on a corporate hierarchy and supervisors’ power (Lo, Ramayah and Wang, 2015).  
3). Connections between influence and control are introduced in many scientific publications that 
provide knowledge about the interplay between influence and control in the context of the relationship 
between HQs and their subsidiaries and JVs. The review shows that HQ exercises influence and control 
over subsidiaries and JVs, in order to protect the investments (Martin and Beaumont, 1999). Some of 
the scholars draw a synonymy between influence and control (Scheytt, Soin and Metz, 2010). Several 
scholars consider not only influence and control but influence, power and control as synonymous 
(Mechanic, 1962). Some researchers, describing the link between influence, power and control, argue 
that these concepts are connected to each other and suggest that concepts cannot be used synonymously, 
but control mechanisms can be exercised as tools, in order to achieve influence and power (Salancik 
and Pfeffer, 1977). The scholars considered the multiple roles of control linking to influence (Huemer, 
Boström and Felzensztein, 2009).   
The majority of the articles related to the subject of the definitions of the phenomenon of influence 
demonstrated that the phenomenon of influence is closely connected to both the concepts of power and 
control – whether interchangeably or synonymously or both – and that it has a strong impact on the 
variable processes in an organization, particularly in MNCs, in the establishing of relationships 
between HQ and the subsidiaries and JVs in different cultural contexts.   
The context of this study led to the choice to research the concept of control, not as a phenomenon but 
as tools or mechanisms that will support the phenomenon of influence from HQ towards subsidiaries 
and JVs. This means that this study will investigate what kind of control tools or mechanism are 
needed, in order for HQ to influence the subsidiaries, in the process of internationalization. 
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2.2. Influence and control under internationalization. 
Presentation of the research streams of the phenomenon of influence from HQ towards 
its subsidiaries and JVs, in the process of internationalization of MNCs.  
Stream 1. Influence via ownership structure – control mechanisms 
 
The basic assumptions of this stream of research are related to the questions: 1) What kind of ownership 
structure gives the most effective influence, and why? 2) What kind of control tools are needed, in 
order to secure influence through ownership from HQ towards its subsidiaries and JVs? 3) How does 
the interplay between influence and ownership affect the relationship between HQ and its subsidiaries 
and JVs? 
Influence and ownership structure 
In many discussions, the issue of influence via ownership is connected to the different forms of 
ownership and the forms of organization, such as equity-based enterprises and non-equity-based 
enterprises. “Within equity-based the choice is between wholly owned operations and equity joint 
ventures, while within non-equity-based modes, the choice is between contractual agreements and 
export” (Pan and Tse, 2000, p. 535). Groot and Merchant (2000) argue that, despite the fact that the 
equity principle is the best for international subsidiaries, there are many non-equity JVs with different 
contractual agreements in the world because of the processes of internalization and globalization.    
 
Noting the variety of ownership forms connected to investments abroad, this research will focus on 
the forms of ownership that are most relevant for MNCs: wholly-owned subsidiary (WOS) and joint 
venture (JV). In order to better understand the discussions in the management control research domain 
related to the topic of the kind of ownership control the HQ uses to influence its subsidiaries, the above-
mentioned definitions will be further elaborated.   
A subsidiary or subsidiary company is a company that is owned or controlled by another company, 
which is called the parent company. A subsidiary company has 50% or more of its voting shares 
controlled by another company. It is defined as a WOS when all the common shares are owned by the 
parent company. In contrast, a regular subsidiary is 51 to 99% owned by the parent company. The 
parent company is typically a larger business enterprise that often has control over several subsidiaries. 
The amount of control the parent company chooses to exercise usually depends on the level of 
managing control the parent company provides in the subsidiary.  A JV is formed by an agreement 
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between two or more entities or partners for a specific business purpose, in order to develop a business 
activity, a new entity. Being the partners in the JV, the shareholders can have different degrees of 
ownership – minority, majority or equal ownership. The various forms of ownership and different 
degrees of shareholding reflect the level of influence and control in the subsidiary and the joint venture.  
The major differences between a JV and a subsidiary are related to the question of how each business 
is established and how it maintains control over the enterprises. The subsidiaries exist as separate 
business entities from the parent company, but the parent company maintains partial or full control of 
its subsidiaries. The level of control that the parent company has over its subsidiaries depends on 
whether the parent company owns all or just part of the subsidiary companies. In a joint venture, 
partners have an ownership interest in shares and in management responsibilities. The parent company 
of a subsidiary controls the decision-making, such as the selection of the board of directors and 
managers, to the extent of its ownership interest in the subsidiary. Despite the management 
responsibilities of a JV being shared between the co-owners, the JV may be organized in such a way 
that gives some of the partners the possibility of having dominant control over the business unit, in 
relation to other joint venture participants.  The main factors explaining the link between ownership 
and influence in the context of HQ and subsidiaries will be further presented. 
The size of the company invested in abroad and previous international experience are important 
paradigms in choosing the form of ownership, in order to achieve influence over subsidiaries and JVs. 
The evidence from the research literature indicates that the WOS is the more common form of 
ownership than the JV in influencing the subsidiaries (Mutinelli and Piscitello, 1998; Barbosa and 
Louri, 2002; Álvarez, 2003; Desaia, et al., 2004). These discussions are related to the followings 
factors that influence choosing WOS:  1) The parent company’s size positively influences the setting 
up of a WOS rather than a JV (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992; Mutinelli and 
Piscitello, 1998; Makino and Neupert, 2000; Pan and Tse, 2000; Brouthers and Brouthers, 2001). 2) 
The parent company’s coordination of integrated production activities across different markets, 
transfer technology, benefit from worldwide tax planning (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Padmanabhan and 
Cho, 1999; Asiedu and Esfahani, 2001; Desaia,  et al., 2004). 3) The parent company’s substantial 
experience in a specific geographical area, knowledge of the country’s market and environment 
(Hennart and Larimo, 1998; Mutinelli, and Piscitello, 1998; Brouthers and Brouthers, 2001).  
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Enterprises with large size, large international experience, large industrial experience, and low cultural 
distance between home and the country being invested in, are interested in large markets and can 
benefit the high level of economic growth from investments, choosing   the WOSs, in order to increase 
their influence on the operations abroad (Tahir and Larimo, 2004).  In addition, the factors of high 
competence, innovation, high level of research and development process among the enterprises 
reaching the foreign market and low levels of risks in the target country increase the probability of 
choosing WOS (ibid.). Thus, large firm size, low cultural distance, large size of the target market, and 
high level of economic welfare also increase the probability of choosing WOSs   and achieving greater 
influence in subsidiaries. 
In the context of this research, it will be interesting to investigate how the owners achieve influence in 
the framework of JVs organized during the process of internationalization. The scholars explained the 
reasons why some companies may prefer to invest through a JV and not a WOS in particular situations: 
1) when the entity needs to share risks (Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; Agarwal and Ramaswami, 
1992; Kim and Hwang, 1992; Mutinelli and Piscitello, 1998; Pan and Tse, 2000); 2) when the entity 
needs additional resources to invest abroad and to be provided with knowledge by a partner, and when 
there is a lack of adequate experience of working abroad (Aghion and Tirole, 1994; Álvarez, 2003); 
and 3) when the market to be invested in is far from the socio-cultural paradigm of the parent company 
and there is a need for close co-operation with local partners (Mutinelli and Piscitello, 1998; Pla, 1999; 
Brouthers and Brouthers, 2001; Asiedu and Esfahani, 2001; Barbosa and Louri, 2002). 
When discussing the influence and control mechanisms in JVs, attention should be paid to the possible 
tensions that can appear in these organizations. In this connection, the issue of co-operation with 
partners is important, based on knowledge that no one party has total control and that accountants, in 
particular, must have “an array of specialized knowledge and skills to function well” in JV situations 
(Morris, 1998: p. xiii).  Morris (1998) concluded that influence and control of JVs is complex and 
multidimensional, underlining that one of the most important issues is that behaviors of the JV’s 
partners and the partners' employees must be agreed in choosing the set of controls to use. Groot and 
Merchant (2000) underlined a significant factor for JV success: the common multiple control-system 
which has similarities as a formal JV agreement, all partners monitoring overall JV results and 
governance through a board of directors, in order to achieve influence.  At the same time, the factor of 
at what stage of its establishment in the market abroad the investor is can be an important additional 
factor, affecting the matter of form of ownership, influence and control.  Thus, being at an earlier stage 
of the establishment of subsidiaries and JVs abroad, the use of specific control mechanisms can be of 
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more relevance to JV partners, in order to achieve influence, than overall equity control (Geringer, 
1986; Schaan, 1983). 
Influence via ownership in order to achieve control 
Ownership structure and the issue of influence link to the question of how to achieve control in an 
organization (Cubbin and Leech, 1983; Abernethy et al., 1995; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Groot 
and Merchant, 2000; Chalos and O’Connor, 2004; Dessai et al., 2004; Ben-Amar and André, 2006; Al 
Farooque et al., 2010; Dekker, 2008; Chenhall, 2008). With the growth in large corporations abroad 
and the dispersion of their stakeholders (Ben-Amar, 2006), in order to achieve influence, the question 
of the separation of ownership from operational control and concentration on strategic control became 
important. The usage of WOSs and JVs links to the possibility of various types of control mechanisms. 
These controls include expatriate staffing, socialization practices, delegated decision-making 
responsibilities, parent company communications and manager performance incentives (Al Farooque 
et al., 2010) that, in common, will increase the influence from HQ towards subsidiaries and JVs. 
Some authors support the assumption that the degree of ownership increases the level of influence and 
control (Chalos and O’Connor, 2004), especially strategic control, which is connected to the processes 
in the organization and control of the development and implementation of strategic plans (Reufli and 
Sarrazin, 1981).  Other researchers argue that other forms of ownership can also affect the issue of 
influence and control. Thus, Groot and Merchant (2000) describe unequal ownership, which may have 
significant effects on the decision-making process and control mechanisms and, in this way, affect the 
influence in the subsidiaries and JVs. At the same time, Mjoen and Tallman (1997) found no linkage 
between equity of ownership and strategic controls, or between equity of ownership and operational 
controls that can give influence.  
Influence via ownership structure in order to increase control and company performance   
The relationship between ownership concentration and influence on company performance is another 
important issue discussed among scholars.  Ownership concentration and firm performance 
simultaneously impact each other (Al Farooque et al., 2010). André and Schiehall (2004) found a 
similar relationship between the ownership shares of the dominant shareholder and the firm’s 
performance. Other discussed factors that have a positive impact on value creation and an influence 
on company performance under internationalization are linked to the right governance mechanisms 
and the question of separation of ownership and control (Ben-Amar, 2006; Andre et al., 2004).   
Separation of ownership and control, according to Ben-Amar (2006) and André et al. (2004), does not 
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have a negative impact on performance.  In this connection, the discussions about corporate 
governance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) are central. Some publications link influence, ownership and 
control issues to governance of MNCs (Dekker, 2008).  These articles focus on how firms can handle 
with control and influence challenges that arise in MNCs by selecting a ‘good’ partner, and by 
designing an appropriate governance structure (Dekker, 2004), in order to increase the HQ’s influence 
on its subsidiaries and JVs. At the same time, influence and control mechanisms that are linked to 
company performance and the active or passive role of shareholders (van den Bogaard, Speklé, 2003; 
Thornburg, 2012) are connected, further, to shareholders’ high incidences of control contests, and can 
lead to poor financial performance and high turnover among managers and directors. 
Models for ownership in JVs abroad  
Karhunen, Löfgren and Kosonen (2008) used their concepts of degree of ownership and degree of 
foreign control in order to research four types of international business operations in transition 
economies; they suggest four types of relationship between the above-mentioned parameters. Despite 
the fact that the authors did not include the topic of influence in their article and in their models, I have 
chosen to present these models, based on the logic from the section about the definition of the 
phenomenon of influence, where influence, power and control are linked to each other. The models 
focus on the issue of control in operations abroad that can be interpreted as influence and will be used 
further in this research in discussions, in order to analyze and compare the empirical findings of my 
research and the results presented by Karhunen et al. (2008). 
Type 1: the “arm's-length contractor” represents low levels of foreign ownership and low level of 
control (contractual partnerships, such as licensing, subcontracting or contracted manufacturing). 
Using technically simple manufactured products, the investor can give a local partner the opportunity 
to be an independent subcontractor organizing the process and the control exerted by the foreign 
partner (limited by control of quality of the end product).  
Type 2: the “hands-on contractor” represents a low level of foreign ownership and a high level of 
control, when operations are often technologically simple (consumer goods manufacture, and the 
subcontractor follows the product to the final stage). In this connection, quality control is a more 
important factor than in the previous model.  “However, while arm's length companies often supply 
components and parts for heavy industry, ventures in this category are often ‘footloose’ – easily to be 
transferred from one geographical location to another as companies constantly seek lower production 
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costs. The difference between this and the previous type, however, is that the foreign partner exercises 
more control over the quality of production and hence the production process” (Karhunen, 2008, p. 83).  
Type 3: the “brand protector” represents high levels of foreign ownership and control. Such operations 
display the expected interaction between ownership and control (Karhunen, 2008, p. 83).  The 
contributions of financial resources at the entry phase (acquiring a 100% share) and of managerial 
resources, in order to establish control over the operations, are high, and brand image is one of the key 
assets of the company that prefers the standardization of management procedures across countries.  
This type of company is motivated by expansion into the market.  The implementation of standardized 
operations requires a high level of financial and managerial resources from foreign entities. While the 
ownership share of the foreign partner may be close to 100%, at the same time, the local employees or 
co-partner are granted freedom over management of the operations.  
Type 4: the “market share maximizer” represents a high level of foreign ownership and a low level of 
control when the ratio of resource commitment to ownership is high, because the foreign partner is 
willing to maintain operations in the local market for the longer term (ibid.).  
It is to be noted that, in practice, some investors do not take on the active managerial role of the JV, 
preferring the role of a  so-called “sleeping partner”: that is, a partner in a company who does not take 
an active part in its management, especially one who provides the company with capital (Karhunen, 
2008; Child and Yan, 2002). Additionally, in this connection, foreign investors can make the choice 
to delegate the administration to the local management due to its tacit knowledge of the local business 
environment and contacts with governmental actors (Karhunen, 2008, p. 81). 
To conclude, the literature review demonstrated that:  
1). There is a link between the influence and ownership structure, in relation to the context of this 
study, in the relationship between HQ and subsidiaries in multinational settings within the MNC 
framework.  In many discussions, the issue of influence via ownership is connected with the different 
forms of ownership and of organizing, such as equity-based enterprises and non-equity-based 
enterprises. The context of this research is limited to the framework of the MNC in the process of 
internationalization and, consequently, to equity-based enterprises.  Many scholars point out the 
tendency among MNCs to prefer WOSs rather than JV (Mutinelli and Piscitello, 1998; Barbosa and 
Louri, 2002; Álvarez 2003; Desaia,  et al., 2004), explaining this by the fact that JV  ownership is 
generally suboptimal because of the sharing of residual control rights, and that WOSs mean greater 
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influence and control but also require a major commitment in terms of resources and imply both greater 
risk and less flexibility (Desaia,  et al., 2004).   
2). Scholars suggest that the degree of ownership increases influence and control (Chalos and 
O’Connor, 2004), especially strategic control. At the same time, usage of WOSs and JVs is linked to 
the utilization of various types of control mechanisms that include expatriate staffing, socialization 
practices, delegated decision-making responsibilities, parent company communications and manager 
performance incentives (Al Farooque et al., 2010), which increase the HQ’s influence over subsidiaries 
and JVs. 
3). The interplay between influence and ownership has an impact on value creation and influences 
company performance (Ben-Amar, 2006; Andre et al., 2004).  In this connection, discussions on 
corporate governance are central (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), in order to increase the HQ’s influence 
over subsidiaries and JVs.  It has been discussed that the relationship in JVs can lead to tensions 
between the partners, and it is important to design an appropriate governance structure. 
Stream 2. Influence via board of directors – control mechanisms 
 
In the research literature, important factors for control mechanisms and influence in equity WOSs and 
JVs are connected with the role of the board of directors.  The issues that are in focus in the scholarly 
literature (Mizruchi, 1983; Geringer and He´bert, 1989; Yan and Gray, 1994; Chalos and O’Connor, 
2004; Bisbe and Otley, 2004; Stein, 2008; Krivogorsky and Burton, 2012) are connected to the 
following topics:  1). What is the role of the board of directors? 2). What kind of control does the 
board of directors exercise in order to influence subsidiaries? 3).  What is the link between the equity 
ownership and influence that the board of directors exercises in subsidiaries? 
Board members play an important role in the influence and control in the company, as the board 
approves the venture’s business plan, profit distribution, major investments and other important 
financial decisions. In addition, board members can influence appointments to key executive positions 
in the JV and will sometimes insist on approving them (Geringer and He´bert, 1989). According to 
Mizruchi (1983), the board of directors (BoD) is the ultimate center of control. This control, which 
may vary, depending on the relative performance of the firm, as well as on other factors, is exercised 




Bisbe and Otley (2004) argue that other important issues connected to the board’s activities are linked 
to the processes used by organizations for measuring, controlling and managing their performance, 
for implementing strategies and for achieving their framework, in relation to the process of setting 
performance targets and exercising strategic control. Thus, Yan and Gray (1994) define control as 
board votes and point out that the board exercises strategic control and also influences operational 
control through its appointments of key executive positions.  Geringer and He´bert (1989) argue that 
the BoD can   have an indirect effect on operational control through the appointment of top managers. 
The board can gain influence over the subsidiaries through the rewards systems that are the important 
control factors in organizations, influencing by achievement or failures, in order to meet performance 
targets (Bisbe and Otley, 2004). Chalos and O’Connor (2004) link the factor of gaining higher equity 
ownership to guarantees of greater control and higher influence over the composition of the board of 
directors. 
To conclude, the board of directors exercises both strategic control (Mizruchi, 1983; Bisbe and Otley, 
2004) and indirect operational control (Geringer and He´bert, 1989). Chalos and O’Connor (2004) link 
higher equity ownership to greater influence in subsidiaries via the composition of the board of 
directors. 
Stream 3.  Influence via staffing of expatriates – control mechanisms 
 
The definition of expatriates 
The expatriate (Delios and Bjorkman, 2000) is a manager deputed from the multinational headquarters 
to the firm's overseas JVs. Expatriates are expected to steer the JV through the liabilities of newness 
(Bruderl and Schussler, 1990) and foreignness (Zaheer and Mosakowski, 1997), provide stability to 
the new organization through the effective deployment of the multinational enterprise’s (MNE) 
capability and expertise, and ensure that the JV achieves the requisite level of performance (Richards, 
2001). 
MNCs usually send high quality staff from HQ (expatriates) to manage the subsidiaries and JVs abroad 
and to train the local staff.  It is expected that local employees will take over the responsibility in 
subsidiaries and JVs within the medium or long term. The researchers described “ethnocentrism 
staffing policy” (Banai, 1992; Banai and Sama, 2000; Van Merrewijk, 2011), which presents two 
different groups of executives within MNCs: the “in-group” expatriates, who represent the core 
corporate knowledge trusted by HQ, and the “out-group” expatriates, who usually lack corporate 
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knowledge and need to be trained. One of the central elements of ethnocentric staffing policies is the 
fact that expatriates receive greater benefits and salary than host-country nationals do, leading to 
locals’ inconformity regarding the amount and quality of input in comparison to compensation (Toh 
and DeNisi, 2005). 
The issue of HQ’s influence over subsidiaries and JVs abroad strongly links to the role of expatriates 
in subsidiaries and JVs, their influence on local staff, control mechanisms performed by expatriates 
and the staffing of expatriates in key managerial positions, in order to increase their influence on 
operational control and performance (Groot and Merchant, 2000; Harzing, 2001; Legewie, 2002; 
Charlos and O’Conner, 2004).   
Attention was paid to the increasing role of expatriates sent from HQ and appointed to the key positions 
in the companies abroad, and their strong support of operational control functions and practice in 
subsidiaries and JVs. In WOSs, expatriates are strongly involved in decision-making processes and in 
providing the HQ’s strategy in subsidiaries and JVs. At the same time, expatriates represent the formal 
practice of feedback and reporting to HQ. Charlos and O’Conner (2004) focus on the following issues 
related to the topic of expatriates:  expatriate staffing, socialization practices, delegated decision 
responsibilities, parent company common actions and incentives.  It was found that the high level of 
operational control and influence from HQ is connected to the role that expatriates play in subsidiaries 
and JVs and their practice in replicating the control mechanisms from HQ towards subsidiaries and 
JVs (Charlos and O’Conner, 2004).  
Charlos and O’Conner (2004) focused on the fact that that, being in the position of key managers, 
expatriates can influence the organizations abroad on behavioral, cultural and social levels of 
communication. Delios and Bjorkman (2000) underline that expatriates are conceptualized as 
performing two primary functions – influence and control – and transfer the knowledge from the parent 
company/HQ.  Two types of parent-company knowledge can be operationalized: marketing and 
technological knowledge. Everything else being equal, it can be expected that MNCs with a high level 
of marketing or technological capability will be likely to use expatriates to transfer this knowledge to 
the foreign subsidiary.  
The studies have tended to emphasize how expatriates have been utilized by the HQ to exert influence 
and management control over the JV (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1994; Delios and Bjorkman, 2000; 
Martinez and Jarillo, 1989; O'Donnell, 2000). Yan and Gray (2004) found that partners’ equity 
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ownership influenced expatriate staffing but none of the other control mechanisms. Relative to partner 
knowledge, dependence and specific asset investments, bargaining dominance conferred by majority 
equity ownership appeared to offer little explanation of JV control mechanisms. At the same time, 
Peterson et al. (2000) found that the expatriation strategy in MNCs presents the following 
characteristics, providing the position of influence and control: 1. expatriate staffing is primarily driven 
by the HQ in order to increase influence; 2. assignments are matched based on a careful assessment of 
the chosen manager's technical and managerial skills and expertise; and 3. control decisions in 
subsidiaries and JVs are highly centralized. 
Dutta and Beamish (2013) stated that MNC management teams, as well as the managers' or expatriates' 
culturally determined sense-making, have important roles to play in affecting organizational outcomes 
(Brannen and Salk, 2000; Salk and Brannen, 2000; Chung et al., 2006) and increasing influence. 
To conclude, expatriates influence the WOS and JV's strategy in achieving goals in performance by 
strengthening revenues and reducing costs (Dutta and Beamish, 2013). At the same time, expatriates 
are important in providing influence and the transfer of organizational knowledge, including tacit 
knowledge and the assimilation of HQ practice, to subsidiaries and JVs. However, “While deploying 
expats provides benefits, there is a diminishing return effect that sets in, especially depending on the 
local context and conditions associated with the local partner” (ibid., p. 160). 
Stream 4.  Influence via the establishment, implementation and practice of common corporate 
rules and norms – control mechanisms 
 
The issue of influence via the establishment and practice of corporate rules is very much connected to 
the process of creating common global corporate values and culture (Chow, Shileds and Wu, 2010) 
and implementing company rules in both HQ and the overseas subsidiaries and JVs.  
Establishing corporate rules and norms in order to increase the HQ’s influence on the subsidiaries’ 
and JVs’ operations is linked to stakeholder interests, when seeking win-win outcomes through 
synergistic common value creation (ibid.) across the whole MNC. For the MNC, it is important to 
create “pluralistic definitions of corporate global values” (Kurucz et al., 2008, p. 91), based on the idea 
of building a “strong” organizational culture, and implementing them in both HQ and the subsidiaries 
and JVs.  In this sense, leading scholars in the research on MNCs stress the unifying influence of the 
multinational organization through the building of a shared vision and individual commitment (Bartlett 
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and Ghoshal, 1989).  Similarly, Nohria and Ghoshal (1997) stress that the “dispersed nodes” of the 
network organization must be integrated normatively through the development of organic solidarity 
and shared values.  At the same time, several cross-national organizational studies, such as research 
into national business systems (Lane, 1989; Whitley, 1999, 2001) or societal effects (Maurice, 2000; 
Sorge, 1995; Sorge, 2000), are rather skeptical about the emergence of “strong” integrative global 
cultures and an increasing similarity of international structures in internationally operating firms. 
Studies have shown that certain national institutions, such as the system of industrial relations and the 
educational, legal or financial systems, may significantly influence the learning processes in MNCs’ 
HQ, rather than effecting influence from HQ.  
Aiming to achieve influence over subsidiaries and JVs, MNCs create and extend a common global 
control system, including in it culture-based preferences appealing to local employees (Chow, Shileds 
and Wu, 2010) and corporate rules reflecting the cross-cultural context of their global presence (Tayeb, 
1998).  As a result, MNCs started the process of converging organizational design and management 
systems that support the business activities in multinational settings and strengthen the   influence from 
HQ.  In this connection, mention was made of how the interplay between HQ and the subsidiaries and 
JVs happens and reflects ‘push’ and ‘pull’ practice (Meardi and Toth, 2006).  The argumentation for 
‘pull’ practice has traditionally seen it as adaptation of HQ routines to local practices; the ‘pull’ 
activities could be planned by HQ and implemented further in the subsidiaries and JVs by powerful 
and influential actors (ibid.). 
At the same time, Gomes-Casseres et al. (2006) argue that relational problems growing from HQ-
subsidiaries and JVs are not visible.  Possible tensions are smaller when HQ-subsidiaries15 and JV 
relationship ties establish a shared corporate culture, a similar corporate perspective, and common 
management control systems from the HQ, support from HQ in terms of resources, and fear of censure 
and restrictions in the case when one subsidiary tries to inappropriately capture inordinate rents from 
another.  
The issue of global corporate rules is linked to the establishment of common corporate ethics that will 
shape the corporate culture and behavior and function as an important element in HQ’s social influence 
on the subsidiaries and JVs. In this connection, Watson and Weaver (2003) suggested that 
internationalization influences corporate ethics and affects both formal structures in the MNC and 
                                                 
15 Relationships between HQ and subsidiaries 
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informal management behavior, as well as the role of ethics in both formal structures and informal 
managerial behavior in corporations.   
Following the discussions from the section dedicated to the definitions of influence, in which the 
phenomenon of influence was described as being closely linked, among other factors, to the 
phenomenon  of control, it can be considered that the goal of establishing  corporate ethics programs 
can contribute to maintaining a basic level of business practice and commitment, in order to strengthen 
influence that can  lead to  the elimination of  the need for more direct and elaborated forms of control 
and monitoring (ibid.). An effective ethics control structure influences the general trustworthiness of 
organization members (Scott and Meyer, 1991) and can reduce the risks from employee decision-
making autonomy by introducing a “shared conception of objectives” (ibid., p. 311).  As a result of 
this process, the uncertainties about self-serving behavior that lead to the creation of a relatively 
uniform value framework within the MNC, influencing the establishment and practice of common 
corporate culture and norms, can be reduced. This leads to a balanced use of formal control systems, 
influencing the values and norms in the MNC, that involve monitoring, disciplining and rewarding 
employee behavior with the general ethical rules and norms (Weaver and Treviño, 1999). In this case, 
the practice of corporate rules and norms reduces the formal control and influence based on the detailed 
description and monitoring of performance, specific tasks and roles (ibid.) but increases the ethical 
control and influence that strengthen relationships between HQ and subsidiaries and JVs. Ahrens and 
Mollona (2007) conclude that “the interrelationships between diverse formal and informal, practical 
and conceptual, human and non-human elements of control” are an important framework for business 
practice. 
The processes lead to the establishment of global diffusion of “best practices” (Meyer, 2000), 
spreading global best practices in MNCs, which are called “global organizational effects”, and will 
override national institutions and cultures (Mueller, 1994). At the same time, it is necessary to take 
into consideration the fact that HQ’s managers “draw upon” (Meardi and Toth, 2006, p. 159) local 
knowledge and public discourse to shape the balanced view of the subsidiary (ibid.). Hence, the issue 
of influencing via best practice in MNCs has been investigated by Martin and Beaumont (1998), who 
observed that diffusion has to be taken into account in the issue of the relationship between the local 
cultural and institutional context and HQ, when the focus on the ability and incentive of local managers 




Influence via corporate rules and norms in a cross-cultural context 
Due to the process of internationalization, the issue of cross-cultural business context and cross-
cultural management could be taken into consideration, in order to better understand the process of 
influence from HQ towards subsidiaries and JVs.  The phenomenon of influence in MNCs is linked to 
the cross-cultural context and stimulates the development of new organizational forms that enable 
knowledge-sharing and competency-development across national borders. Cross-cultural management 
studies in accounting literature explore the differences in the levels of influence in the framework of 
cross-cultural issues, linking the national contexts from different markets abroad to corporate practice 
established in HQ (Bates, Amundson, Schroder and Morris, 1995; Lachman et al., 1994).  Yazdifar, 
Zaman, Tsamenyi, and Askarany (2008)  discovered that  the operations of the “subsidiary company 
are influenced by inter-related forces, both inside and outside the organization encompassing issues of 
power, politics and culture” and (p. 404) that it leads to the process when “The existing institutions in 
subsidiaries and JV are influenced, sustained, and changed by the socio-economic context in which 
the subsidiary is located” (ibid.). 
Several studies have explored the interplay between the cultural paradigm and the phenomenon of 
influence and control in MNCs (Macintosh, 1994; Covaleski, Dirsmith and Samuels, 1996; Bhimani, 
1999; Chow, Shield and Wu, 1999; Scheytt, Soin and Metz, 2010). At the same time, it is necessary 
to notice that the topic of cross-cultural control mechanisms, which is linked to the phenomenon of 
influence, is still in its infancy (Harrison and McKinnon, 1999) and more research is required in this 
field.  
Influence via knowledge transferring 
The issue of competence, learning and knowledge transfer is important in the relationship between HQ 
and the subsidiaries and JVs (Birkinshaw and Fry, 1998; Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998; Birkinshaw, 
2000; Geppert, 2005), when MNCs create worldwide learning and knowledge sharing across 
functional and national borders, and the establishment of a strong company-specific culture is the focus 
of contemporary research related to MNCs.  
The importance of knowledge transfer in organizations and how these processes influence the 
relationship between HQ and the subsidiaries and JVs has been acknowledged by many scholars 
(Conner and Prahalad, 1996; Davenport, 1998; Drucker, 1992; Grant, 1996; Kogut and Zander, 1993; 
Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Tsoukas and Vladimirou, 1996).  There has also been a focus on how to 
facilitate intra-organizational knowledge transfers in MNCs in general (Kogut and Zander, 1993; 
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Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000; Becerra-Fernandez and Sabherwal, 2001; Gold et al., 2001), and 
research into the central elements of knowledge transferring (Szulanski, 1995; Simonin, 1999;) in 
international settings in an MNC framework.  
At the same time, it is necessary to admit that knowledge transformation goes both ways, not just from 
HQ towards the subsidiaries and JVs but also from the subsidiaries and JVs to HQ.   In this connection, 
the topic of how firms can best “learn at the periphery”, i.e. benefit from subsidiaries’ and JVs’ 
knowledge (Doz and Santos, 1997) is still fragmented. Following this issue, Gnyawalịa, Singal and 
Muc (2009) researched the factors that influence the likelihood of inter-subsidiary tie formation within 
a multinational corporation and how various contextual factors influence the effectiveness of 
knowledge flow between the HQ and subsidiaries and JVs. The researchers suggest that focusing on 
voluntary ties should be made “a clear distinction between tie formation and tie effectiveness” (ibid., 
p. 397), which leads to the conclusion that not all ties can be effective in the creation and transfer of 
knowledge.  
Ciabuschi, Martín, Ståhl (2010) investigated knowledge transfer in MNCs and saw that HQ’s 
entrepreneurial function can be a matter of substantial influence. “This influence can be exerted 
through a variety of mechanisms as local resource slack, local autonomy in decision-making, 
normative integration, and internal density of communication with managers at headquarters and other 
subsidiaries and JV as the most important in influencing subsidiaries and JV’s ability to carry out 
innovation tasks” (p. 474). 
The question of HQ’s methods of influencing subsidiaries and JVs in knowledge transferring 
incorporates multiple drivers of voluntary efforts between HQ and subsidiaries and JVs, in order to 
collaborate with each other, and specifies conditions in which voluntary ties are important for making 
the ties effective (ibid.).  The discussion further leads to the description of the phenomenon of  
“knowledge networking capability” (ibid., p. 397), which addresses the importance for the subsidiaries 
and JVs  in MNCs  of developing their own knowledge networking capability: “the ability of a 
subsidiary to channel its own  knowledge and experiences, aiming to identify, acquire, access, and 
create valuable knowledge and influence, becoming a strategic player in the MNC” (ibid.), as well 
towards HQ.  
Forsgren and Holm (2010) focused on the processes of specific knowledge initiated by HQ that can be 
crucial for the innovation process and produce the value-creating influence of HQ.  In this connection, 
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“HQ cannot exert control from a distance, only exert influence by its own participation in the 
innovation process” (p. 428), influencing behavior. 
Harzing and Feely (2007) investigate the role of one corporate language in MNCs as an important 
element of HQ’s influence over the subsidiary. It is found that the employment of a majority language 
– that subsidiaries are often forced to use – can be utilized as a tool of power and influence (Kim, 2001) 
in the power-authority balance.  This may even happen if the language in use is a third language (such 
as English), in which subsidiary managers have a greater facility than HQ managers (Lincoln, 1995).  
To conclude, the establishment of corporate rules and norms and their implementation in subsidiaries 
play an important role in the relationship between HQ and the subsidiaries in terms of influence (Chow, 
Shileds and Wu, 2010). The important elements in the relationship between HQ and the subsidiaries 
are connected to the cross-cultural paradigm and cross-cultural control mechanisms that are linked to 
the process of influence in the multicultural context (Bhimani, 1999; Scheytt, Soin and Metz, 2010). 
The process of knowledge transfer, the development of corporate competence, worldwide learning and 
knowledge-sharing across borders   strengthen HQ’s influence over the subsidiaries (Birkshaw, 2000; 
Geppert, 2005). 
Stream 5. Influence via CEO of MNC and top management from HQ 
 
The research literature connects the issue of influence through the CEO and top management in the 
MNC to the topic of hegemonic influence and the significance of hierarchy. Executives of 
multinational firms recognize the ethical complexities presented by the internationalization of business 
(Watson & Weaver, 2003, p. 76) and their own responsibility.  
Abernethy, Bouwens and van Lent (2010) found that leadership style influences the use of planning 
and control systems, as predicted. Those with power are able to influence the course of organizational 
development through control over valued resources and through the use of symbols, by which 
organization members mediate their experience (Smircich, 1983, p. 161). Doz and Prahalad (1984) 
examined the patterns of strategic control in MNCs and the role executives play in a global 
organization, when the increasing influence of HQ executives over international operations is 
“sufficient and affect strategic control effectively” (p. 67). Compared with the old economy from the 
1970s, “While top managers could delegate the selection process to intermediate levels in many cases, 
they were nonetheless able to intervene selectively…and senior executives saw this as the major 
41 
 
channel through which they exercised influence” (p. 69),  it is underlined that, in the modern global 
environment, senior managers play a critical role in the successful implementation of – and influence 
– organizational strategies, structures and processes, the establishment of the subsidiary and its 
influence on the staffing composition in the subsidiary (Collings, Morley and Gunnigle, 2008). 
At the same time, Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard (2006) provided evidence from case studies that 
shows that the MNC’s subsidiary managers are able to influence HQ decisions regarding the 
implementation of decentralized management systems in ways that go beyond the immediate interests 
of corporate headquarters and are counterintuitive to the traditional view of organizational power and 
hierarchy. 
Analyzing literature in the management control and accounting research domain and 
management and strategic research domain. 
 
The literature review demonstrates that previous research publications provide knowledge about the 
phenomenon of influence from HQ towards subsidiaries and JVs in the process of internationalization 
of MNCs. In spite of the increasing interest of researchers in this topic, it is necessary to mention that 
the issue of the HQ’s influence over subsidiaries and JVs, in the process of internationalization of 
MNCs, is still in its infancy in the accounting research domain, and more research into this field is 
needed.  Despite the fact that  management and strategic literature have paid much more attention to 
the phenomenon of influence from HQ towards subsidiaries, the rapid process of globalization and 
internationalization has an impact on the development of MNCs in the global world that leads to a lack 
of knowledge related to the topic of the interplay between HQ and subsidiaries, based on the latest 
findings, especially from case studies. 
The review shows that the selected articles have investigated issues related to 1) Influence via 
ownership structure; 2) Influence via board of directors; 3). Influence via expatriate staffing; 4). 
Influence via the establishment, implementation and practice of corporate rules and norms. The articles 
focusing on management control mechanisms and MCS16 design are dominant among the publications 
in accounting literature (Cubbin and Leech, 1983; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Groot and Merchant 
2000; Chanhall et al., 2003; Chalos and O’Connor, 2004; Dessai et al., 2004; Ben-Amar and Andre, 
2006; Al Farooque et al., 2010; Dekker, 2008).   
                                                 
16  MCS – management control system 
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In a framework of the interest of this research, the articles related to the ownership configuration 
(Mutinelli and Piscitello, 1998; Pan and Tse, 2000; Groot and Merchant, 2000;  Barbosa and Louri, 
2002; Álvarez, 2003; Desaia,  et al., 2004), the role of the board (Mizruchi, 1983; Geringer and He´bert, 
1989; Yan and Gray, 1994; Chalos and O’Connor, 2004; Bisbe and Otley, 2004; Stein, 2008; 
Krivogorsky and Burton, 2012),  expatriate staffing (Groot and Merchant, 2000; Harzing, 2001; 
Legewie,  2002; Charlos and O’Conner, 2004) and the establishment of a common corporate system 
of rules and norms, taking the cross-cultural context into consideration, are most relevant and indirectly 
reflect on the topic of how to achieve influence in the process of internationalization (Macintosh, 1994; 
Covaleski, Dirsmith and Samuels, 1996; Bhimani, 1999; Chow, Shield and Wu, 1999; Scheytt, Soin 
and Metz, 2010). 
The forms of both the WOS and the JV with equity ownership are explored in the literature of the 
management control research domains. In articles investigating WOSs, the focus of the researchers 
was concentrated on the factors influencing MNCs to choose the WOS structure (Makino and Neupert, 
2000; Pan and Tse, 2000; Brouthers and Brouthers, 2001; Asiedu and Esfahani, 2001; Desaia, et al., 
2004).  In the publications exploring JVs, the focus of the researchers is captured by the question of 
control and partnership within the JV and equality of the relationship between partners and the 
influence mechanisms (Geringer and Hebert, 1989; Mutinelli and Piscitello, 1998; Pan and Tse, 2000; 
Groot and Merchant, 2000; Álvarez, 2003). In this connection, the publications linking the cross-
cultural approach to JV ownership dominate (Morris, 1998; Groot and Merchant, 2000; Chalos and 
O’Connor, 2004), despite the fact that the accounting literature still underestimates the influence of 
cultural matters in management control. Thus, there are several authors, who have underlined the 
importance of involving the cultural, political, societal paradigms in accounting research 
(Wickramasinghe and Hopper, 2003; Ahren and Mollona, 2004; Bhimani, 1999). 
The issue of strategic management and control is related to the questions of ownership (van Bogaard 
et al., 2003; Chenhall et al., 2003). In this connection, the focus of the researchers is mostly connected 
to the contingency theory and separation between shareholders and managers.  Most of the researchers 
argue that the separation between owners and managers can improve performance. Despite the interest 
in ownership issues in the review literature, there is not enough research in this field. One topic that is 
not represented but remains a sphere of interest in this study is the process of influence in the course 
of internationalization and control mechanisms of state-owned enterprises. 
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The issue of company performance is a central one in accounting literature related to 
internationalization. The publications appoint the factors that influence performance and connect these 
issues to the choice of strategy. The questions about performance are closely connected to the studies 
on governance and operational control in a framework of the BoD and ownership questions (Ben-Amar 
and André, 2006; Al Farooque, et al., 2010; Chalos and O’Connor, 2004).  
Publications investigating the staffing of expatriates and the function of expatriates working in 
overseas operations are few (Delios and Bjorkman, 2000; Charlos and O’Conor, 2004); this area of 
research obviously needs to be developed further. Focusing mostly on the expatriates’ role and control 
mechanisms, the articles underestimate other aspects related to the role of expatriates in subsidiaries 
and JVs abroad i.e. as cross-cultural approach. The majority of the research links the role of expatriates 
to the control functions and the decision-making function in relation to the approach from the owner 
in the strategy to strengthen operational control. The management literature (Yan and Gray, 2004) 
indicated, based on the empirical evidence, that the partner in equity ownership in JV structures 
influenced expatriate staffing but none of the other control mechanisms. The issues focusing on the 
use of expatriates in WOSs need more research, especially in the context of the interplay between HQ 
and the overseas subsidiaries and JVs, and how the role of expatriates can be included in the paradigm 
of influence in MNCs. There is a need for further exploration of the diversity of the expatriate’s role 
and its influence on the relationship between HQ and subsidiaries and JVs.  
It could be a useful contribution to the accounting field research, if the issue of internationalization 
and intercultural management could be further explored; that could substantially extend the research 
field and provide new inputs to the research process. 
Methods 
The majority of the previous studies are based on quantitative methods (accounting literature: Barsky 
and Hussein, 1999; Chenhall, 2003; Chalos and O’Connor, 2004; Adler and Chen, 2011; Bedford, 
2015; management literature: Abernethy and Stoelwinder, 1995; Brouthers and Bamossy,1997; 
Abernethy and Brownell, 1997); therefore, there is a need for more research using qualitative methods, 
including the wide spectrum of the qualitative tools in data collection (accounting literature: Alvesson 
and Ka¨rreman, 2004; Ahrens and Mollona, 2007; management literature: Child and Yan, 1999; 
Karhunen, Kosonen, 2003). At the same time, scholars have used several case studies from a cross-
cultural context (accounting literature: Bhimani, 1999). There are not so many comparative studies 
describing the same processes in different countries.  Among the studied articles, few studies are based 
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on field research (accounting literature: Chalos and O’Connor, 2004; Ahrens and Mollona, 2007) and 
few of these take a longitudinal perspective (management literature: Beamish and Jing, 2002). We 
used samples, questionnaires, interviewees, investigation of secondary data, such as annual reports and 
websites.  
Most of the studies in the management control research domain in the context of this research are 
dedicated to the topic of control mechanisms in MNCs. The issue related to the processes of 
internationalization and questions of what influences the relationship between HQ and subsidiaries are 
not answered. In management and strategic literature, the process of internationalization and the role 
of the MNC in the global world have received much attention.   But, at the same time, the processes 
related to the mechanisms of influence and control from HQ towards subsidiaries and JVs are not 
covered enough, especially based on case analysis.  In this connection, there is a need to answer the 
question of how, in the process of internationalization, the HQ achieves influence over subsidiaries, 
with a particular focus on several important dimensions of the interplay between HQ and subsidiaries, 
such as ownership structure, role of board of directors, role of expatriates, role of the corporate CEO 
in the relationship between HQ and the subsidiaries, and how the common rules and norms created in 
HQ can influence  the realization of a corporate strategy directed  towards subsidiaries and JVs. 
Empirical settings 
There are very few publications conducting cross-field research, but, at the same time, there are several 
works suggesting the greater use of this kind of approach. First, these articles are related to the field of 
cross-cultural science, political science and social science with the purpose of supporting the 
accounting research in a broader perspective.  
The literature review shows that many of the cases that were explored are related to the emerging 
markets, with the spreading from Asia to Africa  and Eastern Europe (accounting literature: Child and 
Yan, 1999; Chalos and O’ Connor, 2004; Wickramasinghe and Hopper, 2005; Carney and  Gedajlovic, 
2006; management literature: Tahir and Larimo, 2004; Hitt, Ahlstrom, Dacin, Levitas, and Svobodina, 
2004; Karhunen, Kosonen, and Leivonen, 2004).   At the same time, cases have been studied from the 
mature markets of Australia, USA, Canada and Europe (accounting literature: Abernethy and 
Brownell, 1997; Alvesson and Kärreman, 2004; Ahrens and Mollona, 2007; Adler and Chen, 2011; 
management literature: Christmann, Day and Yip, 1999; Butler and Anchor, 2000). However, it can 




In order to present a wide picture of the research issue about the phenomenon of influence, in the 
process of internationalization, from HQ towards subsidiaries and JV, a choice was made to include 
articles from the management and strategy research domain in this literature review. 
Management and strategy literature 
The management and strategy  literature has mostly focused on the management  processes related to 
ownership, governance and business practice (Merchant, 1981; Yan and Gray, 1994; Hu and Chen, 
1996; Mjoen and Tallman, 1997; Lee et al., 1998;  Kumar and Seth, 1998; Ramasway et al., 1998; 
Banai et al., 1999; Child and Yan, 1999; Luo, 2001; Beamish and Jiang, 2002;  Gong et al., 2007; 
Harzing, 2001; Legewie, 2002; Beamish and Jiang, 2002; Quattrone and Hopper, 2005; Brouthers and 
Bamossy, 2006; Karhunen et al., 2008;  Lymbersky, 2010;  Beamish, 2013;  Killing, 2013). 
In the background of my study, it is interesting to look carefully at the introduced models, as the 
relationship between degree of ownership and degree of foreign control is closer to my research issue 
of how to achieve influence in the process of internationalization. It is necessary to pay attention to the 
fact that the models and scenarios presented by Karhunen et al. (2008) have their limitations, due to 
the parameters of the data collection that were chosen.  At the same time, Karhunen et.al. (2008) carried 
out his research based on empirical evidence, mostly from small and medium size enterprices17.  
However, a big benefit of the presented research is that Karhunen et al. offered the analysis of a 
different case, representing industrial diversity.   
2.3. Psychological aspects of the mechanisms of influence and control 
During the last decade, several scholars have called for more psychology theory in management 
accounting and management control research (March 1996; Adler and Borys, 1996; Wouters and 
Wilderom, 2008; Hall, 2008; Chapman and Kihn, 2009; Tessier and Otley, 2012; Bourmistrov and 
Kaarbøe, 2013; Hall, 2015; Otley, 2016; Arend et al., 2017). 
Previous studies have shown how changes in MCS may be related to changes in decision-maker 
mindset and behavior (Bjørnenak and Kaarbøe, 2011; Jensen, 2003; Seijts and Lathem, 2005; Tanlu, 
2009; Burdett, 1994; McCarthy and Lane, 2009; Howcroft, 2006; Gunn, 1995; Giraud et al., 2008; 
Blenko et al., 2010; Marginson and Ogden, 2005a,b; Burchell et al., 1980).  
                                                 
17 Hereafter in the text, it will be used SME. 
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According to Adler and Borys (1996), it is important to focus on the enabling as a form of performance 
in the organization, in order to increase the “attitudinal” impact (p. 66) on the managers’ decisions and 
positive performance. Hall (2008) connects managerial performance with psychological empowerment 
and calls for a focus on the mechanism that influences managers in their decisions, motivation and 
actions. Tessier and Otler (2012) suggest looking carefully at the design of control systems and argue 
that “The design of control systems and the way they are presented do influence how controls are 
perceived” (p. 181).   
Otley (2016) also examines the issue of the decision-making process in organizations being influenced 
by the findings and discussions in psychological literature.  Several scholars suggest that it is important 
to examine how managers make decisions about the design and use of management control systems, 
based on their interpretation of their work and decision situations (Bourmistrov and Kaarbøe, 2013).  
One of the streams in the research domain in accounting and management control literature suggests 
examining how managerial perceptions of controls influence managerial judgment and beliefs about 
how the control system affects the relationship between organizational behavior and its outcomes. 
Bourmistrov and Kaarbøe (2013) examined how managers, experiencing a state of mental 
“discomfort” with the control outcomes, have introduced changes in the control system configuration, 
so that new behavior and a new state of a mental “stretch” were possible. The organizational sociology 
and psychology literature use concepts like “comfort” and “discomfort” zones to describe different 
individual perceptions. The interpretations are dependent upon a correspondence or lack of 
correspondence between the mindset of the decision-maker and actual behavior at work. The mindset 
is usually characterized as individual attitudes and assumptions about how the world around the 
decision-maker works, including individual work identities (Ibid). Behavior is represented by actions 
that are done or should be done in a concrete work situation. In a “comfort” zone, managers positively 
appraise the work situation characterized by an anxiety-neutral mindset because there is a match 
between behavior and mindset (Kahn, 1990; White, 2009). On the contrary, a “discomfort” zone is a 
state of control situation appraisal characterized by a higher level of anxiety because of a misalignment 
between established mindset and behavior (Kira and Korpelainen, 2012). As Bourmistrov and Kaarbøe 
(2013) show, the manager’s perception of “discomfort” can lead to a substantial redesign of the 
management control system.   
Another piece of research shows that managers can develop a perception that actually prevents changes 
from happening because they overestimate the degree of the control system’s contribution to the 
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achievement of the organizational outcomes (Dermer and Lucas, 1986). The illusion of managerial 
control  or  – as it is often  presented –  the “illusion of control” (Dermer and Lucas, 1986; Seal and 
Mattimoe, 2014) is  a managerial perceptual failure to recognize that conventional controls used by an 
organization do not control the actual behavior, meaning that actual behavior and the actual control 
outcome are the subjects of other processes in the organizations, rather than conventional controls. 
“Illusion of control” is also widely discussed in the psychology literature, e.g. that individuals facing 
a random sequence of successes and failures can perceive that they are more responsible for successes 
but blame external factors for failures (Koeing et al., 1992). Perceptions of managers can also affect 
their judgment of contingencies in accessing the cause-outcome relationships, because the potential 
cause is an uncontrollable external event.   
To conclude, although there is an  increasing interest in research literature about the psychological 
aspects related to the design of management control mechanisms in order to achieve influence,  we are 
aware of no studies that have addressed how internationalization processes have influenced perceived 
work situations of managers involved in the processes (i.e. in terms of changes in mindset and 
behavior) and, subsequently, influenced changes in MCS. Thus, the issues of how the perceived 
influence and control can form out of the internationalization strategies and how those strategies 
interact with management control processes have not been paid enough attention in the research 
domain. 
2.4. The theoretical framework: the guidelines from the process theory  
In order to structure and analyze the empirical data related to the motivation at the individual level in 
organization and to describe the triggers and driving force  of the changes of the mechanisms of 
influence in the process of internationalization, it is  suggested to draw on the main concepts of process 
theory (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995; Poole et al., 2000; Mähring and Keil, 2008).  At the same time, 
this theory can be applied at a micro level, explaining the social-psychological processes, focusing on 
behavior.  This is the reason why this theory will be used in the analysis of the role of expatriates in 
the process of internationalization in “T”. 
As it will be presented in this study, the theoretical understanding of the process of change in 
organizations has its roots in Van de Ven and Poole’s (1995) description of four ideal-type process 
theories and motors of change. The process theory consists of “four basic theories that may serve as 
building blocks for explaining processes of change in organizations: life cycle, teleology, dialectics, 
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and evolution” (Van deVen and Poole, 1995, p. 510).  These four theories represent different sequences 
of change events that are driven by different conceptual motors and operate at different organizational 
levels (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995) and introduce different explanations of change and development 
processes in organizations.  Each process theory triggers different motors of change, which can be 
mapped as a distinct action cycle. However, change and development processes in organizations are 
often more complex than any one of these theories can offer, triggering interplay among several change 
motors or generating mechanisms. 
I will not go into a detailed analysis of all the motors’ processes, as the main purpose of this study is 
to examine the mechanisms of control in the process of internationalization, with the aim of achieving 
influence. In this respect, after a short presentation of three of the existing motors of changes in 
organizations, the focus will be on the teleological motor – the motor of “the purposiveness” – that 
will be used as the theoretical lens for this study.  
Life-cycle theory and its motors of change 
Van de Ven and Poole  (1995) propose that, according to life-cycle theory, changes happen  as  “unitary 
sequences that follow a single sequences of stages or phases” (ibid., p. 515), and  that  the sequences 
are  of both a cumulative character, when the  motors “acquired in earlier stages are retained in later 
stages” (ibid., p. 515),  and a conjunctive character, when “the stages are related such that they derive 
from a common underlying process” (ibid., p. 515). Van de Ven emphasizes the importance of 
considering that the “trajectory to the final end state is prefigured and requires a specific historical 
sequence of events. Each of these events contributes a piece to the final product…each piece sets the 
stage for the next” (ibid., p. 515). At the same time, it is stressed that each stage of the progression is 
seen as “a necessary precursor of succeeding stages” (ibid., p. 515), that each successive phase is 
evolved from a previous stage. Thus, the life-cycle theory will “rely on logical or natural sequences” 
(ibid., p. 515) in the development of the organization.  In life-cycle theory, the process of change is 
built upon the progression of change events and is governed by the following motors: “progression 





Dialectical theory and its motors 
 “In a dialectical process theory, stability and change are explained by reference to the balance of 
power between opposing entities. Struggles and accommodations that maintain the status quo between 
the oppositions produce stability. Change occurs when these opposing values, forces or events gain 
sufficient power to confront and engage the status quo. The relative power of an antithesis may 
mobilize an organizational entity to a sufficient degree to challenge the current thesis or state of affairs 
and set the stage for producing the synthesis” (Van de Ven and Poole,1995, p. 517).  Nevertheless, it 
is pointed out that the synthesis departs from both thesis and antithesis, starting the new process of 
change when the synthesis becomes the new thesis in a new dialectical process.  Having said that, the 
management literature describing the conflicts and negotiations in the organization (Neal and 
Northcraft, 1991) suggests that the status quo can be replaced, as long as an opposition group 
“mobilizes sufficient power to simply overthrow” it (Van de Ven and Poole,1995, p. 517). In this 
connection, suppressing and preventing mobilization of the opposition group by “the desired creative 
synthesis” (ibid. p. 517) can lead to win-win solutions. It is underlined that, in terms of the 
organizational changes, “The maintenance of the status quo represents stability, but its replacement 
with either antithesis or the synthesis represents a change, for the better or worse” (ibid., p. 517). Thus, 
in this theory, the motors of change are conflicts and confrontations between units when opposing 
thesis and antithesis generate the dialectical cycle.  
Evolutionary theory and its motors 
According to Van de Ven and Poole (1995), “Evolution is something equated with change” (ibid., p. 
517).  Organizations often use evolutionary theory in order to explain the strategical processes and 
strategy-making, focusing on the change process through a “continuous cycle of variation, selection 
and retention” (ibid., p. 518).  If the variations in organizations are often happen through random 
chance, selection “occurs principally through the competition” (ibid., p. 518), and retention engages 
forces “that perpetuate and maintain certain organizational forms” (ibid., p. 518).  Taking into 
consideration that variations stimulate the selection of new forms, while retention “maintains previous 
forms and practices” (ibid., p. 518) (see Weick (1979) and Pfeffer (1982)),  evolutionary theory can  
explain changes and development in organizations as “a recurrent, cumulative, and probabilistic 
progression of variation, selection, and retention of organizational entities” (ibid., p. 518).  Despite the 
fact that evolutionary theory in organizational applications is often used in explaining global changes, 
this theory can be applied at a micro level, focusing on and explaining the social-psychological 
processes.  This is the reason why this theory will be used in the analysis of the role of expatriates in 
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the process of internationalization in “T”. In this theory, the motors of change are the repetitive 
sequences of variation, selection, and retention events and mechanisms of organizational entities. 
Teleological theory and its motors of change – the theoretical lens of the study 
According to teleological theory, the progression in organizations happens as a development towards 
a goal that is socially constructed and cognitively shared as a common goal or end state. “It is assumed 
that the entity is purposeful and adaptive; by itself or in interaction with others, the entity constructs 
an envisioned end state, takes actions to reach it, and monitors the progress” (ibid., p. 156). Thus, this 
theory considers the progress as “a repetitive sequence of goal formulation, implementation, evaluation 
and modification of goals based on what was learned or intended by the entity” (ibid., p. 156).  
As Van de Ven and Poole (1995) pointed out, in this theory “Once on entity attains its goal, this does 
not mean it stays in permanent equilibrium” (ibid., p. 516) because the goals are “socially reconstructed 
and enacted based on the past actions” (Weick, 1979 from Van de Ven and Poole, 1995, p.  516) as 
sense or decision-making with clearly identifiable goals.  Factors from the external environment or 
inside the organization “may create instabilities that push it towards a new developmental path” (ibid., 
p. 516), which confirms that, in this theory, “there is no prefigured rule, logically necessary direction” 
(ibid., p. 516), but  there is a focus on attaining the goal and the accomplished functions  that should 
be fulfilled. The teleological theory considers “the purposiveness” (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995) of 
the organization as the change motor. 
I rely on the guidelines from the teleological motor in process theory to identify a sequence of events 
in a historical retrospective, in order to define and distinguish the elements that can explain how the 









Model 2.1. Process Theories of Organizational Development and Change  
Figure 2.1. (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995) 
Antecedent conditions in a process of changes in organization process theory  
I rely on the guidelines from process theory (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995; Poole et al., 2000; Mähring 
and Keil, 2008) to identify a sequence of events in a historical retrospective to define and distinguish 
conditions for the changes in an organization. Van de Ven and Poole (1995) identified such conditions 
as determining antecedent conditions in advance of sequences of events that influence the process of 
changes in an organization. In this study, there will be factors from the macro and micro worlds that 




2.5. Theoretical Model 2.2. 
  
Figure 2.2. summarizes the theoretical model for this study. 
I assume that, when a particular internationalization strategy is formulated and carried out, it produces 
effects for the organization and managers, in terms of issues around HQ’s influence and control over 
subsidiaries. For individual managers, those effects can also be captured in terms of perceived work 
situation that can be reflected by changing their mindset and behavior in relation to 
internationalization. In its turn, the perceived work situation can influence the choices made by 
managers in HQs, in respect of setting different configurations of the institution of expatriates. In their 
turn, the changes in the institution of expatriates can facilitate changes in the internationalization 
strategy.  
I, therefore, have formulated the following research question: How have control mechanisms evolved 
during the internationalization process, and why? At the same time, I want to underline the importance 
of the internationalization process and the issues of HQ’s influence and control over subsidiaries, as a 
context for the study.  In order to clarify how the context  can affect: the changing  of  mindset;  the 
behavior of managers in HQ in designing the strategy of internationalization that had an impact on the 
design of the influence and control mechanisms; and the perceived control situation  that can influence 
the choices made by managers in HQs, in terms of setting different configurations or packages of the 
mechanisms of control, three sub research questions are formulated as follows: 1). How has the 
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internationalization of “T” happened? 2.) What control mechanisms were in place during different 







Chapter 3: Methodology and methods 
3.1. Scientific position. Research setting and methods 
“Methodology should reflect an overall research strategy” (Mason, 1996, p. 19). The methodological 
perspectives will be analyzed from the theoretical paradigms and their practical implementation during 
the research process, supporting explanations of “why things are” and “the way they are” (Hempel, 
1965; Nagel, 1961).    
This study has been carried out in a framework of qualitative research with the aim to extend the 
understanding of the mechanisms of influence from HQ towards subsidiaries in the process of 
internationalization. Empirical evidence has been collected from the documentary analysis, interviews 
and longitudinal observations from the field.  This research is  the first academic study, whose intention 
has been to analyze the internationalization process of “T”, the package of   control mechanisms in 
“T” and the concept of  TW18; it can contribute to the management control literature through a better 
understanding of the processes of  internationalization  in MNCs in the multinational context, using 
the case studies from a Norwegian company. Despite the increasing attention on cross-cultural studies 
related to MNCs, little research on this topic has been performed, both in a concrete business 
environment and specifically related to Norwegian companies as case studies.                                                                                                                                                              
The relevant research literature was found by searching in the following scientific databases:  Science 
Direct, Oria, Saga, Emerald and JSTOR, and by carefully examining the reference lists of relevant 
articles.  In the data collection process, the search was limited by including two principal factors: 
context of the research and date of publication.  The research context in the publications was limited 
to a focus on issues concerning the influence of MNC’s HQ over subsidiaries abroad. Regarding date 
of publication, the view was limited by including publications in the period from 2000 to 2015, in 
order to map the latest scholarly debate related to the topic of the research.  The journals were selected, 
based on existing journal rankings: levels 4, 3 and 2 from Academic Journal Guide 2015, published 
by the Chartered Association of Business Schools, which supported this study with its list of the most 
influential journals.    
                                                 
18  T Way – a concept of the behavior platform in T. Hereafter in the text, it will be use as TW. 
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As there was insufficient attention paid to the processes of internationalization and the phenomenon 
of influence in the previous management control and accounting research domain, for the literature 
review, it has been prioritized publications in scientific journals covering the disciplines of accounting.  
The following journals were selected:  Accounting, Organizations and Society; Accounting and 
Business Research; Accounting Horizons; Accounting Research Journal; The Accounting Review; 
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal; Behavioral Research in Accounting; British 
Accounting Review; Critical Perspectives on Accounting; European Accounting Review; International 
Journal of Accounting; Journal of Accounting and Economics; Journal of Accounting Research; 
Journal of Accounting, Audit and Finance; Journal of Business Finance and Accounting; Journal of 
Financial Economics; Journal of International Accounting Research; Management Accounting 
Research; Review of Accounting and Finance; Review of Accounting Studies.  
At the same time, the search process in the research domain of management led me to articles published 
in scientific journals –from the disciplines of international management, human resource management, 
strategic management and psychological science – that cover the topic of this study.  Using the search 
parameters in the scientific databases as  presented above, the focus has been  on key words, such as 
“influence from HQ towards subsidiaries in MNC”, and  the search process  led to the  following 
journals: Asia Pacific Business Review;  Journal of Management History;  Strategic Management 
Journal;  International Business Review;  Journal of International Management; Academy of 
Management Journal; Journal of East-West Business; Scandinavian Journal of Management; Critical 
Perspectives on International Business; The International Journal of Human Resource Management;  
Management International Review; Journal of World  Business; Journal of Management Studies.   
The reason why the decision was taken to investigate the publications in the above-named journals 
was to present selected contributions from the above-named scientific fields, with the aim of presenting 
a broader view on the phenomenon of influence in contemporary research. Scholarly literature in the 
academic field of management and strategy has made substantial contributions regarding the processes 
of internationalization and the mechanisms of influence.  The literature from this field will support the 
findings from the accounting scientific field, in order to highlight the phenomenon of the HQ’s 
influence over subsidiaries abroad, during the process of internationalization in MNCs. 
The question of the HQ’s influence on subsidiaries, in the process of internationalization of MNCs, is 
a matter of several studies. As previously mentioned, scientific streams will be presented, based on the 
research process in both accounting and non-accounting journals.  Of the 84 articles selected, 34 
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articles were taken from accounting journals and 50 from management, strategy, human resource 
management studies, presenting different types of influence from HQ towards subsidiaries, 
highlighting the forces which shape these variations in different geographic contexts: the USA, Europe 
and Asia. In just the first section, describing the research stream related to the issue of control, the 
findings from the accounting literature and non-accounting literature will be presented separately, due 
to the importunacy of the topic. 
This is a case study of a Norwegian MNC, “T”: of both its HQ and some of its subsidiaries abroad.  
Exploratory qualitative research 
It is known that, due to the purpose, the research can be exploratory, descriptive, and causal. These 
categories are not mutually exclusive; they are a matter of emphasis (Zikmund, 2003). The object of 
exploratory research is to gather preliminary information in order to define problems and suggest 
hypotheses, and identify key issues and key variables (Kotler and Armstrong, 2006), contrary to the 
object of descriptive research (to provide an accurate description of observations of a phenomenon; 
and causal research (to test hypotheses about cause-and-effect relationships) (ibid.). In order to answer 
the research questions, it was  beneficial to utilize exploratory research, which  gained familiarity with 
the phenomenon of influence and control, provide significant insight into processes connected with 
“T”’s internationalization, leading to the formulation of the more precise problem of how people get 
along in the settings of “T”’s internationalization, what meanings they give to their actions, what  are 
the issues concerning  them, when the situations involving them occur, and why.  
According to the data collection methods, research can be classified into qualitative and quantitative. 
As defined by Hakim (1987, p.19), qualitative research provides the individuals own accounts of their 
attitudes, motivations and behavior; reports of individuals’ perceptions, beliefs, feelings, the meanings 
and interpretations given to events and things. It is also about their behavior, displaying how these are 
put together, more or less coherently and consciously, into frameworks, which make sense of their 
experiences. It illuminates the motivations which connect attitudes and behavior, the discontinuities, 
or even contradictions between attitudes and behavior, or how conflicting attitudes and motivations 
are resolved, and choices made. This research benefits from the use of qualitative methods, focusing 
on analysis processes connected with “T”’s internationalization and collecting all relevant data that 
will support the main purpose of the study.  
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Depending on the time dimension, the research can be cross-sectional and longitudinal. Cross-sectional 
studies are those in which data is gathered once, during a period of days, weeks or months: that will 
be suitable for collecting information in subsidiaries abroad. Research carried out longitudinally 
involves data collection at multiple points in time and will be used to collect information from a field 
study in “T”’s HQ in Norway. According to the research setting, the study can be conducted either in 
contrived or non-contrived settings. A non-contrived setting is the natural environment in which events 
normally occur. Both field research and case studies are examples of non-contrived settings and benefit 
this project, as they are carried out in the natural environment with minimal interference from the 
researcher. Following the goal of this exploratory qualitative research – to learn “what is going on?” 
(Schutt, 2011) and to investigate the social phenomenon of influence and control – it was beneficial to 
utilize the flexibility of exploration methodology in addressing research questions of all types in a 
framework such as a case study. Case studies have been defined by Yin (1989) as “an empirical inquiry 
that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context when the boundaries between 
the phenomenon and its context are unclear, and where multiple sources of evidence are used” (cited 
in Brownell, 1985) and “a phenomenon of some sort occurring in a bounded context” (Mile and 
Huberman, 1994).  
3.2. Methodological choice and the philosophy of the study. Data collection 
Methodological choice and the philosophical assumptions 
Performing qualitative studies in management is not a question of method but of methodology, 
understood as a general approach to the study of research topics (Silverman, 1993). Silverman (2005) 
defines methods as techniques, which take on a specific meaning, according to the methodology in 
which they are used. There is no right or wrong method, but the method must be appropriate for the 
research purposes and the chosen research model (Remenyi, 1998); this means that, in this research, 
methodological choices should be consequential to the researcher’s philosophical stance and will 
support the research phenomenon to be investigated. The choice of the philosophy of the research is 
determined among other factors by: the assumptions of the researcher, precedents set by earlier 
research, and the selection made in terms of different research methods and the methodology applied 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 2002).  
The research paradigm identifies a framework of assumptions about the nature of the social world (i.e. 
ontology), and what we know about the nature of social knowledge (i.e epistemology), and  the applied 
research design and methods for extending knowledge (i.e methodology) ( Khun, 1970; Chua, 1986). 
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The  mentioned above approaches and worldviews have the impact on the ideas and reflections about 
ontological, epistemological and methodological standpoints shared by the researches in a particular 
research community, i.e using in the literature two main philosophical paradigms as positivism and 
phenomenology ( Saunders et.al, 2000) demonstrates different world outlook that affect  the 
researcher’s understanding about the social world and nature related to the scientific research.  
Positivism believes that the nature of social the reality is considered to be objective, i.e the social world 
exists as an objective reality. Thus, positivistic approach in science assumes that existing 
independently of human beings an objective reality should be measured by the objective methods 
within   established knowledge based on the observation of this reality (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002). 
Phenomenology, in contrast to positivism, assumes that the reality is not objective and external 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 2002), but socially constructed.  The purpose of the phenomenological scientific 
research is to understand the phenomena’s inter-subject  existence (Gilje and Grimen, 1993) 
constructed by actor’s perceptions  In this connection, the social reality can be  understood by  
investigating the perceptions of the actors when the knowledge are capturing by interplaying between  
the researcher   and  the phenomena which are  being researched (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002). This   
results by the process of  interpretation  from actor’s  viewpoint and  cognition ( Ibid).  
In relation to the philosophy of this research, it was supported by a main philosophical approach: the 
phenomenological/interpretive approach. The current research is built up on the interpretivist paradigm 
which reflected throughout the research process, in the research questions and the methodology and 
design of this research. i.e to investigate the phenomenon of influence in the process of 
internationalization and how have managers perceived the effects of controls established in the process 
of internationalization.  
The phenomenological paradigm  as well reflected in the theoretical  approach of the current research 
as it builds on the process theory  providing with the perceptions of the changes in the organizations   
as a reality (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995; Poole et al., 2000; Mähring and Keil, 2008; Kraus and 
Strömsten, 2016) in which actors ( i.e managers) and their behavior and actions are  involved. 
The methods applied in this research support the interpretive approach. Thus, the process of data 
collecting (techniques and procedures) is built on the collecting of opinions, views and stories about 
the phenomenon investigated through interviews with the respondents. Such approach gave me the 
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possibility to apprehend the personal perceptions and interpretations, understand how meanings about 
the concrete actions and situations are constructed (Czarniawska, 2004). 
Ontology 
The phenomenological/interpretivist approach in research presumes that the ontological nature of the 
phenomena is regarded to exist in the consciousness of actors, and that the reality of the phenomena is 
constructed by the actor’s cognition, presenting the reality by the subjective opinions and  meanings 
(Lincoln and Cuba, 1985). The current research presents ontological perceptions in the describing and 
meditation of knowledge and judgments about the empirical world, created by the process of the 
internationalization and the situations, actors and phenomena involved in it.  
Epistemology 
The epistemological approach to present and describe phenomena is considered to occur from the 
meninges and standpoints of the subjective interpretations and perceptions.  Thus, while the 
ontological assumptions describe the nature of the phenomenon of  influence in the process of the 
internationalization  as the reality, the epistemological contemplations raise the question of how the 
phenomenon of influence can be described, what are the interaction between the researcher  and  what 
can be explored about the phenomenon of influence in the process of internationalization – reality. In 
this connection the following assumption is important that the knowledge about the studied phenomena 
(i.e the phenomenon of influence in the process of internationalization of a Norwegian MNC) is 
considered to be a result of the researcher’s and the actors/respondent’s interaction. Usually, the 
researchers’ interpretation about the subjective standpoints and opinions provided by respondents, has 
the interaction with the researchers own pre-conceptual viewpoints. The researchers’ new 
comprehension of the phenomenon and the understanding of the reality  through the respondent’s 
perceptions, have the impact on the  researcher’s interpretation of the phenomenon in the theoretical 
context.   
Methodology 
The ontological and epistemological approaches in the phenomenological/interpretivist paradigm have 
the strong impact on the research methodology. So long the reality of the described phenomena is 
socially constructed, comprehension about the studied phenomena can only be understood from the 
actor’s perceptions and viewpoints. That requires the awareness about the methods applied to the 
research, as careful understanding of the insight to interpretation and standpoints presented by actors 
(Lincoln and Cuba, 1985). Thus, the research has to have a role as a participant in the actor’s reality, 
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trying to interact it in order to interpret the reflections of cognitions about the phenomena/ phenomenon 
studied.  At the same time, such interaction cannot impose bias in researcher’s interpretation (Lincoln 
and Cuba, 1985).  Hence, actors are receiving an influential position in constructing both the 
knowledge in the research, the research design and the theories applied in the research. Relevant for 
this study, the key elements of this philosophical paradigm are presented, and there is a certain 
awareness of both its strengths and weaknesses, coincident with possibilities which focus on (adapted 
from Remenyi, 1998; Easterby-Smith et al., 2002; see also in Warner-Søderholm, 2010) evidence 
collection method and close contact between researcher and subjects. At the same time, data has been 
collected from small samples from the employees in “T”, the information was deliberately selected 
based on non-random selection, and evidence is rich and extensive. The insider’s point of view (emic) 
and descriptive write-up were preferred. The strengths of the phenomenological/interpretive approach, 
such as the ability to follow the change process in the process of the internationalization  related to the 
phenomenon of influence over time and the opportunity to understand people’s opinions about what 
they have experiences both in HQ and  in the subsidiaries abroad,  contributed to the evolution of new 
theories (Ibid). At the same time, it is necessary to observe that the possible weaknesses of the above-
named approach can be reflected in data collection, which can be time-consuming and resource-
demanding, and the analysis and interpretation of data may be difficult. Using the 
phenomenological/interpretive approach, it was harder to control the pace and completion of a study, 
and research results may be given lower creditability, due to the issue of subjectivity.  In order to avoid 
it the researcher needs to interact and be part of the reality of the respondents (Lincoln and Cuba, 
1987). 
Data collection 
This is a case study of a Norwegian MNC, “T”: of both its HQ and some of its subsidiaries abroad. 
The main source of empirical data was interviews: 34 face-to-face interviews and 21 conversations 
were held with “T”’s employees.  Interviews, both structured and unstructured, were the main and 
most useful method of data collection, as they allowed me to go deeper into the research problem: in-
depth, face-to-face interviews (personal interviews with the respondent informants inside the focus 
groups they belonged to) (Breweer, 2000). Most of the interviews were tape-recorded and later 
transcribed, which contributed to the collection of unimpaired notes but with all the information 
available later for full analysis. Since the interviews were exploratory in nature, special attention was 
focused on not steering the conversation towards the author’s personal viewpoints.  At the same time, 
it is important to mention that many of the interviewees were new to the interview settings. In order to 
arrange the interview-process as comfortable as possible for the respondents, in some interviews the 
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tape recorder was not used. Instead, it was made notes while the interviews have been conducted.  The 
notes from each interview were transcribed after the interview was over.  It was used the open-ended 
interviews as well (Kraus, et.al, 2016) that made the interview adaptive to each respondent, and created 
the conversational atmosphere, comfortable for the interviewee.   
The average time taken per interview was 1.5 hours, while the average time taken per conversation 
was 30 minutes.  All respondents had a role in the process of “T”’s internationalization.  
 In addition to that, 6 interviews and 3 conversations were conducted with managers from another 
companies than “T” aiming to get more background information about influence and control in the 
process of internationalization among the Norwegian enterprises. 
The collected empirical material guided the research, and lead to the additional interviews, some of 
them were performed as telephone interviews, or telephone conversations.  These interviews lasted in 
average 1 hours, and conversations between 25-35 minutes (average around 30 minutes).  
The focus in the interview was on the following central questions: 1). How has the internationalization 
of “T” happened? 2.) What control mechanisms were in place during the different phases of 
internationalization? 3). How have managers perceived the effects of those controls? The questions 
that were asked had the purpose of getting the respondents to explain the practices in HQ and 
subsidiaries. Three languages were used for data collection (English, Norwegian and Russian). 
Among the respondents were two former CEOs, former members of the executive board, former board 
members, present executives in “T”. “Access to elite groups is generally quite restricted” (Roberts et 
al., 2006 – see in Kraus and Strömsten, 2016) and the information collected required “discretion 
because the information was considered to be sensitive” (Kraus and Strömsten, 2016, p. 64).  In this 
connection, the majority of data was collected in the period from 2011 to 2018, and the topics of many 
interviews were linked to historical aspects, describing the process of internationalization from 1991. 
The author of this paper is also an employee of “T” and therefore had direct access to internal 
company documents and reports and “T”’s employees. Based on the agreements with “T”, the 
researchers used only information that could be published. This access made it possible for the author 
to have communication with “T”’s employees informally, providing the opportunity to complement the 
information provided by face-to-face interviews. Dialogues, discussions, conversations on the most 
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discussed topics related to the research questions were provided; informal meetings were helpful in 
the early stage of the research process, to clarify the details around the key issues.    
In order to present the insights into how the process of internationalization was developed, and what 
control mechanisms were used in order to achieve influence, the narrative stories told by some 
employees are presented and analyzed. In addition, secondary sources, such as annual reports and 
information from the website, have been used, in order to support the primary sources and verify the 
information from interviews.  
3.3. Issues of quality: Reliability, validity, and ethical considerations 
While the discussion on the case study and qualitative research is in progress, it is necessary to mention 
some important issues relevant for the study, as the case study has been criticized for exhibiting a 
tendency for poor validation and questionable generalizability, due to the lack of statistical techniques 
(Näslund, 2008).  According to Alvesson (1996, p. 456), “Much qualitative research is as superficial 
as questionnaire studies”. Qualitative methods can have the tendency to be subjective in interpretation; 
the methods of data collection, which are characterized by low-inference description, also have 
difficulties in distinguishing between raw data and analyzed data (Seale, 1999). In order to secure 
quality in research based on a case study, there has been a focus on the criteria of sound methodology 
(McNeill, 1990 in Riley et al., 2000), such as: validity, reliability and generalizability.  
Validity concerns how accurately collected data represents the social phenomena to which it refers 
(Hammersley, 1990 in Silverman, 2005). The researcher should be critical regarding whether the study 
clearly gains access to the experiences of those in the research setting (construct validity) (Fielding, 
1986). Thus, it is important to obtain access to data from experts on several levels working with the 
internationalization issues and with the TW implementation. Dialogues with experts from academic 
circles, representatives from the board of directors and shareholders were helpful to secure the quality 
of the information related to the research questions. Construct validity was secured by linking 
interview questions to the defined theoretical frames of reference.  
Reliability refers to the degree of consistency with which instances are assigned to the same category 
by different observers or by the same observer on different occasions. The focus groups included 
employees at several levels in HQ and the subsidiaries; “bottom-up” were used for primary data 
collection, starting from ordinary employees and moving up to top management. To secure reliability, 
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after interviewing and processing the results, the following method has been implemented - to deliver 
texts with interview summaries back to the interviewees, who asked about it for their approval in order 
to make any corrections or additions to the text.  
Bearing in mind that a concept of implementation of TW and its implementation in a multinational 
context is a global concept, and is international in its nature, generalizability here may be reached only 
in the sense of acquiring a fundamental understanding of the phenomenon studied (Gummesson, 2000); 
knowing that statistical generalization is hardly achieved in case studies: they rely on analytical 
generalization, e.g. knowledge acquired in one case may be applied to another (Stuart et al., 2002). 
Ethical issues of the research 
For scientific research, ethical issues always have the aspect of complexity: each research case will 
involve people and touch on possibly sensitive issues. Research ethics and the researcher’s behavior 
should be appropriate in relation to the rights of those who will become the subject of the researcher’s 
work, or might be affected by it (Saunders et al., 2003). To achieve ethical integrity with the parties 
involved, ethical issues must be the focus at all stages of the study. A process of formulation and 
clarification of the research questions must satisfy the interests and requirements of at least three 
parties: the researcher, academic supervisors and employees in “T”. As “T” is fully financing this PhD 
project, it was made the company interested in contributing to the overall goal’s research. At the same 
time, it is necessary to be cautious about my role as an independent researcher. To find a constructive 
compromise in the formal and academic requirements of the university, the expectations of “T” and 
the personal abilities of the researcher will be satisfied. This compromise and the corresponding 
adjustments of the research topic and perspectives of the study are achieved through continuous 
communication with all interested parties.  
Since much of the empirical data have been obtained from face-to-face interviews with managers and 
employees involved in the process of internationalization, it was fully respecting the rights of these 
people and their organizations. While obtaining access to the interviewees, interviewing, analyzing the 
data, and disseminating the research results, important issues, such as the privacy of the participants, 
the voluntary nature of participation and the right to withdraw, confidentiality and anonymity, 
objectivity, and the avoidance of harm, have been  addressed (Saunders et al., 2003). The participants 
were approached by informing them of the possible benefits of participation in interviews, instead of 
putting pressure on them. 
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The HQ and subsidiaries were opened in sharing their experience, supporting the research and 
receiving the benefits from better understanding the named processes, by providing access to the 
information and sharing the documentation and information. Any issue of disclosure of the research 
results were handled carefully, if it is directly dependent on the depth of data received from the 
interviewees. The author was aware of this topic and did her best to make the publication of research 
findings harmless to the parties involved: the interviewees were given the right of anonymity and, in 
the case of resistance from the interviewees regarding the use of the tape-recorder, it was explained 
that it is used to ensure data safety and to increase the accuracy of further data interpretation and 
analysis; if this does not help, a tape-recorder was not  used. There is no universal ethics code 
applicable in all cases (Dalton, 1964 in Saunders et al., 2003); one must operate as a thinking and 
reflective researcher, repeatedly sorting and re-evaluating one’s own values and obligations during the 
research process (ibid.). 
Validity 
It is important to underline the role of one of the authors employed in “T”, in connection with the 
research process. Being an employee of “T” for 20 years gives unique possibilities in respect of access 
to information, sources and informal contact with the employees, which provides informal interaction 
with “T”’s employees, who can be described as the sources of information and colleagues. At the same 
time, during a long career in “T”, this person has been an active participant in many processes that are 
now being described and analyzed. 
Since much of the empirical data has been obtained from face-to-face interviews with managers and 
employees involved in the process in “T”, whom the author knows well personally, any issue of 
disclosure of the research results will be handled carefully.  
Exploration of literature and data related to the described processes provided good sources for 
understanding the reasons of the process of internationalization and development and the 










Chapter 4: Phase 1 in the internationalization of “T” (1992-1996): “The 
battle to be a company” 
 
The story of the internationalization of a Norwegian MNC, “T”:  how “T”’s HQ’s mechanisms of 
influence over the subsidiaries abroad have changed during international expansion.  
In order to describe the internationalization process of the Norwegian state-owned incumbent “T”, it 
is necessary to answer a second question: how was the international strategy of “T” formed and 
developed? and what were the main triggers for the evolution of “T”’s international strategy? 
Based on the empirical evidence collected during this study, the internationalization of “T” can be 
described as a process divided into four phases:  1992-1995: “Small company – small international 
steps”; 1996-2001: “Planting the flags – Viking strategy”; 2002-2004/2005: “Up or out”; 2005/06-15: 
“Different companies – one group”. 
Chapters Four, Five, Six and Seven draw the picture of how “T” enhanced its HQ’s influence on 
subsidiaries, based on the empirical data collected in the period from 2013 to 2017.    
The  chapters are structured as follows:  each chapter starts by providing  the antecedent conditions, 
based on the macro  and/or micro factors for why a Norwegian MNC, “T”, started its international 
expansion; then it presents the internationalization  mode, describing “T”’s internationalization 
strategy; it then goes on to describe the configuration of the different  control mechanisms “T” 
prepared, in order to have influence and control in the subsidiaries;   finally, the mode of the perceived 
influence from HQ towards  the subsidiaries will be illustrated, by describing the factors that prevented 
“T”’s managers from having the full influence. 
During this period, company “T” changed its ownership form from that of a state-owned enterprise 
(SOE), a part of the telecommunication directorate, to an ordinary joint-stock company (JSC), starting 




4.1. Antecedent conditions:  The macro factors that influenced the strategic decisions 
related to the process of internationalization  
In this part, it will be highlighted the antecedent conditions – macro (external) factors – that influenced 
the building up and shaping of “T”’s international strategy. 
Factor 1:  Liberalization of the European market in the telecommunication sector that forced 
European operators - incumbents to change their domestic and international strategies. 
 
Starting from the 1980s, the EU19 commission initiated the research report, RACE (Research and 
Development in Advanced Communications Technologies in Europe), on the development of the 
telecommunication sector, targeting the establishment of the more effective common European market 
and innovative international competitive companies that could compete with the USA’s and Japan’s 
ICT and telecommunication industries (OECD, 1968; Servan-Schreiber, 1968; Dan Nguen et al., 
1992).  Already, by 1985, the EU had launched the idea of the common European market, regulated 
by the same laws, and, from January 1st, 1993, the ideas started to become a reality.   
In this period, the EU worked in parallel with the “green paper” – an action plan, presented in 1987, 
concerning the common European market for telecommunication services and telecommunication 
equipment. The complete liberalization of the European market was finalized for 1st January 1998 
(COM, 1987).  The EU directives  were aimed at increasing the competition  among the established 
European companies and  implementing the ideology of market orientation that was supposed to lead 
to lower prices for the communication services and better quality  that,  overall, should support the 
processes of  social and economic optimizing (COM, 87), meaning that  the access to modern mobile 
telephony can generate publicity, to increase the awareness of new products and services and lead to 
social development in society.  At the same time, modern technology and the improvement in high-
quality telecommunication services can   be one of the most important factors in the rapid economic 
development of the economy and society.  
In this period, substantial changes occurred in the regulation of the telecommunication market. In 1993, 
the EU announced plans to change the dominance of the national monopolies in telecommunication 
and to open up the European telecommunication market to full competition. In 1994, 24 countries in 
                                                 
19 European Union, hereafter in the text, it will be used EU. 
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the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) decided to reorganize the 
national operators as incumbents (an incumbent telecommunications company is a former monopoly 
that still has a dominant market share, often state-owned - brodynt.com), leading to organizational 
changes in the companies and increased competition. Most of the operators were organized as the 
agencies or parts of the telecommunication ministries and were now reorganized as   business 
companies that could provide access to different financial mechanisms and fresh capital, while, at the 
same time, having a high level of freedom in business decisions.    
The governmental report on the situation in the telecommunication sector in Europe and Norway 
(“Rapport fra statssekretærutvalvget som har vurdert tilknytningsform for Tlv20, Postverket og Norges 
Statsbanen, februar 1994) concluded that the liberalization of the telecommunication market in Europe 
had happened much quicker than expected. This would have an impact on the further development of 
the Norwegian incumbent company “T”, which, in 1994 had been reorganized as JSC “T”. The full 
liberation of the European market in telecom across borders happened from 1st January 1998.  
In practice, the consequences of the EU’s new liberal politics for the big European telecommunication 
incumbents – companies led to the end of the monopoly situation for the national telecommunication 
operators.  The upcoming high level of competition between the newly appeared domestic companies 
and the different European actors and the possible profits reduction followed. Hence, the need to 
protect the national telecommunication operators, while, at the same time, giving them possibilities to 
look at the new opportunities in competing in other European and international markets, changed 
national competition politics, and national legislation was needed (Stortingsmelding, 1986-1987). 
In Norway, as in many European countries (Norway is not an EU member country but a member of 
the EEA (European Economic Area), the above-described processes took place in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, leading to further big changes for the Norwegian state-owned company, “T”. 
Factor 2:  The opening of the markets in Eastern Europe 
 
The atmosphere of “Glasnost’” and the major changes that occurred in Eastern Europe at the end of 
the 1980s opened up opportunities for Western authorities and private companies, as well as for 
                                                 
20 Tlv -Televerket - the name of “T” up to 1995. 
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Western industries, to look at the countries of the former Eastern bloc as an interesting market, with 
good potential for investments and further growth.  
The main characteristics of these countries at that time were an underdeveloped, old and worn-down 
telecommunication infrastructure, and the lack of investments and access to capital. The traditional 
telecommunication and managerial channels were not effective. This situation opened up the 
possibilities for finding business opportunities in these countries by using personal contacts inside the 
political circles that company “T”, as the main telecommunication company in Norway, could use, in 
order to establish new business (Teledirektoratet, 1990).   
Liberalization of the telecommunication market in Europe forced the national operators, who were 
experiencing the threat of the open competition in domestic markets, to look at the new opportunities 
in the new promising markets. Eastern Europe was an attractive geographic area because of the 
perceived low-cost entrance to the markets and the highly supportive authorities in the local 
governments, emphasizing the processes of privatization, liberalization and modernization.    
The Eastern European countries needed both investment and modern technologies.  During the 1990s, 
the big European companies invested in Eastern Europe. Here are some examples of the strong 
expansion towards the Eastern European countries from Western companies: Deutsche Telecom 
(investments in Russia); Telia (investments in Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Russia); Sonera from Finland 
(investments in Russia); “T”   mobile (investments in Hungary; Czech republic); Tele 2 (investments 
in Croatia),  France Telecom (investments in Poland, Romania); Vodafone (investments in Czech 
Republic),  etc.  
Many of the European companies opened country offices in Eastern Europe, in order to do lobby 
government and to closely follow the investment climate in those markets.   
Factor 3:  The new technology opened up new possibilities 
 
The strong growth and rapid international expansion in the 1990s, on both the European and other big 
markets, are also connected with the blooming of the era of mobile telephony.  
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Mobile telephony was not a new phenomenon. The first mobile phones in Norway, as in other countries 
(so-called land-based mobile services), had already been established in the late 1950s, but the mobile 
phones were large and heavy – scarcely portable – and most were built into cars. Typical use was in 
closed networks where the office could communicate with the company’s cars, and the cars could be 
connected with each other. 
The first international co-operation related to the development of mobile technology took place in 
1969.  A mobile phone company from Norway and other Nordic telecom companies gathered in 
Northern Norway and decided to establish Nordic Mobile Technology (NMT). The goal was to 
develop a common standard for more advanced mobile technology –now known as first-generation 
mobile services (1G); the usage was extended – mostly to boats and cottages, homes, etc. – as the sets 
became more portable. 
The project also became a driving force in the development of the next mobile generation – GSM 
(Groupe Spécial Mobile or Global System for Mobile Communication), which was formally 
standardized in 1989 and launched commercially in many European countries at the beginning of the 
1990s. The Nordic countries (Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland) were the first to launch GSM 
in 1993. At the same time, many of the European countries started to develop the GSM more actively, 
like the Nordic countries, as long as they did not have another technology as the Nordic countries.  
The revolutionary project, NMT21, started to compete with the new technology, GSM. This new 
standard was underestimated during its early. Thus, in Norway, the use of the NMT phone was 
recommended, but in the marketing advertisement related to GSM, it was explained that GSM phones 
were mostly for those traveling to Western Europe (Telecom Revy, 1998). The chief of Tele Mobile 
in Norway strongly believed that NMT technology would survive long after 2000, as long as NMT 
was built up with good coverage in the mountains and along the coast, and with good signals in the 
sea, used by hunters and fishermen (in reality, it was closed in 1998, due to GSM’s rapid development) 
(DN, 1991). 
At the same, GSM systems were actively rolled out in Europe, when customers discovered the real 
benefits from the technology. Due to the active competition in Europe, the prices on GSM phones 
                                                 
21 Nordic Mobile Telephone System, hereafter in the text, will be used NMT. 
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started to fall. In Norway, during the autumn of 1993, the cost for GSM communication had already 
reduced by 27%. 
During the period of 1996-1997, the operators in Norway and in many other European countries 
established a broad distribution network and delivered good coverage. The prices for services came to 
the level that even private customers could afford; during the campaign period, the price of a phone 
could even be 1 NOK. 
GSM started to be the main standard in Europe, which gave an advantage in the implementation of 
this, the most developed telecommunication technology, in in the markets that did not have full 
standardization, as in the countries of Western Europe, and used several systems (such as the CDMA22 
technological standard for mobile telephony in Asia, and the AMPS standard in the USA). Using the 
technological advantage of being an experienced operator in GSM systems and using the close co-
operation with the European vendors that supported GSM systems, like Nokia, Ericsson and Alcatel, 
many of the European countries used this knowledge in their internationalization strategy, especially 
towards East European markets that chose the European GSM standard, instead of that of the USA or 
Asia. 
At the same time, the further technological improvements in GSM systems gave an opportunity for the 
European investors to also be attractive in the Asian region.  
As the incumbent operator in Norway, “T” took all the advantages of the modern technological 
development in telecommunication and built up solid competence, based on GSM and NMT standards, 
and tested both standards in Norway’s challenging landscape.   
Factor 4: Opportunities in big Asian markets  
 
The globalization of the world economy opened opportunities to look at markets that lie far from 
neighboring borders. The Asian region, being deeply integrated in a global economy, started to become 
a region for growth and big possibilities for investors from the Western countries. The world order 
seemed to be in a great transition, shifting the place of power and influence from the West to the East 
(Yeo Lay Hee, 2002).  
                                                 
22 CDMA Code-Division Multiple Access. Hereafter in the text, it will be used CDMA. 
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The main trends of political liberalization and democracy and economic reforms made the region of 
Southeast Asia especially attractive for the investor. Using the examples of Indonesia, which became 
a member of G20, the political opening in Myanmar, and improved investor climate, despite some 
political tensions in countries like Thailand and the Philippines, can illustrate the positive attractiveness 
of the Asian markets for investors. This is in spite of the fact that Asian countries faced challenges in 
establishing strong governance and the order of law, and the struggle against corruption and political 
patronage (ibid.). The Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998 forced serious reforms that initiated closer 
co-operation between countries in the region and global investors.  Hence, the following main external 
triggers behind internationalization in Asia made the region a targeted market for Western business: 
the region’s large population, low-cost entry and improved predictability of investor climate.  
To summarize, from the middle of the 1990s there were several important drivers, influencing the 
development of the European telecommunication market, that supported the European 
telecommunication operators in their active internationalization process. Among the main factors that 
helped the process of internationalization are: 1) the liberalization of the European market in the 
telecommunication sector, forcing European incumbents to change their domestic and international 
strategies; 2) the opening of the emerging markets in Eastern Europe; 3) the new mobile technology 
that opened up new possibilities for investment abroad; and 4) the great opportunities in the large 
emerging Asian markets, which started to be attractive for the European companies. 
4.2. Internationalization strategy of “T” in Phase 1 
This section introduces the main steps in the internationalization strategy of “T” during Phase 1 of its 
internationalization. 
1. The necessity for the organizational changes ahead of the challenges, in line with the 
liberalization of the telecommunication market coming from the EU: the process of 
transformation of “T” from state-owned enterprise (SOE) to an ordinary joint-stock company 
(JSC). 
 
On 1st January 1995, the Norwegian state-owned enterprise, Tlv, became “T”. This fact was closely 
connected to the processes of organizational change that began in 1991, when a new CEO has been 
appointed. The new CEO did not have much experience in the internationalization process. His focus 
was on the domestic market, ownership issues and the reorganization of the company. Despite this, a 
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short time after being appointed as CEO of “T”, he understood the necessity for organizational changes 
ahead of the challenges, in line with the liberalization of the telecommunication market coming from 
the EU and increasing globalization. In this connection, there was a need to start “T”’s international 
expansion. In order to meet the new situation, where “T” could take is own business decisions and 
obtain access to capital through the world financial mechanisms, it was necessary to transform “T” 
from a state-owned enterprise (SOE) to an ordinary joint-stock company (JSC). In addition, one of the 
important reasons for the changes was that the regulation in Norway was supposed to be harmonized 
according to the EU’s demands for liberalization of the telecommunication market. Following that, 
“T” had initiated with the owners (the Ministry of Communication) the process of transforming “T” 
from an SOE to a JSC and, further, to a public listed company. This process can be described as 
preparatory work, to meet the upcoming European competition initiated by the EU.   
The different groups in the Norwegian authorities that had a focus on “T” and represented “T”’s owner 
(i.e. the Norwegian state) were divided in their visions about “T” and its organizational transformation. 
Some of them were even skeptical about the changes of the form of ownership and the plans for 
possible internationalization.   
The stakeholders were afraid to lose the “Norwegian focus” in “T”’s business model. 
Nevertheless, “T” started to look for some small opportunities abroad, in order “not 
to be eaten by the big companies” when the EU directives were implemented. At the 
same time, the organizational changes were necessary because a company with an 
SOE structure could not invest abroad. We had to become a company that could have 
investment projects. An EVP (executive vice president) was appointed to be 
responsible for international projects, and he started to build up the international 
team. At the same time, we had to change the system of reporting as a JSC. (Interview 
with the former Legal Director of “T”, member of the executive board, 2015) 
The organizational changes, started by the CEO, led to important transformations– the company 
became a JSC and new routines were established in the relationship with the Ministry of 
Communication. The state changed the ownership of “T”, in order to avoid the conflict of professional 
interests in telecommunication, from the Ministry of Communication to the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry.  The Ministry of Trade and Industry continued to own 100% of “T”, on behalf of the state. 
The new owner of “T” continued to retain control of the company but now this was based on the  rules 
regulated  by the EU, related to the  governance between the owner as a state and the business company, 
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meaning that even the ministry appointed  both the  BoD, the Chairman of the BoD, but, in its the 
business decisions,  “T”  was independent, as these decisions were approved by the BoD. However, in 
strategic decisions concerning the national telecommunication policy, the Minister expected to be 
oriented by the Chairman of the BoD and the CEO, in order to provide information, further, to the 
Prime Minister and/or Parliament. 
2. “T” found international projects, mostly by being invited by other telecommunication 
operators or through projects being found by their own managers (“passionate ambassadors”), 
who established a good relationship with their local partners. There was no clear international 
strategy related to technology, geography or the issue of ownership.   
Dilemmas related to internationalization 
The former CEO of “T” (1992-2001) explained that, at the start of internationalization, there were 
certain dilemmas, such that many of the projects were in the emerging markets and “T” needed to find 
the right form of ownership for its subsidiaries (Interview, 2014).  The dilemmas that the respondent 
mentioned are connected with the internal debates in “T”.  Some of the top managers argued for 
international expansion into the established and mature markets in Western Europe, while others 
argued for expansion into Eastern Europe, with high risks and political instability but good possibilities 
for further growth.   
Following the idea of JV as a preferable form of ownership at an early stage of its internationalization, 
the respondent underlined that emerging markets were the natural choice for “T” so long as: 
There were possibilities and we were invited to be there. We also looked upon this 
project from an idealistic point of view, and we created possibilities and helped to 
develop the markets and the countries. In these countries, we didn’t take dividends 
for as long as possible, in order to develop the companies. All of them were JVs. 
(ibid.)   
The first investments were made not only in the border-area – North-West Russia and especially the 
Murmansk area – but also in the Baltic area. In 1991, the President of Lithuania asked the Norwegian 
government to support the establishment of direct communication between Lithuania and Norway. 
Using satellite technology from the roof of the Lithuanian Parliament, several satellite lines were built 
to connect Oslo and Vilnius.   
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At the same time, the first Central European investments were made in Hungary (from 1993 to 1995), 
as a result of an invitation from other Nordic telecommunication operators to join a consortium.   
Internationalization, as I remember, started from the small projects in Murmansk in 
1992-1993 – we organized traffic (signals and voice services – author) via Norway. 
The office in Vadsø has responsibility for that. But, before the project started, and 
even after that, at HQ at the top level the discussions were focused on the Norwegian 
cases…  
“T” understood that our monopoly would be over because of the EU directives, and 
we had to change the ownership in order to be a company or we could not invest.  
We thought that we needed to look abroad, but there were not many discussions 
about this topic among the top leaders: how to organize the activities and what kind 
of projects to look for…  
We did not even have staff with international experience. They came later and were 
the driving force in the international projects – the real passionate ambassadors. 
(Interview with the former Legal Director, member of the executive board, 2015) 
Answering my question, “Did ‘T’ have an internationalization strategy at that time?”, most of the 
respondents replied that “T” did not have an international strategy. The first international projects 
appeared mostly because of “political approval”,  in terms of the Ministry being very well informed 
about the projects and supporting them (Interviews with the former “T” worked with international 
projects, 2015; the former Legal Director, member of the executive board, 2015; the CEO 1991-2001).   
Another respondent said that managers from “T” acted on their own, without the involvement of the 
authorities, and found projects themselves for different reasons. 
We were very curious about going to work abroad. But we were small and 
unexperienced and had to tread carefully. We were often invited to be part of 
international co-operation, as we were known for good technical skills. Thus, 
Denmark Telecom invited us to be a small partner in Hungary. And the local 
telecommunication managers from the northern part of Norway and the northern part 
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of Russia wanted to co-operate and form a common project across borders. The 
authorities did not initiate any of these projects. (Interview with the one of the former 
executive managers in “T” who both in Norway and internationally from 1990s, 
2018) 
 At the same time, the former CEO of “T” explained that many of the first international projects in the 
northern part of Russia were supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Minister of Trade 
and Industry was informed.  As an example of this, he told about the project for the donation of 
depreciated telecommunication analog equipment to the Arkhangelsk area (Kholmogory), when “T” 
was asked to deliver the equipment, install it and teach the local staff (Conversation with the respondent 
– employee from the division, involved in several projects in the Northern part Russia, 2015). 
Several respondents said that the drive behind the first international projects was not a matter of 
strategic decisions and doing business internationally and making profits but, rather, a matter of 
curiosity about working internationally and the possibilities of carrying out small projects, together 
with international partners. 
We were like pioneers, wanting to come out into the big international world, and we 
learned step by step. (Interview with the former legal director, 2018) 
At the same time, one of “T”’s executives, who was responsible for taking care of 
international projects said that he did not agree that “T” did not have an international 
strategy. In his point of view, despite the main focus at the corporate level being on 
domestic affairs, his department took the first steps to develop the international 
strategy. In this period, the strategy was dedicated to making attempts to build up 
international alliances with European operators, among them BT), which benefited 
“T” later in establishing the international footprint (Interview with a member of the 
Executive Board also responsible for international projects). 
In spite of the modest, but successful, co-operation with BT, most of the issues that were discussed at 
the board of directors’ meetings and executive meetings in “T”’s HQ were dedicated to affairs in the 




I don’t remember that the BoD or top management of “T” discussed international 
projects in detail. We were focused on domestic issues. (Interview with the former 
Legal Director, member of the executive board, 2015) 
The same respondent stated that, even the newly appointed CEO did not think about international 
projects at this time; most of the projects came from either the authorities or the managers in “T”, who 
established good personal contacts abroad (Interview, 2018). 
3. All of “T”’s investments abroad in Phase 1 were low-cost projects with small-stake ownership 
in JVs.  There was a battle with its own BoD to obtain support for these projects. 
 
The first international investments had already been made in 1993.  The first projects were a part of 
the political process in the framework of Barents co-operation and started in Murmansk. The 
liberalization processes in Russia in telecommunication in the early 1990s were mostly related to the 
establishment of new legislation, and, therefore, the Russian authorities prepared the reforms in order 
to attract Western capital.  “T” used this opportunity and established a fixed network telephony-project, 
“KTcom23”, in which 50% was owned by the Russian governmental fixed line company, “Mesv24”, 
and 50% by “T”. A former Legal Director of “T” explained: 
“T” decided to try the first investments abroad as JV projects and inexpensive, while 
we lacked international experience and wished to reduce the risks. At the same time, 
we were not so much occupied by having profits. It was important to learn to work 
internationally. (Interview, 2016) 
His statement was confirmed by another executive at “T”: 
We did not have enough capital; we were state-owned and looked for small low-cost 
projects. The BoD did not always support us. (Interview with a former member of 
the Executive Board, responsible for mobile operations worldwide, 2015) 
                                                 
23 KTcom- JV of “T” in Russia in Murmansk  
24 Mesv – Russian company in Murmansk 
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One of “T”’s pioneers in international projects in the late 1990s described how the “KTcom” project 
was established. 
The Chief of “T” in Vadsø had a good relationship with the Chief of “Mesv”. They 
discussed how to improve the quality of telecommunication services in the 
Murmansk area, which were very bad in this period. The idea was to send good 
signals via Norway and establish a good voice telephony. People from the Murmansk 
area could call with the Norwegian numbers but pay local tax. It was a low-cost 
project; none of the partners had much money.  From “T”’s side, the intention was 
not to make money but to learn how to work with Russians. That helped us a lot later. 
When we decided to go further in international expansion and participated in a tender 
in St. Petersburg, together with the Swedish and Finnish partners, the American 
telecommunication company was the most serious competitor. The Americans were 
experienced, rich and arrogant. They were sure that they would beat us. But the 
Russians chose us! Mostly because of the fact that we had good experience in 
working with Russians in Murmansk and Arkhangelsk and because we had learned 
how to work with Russians – how to show respect and be polite, to understand their 
culture. (Interview, 2018) 
In “T”’s BoD documents from 1992 (ref. Thue, 2005) it states that, in 1989 in the Murmansk area, six 
international JVs were registered. By the beginning of 1992, the number of such JVs had increased to 
56.  Three Nordic countries were most active in this region, and Finland was the most active.  Other 
substantial investments were made in the company “NWG25” in St. Petersburg in 1994/1995. This was 
again a JV between Russian partners (51%) and the consortium of three Nordic countries that together 
owned 49%, of which “T” owned 12.74%. Finland’s SO26 owned 25% and Swedish TA27, 12.26%.   
At the beginning of 1997, “T” invested almost 40 million NOK in the northwestern part of Russia. 
According to a Director, who worked in projects in Russia in the 1990s, the projects were successful. 
                                                 
25 NWG – JV in St.Petersburg 
26 SO – a company from Finland 
27 TA – a company from Sweden 
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We did not lose money, we made some profits and built up our competence and 
knowledge, step by step.  All these first projects were very important for the further 
internationalization of the company. (Interview, 2018) 
However, the BoD of “T” was not supportive of “T”’s first small steps abroad. In “T”’s BoD notes 
from 1995, reflecting on the investments in the 1990s, the following is stated:   
Unfortunately, there was a sliding in the international projects, in that they were not 
based on any strategy, and, without that, the formal conditions for the projects were 
not fully clarified in advance.  (Notes from the BoD, 2005, 330)  
Because of the Nordic co-operation, “T” was brought into the St. Petersburg 
consortium… Do we have a strategy in this area? (ibid.) 
The development of the projects happened so quickly, and before any decision was 
taken about the strategy, “T” was involved by Nordic partners in a bidding round in 
Hungary. (ibid.)   
Unfortunately, the development of the investments in Russia was influenced by 
changing premises, and because of that “T” was committed more than was foreseen 
at the start. (ibid.) 
The interviews and documents that describe the start of “T”’s international projects in the 1990s show 
that the first step in the internationalization process was not taken because of the clear strategic 
decisions regarding international expansion. Rather, it can be characterized as small steps and “pilot 
projects”, mostly initiated by management working as pioneers (mentioned in one interview) and who 
later became known as “passionate ambassadors” and the first expatriates in “T”. 
4. At the same time, one important thing was clear for the top management – “T”’s role abroad 
can be defined as an industrial investor.   
 
Since 1855, when “T” was established, the company has developed high quality, both in telephony and 
later in modern telecommunication. That is why “T” could use its technical competence as the unique 
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know-how in its international projects abroad.  One of the telecommunication pioneers in “T” related 
that, when the whole of Europe was talking about GSM standards as a European standard from the 
beginning of the 90s,  “T”  had already initiated the first project in a mobile telephony in 1966: a  kind 
of prototype of modern mobile communication (From conversations with the former Chief in “T” 
Mobile,  2010). 
One of the respondents explained that it was important for “T” to underline its role as an industrial 
investor, and not a financial investor, when it could contribute to the JV with its industrial competence, 
developing the JV and increasing the value: 
Due to “T”’s 160 years of technical competence in knowing how to build up the 
telecommunication network in the challenging and demanding geographical 
conditions of Norway, and  taking into consideration that “T” started early with the 
modern technology, in order to cover a country with demanding geography, there 
was no doubt for top management  that “T” could be just an industrial investor in the 
international projects. We knew telecom vey well as engineers, as people who built 
up telecom in difficult conditions. We knew how to build up good 
telecommunication coverage. We could contribute and wanted to contribute with this 
knowledge, developing the projects in a good industrial way. (Interview with a 
former senior manager, who worked both in Norway and abroad, a member of 
several BoDs abroad, 2013)    
One of the directors in “T”, who worked for the company for almost 40 years, starting on an apprentice-
training scheme and progressing to the position of an executive in “T”, explained the reason for “T”’s 
having unique technical skills. He called attention to Norway as a “laboratory” for the most challenging 
telecommunication projects ever, because of the geographical position of the country and the difficult 
landscape – like a laboratory, where the technical staff of “T” worked extremely hard with the coverage 
issues. Underlying the importance of the quality of a telecommunication network “without holes”, one 
of the most experienced top managers of “T”, who worked first in Norway on the launching of the 
mobile network and then on  several important international projects, always said to both Norwegian 
colleagues and colleagues abroad: “Coverage, coverage and again coverage are the most important 
elements in telecommunication”. 
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“T” wanted to utilize its competence in technical skills during the process of internationalization and 
to use it as an advantage in competition with other operators.  “T”’s technical staff had developed 
special knowledge in how to build good coverage for telecommunication services in demanding 
geographical conditions: good coverage, no “holes”, technically smart. The EVP responsible for the 
international projects stated that even big European companies that had sufficient capital for 
international expansion appreciated “T”’s technical know-how and wanted to invite “T” into different 
alliances (Interview with former director in international operations who had as well solid experience 
from Norway, 2016). 
To summarize, 
Firstly, it seems that “T” did not have clear plans for its international strategy, despite “T” having been 
involved in several international projects. Often “T” was invited to participate in the different 
consortiums because of its industrial know-how and competence. “T” management had dilemmas and 
discussions related to internationalization. 
Secondly, several important issues can be underlined, such as: the markets for expansion were not 
clearly defined – “T” invested in the countries in which it was invited to invest  by its local partners, 
initiated by authorities or international operators who wanted to build up alliances;  the technology for 
investment projects was not clear – in some projects there were investments in fixed network 
telephony, in others, in mobile telephones; the ownership model for the international business was  JV.   
Thirdly, several important processes, as the organizational changes in “T” led to the transformation to 
POE,  and allowed “T” to  make “the pilot”   international  project, that was the start for  “T”’s  
internationalization  that happened by  small steps in the geographical area close to the Norwegian 
border in the North and later in Hungary. “T” used the new the organizational structure and a new 




4.3. Configuration of control mechanisms used in Phase 1 of “T”’s to achieve influence 
from HQ toward subsidiaries. 
Ownership:  small parts in JVs are preferable. 
All “T”’s activities abroad in the 1990s were JVs; most of “T”’s existing JVs abroad were established 
in emerging markets (see Table 4.1, describing the portfolio of “T” at the end of the 1990s).    
Here is the portfolio, just in the telephony projects from 1992-1996 (from “T”’s press release March 
2000. “T” website)28.  
 
Table 4.3 The first international activities (1992-1996) 
 




VIA29 Germany 10% 
COS30 Greece 22% 
PAN31 Hungary 25.8% 
ESA32 Ireland 49.5% 
CON33 Austria 17.5% 




Table 4.3 demonstrates that, to the end of 1996, the international projects in telephony (fixed network 
and mobile) were JVs, with the ownership share mostly less than 50%.  
What was the reason that “T” chose to be in JV ownerships in operations abroad?  
                                                 
28 The names of the companies in the Table have been changed by the author The same will be applied in the next tables.  
29 JV in Germany 
30 JV in Greece 
31 JV in Hungary 
32 JV in Ireland 
33 JV in Austria 
34 JV in Russia, St. Petersburg 
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The data show several main discussions regarding why “T” started the internationalization process 
with small shares in JVs. 
Lack of capital 
Several respondents mentioned that “T” did not have enough capital to invest in companies in mature 
markets, where the risks for foreign investors were much lower, while emerging markets were 
connected with the high political and economic risks. 
“T” had to choose a JV ownership structure together with local partners. 
(Conversation with the former member of the executive board responsible for 
international projects, 2015) 
The same information about the reasons for choosing JV ownership at the beginning of 
internationalization was confirmed by the former EVP for mobile operations worldwide, who said that: 
We did not have not enough capital to start the international expansion by targeting 
a big portfolio. We had to buy what was cheap and available on the markets – small 
projects, mostly in the emerging markets because of the price of being a partner in 
JVs (Interview with the former EVP responsible for international mobile operations, 
2014).   
“T” was late in its process of internationalization 
Continuing with the topic of “T”’s form of ownership in subsidiaries abroad, one of the respondents 
pointed out that “T” was late in its process of internationalization and started to look at the 
opportunities to invest abroad later than other European companies, and that there were no available 
licenses left in the European markets.  
We were late in our internationalization; all the licenses that probably could have 
been available in Western Europe had been taken by others, and we had to look 
towards the markets with high risks, small stakes and low influence. We needed to 
co-operate with the local partners. (Conversation with the former senior manager 
worked in the international mobile operations, both in Norway and internationally). 
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This supports the arguments for why “T” had to choose the JV partnership at the beginning of its 
international investments on the emerging markets that were connected with high risks, mostly linked 
to political risks, and low influence in JVs.  
Lack of international experience led to the individualization of internationalization through “passionate 
ambassadors”  
Another member of the Executive Board of “T” in the period from 1991–1999 confirmed that “T” 
started with JVs, but he shared another opinion that: 
At the beginning, and even in the middle of the 1990s, the international expansion 
or anything that we can describe as ‘international’ was not an issue in the executive 
meetings; the focus was on the domestic operations. (Interview with the former 
member of the Executive Board responsible for the international projects, 2015) 
When the first international operation appeared, there were no discussions about 
what kind of ownership “T” would have, or what markets, or what technology.  “T” 
did not have any international experience, we had to start with some small projects.  
It was JVs that “T” started with. (Interview with the former member of the Executive 
Board responsible for Legal Affairs, 2016)   
At the same time, he confronted the other respondent’s opinion that JV was the preferable form of 
ownership. He agreed with the majority of the respondents that, in the early stages of the 
internationalization ,“T”’s top-level team did not have a clear strategy for international operations, but 
“T”’s “passionate ambassadors” secured small stakes in different companies abroad, where they 
managed them (the discussion on the “passionate ambassadors” will be given in the sector related to 
the role of expatriates). In these terms, the international strategy was individualized, and centralized.    
Discussions among top management about “JVs in Eastern markets or alliances with “Western 
partnerships”  
Different stories were told about the first phase of “T”’s internationalization, which can illustrate the 
internal discussions in “T” at the top level of management. One of the central dilemmas at the 
beginning of the internationalization process of “T” was dedicated to the question: Is it beneficial for 
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“T” to be a part of a big European alliance or not? The result of this discussion was directly connected 
to the question about the form of ownership for projects abroad – JV or not. 
One of the respondents explained that, at that time, understanding its limitations in international 
experience, “T” did not have the ambition to own 100% in the subsidiaries abroad but aimed to be a 
minority owner by being a member of a strong alliance with a powerful and experienced Western-
European operator.  The respondent explained that, in his opinion, “T” had a strategy: orientation 
primarily towards mature markets and to have a small stake in JV projects, as it was more secure to be 
in the mature European markets than in emerging markets (the former EVP responsible for all 
international projects, interview 2014).   
It was a good reason for having just small stakes and not sharing the risks, but to 
build up the alliance with the predictable and solid Western partners working in a 
known environment... We had a very good relationship with the people from BT… 
we contributed well to the projects, a nice atmosphere in co-operation, we understood 
each other. (ibid.) 
I was responsible for building up the alliance with B in the early 1990s, and we 
invested together with B in mature markets such as Germany and Ireland, as JVs.  It 
was a strategy – to go to the markets that we could understand – in Southern Europe 
or Western Europe or where we could go and use the technology that we were good 
at. (ibid.)   
The respondent pointed out that, in order to maintain the good relationships with the partners in JVs, 
he built up personal contacts with the leaders from B.   
Another respondent talked about the discussions among the top management of “T” and explained why 
being part of an alliance was not beneficial for “T” in the long term, and that JV was a necessary form 
of ownership for international projects in the short term.  
“T” had to sell the shares in JVs in mature markets and to leave the alliance with BT, 
despite the good co-operation and good partnership.  We understood each other, had 
a similar mentality in how to do business, we could understand the language and 
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could communicate directly with the partners. It is true that we did not have the 
dominating position in JVs – we were minorities, and we did not have enough 
influence and control. Our business co-operation with partners was based on trust 
and the same understanding of the business models. (The former EVP responsible 
for all international activities from the corporate level, interview 2014) 
Another respondent was sure that the JVs in emerging markets, without alliances with the Western 
partners, was the right way to go. 
If we stayed in the alliance with B, we would always be just another small partner 
from a small country, without having control and influence, that would lead in the 
future to the position of being a small partner in different JVs.   We did not know 
what to do in 1992–1993. Everything was new.  Maybe it sounds unoriginal to say 
in 2014 that a low level of ownership leads to a low level of influence. But in 1993, 
when we didn’t have a clear strategy, no experience, we looked at all the markets 
where we could use our skills in technology and where we could invest small money.  
In other words:  cheap markets, small money, but good possibilities in the future 
through increasing the number of shares – that was our approach…   
Emerging markets and JVs provided these possibilities as, for example, in Hungary. 
We started there with 5% ownership in a consortium and increased more and more 
to 100%. We were aware that we needed to increase ownership, in order to have 
more influence. We hunted for it. (Interview with the former EVP responsible for 
International Mobile Operations, 2014).  
Did “T” even consider owing 100% in international projects?  
Most of the respondents were very surprised by the direct question: “Did ‘T’ actually consider owning 
100% in international operations from the first steps?  The answers revealed that this question was not 
discussed at all in “T”, and many of those who were responsible for the international projects thought 
that there were limitations in telecommunication legislation in the emerging markets that demanded 
the partnership with local operators.  
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I assume that that it was not possible to have the majority in JVs in emerging markets. 
We never discussed this possibility. (Interview with the Director involved in 
international operations from the 1990s, 2018) 
 I think that it was not allowed to own 100%... We took what we could take and were 
enthusiastic about it. We never discussed 100% ownership. (Interview with the Legal 
director, involved in International projects from the 90s) 
To conclude, “T” made a choice to be in a JV ownership for different reasons, mostly because of the 
lack of capital and the lack of international experience, which led to their later entrance in the 
international arena. “T” had disagreements among the top management, related to the form of the first 
steps in international projects – whether to go for an alliance with the strong Western partners or to try 
the first JVs for itself. At the same time, the respondents confirmed that the question of 100% 
ownership was not an issue at the start of internationalization.  
BoD: Members of the BoD from “T” had a supportive role, functioned as a link with HQ and 
provided JVs with the necessary competence. 
 
In the data collection process, there were several respondents who worked with the international 
operations in the early 1990s.  Almost all of these who were members of the BoD in subsidiaries in 
JVs understood that the level of control or influence in JVs was limited, but it was more important to 
build good relationships with the partners and transfer knowledge from the HQ to subsidiaries.  This 
aspect was mentioned in several interviews: 
Relationships with partners were important… as was not taking out the dividends in 
a period in order to develop the company... we co-operated with the Norwegian 
authorities that supported starting the projects in the border area close to Norway. 
(Interview with the former CEO in “T” in the period 1991-2001) 
Another respondent mentioned that, for the BoD members, it was important to teach the local partner 
how to do business in the Western way and to teach the staff of the local company (Conversation with 
a member of the BoDs in two companies in Russia in the middle of the 1990s, 2012). 
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To conclude, “T” considered that the BoD was a forum for building relationships and not for having 
control. 
Expatriates: “Passionate ambassadors” were important for the start and further development 
of the international projects. 
 
As mentioned in several interviews, the internalization in practice of “T” was driven by the so-called 
“passionate ambassadors” (the definition came from several interviews) of the international projects.  
We had “passionate ambassadors”, who traveled in many countries, established 
contacts and tried to find investment projects for “T”; their role was invaluable. 
(Interview with a former member of the Executive Board, responsible for mobile 
operations worldwide, 2015) 
We needed the enthusiastic people, the “passionate ambassadors”, who traveled 
everywhere, could represent us and find good partners and projects. (Former EVP in 
legal issues)  
It was mentioned that it is important to have “good ambassadors” in subsidiaries 
(former EVP in HR35). 
“T”’s people were like cowboys in the 1990s – we came from a small country, there 
were no direct connections to many countries (Eastern Europe, Asia), we did not 
have much money to invest, but we had a lot of competence and courage. Tempo 
was an important element for us. And passionate people were the key. (Former EVP 
responsible for mobile operations) 
Thus, the “passionate ambassadors” were the people who did not have the formal position of being 
an expatriate and did not have control functions or much formal power. But, being the trusted 
employees of HQ and having a close relationship with the top management of “T”, they influenced the 
business process of internationalization by collecting important knowledge and establishing the 
necessary connections abroad, with both potential partners and local authorities. They traveled all over 
                                                 
35 HR-Human Resources department. Hereafter in the text, it will be used HR 
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the world and established the contacts needed, gained knowledge about foreign markets and brought 
it back to HQ, influencing the business decisions. “Passionate ambassadors” were the first of “T”’s 
employees to work internationally, and, when the first investments were made abroad, they worked in 
JVs or country offices, in order to support the activities and transfer their knowledge and contacts. 
 After the first success stories abroad, we understood that we could manage 
international projects, could have influence among the local partners because we 
were good at technology. (Former member of the Executive Board, responsible for 
international operations)  
What helped our people at the beginning of internationalization was the fact that we 
came from a small peaceful country, with highly developed technical skills. We were 
not a threat. We were supportive. Our people established good relationships with the 
partners and authorities. (Former Executive manager worked both in Norway and 
internationally, had a career of almost 30 years in “T”) 
Our “passionate ambassadors” were good skilled persons; they were not afraid to 
travel, as all Norwegians, they had a good understanding of the possibilities in 
building telecommunication. It was important not to sit at home but to travel and 
search for good projects. (Former EVP, responsible for international mobile 
operations) 
To conclude, gaining from the efforts of the “passionate ambassadors”, it was essential that “T” 
expanded internationally. It seems that “T” needed more people, who could work internationally, being 
at the same time highly qualified professionals when it came to internationalization.  
CCR: “T” has simple templates, based on Norwegian values such as “How to behave in “T”. 
 
Although the CCR were not formally developed at that time, the CEO during this period, was 
personally engaged in the issue of ethical attitudes to doing business, underlining the importance of 
having clear ethical standards for business practice as an important condition for entry to the emerging 
markets. Particular, it was important, when “T” had to choose to be an investor in a JV, in which the 
level of influence was low and the tradition of doing things was different from that of Norway. Thanks 
to the CEO, the Ethical Council was established, and ethical issues were thus on the agenda. This was 
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supposed to contribute to those managers better understanding the ethical framework of doing 
business. 
It is important that everything should be correct when a company such as “T”, a state-
owned JSC, is going abroad. At the start, the best legal form was JV, in order to 
understand the situation and work with the authorities. We, as a company, had to 
play an important role – we had to develop the possibilities. In order to achieve that, 
we had to be clear about “T”’s and Norwegian values. (ibid.)  
I personally have worked with the CEO from 1997-20101, and my impression is just 
as he described.  The CEO often said that it is important to remember that “T” is a 
state-owned company and it is extremely important to demonstrate the standards for 
ethical business.   As an example, it is necessary to mention how the first 
international projects in the North (Kola area) were developed. 
The first international projects in “T” were politically supported by the idea of 
Barents co-operation in the North. “T”’s staff had close co-operation with the 
administrations from the northern part of Norway and three northern areas in Russia 
– Arkhangelsk, Murmansk and Petrozavodsk – when the Pomor – the 
telecommunication project – was established in 1989, in order to provide high-
quality telephone lines for the northwestern region of Russia. The project was 
supported by the Russian and Norwegian authorities. Both the Murmansk and 
Arkhangelsk areas were areas closed to international investment before 1989; in 
order to understand the rules of the game in these areas, “T” co-operated  with the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which  both supported  “T” in   coaching for the ethical 
attitude in doing business abroad (ExportRådets kurs) and helped “T” to fill out all 
the necessary documents, in order to be as correct as possible, and represent Norway. 
Many of the projects in the Barents area were charity projects, supported by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway (e.g. the project to install depreciated 
technical telecommunication equipment and train the local staff in its maintenance).  
In this period, the Ethical Council published a small book with advice on how to be 
a good representative of a state-owned company, “T” and Norway.  Among the issues 
presented in the book were: how expensive a gift can “T”’s employees give and 
receive; does the employee have a conflict of interests working abroad; did the 
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employee report cases of concern; did the employee correctly report all expenditures 
and fill out a travel report.  At the same time, the enthusiasm influenced by 
Perestroika was high, and the idea of helping Russia and supporting the development 
of modern telecommunication there was more important than thinking over the real 
business models. (Personal observations and conversation with an employee of “T”’s 
consulting division, who was strongly involved in the projects in the northern part of 
Russia, 2018) 
At the same time, several of the respondents who worked directly in the projects stated that they did 
not experience any training, and there were no written rules for how to do business abroad. 
We did not have any written rules. We just used common sense and tried to be good 
representatives of “T” and Norway. The most important thing that we learned was to 
treat our partners abroad with respect. (Interview with a director, who worked 
internationally from the 1990s, 2018) 
 I do not remember any instructions or any written rules, but we understood that we 
came from a very small country and should act carefully and with respect for the 
local traditions and local people. This helped us a lot later, during other international 
projects. We tried to build close and good relationships with the local authorities as 
well, and, in this connection, “T”’s close and constructive contact with the 
Norwegian authorities helped – we could easily connect authorities in Norway with 
the international projects – invite them to take part in the meetings, events, 
celebrations. (Interview with a manager, who worked internationally from the 1990s 
and later, 2018)  
To conclude, with the development of the first international projects abroad, the top management of 
“T” established the Ethical Council, in order to focus on the ethical standards for doing business broad. 
A special division was also established (“T” Consulting”), to maintain the training of employees 
working abroad. Top management had an attitude that “T”, being a state-owned company, which was 
involved in projects supported by the Norwegian authorities, should show an example of an ethical 
attitude to business and educate the local staff.   At the same time, the employees who traveled abroad 
were not given instructions – many of their actions were built on common-sense good relationships 
with the local partners. These contacts were individualized and personalized.  
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 At the same time, each division in “T” had its own practice for reporting expenditure, for the buying 
and receiving of gifts, for the choice of business class tickets and other important routines connected 
with international business; many of these practices were dependent on the personal understanding of 
the manager of the department (personal observations). This means that, during the first steps of the 
international projects, “T” did not have a common practice and routines in the formalization of travel 
and business actions abroad. 
4.4. Perceived influence – challenges during Phase 1 of “T”’s internationalization 
process 
From one side, the descriptions above show that during Phase 1 of “T”’s internationalization, the issue 
of how to achieve influence in the first international projects was rather connected with the idea of 
establishing the first footprints abroad in close co-operation with the Norwegian authorities and local 
authorities. The involvement of the authorities gave a kind of protection and safety.  The form of JV 
seemed to be right for the company, unexperienced in international co-operation, from a small country. 
The consultative role of the BoD and the idea of helping and developing the emerging markets gave 
support to JV ownership. The role of the “passionate ambassadors” also supported the idea of best 
competence in a local market, resulting in positive “pilot projects” abroad. The ethical standards of 
doing business abroad, based on the established practice from the state-owned company and advice 
and courses presented by the Norwegian authorities, gave the behavioral ethical framework for “T”’s 
employees working abroad on the first international projects. 
At the same time, the empirical evidence shows that “T”’s managers started to reflect upon matters of 
influence and control, especially regarding important challenges facing the projects and subsidiaries 
abroad in the early 1990s. As one manager explained,  
“T” did not have enough international experience and competence, didn’t have an 
international team, a clear strategy for international expansion, ideas about the BoD 
composition in the projects abroad or how to follow up the projects. The work on the 
framework of the BoD was considered as transferring knowledge and supporting the 
local top managers, who were members of the BoD as the local owners; the members 
of the BoD did not focus on the challenges of the situation if there were some 
business misunderstandings, they tried to work out the challenges.  The institute of 
expatriates did not exist. The consultants were sent abroad to support the local 
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management. “T” had no common corporate rules that could be applied abroad, so 
that topic was not an issue during the first international investments. Common 
practice based on some unwritten rules for SOEs regulated behavior abroad. I 
experienced that the more we were involved in international projects the more we 
needed to discuss how we would go further. We had a simple business model – to 
survive, not to lose, to establish good relationships with local partners and to learn 
how to work internationally. (Conversation with a former senior manager, 
responsible for the first international projects in “T” from 1991, 2016) 
One of the first “passionate ambassadors” in the 1990s stated “T” did not have sufficient control and 
influence in the first projects, but “T” had another intention. 
We trusted our partners and co-operated well. The question of influence or control 
was not on our agenda. We supported the local partners in building up modern 
telecommunication; we invested in trust and good relationships, based on respect. 
That helped us further. (Interview, 2018) 
At the same time, another respondent said that, in his opinion,   
“T” had the influence and control that was needed by new beginners in the first 
projects abroad, in order not to lose money and not to be cheated, but actually it was 
not a target to have business control, while the size of the investments was low; the 
primary target was to learn to work internationally, to build good relationships with 
the local partners, to understand the culture and the way to do business 
internationally (Interview with a Director, who worked internationally in  the 1990s, 
2018). 
We learned a lot and saw the benefits of that in other Russian projects later.  Maybe 
we did not make money, but we had a feeling that we managed. To be true, maybe 
we did not understand everything, especially the costs in marketing that could be 
overestimated. But what we learned from the projects gave us much more. When we 
decided to continue to go internationally, we took the experience from our first 
projects and started to think about what we needed to do in JV in order to secure 
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investments when they would be larger. (Interview with a manager, who worked in 
international projects in the 1990s and later, 2018)  
To conclude, the results of the first international projects of “T” were  positive, in terms of the fact that 
the first footprints abroad were established and the results of these pilot projects were  as  expected:   
to pay back the investments (as  an example, about 40 million NOK were invested in  Kola Telekom 
(Murmansk), and the investments were almost payed back);  the  depreciated equipment was delivered 
to Arkhangelsk, and installed; the relationship with the local partners was developed   in St. Petersburg, 
Murmansk, Arkhangelsk and Karelia;  “T” started to be known among Russian authorities; and the 
knowledge of how to work internationally was accumulated in the organization. However, the 
perceived influence during Phase 1 in internationalization was actually a matter of very limited 
influence, and the effect of control mechanisms was low.  The respondents underlined that the topics 
of influence and control were not on the agenda. The positive experience from the first projects taught 
“T” international experience, built relationships with the local partners and gave the necessary 
knowledge in internationalization, in order to go further with the international expansion.  If “T” 
decided to go further in its international development, it needed to develop an international strategy, 








Chapter 5: Phase 2 of internationalization 1996-2001. Planting the flags 
– the “Viking strategy”  
 
In this period, company “T” began its active international expansion into the emerging markets, using 
knowledge and experience from the first stage of internationalization. 
5.1. Antecedent conditions 
1. The first positive experiences from the first operations abroad and the rapid development of 
the telecommunication markets in Europe and Asia – due to the continuing liberalization of 
telecommunication legislation in both EU and Asia – provided opportunities for the process of 
international expansion and the establishing of Joint Ventures (JVs) abroad.  
 
Taking advantage of the global business environment and the new opportunities in foreign markets, 
like other corporations, “T” extended its core businesses across borders, exploited the new possibilities 
that opened and benefited from these as a multinational corporation (MNC) (Eliassen and Sitter, 2008). 
We started as amateurs in the early 90s, but we learned quickly and experienced 
success, meaning that we understood how to continue the internationalization. We 
needed to be serious in our choice of partners, started to check up on companies for 
the potential investments and implement, for example, the due diligence process; we 
needed to think about the qualities and professional skills of the people whom we 
could send to work abroad. We started “to hunt” the companies we wanted to invest 
in in Eastern Europe, where we had already had good experience; we looked at some 
countries in Western Europe and in Asia, where we saw the possibilities. We could 
establish contacts, not only with the state companies, as we did before, but with the 
private individuals who had the licenses. (Interview with a director, who worked in 
international projects from the 1990s to the beginning of 2000, 2018)   
From the period 1994/5-2000, a number of small acquisitions was made that constructed the 
framework around the international expansions and built the foundation for the further development 
of the international strategy.   
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“T”’s annual report of 1999 states the following:  
“T” is particularly well placed for international expansion in the areas of mobile 
telephony… “T” currently owns shareholdings in 13 mobile operations abroad, 
mostly minority shareholdings in European countries. With this as its basis, the 
company’s strategy will be to establish a position as a leading supplier of mobile 
services in the Nordic region, and to strengthen its positions in Eastern and Central 
Europe, and in Southeast Asia, either independently or in partnership with others. 
(“T”’s annual report, 1999, p. 7) 
2. “T”’s top management was the catalyst for the rapid international expansion 
 
In spite of the fact that domestic operations remained the priority for the CEO’s and the top 
management’s agenda, both the CEO’s personal engagement in international projects and the 
involvement of top management in international operations were growing. 
“T” has been the fastest growing incumbent in Europe over the past four years… We 
do not think it is too assertive to argue that “T”’s senior management has been the 
catalyst for the fast development of the Norwegian telecom market. (First Securities, 
2000, p. 4) 
One of the most experienced managers in “T”, who participated in the international activities from the 
first steps, confirmed that if, in the first international projects, the CEO and top management were not 
so involved and interested, then, later, their engagement developed gradually. 
The top management of “T” gradually understood the importance of the international 
projects. In this period, “T” was organized as one company, consisting of several 
divisions.  All these divisions had a Norwegian focus. But the CEO and top 
management agreed to establish the division “T” Invest, in order to start the active 
development of international projects. The Director of “T” Invest reported to the 
EVP responsible for all international operations. We, employees in “T” Invest, were 
divided into groups geographically – there were groups in Eastern Europe and Asia. 
We also had a Western Europe group. All groups “hunted” separately; at the same 
time, we all had the feeling of a common process to establish an international 
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footprint. We celebrated all “victories” – when we won a tender or found a good 
project. We invited the partners to Norway, and top management was involved – 
participated in the dinners, launches, meetings. (Interview with the Director for the 
Eastern Europe group in “T” Invest, 2018)    
At the same time, the CEO of “T” showed personal interest in the international projects, especially in 
those projects in the emerging markets. 
The activities of “T” International were not the core activities for “T” in the 1990s, and the CEO was 
not involved in them on a daily basis.   In order to involve the CEO in important meetings or events in 
“T” International, a special procedure was established – individual negotiations with the CEO in 
advance, in order to find space in his schedule, which was occupied by political meetings, meetings 
with executives from domestic operations, sponsors, etc.  Not a single case was noted of the CEO 
refusing to participate in events related to the activities in Eastern Europe.  As a former politician and 
a socially oriented person, the CEO always had a special focus on those projects where the business 
targets could be combined with the social targets. He confirmed several times that it is important to 
develop the market where “T” is going to invest and to show the social profile of “T” as a state-owned 
company. Thus, when “T” invested in Bangladesh, the CEO initiated the sponsoring by “T” of an 
orphanage. In Russia, the CEO supported a project for disabled children.   
Top management learned internationalization, together with the employees who traveled abroad in 
order to work internationally.  
At the start of my career in “T” the BoD was in discussions related to the traditional   
annual trip abroad. In this period, T. made some investments in Germany, Hungary 
and some small operations in Russia. In St. Petersburg, “T” owned just 17.4%. There 
were now plans to visit three countries. The CEO personally insisted on visiting 
Russia; he wanted to understand the perspectives of the projects in Russia himself. I 
was asked to prepare such an “additional” trip after the BoD finished their trip to 
Western Europe. The BoD had extremely little time – a late arrival and departure 
after lunch. 
I had to work in a tight framework, prioritizing the meeting with the partners and a 
visit to the location of the Russian operation’s HQ. The CEO personally invited me 
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to the consultations and asked me not to ignore the cultural aspect. “We can sleep at 
home. When we are on the business trip, we need to see, understand and gain 
knowledge,” he said.  
Late in the evening, after a “packed dinner” on the bus, straight after arrival, the BoD 
went sightseeing; there were questions, discussions about the Russian mentality, and 
several business questions related to “What is Russia now?” The CEO was one of 
the most engaged persons on the bus that drove us around St. Petersburg during the 
night, (thanks we visited St. Petersburg when it was a period of the so called “white 
nights.36”   
The day after, the CEO walked alone around the center of St. Petersburg, around the 
hotel, in order to see the people and the morning rush. During the meetings, he was 
one of the most active participants. I understood that many questions related to 
customer attitude were taken from his personal observations from his short trips 
around St. Petersburg. (Based on personal observations)  
In the late phase of this period, the CEO visited almost all of the emerging markets’ operations, in 
order to understand how to work internationally and whether “T” was working efficiently abroad.   At 
that time, “T” had nine JVs in Russia, one JV in Ukraine with a national license and several projects 
in Asia. 
 3.  The telecommunication situation in Europe opened up possibilities for building alliances 
among the operators, to develop the international expansion. “T” tried to build alliances twice 
and failed, which gave “T” the confidence to develop its international strategy alone. 
 
In this period, “T” experienced several operators from Northern Europe coming with an invitation to 
be part of Scandinavian/Northern European alliances in different international projects, in order to 
strengthen their own opportunities in international expansion, reduce the costs and minimize the risks. 
                                                 
36 From late May to early July the nights are bright in St. Petersburg, with the brightest period, the White Nights, normally 
lasting from the middle of June 11th to the beginning of July.  
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“T” knew operators in Sweden and Denmark well from some Nordic co-operation 
projects. First, the Danes invited us to be partners in Hungary, then the Swedes 
invited us to be partners in Russia – all these small projects were the first steps of 
our international adventure. It worked well. We started to think about a big alliance, 
in order to go together into international expansion:  The alliance as a common 
merged company. We considered “TA” from Sweden as a good partner for 
international alliance. (Interview with a former executive manager, involved in 
international operations, 2016) 
Understanding “T”’s limitations in international knowledge and experience, “T”’s top management 
wanted to build alliances with powerful and experienced European operators and chose one of them to 
be a strategic partner. First, “T” started to co-operate with a global British company, BT, in Germany 
and Ireland, and then with Danske Telecom in Hungary, and “TA” (Sweden) and SA (Finland) in St. 
Petersburg. All these investments were made between 1994 and 1995.  
In 1997, the Norwegian newspaper, Dagbladet, asked “T”’s CEO about the possibility of “TA” being 
the   strategic partner for “T”. The CEO answered, “‘TA’ has its own projects and has started to compete 
with ‘T’. But, at the same time, Norway and Sweden are neighbors, and ‘T’ and ‘TA’ could potentially 
have good co-operation” (Dagbladet, 27.11.1997). There were only a few people around the CEO, who 
knew that he had started negotiations with the CEO in “TA” about the possible merger.  
One of the most interesting events at this time was connected to the possibility of merging with “TA” 
(Sweden).  The merger with “TA” was an important step for “T” in further international expansion, in 
order to build an industrial and financial alliance with a strong partner for further global development.  
Two attempts were made to merge “T” and “TA”. The last one was almost completed, approved by the 
EU’s authorities and celebrated by both companies as a newly established company, TelCo, in 1997.  
The new management was appointed. The common processes of consolidation of both companies into 
one started. The merger failed during the first BoD of TelCo, which showed the different intentions 
among the Norwegian and the Swedish BoD’s representatives and, later, among the shareholders as 
well. In spite of the fact that the merger with “TA” failed twice, afterwards, according to the former 
CEO, “T” did not give up the idea of active internationalization and gained much confidence, 
strengthening its ambition to go it alone, without a partner, in a process of international expansion in 
the most difficult and risky markets.  The experience from challenging markets, such as Russia, 
Ukraine, Hungary, Greece, Ireland, Austria and Bangladesh, had an impact on the further development 
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of the company:  the international team was recruited, “T” gained more experience and knowledge, 
“T”’s technical skills were important for the international expansion. 
5.2. International strategy during Phase 2 
1. The first attempts to build an international strategy can be characterized as a “Viking 
strategy” - it was important to “hunt” the possible projects where it was possible.   
 
On the question, “Did ‘T’ have an international strategy after the first steps in the international arena?”, 
several of “T”’s key personnel admitted that there was no clear strategy in this period, but the top 
management tried to work with a strategy, based on the experience and knowledge from the 
international projects in the early 1990s. 
One former member of Group Executive Management, who worked in “T” for almost 40 years, 
described the strategy as the “Viking way to do things”.  
“T”’s people, “passionate ambassadors”, planted flags in different countries where 
we thought we could develop a good partnership with the local partners. 
(Conversation, 2007)  
Another respondent stated that the strategy in this period did not involve the issue of how to manage 
the projects or control them, and that there were no discussions in “T” at the top level or among the 
“passionate ambassadors” about it. 
We did not think about how to control and manage the project. The idea was to get 
something. The question about the management and control came later. We wanted 
expansion. We were hungry. And we wanted several JVs. (Interview with one of the 
former executives worked with the legal issues”, 2015) 
We had to invest in the countries where we could find the companies to invest in. 
Now, I can say that there were investments with little money and, at the same time, 
with the opportunity for good profits in the future. (One of the former executives, 
who worked in international mobile operations, interview, 2015) 
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Pursuant to the former CEO, in 1995, senior managers in “T” discussed several scenarios for the further 
growth of “T”.  The scenario, named “expansion scenario”, collected the majority of voices, and the 
plan, with the title “Reconditioning and positioning”, was improved. The big issue for the top 
management of “T” was how to finance the investments, as “T” was still a state-owned company.  The 
Norwegian Parliament Storting’s37 White Paper about “T” (1995-1996) states that ““T” would   
continue to have a high level of activities and the BoD would present the plan further for the General 
Assembly” (Stortingsmelding 21, 1995, p. 37). 
In the period from 1995 to 1999, “T” increased its investments from 4.6 to 13.2 billion NOK, and, 
further, to 50.7 billion in 2000 (Annual reports, 1995-2001). 
In order to finance the international expansion and compete with other players in the market, “T” was 
supposed to get the capital from the owner – the Norwegian state.  The Storting was informed about 
“T”’s plans for further growth (Stortingsmelding 17, 1997-1998: 37). The General Assembly supported 
the BoD’s proposal to return dividends back to “T” after the state had taken 15% of the profits.  “T” 
got 566 million NOK (ref. Thue: 343). A low level of dividends was paid to the state, in order to give 
“T” the possibility to build up the equity for international expansion.  The ministry followed the 
proposal from the BoD.  
Nevertheless, at the end of 1997, the CEO of “T” started the debate (Dagbladet, 1997) about the state’s 
dividend practice and indicated possible scenarios for the further positive development of “T” – to find 
a strategic partner related to the issue of ownership.  In this way, two central questions were put on the 
agenda – the process of privatization, in order to get enough capital for the further process of 
internationalization, and the process to frame an alliance with an international partner, in order to 
better maintain the process of internationalization.  
 
Both issues show that “T” had certain challenges related to the process of internationalization: 1.) 
connected to its status as a state-owned company and to be a big national player in the Norwegian 
market, with a strong national profile; 2.) related to the necessity to   find the right strategic partner. 
Finding a good solution for both these issues could help “T” to increase its equity and obtain sufficient 
capital for further internationalization, and to gain the support of a powerful alliance partner, in 
realization of its international strategy. On the question: “Was it realistic to find such a solution for 
                                                 
37 Hereafter in the text, it will be referred to as Storting. 
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‘T’, which was a state-owned incumbent, and was the role of the state positive or negative in the 
process of internationalization?”, a former executive, who had the responsibility for international 
expansion, said the following: 
We were enthusiastic cowboys with a state as an owner. And there was no conflict 
in this. During the early stages of internationalization, we noticed the benefits of state 
ownership. Although we did not have sufficient money for the investments, we knew 
that we had backup from the state and, if bad results came, they would not come out 
as “red figures” when a company is listed. At the same time, there were many 
partners who wanted to have an investor from a state-owned enterprise – that gave 
them a feeling of safety. We felt that the state was on our side; it means that we could 
start to think about privatization and to find a strategic partner. But, in the issue 
related to dividends, the state had a strong policy, and, as a result of that, we lacked 
the capital for investments. (Interview, 2015) 
The CEO of “T” in this period explained that “T” needed 15-16 billion NOK in grants from the state 
as equity capital for the next seven to eight years. The grants were necessary, in order to have 
approximately 50 billion NOK for investments, with the greatest part of the capital going abroad 
(Dagens Næringsliv, 1997).   This means that the development of “T”’s international strategy was not 
just a question of natural expansion, it was a  struggle, influenced by serious external factors  – 
political: to convince the owner about the necessity of privatization and changing the form of the 
ownership and entering into a strategic alliance;  economic: to obtain the capital for the realization of 
the strategy;  and social: as a big player in Norway, changing the structure of the company could have 
an impact on employment in “T”, the place of the important divisions in the matter of the merger and 
possible consequences for the quality of and access to services. 
 
At the same time, the respondents related that, while the top management and the state/politicians 
discussed the issue of the international strategy of “T” at the top political level, the employees were 
also working well with internationalization on the practical level.  
While the top management of “T” tried to formulate the international strategy, the 
“passionate ambassadors” “hunted” the projects. (Interview with a director, who 
worked internationally from the 1990s, 2018)  
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“Passionate ambassadors” often used personal contacts in finding the projects, in this way imbuing the 
international strategy with personalization or/individualization. The “passionate ambassadors” in this 
period increased, and they used the possibilities that appeared in this period with the liberalization of 
the world markets, when several private companies, not only governmental structures, had licenses. In 
this connection, it was much easier to establish contact, but, at the same time, the level of the risks 
increased.  This international strategy did not define the geographical areas of the investments and/or 
technology. The only thing that was important was to find projects for investment that “T” could 
develop further.  
We tried to find some projects in several geographic areas – Eastern Europe, Western 
Europe, Central Europe, Asia…  The broad approach – here and there. And we tried 
the different technologies… Who worked with that? ... always some “passionate 
ambassadors”.  We worked in parallel – one group with the geographical expansion, 
another with the technological expansion, the third came from the business areas and 
looked for the products.  What was special was that, unfortunately, we did not 
manage to transfer all the knowledge back to the organization. The groups did not 
share their experience, mostly because of the lack of time – the processes had to 
happen quickly. (Interview with one of the former executives who worked with legal 
issues and was also a country manager, 2015) 
At the same, the international team, which should support “passionate ambassadors”, 
had been recruiting, and started, with the staff, the several newly opened country 
offices38. In this way, personalization of the internationalization strategy was 
supplied by the attempts to centralize it.  
Several country offices were established.  Country offices were supposed to co-
ordinate “T”’s operations in the same country. (Interview with a former Legal 
Director, also a country manager, 2015) 
                                                 
38 Country offices were opened in those countries where there were substantial investments and/or several of “T”’s 
activities. In this period, country offices were opened in Hungary, Russia, Ukraine and Singapore (responsible for the 
investments in Asia; later, the office was moved to Bangkok).  
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Thus, in 1997–1998, “T” experienced active expansion abroad, with acquisitions in several operations 
in Russia (two operations – in Kaliningrad and in Stavropol), Ukraine, Germany, Greece, Ireland and 
Austria.  
“T” was in a partnership with B in several very small projects in Western Europe, 
where “T”’s role was very limited.  The investments in Germany (10%) Greece 
(22%) and Ireland (49%) were the important part of the international expansion.  Co-
operation with B was an attempt to build an alliance with a powerful and experienced 
European operator. Unfortunately, we had to stop this co-operation later. (Interview 
with one of the executives, who worked in international projects in the 1990s, 2016) 
One of the executive managers, who worked as a country manager, emphasized the importance of the 
activities in Western Europe for increasing knowledge:  
The projects in Western Europe created the success in internationalization, taught us 
much and gave the feeling of how to be a partner with a global company, but, later, 




Here is the portfolio just in the mobile projects as it was in 2000 is shown below (from “T”’s press 
release March 2000. “T”’s website).  







VIA Germany 10% 
COS Greece 22% 
DT39 Thailand 40% 
PAN Hungary 25.8% 
ESA Ireland 49.5% 
DG40 Malaysia 30% 
CON Austria 17.5% 
VCom Russia 31.7% 
NWG St. Petersburg, Russia 12.7% 
KVS Ukraine 35% 
GRPh41 Bangladesh 46.4% 
PRM42 Montenegro 40.1% 
STAV43 Stavropol, Russia 49% 
EXT44 Kaliningrad, Russia 49% 
 
2. “Passionate ambassadors” “planted flags” in risky and low-cost markets, where “T” both had 
already got experience and understood the opportunities for further growth in the new markets.  
The issue of low-cost investments in high-risk markets 
Several respondents stated that “T”, being a state-owned company, did not have enough capital to 
invest in the projects the company wanted to be an owner in.  Thus, “T” focused on low-cost projects.  
                                                 
39 JV in Thailand 
40 JV in Malaysia 
41 JV in Bangladesh 
42 JV in Montenegro 
43 JV in Stavropol, Russia 
44 JV in Kaliningrad, Russia 
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We did not have enough money and had to buy cheap. (Interview with the former 
executive worked with the international projects, 2016) 
At the same time, it is important to mention that being a state-owned company, “T” had to co-ordinate 
its investment activities with the ministry and, further, with the Storting.  The amount of money used 
on the investments depended on the state’s dividend policy, regulated by the Storting.  Thus, for 1995, 
“T” paid to the state 550 million NOK.  In 1996, the state increased the dividends from 400 million to 
900 million NOK, while, in 1997, the state increased the dividends from the suggested 300 million 
NOK to 570 million NOK. All these additional payments were implemented in order to compensate 
when the size of the dividends was low, regulated by Stortingsmelding (Stortingsmelding 17, 1997-
1998, p. 37), when the Parliament agreed to return dividends to “T”, after the state had received 15% 
of the profits.  At the end of 1997, the CEO of “T” published an article in Dagbladet (27.11.1997), in 
which he called   the state’s dividend policy short-term thinking and wrote that “‘T’ is not a cow for 
milking!”, protesting against the policy of tapping   money from state-owned companies.  In 1998 and 
1999, “T” paid to the state, respectively, 675 million NOK and 500 million NOK, in accordance with 
the proposal of the BoD on 15% of the profits.  
Although the size of the dividends to the state was reduced from 1999 (from 41% to 12%), “T” did not 
have enough capital for the expansion abroad (the CEO of “T” estimated in 1997 that “T” needed 
approximately 50 billion NOK for the investments, mostly for international projects) 
(Dagensnæringsliv, 4.2.1997). Thus, “T” had to go for the low-cost projects and struggled to obtain 
funds for international expansion. 
One of the directors of the projects in Russia in the 1990s confirmed that “T” also had to go for the 
low-cost projects because “T” was late in its international expansion, it did not manage to build up 
enough capital for the investments, and because “T” was limited by its capital resources:  
We came late to the international market and had to take the high-risk and low-cost 
projects that the many big companies that were experienced in Europe were possibly 





3. An international team was built in HQ, in order to support "passionate ambassadors" to 
manage the international expansion. 
In order to manage the growing international activities of “T” and to support the activities of 
“passionate ambassadors”, who “planted the flags” in different countries in Europe and Asia, “T” 
started to build an international team. The team consisted  of people who had the experience to work 
abroad; people who could work as expatriates and had different professional skills in foreign affairs;  
Norwegians with a foreign background, who could help “T” to understand national cultures; local staff 
in country offices, who had the experience to work with the Western companies and had excellent 
skills in English. Some of the local staff in Eastern Europe could speak one of the Scandinavian 
languages. 
Several top managers, who had the international experience, were appointed. More 
than more than 30 positions were announced, dedicated to the international projects. 
In order to survive as a company, we had to start with internationalization. (Interview 
with one of the former members of the Executive Board, who worked in international 
activities, 2015)  
At the same time, the importance of educating the new team to be international managers was 
mentioned. 
We had to send the consultants to our subsidiaries abroad. We thought that they 
would bring competence into the subsidiaries. We needed all kinds of specialists: 
finance people, marketing people, project managers, etc. We had qualified technical 
staff, but they did not work internationally. We needed to teach them to be 
international managers.  (Interview with a former manager, who worked in legal 




4. The important question of the choice of the technology for the telecommunication was not yet 
an issue during Phase 2 of internationalization.  
In this period, “T” tried to invest in the projects, without binding itself to one concrete technology.  
There were projects in mobile technology, in standard GSM, in satellite communication, in paging 
technology, in fixed telephony, in media business, in the Internet.  
“T” is a complete operator and had all the telecommunication services. We did not 
have any idea what technology or technologies we had to develop abroad, so we tried 
almost all of them. Different departments in “T” worked in parallel and had to be co-
ordinated by the staff of “T” International and the country offices. We tried the 
technologies by practicing them. First, we had to “collect” the licenses and then we 
had to evaluate what would be the best for “T” abroad, as an industrial investor. How 
would we position ourselves? (Interview with one of the managers, who worked 
internationally with technical issues, 2018)  
Not all the projects were a success story in “T”’s first steps as an international investor, also because 
of the focus on the wrong technology Thus, “T” started investing in Lithuania, Romania and Russia as 
a common project, based on paging technology, via the establishing company, Comet Holding. “T” 
lost 200 million NOK, and the project was closed.  “T” explained the problems in Comet Holding by 
the fact that the company did not have enough well-qualified and experienced employees, and that it 
was difficult to have control in a small operation, while the bigger projects took up all “T”’s 
management’s attention.   At the same time, it was admitted that the paging business was the wrong 
technology for modern telecommunication (based on an interview with one of the former members of 
the Executive Board, who worked in international activities, 2015).  
The information from “T”’s website confirms that the first international projects were started in mobile 
telephony.  Being a member of “T”’s international team from 1996/1997, I can confirm that, in this 
period, “T” did not have a clear technological strategy. Projects based on mobile communication, 
paging communication, fast telephony communication in Murmansk and satellite communication, such 
as Inmarsat and Intelsat, and even projects in the media field (such as the phone directory, investments 




To summarize:  
The investments were made in both mature and emerging markets in Western Europe, Eastern Europe 
and Asia – in the countries and companies where “T” could manage to obtain small stakes for a small 
amount of money. There was no clearly defined strategy for this process, regarding either the 
technology or the geographical areas. The most important thing was to invest in low-cost projects, 
while “T” did not have enough money, being regulated by the state dividend policy. “T”’s international 
expansion at this time could be termed expansion at the cost of control, while the issue of control was 
not on the agenda, and the drive of internationalization was to “hunt” projects.  In this period, 
investments were made in fixed telephony, satellite communication, broadcast and mobile 
communication. Attempts to find a strategic partner and build an alliance with “TA” failed twice.  The 
alliance with B. was very limited – there were only very small projects in mature markets, and, 
according to the respondents, this partnership had to be stopped later. At the same time, the issue of 
the privatization process of “T” was placed on the agenda. 
5.3. Control mechanisms in order to achieve influence in Phase 2 of “T”’s 
internationalization 
Ownership:  different size stakes in JVs, some of the projects are nearly 50-50%. JVs are 
preferable. The importance of management agreements as a control mechanism in achieving 
influence. 
 
During this phase of internationalization, ownership in the subsidiaries abroad was in the form of JVs. 
Several managers confirmed that “T” could not have 100% ownership, mostly because of the condition 
of the licenses in the markets in Eastern Europe and some other markets, such as Greece and Malaysia.  
It was not a question of having 100% in subsidiaries in Eastern Europe. I don’t 
remember that we discussed it. I think that the conditions in these markets were to 
share ownership with a local partner. (Interview with one of the former expatriates 




A former manager, who was involved in projects in Eastern Europe in the late 1990s, confirms: 
We knew that we could not have 100% ownership in several markets: in Russia, 
Ukraine, Greece. The authorities wanted to have JVs and gave the licenses to the 
local partners. 50%-50% was the maximum we could get! (Interview, 2018) 
At the same time, the lack of capital was also mentioned as a reason for “T” choosing the JV form.  
We had no money and had to buy small shares, especially in relation to the mature 
markets in Western Europe. Our investments there were small. (Interview with a 
former member of the Executive Board, who worked in international activities, 
2015)  
One of the top managers responsible for international operations stated that few top managers possibly 
had a kind of “great idea” or dreams to own 100%, but this was not realistic because “T” had no 
experience in the governing of WOSs (wholly-owned companies) abroad. “T” lacked experience and 
knowledge in managing the subsidiaries abroad. 
In this period, we could manage just JVs; we managed it, started from JVs with small 
stakes and increased ownership in other subsidiaries to 50-50 partnerships in JVs. 
(Interview with a former member of the Executive Board, responsible for mobile 
operations worldwide, 2015) 
One of the respondents related that the most important issue in the process of internationalization in 
subsidiaries abroad is the issue of ownership and linked ownership as a mechanism for financial 
control (FC): 
Ownership is the most important issue when it concerns having control and 
influence.  We owned several subsidiaries in Russia, all of them were JVs, we had 
ownership of almost 50%.  We could not get more than 50%, but I think that we had 
control, even if, formally, we did not have the financial control (FC). The owner who 
has the majority in a JV has the FC. In JVs’ structure no one has the FC, and it is 
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necessary to negotiate about everything.  (An expatriate in the late 1990s in Eastern 
Europe, interview, 2018) 
One of the respondents explained that, when “T” had JVs in foreign markets, it was necessary to 
establish influence and control. For this purpose, management agreements (MA) were used as the 
control mechanism, while none of the co-owners had the FC, and many important issues had to be 
negotiated.  The importance of a good management agreement was underlined, particularly as a good 
instrument for also avoiding conflict situations.   
In our operations, when we had the minority ownership in the subsidiaries and didn’t 
have financial control, it was very challenging to have significant influence.  It was 
also difficult to find out how the operations were performing. In such subsidiaries, it 
was important to have a good management agreement.   The management agreement 
gave us power. When the co-partner escalated a conflict, we used the MA to protect 
own position and negotiated. Maybe it was an illusion. (A former executive, who 
worked in international operations in the 1990s, interview 2015)  
 A good shareholder and/or management agreement can give you the opportunity to 
work more safely in JVs.  It is extremely important to have a good agreement. We 
understood it afterwards, not at the beginning… (A former member of the BoD on 
several BoDs in Eastern Europe, interview, 2015) 
One of the members of the BoD in the projects in Russia described MA as a kind of replacement for 
the absent control mechanisms. 
Working in JVs, we discussed how would we transfer the knowledge and build up 
the competence in the JV, when we did not have the FC?  We understood that when 
we were in a JV we could not decide alone and used the mechanism of MA that gave 
the possibility of placing the consultants from HQ in the subsidiaries. And the 
consultants could ensure that everything in the subsidiaries would go as it should. (A 
former member of several BoDs in Eastern Europe, interview, 2018)  
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From the interviews, it is clear that MA functioned as an important tool in the relationship between the 
management of the subsidiary in the JV and the co-owner, who was not local, such as “T”.  What is 
MA?  
One respondent who worked for many years in the markets in Eastern Europe underlined: 
MA is an agreement between partners in JVs that regulates the important issues on a 
temporary basis, such as the use of consultants and payments for the services related 
to the consultants from “T”.  According to the MA, we, who had good competence 
in telecommunication, should provide services to the management in the 
subsidiaries.  Thus, we could retain control over the quality of the different important 
skills: administrative, management and technical services provided by the 
professionals/consultants from HQ… It was an expensive MA, but the companies 
had to pay for that in order to improve the necessary professional skills and achieve 
good quality in the modern telecommunication services. (Interview, 2016) 
We could have control over the important processes in the subsidiary because of MA. 
MA gave us the necessary influence in the decided framework that we did not have 
via the ownership structure. MA gave as a good framework for day- to-day 
operations…. But it was not easy to work, even when we had the MA. The local 
management always tried to bargain; they wanted to find “holes” in the professional 
skills of our experts, in order to doubt their competence.  Some issues could be dealt 
with at the level of the BoD, where they were discussed with the local partners.  The 
local partner was almost always on the side of the local management. (Interview with 
one of the expatriates in operations abroad, 2018) 
The respondent illustrated that, although the MA was used, it could not keep the relationships between 
partners (between “T” and local partners) from conflict.  
Several respondents described challenges in JVs related to the issue of ownership, when the local 
partners gave the impression that they alone owned the JV company, since they knew the local market 
well and had all the necessary contacts, particularly in the local administration. 
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The Chairman of the BoD, who was the co-partner and owned 51% of the company 
together with his family, behaved as if he was the only owner. Sometimes, we had 
the feeling that we were guests… And the local management listened to him. He 
used the best room in the company – the meeting room of the BoD and an additional 
room next to it as his own office. Everything in this room was designed as he wanted. 
And he was not the working Chairman. He used the location just as he did before we 
became the co-owners. He demonstrated that everything was his property. (A former 
expatriate, who worked in a JV in Russia in the late 1990s, interview, 2018)   
From these interviews, it follows that “T” connected ownership to FC, and conceded ownership is a 
central issue in achieving control. At the same time, “T” gradually understood that a JV’s ownership 
structure was challenging, in respect of achieving influence and control, and that an MA was needed 
as a replacement for the absent FC. 
BoD:  Members of the BoD transferred knowledge and experience and functioned as mentors.  
Mostly people with technical competence were selected for the BoDs in JV operations abroad. 
The composition of the BoD was built on the principle of equality; there were employees from 
“T”, who represented “T”, and a local partner and his representative.   
The following story illustrates the importance of the role of the BoD in JVs and the consequences when 
there is no influence in the BoD. The story concerns the “T”– “TA” merging process in 1999. TelCo 
was the company whose ownership comprised 50% “T” and 50% “TA”.  The composition of the BoD 
consisted of an equal number of members representing “T” and “TA”, but the Chairman of the BoD 
was a representative from “TA”.    
 The narrative of a former member of the top management group in “T”: “The BoD did not function 
well”: 
The BoD did not function well. We noticed it – our members of the BoD had cases 
we wanted to vote for, and “TA”’s members had their own agenda. We did not have 
influence, but Telia had a Chairman of the BoD.  The situation was without control 
when the Chairman of the BoD suddenly started to ignore the stakeholder agreement 
and changed his opinion, against all the pre-agreements that had been negotiated at 
both the operational level (“T”– “TA” top management) and the political level 
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(owners).  The Chairman used his double vote in order to get the formal approval in 
one specific key issue for “T”/ “TA”.  The situation in the BoD led to a rift. We 
protested and left. Later, we received information that the Chairman’s task was to 
stop the merging process; and he used the mechanisms of the BoD. The Chairman of 
the BoD destroyed the whole merging process, which had already been approved by 
national organs (national parliaments) and international organs, such as the EU 
commission. (Interview, 2015) 
The story illustrates the typical situation that happened in “T”’s subsidiaries: when “T” did not have 
sufficient influence in the framework of the BoD, that had a serious impact on the strategic decisions. 
One of the respondents stated that the BoD provides the strategic control (SC); he illustrated this with 
his experience in “T”’s subsidiary in Russia, in relation to entry into the Ukrainian market: 
It was obvious, that “T”’s co-partners wanted to enter the Ukrainian market in 2004–
2005. “T” thought that it was not a good investment.  The BoD was divided. The 
BoD members voted on behalf of their owners. “T”’s members were in the minority 
in this case and lost the vote. We lost strategic control. Both the members of the BoD 
from the Russian side and the independent BoD members supported the acquisition. 
The strategic decision was made in the framework of the BoD. It is important to have 
the right composition of the BoD, in order to have strategic control. (Interview with 
the manager responsible for one of the operations in Europe, 2014) 
When “T” did not have the majority in the BoD, there were almost always conflicts 
and challenges with the co-owners, and it was impossible to achieve any influence 
or strategic control. (Interview, 2014) 
At the same time, one respondent (a controller, who worked in different countries, conversation 2014) 
underlined the special role of the BoD in operational control (OC), linking this role to the appointment 
of the right persons in the right positions at the operational level.  
Operational control, as it is used in business, is the control of day-to-day operations. 
“T” can provide the operational control when it owns 100% of the subsidiary or has 
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the dominating position in the BoD. Using OC, we could appoint the right persons 
in the key positions and follow the operations in the subsidiary. Thus, in the operation 
in Ukraine, we were not satisfied with the local management. We did not have OC 
and could not change them out. (Interview with one of the former managers, who 
worked in the operations in Ukraine and other European projects, 2014) 
 At the same time, the respondents who worked in the different BoDs in this period  talked about the 
challenges connected, first of all, to the  fact that a local member of the BoD misunderstood  the role 
of a member of the BoD and used the argument that they knew the local market better than the 
Norwegians, trying to take the advantage of that and putting pressure on the decisions that could benefit 
them personally. 
There follows narrative from a former manager, a member of the BoD in a JV in Russia: “A conflict 
or to give up?” 
I remember how we had tough discussions with the local partners who wanted our 
JV in Russia to sell mobile phones. We tried to explain the established practice 
among the Western operators that our JV should not do it: that is the role of dealers. 
But they tried over and over again to pressure us into this decision at the BoD’s 
meetings. No arguments worked. In the end, we understood that there were some 
personal interests in this case, and we had a dilemma – should we argue further, 
risking creating a conflict, or should we give up and agree with our co-partners? The 
last scenario would absolutely change the approved business plan and would have 
an impact on the way and how we position ourselves in the market. We did not give 
up negotiating: we used the best examples, invited our partners to Norway, where 
they could meet the dealers, and estimated the costs for a period of   five years. We 
worked particularly with the Chairman of the BoD, a very influential person.  He 
was invited to a seminar in Oslo, dedicated to the issues of the development of the 
mobile business, where several concepts were presented by independent experts. 
Finally, he understood the argumentation and we won this case without problems. 




One of the managers, who worked internationally in “T”, summing up the role of the BoD in JVs based 
on his experience, said: 
The BoD is an important link between the owners and the management. If an owner 
has the majority in the JV, the work of the BoD is concentrated on the strategic and 
operational issues: whether there are often conflicts and a “tug of war”.  In this 
situation, the members of the BoD need to negotiate and balance.  We did it all the 
time in our JVs – in Eastern Europe, Asia and in JVs in Western Europe. We needed 
to teach the members of the BoD to always be awake and “interpret” the different 
signals from co-partners. At the same time, it is necessary for the members of the 
BoD from “T”’s side to have the same opinions. We had routines in “T” – members 
of the BoD had together preparations to the BoD, in order to work out and present 
common decisions and discussions, and to stand together in challenging situations.  
(Interview, 2018) 
Expatriates:  consultants to the executives in the subsidiaries 
“T” needed to have expatriates as consultants, who could follow on from the work of the “passionate 
ambassadors” in the JVs in the emerging markets in Eastern Europe, in some mature markets in 
Western Europe, and in Asia, in order to support the local managers in their professional skills.  “T” 
had to strengthen its role as an industrial investor and wanted to transfer know-how and to teach local 
managers by sending highly professional consultants to the subsidiaries.  
“T” invested in the markets with high risks.  We had to manage it, even though we 
did not have enough influence.  We learned how to deal with it while we worked 
there and understood that: we needed to send well-qualified consultants to teach the 
local managers. (A former executive, who worked in mobile operations, interview, 
2015) 
We needed good consultants who understood the business and could work in 
different cultures; we had to recruit them from among our employees who we thought 
were good. (Former EVP, 2014) 
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As long as “T” needed to train the local staff in the subsidiaries, highly qualified professionals were 
recruited to work internationally as expatriates.  Most of them had skills that the local companies did 
not possess, due to a lack of necessary competence in the local employment market, e.g. in finance, 
marketing and technical knowledge. The duration of their work in the subsidiaries was supposed to be 
short-termed because the local managers should take over the responsibilities. “T” also stated that 
the expatriates’ high salaries were too expensive for “T” and for the JVs. 
Those consultants or advisors worked mostly as individuals and were not organized as a team linked 
to the professional teams in HQ, which, at this time, mostly had a “Norwegian focus”, and the 
international department was not big. The consultants were not appointed to the key positions in the 
subsidiaries because representation on the BoD in a JV with minority ownership did not provide the 
possibility for “T” to appoint their employees to the key executive positions with clear decision-making 
mandates. Thus, “T”’s employees – expatriates functioned mostly as personal, individual consultants 
for the top management – thus, did not have the opportunity to influence formal decisions or have any 
formal control function. The consultants did not have any reporting function to HQ and could present 
their own informal opinions about operations when on a “home leave”.  
In addition, it was not the consultants’ function to influence the behavior of the local staff and be 
responsible for the implementation of corporate values.  It is important to mention, that at this time, 
“T” did not have any common corporate governance targets to implement in JVs. “T” had documents 
that were used only in Norway. They wrote in Norwegian and did not reflect on issues related to 
international business, such as corruption, code of conducts transparency, etc. 
Nevertheless, in the majority of cases, the local JVs received the benefit of using the consultants in the 
form of high-quality support that contributed to successful development in the local markets and led 
to the further international expansion of “T”. 
A CEO in one of the JVs in Russia stated that, when his company decided to invite foreigners to be 
co-partners in the company, they looked towards “T”.  
“T” had the best technical skills! And we did not regret it – my company was in a 
challenging situation at the end of the 90s; Norwegians did a lot and managed to be 
aligned to many things. During the first years after “T” became a co-partner in this 
company, a large number of workshops were arranged, in order to improve the 
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professional skills of the managers of the JV. Consultants from “T” were sent to 
Russia almost immediately after the acquisition; among them were the best 
specialists, who had honed their skills in Norway’s challenging market. 
(Conversation with one of the co-partners of “T” in Russia in 1997) 
However, not all the cases of using consultants were successful. First, consultants were at a distance 
from both the local executives and the local employees. For instance:  
The Norwegian consultants were located on the “non-executive floor”, several floors 
above the local CEO in a company. Only his administration was located around the 
CEO.   Other top managers, whom the CEO was used to having contact with, were 
located not far away from the CEO’s office, in order to be a short distance from the 
chief. Norwegian consultants were supposed to be first-class experts in technical 
skills and should have the main role in the technical roll-out, but while the company 
had the local CTO (chief technical officer), the situation was unclear – who was the 
chief? Norwegians were told that they could not report to him, while he did not 
understand the issues of the modern mobile technology and wanted to report to the 
CEO. At the same time, Norwegians tried to build trust among local technical staff 
and teach them high-level technical skills, but the local middle managers were 
confused over the situation and could not understand who the chief was.  In the end, 
the issues had to be discussed with the Norwegian members of the BoD.  The local 
CEO understood that the Norwegian specialists were more useful for the company, 
and he decided to give them a special status, reporting to him personally. (Based on 
conversations with the technical staff from “T”, who worked in one of the Eastern 
European companies from 1997–1998)  
At the same time, The Norwegian expatriates were challenged by the local organizational culture that 
led to misunderstandings and even conflicts. 
A narrative from a local CEO: “My people worked, consultants left” 
Two Norwegian consultants came to the company and misunderstood our local 
working traditions. The consultants left their jobs, as they were used to doing in 
Norway after they had worked 7.5 hours.  It is early here to go home... They did not 
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pay attention to the fact that the local employees were not allowed to leave their 
working places… The locals could leave when the managers allowed them to go 
home. The Norwegians never asked!  
According to the management agreement, the consultants were provided with a 
private driver. When visits to restaurants were late, it also became an issue, as the 
driver could not work as many hours as he had to. In addition, the locals complained 
that the consultants arrived at work late because of the late restaurant visits. They 
were not on vacation. It was their job!  
The local employees paid attention to the lack of knowledge of cultural traditions, particularly in 
relation to the rules of subordination (consultants were used to flat organizational traditions, which 
were contrary to those of Eastern Europeans), being a part of the working community, loyalty, etc. The 
locals were displeased at the level of benefits the consultants received, compared to the quality of their 
work.  
Secondly, there was some evidence illustrating that consultants were sent to the JV without any 
training in how to do business abroad. “T” started to focus on the cross-cultural issues, challenges in 
communication with the local staff, local culture and working traditions.   
When the local managers complained, “T” HQ often changed the consultants. 
Afterwards, having blitz-course at HQ in local culture started to be more or less 
mandatory for the consultants. (Observations) 
Thirdly, when the consultants were sent to JVs abroad, the HQ managers started to see that the cost 
of using consultants was much greater than that of their own employees at HQ. 
 I was told that the consultants’ most important role was to transfer knowledge from 
HQ to JVs according to the management agreement and train the local staff in JVs. 
We knew that the costs related to the consultants were rather substantial. They were 
provided with a personal driver, had the right to come home to Norway every second 




CCR:  first attempts to create a common platform for common corporate rules (CCR) that could 
be interpreted as behavior control (BC). Presentation of ethical dilemmas in HQ and JVs. 
Respondents linked the establishing of corporate culture and corporate rules to behavior control 
(BC). 
During this period, several concerns, mostly from the markets where the business culture was different 
from that of Norway, such as Russia, Ukraine, Hungary, Greece, have been sent     to the “Ethical 
Council45” established in Phase 1 of “T”’s internationalization. So, HQ needed to both work with the 
reported cases and prevent them.  
Most of the projects abroad were partnerships with private actors; only one company involved a 
partnership with a state-owned co-owner.  Partnerships in JVs, especially with private owners, were a 
challenge, in terms of corporate rules and corporate culture, for “T” as a 100% state-owned company, 
which, during almost 150 years of its existence had developed important rules related to business 
governance and business culture, representing the Norwegian values and attitudes that were expected 
from a state employee.  All these rules were mostly unwritten, but they were strongly incorporated in 
“T” as core rules that were based on national values and traditions.  
The Ethical Council arranged several seminars about ethical dilemmas for employees 
traveling abroad. The leader of the council used to draw a picture, presented as “the 
staircase of temptation”: in the first stage there  was a flower bouquet, in the second 
–  a gift, in the third – expensive tickets to the Bolshoi Theater, then some services 
that the local person  gave you personally, such as a  visit to an expensive restaurant, 
or a special thing you personally wanted to buy but could not manage to, and 
suddenly you had it as a present…and then you were asked to perform some service 
that was in contradiction of the   company rules and offered payment for that…  Such 
seminars were arranged in all country offices, and they made a strong impression on 
the local staff – to them, these issues were unknown. But for us, who represented “T” 
abroad, these seminars were useful as well. We always knew that we represented 
Norway and wanted to be as correct as possible. For example, because of the state 
regulation, we could not take expensive and exclusive presents to our partners when 
we traveled abroad. We had to limit the price to the permitted level. But partners 
                                                 
45 “Ethical Council” established in HQ in order to develop the first ethical policy in “T”. 
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sometimes gave us expensive presents…. We faced a dilemma – what to do – to 
offend the partners or to act against the rules. (A former manager, who worked in the 
operations in Eastern Europe in the 1990s, interview, 2018) 
In the interview with the former CEO, it was underlined that “T” started to think carefully about the 
ethical questions and the ethical standards after several international JVs had been established in the 
middle of the 1990s, in order to have the same approach across the company regarding complaints and 
discussions on controversial issues. (Interview, 2014).  
In some JVs, in both Asia and Eastern Europe, “T” arranged seminars, in order to 
present itself to the employees in the JVs and inform them about ethical dilemmas, 
the traditions of doing business in Norway and “T”. We invited all employees – that 
shocked the co-owner and top management in the JVs, which used to have traditions 
of excluding the ordinary employees from high-level events.  We insisted that all 
employees were invited, explaining it as Norwegian tradition and due to the 
importance of the topic. These were high-quality events, with Norwegian music, 
Norwegian food, good stories. We saw that people appreciated it. They could directly 
talk with us, answer questions.  We wanted to present our culture when ordinary 
employees could have an open discussion with top managers and co-owners. I think 
that having a clear understanding of the corporate rules and following the corporate 
rules is connected to the behavior in the organization, and how managers want their 
employees to behave. (A former manager, who worked in the operations in Eastern 
Europe in the 1990s, interview, 2018) 
At the same time, “T” met a business culture that was very different from that of Norway and had to 
signalize the harmonization of some rules in the JV. 
“T”’s team came to a JV in Russia and saw that the local partners and administration 
did not allow ordinary people to talk with us, Norwegians.  We had to change that: 
we could not be in a vacuum if we had to teach the local staff. We noticed that there 
were some rules that we could not understand. Thus, there were two cafeterias in a 
JV – one for the top managers, where there was no payment, another for the ordinary 
employees, who had to pay. There was a separate elevator to the cafeteria for top 
managers.  We did not like this and either used the cafeteria for the ordinary 
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employees or had lunch outside and invited our Russian colleagues. I don’t think that 
it was popular among the top management, even though we tried to tell them that, in 
Norway, we have a flat organization, and that we wanted to work there as in Norway. 
We were always invited to eat in the VIP cafeteria; it was explained that “This is the 
Russian way to do things.” Yes, the behavior of managers and ordinary employees 
was different from us. We could not control it through rules that were not accepted 
in the JV.” (Interview with a manager, who worked as an expatriate in several 
European countries, 2016) 
These interviews show that “T” understood the importance of establishing and practicing corporate 
rules in HQ and attempted to focus on ethical rules, especially for those who worked internationally. 
This was a start to establishing awareness about the issue of corporate culture, corporate rules and 
corporate behavior.   At the same time, “T” had challenges in the implementation of CCR in JVs.  
CCR46 were linked to the behavior issue, specifically to BC, when CCR represented the core elements 
in the corporate culture, which could be implemented. 
5.4. Perceived influence: challenges in Phase 2 of “T”’s internationalization process 
As a co-owner in JVs in international operations, “T”’s influence was limited.  The composition of the 
BoDs in JVs did not offer the possibility to exercise influence and control. Consultants from “T” could 
not perform as executive managers and could not have control functions. Challenges in financial 
reporting. No influence on the behavior in JV organizations while the corporate rules were local; “T” 
started the process of introducing ethical dilemmas connected to JVs’ own corporate rules.   
The presented data collection gave the impression that “T” had sufficient influence, using the 
mechanisms of JV ownership in this period of internationalization. At the same time, some respondents 
related that JV was a challenging structure in which to obtain control and achieve influence. 
Now I know that it is important to own more than 50%, in order to govern the 
subsidiary and have influence and control; the best way is to own 100%.  When we 
owned less, as a JV, the level of influence and control was low. The local partner 
managed the company as his own. If you want to have the influence, you need to 
                                                 
46 CCR -   Common Corporate Rules. Even it is meant that CCR is a plural noun, it will be used the form of a single form.    
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have the control and need to be the owner. We always had this feeling and tried to 
take it with us back to HQ to discuss. (Interview with a manager, who worked in 
M&A47 processes and was also an expatriate in different countries, 2016)   
Another respondent, who worked with financial issues, told about the issues of the unreasonable 
increasing of the budgets that were difficult to control. 
I worked with the financial issues, all big procurements were “clean”, meaning that 
all money that had been invested from HQ to buy equipment was used for this 
purpose, but there was absolutely another story in marketing. We did not know the 
local laws, legislation enough. We had no opportunity to check all the prices, all the 
demands from the authorities. Everything was in the local language. The partners 
said to us, “We need to increase the budget for marketing, in order to pay for the 
marketing things.” We could not say “no” – we had no power to do that. The local 
people insisted that we needed these budgets, in order to build up the marketing 
policy. It was impossible to have control over these payments and costs. (A former 
expatriate, who worked in Russia in 1997, interview, 2018) 
One of the most experienced business controllers in “T”, who worked in Russia, Ukraine and the 
Nordic countries, described the importance of establishing good financial mechanisms or FC that can 
give influence from HQ towards subsidiaries:  
HQ demanded financial reports, financial analysis, financial plans and fact sheets 
from its subsidiaries, in order to compare with HQ’s plans. In addition to that, HQ 
organized quarterly financial reviews, where the results from the different 
subsidiaries were analyzed and discussed with the top management. Audit activities 
were implemented once a year. The controllers could have an opportunity to come 
to the subsidiary and get access to the information. They worked closely with the 
local controllers. (Interview, 2018)  
                                                 
47 M&A is a merging and acquisition process. Hereafter in the text, it will be used M&A. 
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The respondent   explained the importance of establishing routines in financial reporting, in order to 
have control   over the financial situation of the subsidiary. “T” had these functions in relation to all 
subsidiaries.  
At the same time, several interviews indicated that it was not always easy to find the relevant financial 
information, even when “T”’s routines were followed. Thus, one of the respondents, who worked on 
the BoD in several JVs in Russia, stated: 
In one operation, we had a strong feeling that something was not as it should be, 
from the financial point of view.   It was agreed with the co-owner that we could 
come to the company with our own audit and our financial controllers, who would 
work closely with the local staff.  Everything that we could control we controlled, 
but it was obvious to us that the local financial specialists were extremely good in 
the local accounting… We needed to have the majority in this subsidiary, in order to 
have real control of the financial situation. We did not have it. (Interview, 2016)  
The expatriate who worked in this JV at the end of the 1990s stated that it is difficult to get the FC in 
a JV. 
The local Financial Director was under the power of the co-partner. He paid her so 
well that I was not surprised when she reported that, according to the local accounting 
standard, everything was clean. The reports to HQ were like a pro forma – not real, 
we had another standard. We had a separate version of the accounting, prepared for 
us. We needed to be 100% owners, in order to clean up these things. (Interview, 
2018) 
Data collection described   MA as an important tool in establishing control, when “T” did not have the 
majority in JVs, and used it as a governing document.   At the same time, some respondents stated that 
MA gave no guarantee of control in JVs. 
I need to admit that MA was expensive for the JV, which had to pay for the use of 
expatriates. Local partners in almost all JVs argued about the MA and did want to 
pay; they used several “anti-MA” arguments, such as that the services from “T” in 
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the framework of MA were not good enough, and that the local company had no use 
for them. Local partners always negotiated more and more services; in the end, we 
delivered much more than we got paid for. (Interview with an employee worked in 
Europe, 2018) 
According to MA, the time that expatriates could work in JVs as consultants was limited, due to the 
question of money and the idea that, according to MA, the consultants would teach the local staff.  In 
reality, there were always expatriates in JVs, and none of them returned home quickly; they just 
remained in JVs and “T” had to pay for them. 
In the issue of the BoD as an instrument of control in JVs, a respondent confirmed that the co-partners 
often used the BoD as a mechanism to approve an increase in the budget; often, it was difficult to 
understand what was useful for the company and what for the co-owner, personally:  
The marketing consultant for “T” was afraid. She cried because she was hard pressed to present the 
marketing budgets in a wide form. She said that did not know all the local marketing rules and 
mechanisms and had to agree with the co-owner. (Interview with an expatriate in the late 1990s, 2018) 
In spite of the different seminars about “T” and the Western governance and rules for doing business 
being provided to all employees in JVs, “T” could not present the rules as a system at that time, because 
they did not exist.  At the same time, the presentations or seminars of “T” corporate culture at this 
moment could not change local employees’ practice of doing business and their perceptions.  Day-to-
day practice was needed of the rules and the system of the rules, which was impossible in the JV 
structure. As I see it, the implemented and practiced corporate rules are connected to the BC that we 
did not have in JVs. (Interview with a former executive, who worked in HR, 2015)  
In order to illustrate a possible bribe scenario, the following story was told. 
A narrative from a former manager, who worked internationally: “He understood the price of the 
watch”. 
A rather special situation happened in one of our companies abroad, when the local 
manager tried to bribe the top manager from “T”, who could influence his position. 
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He was given a gold watch that was packaged so carefully that the manager from 
“T” could not see immediately that it was a very expensive watch. The manager came 
home and understood the price of the watch. The watch was returned – with the 
explanation that things like that are not permissible in “T” – and reported to the 
Ethical Council. (Based on conversation, 2015).   
This situation illustrates that the ethical issue was not yet established in subsidiaries, and that “T” had 
to find a solution for how to establish its own norms of governance in JVs and an ethical attitude to do 
business. The documents about zero tolerance to corruption were just in the beginning for its 
development “T”.   
Data collection showed the transformation of the expatriates’ role, when highly professional 
consultants were sent to JVs, in order to teach the local staff and support the top management. In reality, 
the consultants should also have had mild control over the situation in the subsidiaries and report to 
HQ.  At the same time, some of the respondents admitted that many consultants did not function well. 
They did not function as we thought – they should have been leaders, managers. 
They were not. (Interview with the former Legal Director, also country manager, 
2015) 
“T” recognized, at a later stage, that consultants could not satisfy the need for managers. 
We were not so successful with the consultants in Russia. We thought that they could 
bring good competence into the company. They could not work with day-to-day 
control in our subsidiary without having a manager’s skills. They had to be managers, 
not consultants… management is important in “T”. But they were more consultants 
than managers … Getting the best people was a problem – many of them were not 
tough enough to take the manager’s role. We didn’t get the best people from HQ. 
The cross-cultural issue was not important then; speaking or understanding the 
Russian language was also not so important. We needed experienced managers, who 
could understand operations and be competent. They used interpreters while the 
locals they worked with could not speak English. They could not choose the local 
staff; that was a decision made by the local management. (Former executive 
manager, who worked in legal issues, interview 2015) 
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To conclude, at the end of this phase, there was a period resulting in strong growth in international 
activities.  “T” established an adequate system, according to its understanding of the needs during the 
process of internationalization from the middle of the 1990s to the beginning of 2000. However, data 
collection showed that, to the end of the 1990s, “T” needed to “tune” its international strategy and use 
of control mechanisms, in order to achieve influence.  None of the presented system of control 
mechanisms – ownership; the JV as a structure for investment as FC; BoD composition in the 
framework of JVs as SC and OC; expatriates as consultants and not managers as OC; and an 
unsystematic package of CCR that could be presented as BC – helped HQ influence the subsidiaries 
With the increase in our experience, we increased our shares in the subsidiaries 
abroad and started to think about how to achieve complete influence and what kind 
of control mechanisms we needed. (Interview with a former executive, member of 
the Executive Board, 2015) 
If “T” was going to  continue  further international expansion,  the company had to  start readjusting  
the package of control mechanisms, such as   how to increase shares in the JVs abroad  and to establish 
an adequate composition of the BoD, in order to increase  “T”s influence in the subsidiaries;  how to 
increase the power and influence of  consultants in JVs, and  how to create a common ethical platform 
of behavior  for HQ and subsidiaries. At the same time, “T” needed to recruit more competence in 
international affairs: people with a clear mandate to administrate the international projects. 
 Nevertheless, a former Director for Legal Affairs in “T” admitted:  
“Top management knew early on that the best for ‘T’ was to have 100% ownership 
in subsidiaries abroad, but it did not have the opportunity to realize this because of 
the lack of capital. We were missing it. Although all “T”’s projects were JVs at the 







Chapter 6: Phase 3 (2001-2004/2005): “Up or Out” - it’s time to develop 
the strategy and governance”. Consolidation of “the planted flags” in the 
international portfolio.  
6.1. Antecedent conditions 
1. At the beginning of 2000, “T” was one of the most rapidly developing European companies.  
“T” had a lot of international experience and knowledge particularly in connection with the 
legislation in each market.  
 At the beginning of 2000, “T” wrote:   
“T” is one of the most value-added companies in Norway with a turnover of some 
NOK 37.6 billion in 2000 and around 20,200 manpower years at home and abroad. 
“T” is a leading participant in the market within telecommunications, data services, 
and media dissemination. “T” aims at offering domestic and international clients 
high quality solutions at competitive prices, and to contribute to increased value for 
shareholders.  (“T”’s website: annual report, 2000) 
In 2005, regarding its international strategy, “T” reported that it had become 
(…) Norway’s largest telecommunications company and one of the fastest growing 
providers of mobile communications services worldwide. (…) In 2005, 57% of the 
Group’s revenues were derived from the mobile operations.  (…) has mobile 
operations in some of the world’s fastest growing markets, and the home market, 
Norway… (“T”’s website: annual report, 2005) 
“T” also described its controlling interests in the following mobile operations: “T” in Norway, 
Denmark, Sweden, Ukraine, Hungary, Montenegro, Thailand, Malaysia, Bangladesh and Pakistan, and 
as well substantial ownership interests in mobile providers in Russia and Austria48. Group revenues 
for 2005 reached NOK 68.9 billion, a growth of 14% compared to 2004. At year-end 2005, “T” 
                                                 
48  “T” in Austria was sold in 2007  
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employed 27,600 people (man-years), 16,700 of whom were employed outside Norway49 (“T”’s 
website: annual report, 2005). 
Thus, the above-presented statements from “T” indicated that, during this phase of internationalization, 
the company experienced rapid development worldwide, focusing on the emerging markets.  As 
presented in its annual reports, “T” increased the turnover from NOK 37.6 billion in 2000 to NOK 68.9 
billion in 2005.  At the same time, “T” underlined that, while the company had around 20,200 
manpower-years at home and abroad in 2000, the number of employees had increased to 27,600 by 
2005. Notably, “T” mentioned that 16,700 of all employees were employed outside Norway, 
underlining the priority it placed on international markets. 
In addition, several employees confirmed the importance of the international focus and explained how 
“T” approached the international markets, and how their actions resulted in an increased number of 
JVs abroad.  One former executive, who worked in operations abroad, stated: 
We travelled a lot and were fearless. We understood that we had to find projects, and 
we found many in a short time. Nobody in Europe did what we did. Maybe we were 
cowboys, but that brought us the results. (Interview, 2015) 
We learned the culture of building a dialogue with the local authorities. Thus, we 
had our own local lawyers, who explained the restrictions in legislation in relation to 
ownership by international owners in specific markets, and other restrictions. We 
were active in supporting the co-ordination between Western/Norwegian authorities 
and local markets, where we saw that the legislation was not good enough for foreign 
investors. We participated in conferences, seminars, forums, established dialogue, 
supported visits, exchanges and worked hard and targeted to get the relevant contacts 
and the relevant knowledge, in order to strengthen the investment climate in 
countries with legislation that was challenging for foreigners.  (ibid.). 
The respondent paid special attention to the issue of the different legislation in different countries, and 
that “T” had to build knowledge on this issue, in order to meet the possible challenges related to the 
                                                 
49  See "T".com 
133 
 
investment climate and the activities of “T”’s subsidiaries.   One important issue for “T” was linked to 
the legislation in the markets where foreign investors could not own 100% of their subsidiaries. 
Thus, one executive, who worked in international projects, stated: 
We knew about restrictions in some of markets where we had made investments. We 
had to learn to handle them. Thus, in Russia, there was a regulatory regime for 
foreign investment in strategic sectors of Russian industry50, that was regulated by 
law, which did not allow us to have 100% ownership in a JV in Russia. We studied 
the law carefully with our local lawyers and had to figure out how we would deal 
with the appointment of a CEO, BoD members, and other issues. (Interview, 2017)  
2. In 2000, “T” was listed on NASDAQ (NY) and on the Oslo Stock Exchange.  
Understanding the necessity to obtain fresh capital for international expansion, “T”’s top management 
suggested the Initial Public Offering Process (IPO process) to the BoD. The government, as the owner, 
supported this process.  The issue was discussed and approved in the Storting, suggesting, further, that 
the government could start the process of privatizing “T”, with the state retaining ownership of at least 
51% (Stortingsmelding 66, 1999-2000).  Prime Minister Stoltenberg confirmed in the media that:  
If Norway is to be at the forefront of ICT and telecommunication, “T” needs new capital and new 
impulses. (Dagens Næringsliv 30.03.2000)   
The former CEO of “T” confirmed that it was necessary, at the beginning of 2000, 
for “T” to go for the IPO, in order to have access to the capital, and added that, in his 
opinion “The target of the listing was also to make the values of the company visible” 
(Interview, 2014).    
  
                                                 
50 Federal Law № 57-FZ “On the Procedure of Making Foreign Investments in Companies of Strategic Importance for 
National Defense and State Security” 
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3. Nevertheless, the listing process was not an immediate economic success and triggered a 
negative effect during the first years of privatization.  
The values of “T” in 2000 were estimated to be between 180-250 billion NOK (ref. 
Thune, 2005), but the share price for “T” was 42 NOK, which could result in 74 
billion NOK. During December 2000, “T” had just 15.2 billion NOK as equity 
capital. What influenced this negative effect during the privatization process? The 
critical analyses made by Goldman Sachs as a feedback to “T” (“Oppdatert 
konsernstrategy for “T” 2001-2004) highlighted three main factors.  First, one of the 
most crucial factors was the lack of control in “T”’s international mobile operations. 
The second was the loss in internet projects abroad, invested in by “T”’s company, 
NXR51. The third was “T”’s particular focus on the home market, where its market 
share was rather high, which caused a misbalance in the portfolio and reduced 
financial institutions’ interest in investing in “T” (Conversation with the former CEO 
in 2014 and notes from his archive).  
Thus, the above-mentioned statements illustrate that investors “punished” the company for its 
perceived lack of control in several strategic directions – in its investment strategy abroad, in its choice 
of technology for investments abroad and its strategy for the balanced focus and presence of “T” in the 
domestic versus overseas markets.    
  4. A new CEO was appointed, who actively initiated the international orientation of “T”.  
The new CEO started to think internationally and emphasized organizational changes, aiming to build 
a new international organization that could achieve better control in its operations abroad. 
One of the first tasks I was given by the CEO, as a newly appointed EVP for HR, 
was to create “international thinking” in “T” that could help to develop a new 
international team that could run international operations worldwide. The new CEO 
was very much occupied with the issue of internationalization and increasing 
international knowledge. (Interview with a former EVP, 2015) 
                                                 
51  NXT – an Internet company of “T”, in this study the company will be called NXR 
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The new CEO visited almost all the important operations abroad, most of them in a 
“transfer – period” together with the former CEO, who wanted to introduce him to 
the local partners.  I participated in such trips in Central and Eastern Europe. He 
wanted to present himself as the leader of the international company, and, during 
conversations with the partners, the Norwegian operations were not mentioned, 
although he wished to underline “T”’s experience and knowledge in relation to 
telecommunication issues. The new CEO used more examples from the subsidiaries 
abroad. He used proven English as a working language abroad, and, as I had 
previously translated for the former CEO from Norwegian to Russian, it was 
interesting to observe how the use of English helped in negotiations. First, although 
the partners did not speak English, they could “catch” and understand the important 
information. Secondly, talking directly to partners in “a common English” helped to 
establish a creditable business relationship. At the same time, the use of English 
stimulated the local partners to improve their knowledge in English.   The CEO also 
wanted to underline his status as CEO, as an international leader for the international 
company and, in this way, included the local partners in the community of 
international business, based on certain rules. One of the central questions that the 
new CEO asked after his first trips abroad was: “How can we be sure that we have 
sufficient control in “T”’s operations abroad?” (observations from the author). 
In order to gain control in international subsidiaries, “T” needed to develop a new strategy, with a 
focus on the institutionalization of operations abroad.  
6.2. International strategy during Phase 3 of “T”’s internationalization 
The consolidation process gave “T” the opportunity to build a new governing strategy in subsidiaries 
that reflected the new business reality. “T” needed to have a new strategy, related to the issue of control, 





1. New corporate thinking – from “T.  International” to “International T”. 
One respondent told a story that illustrates the paradigm change in “T”’s international strategy. 
 We, the newly appointed management in “T”, had a strategic gathering outside HQ, 
in order to work on one issue – creating a new international strategy for “T”.   We 
held discussions over two days, and there were many good suggestions for how to 
further build the company, “T” International, to be a kind of “locomotive” in 
international investments, and how to use this company as the trigger in the further 
development of an international strategy.  At the end of the gathering, it was clear to 
us that we had to change the thinking regarding the international development of 
“T”: everything should be international: not just one company – “T” International – 
but all staff, all employees should start to think internationally. Thus, the idea to 
move from “T” International to International “T” was born.  We decided to close “T” 
International” and improve the strategic plan for how to make the whole organization 
international. (Interview with one of the top managers in “T”, 2016)  
This respondent’s story described how all “T”’s activities – in both HQ and the subsidiaries – would 
have an impact on the process of internationalization.  This process showed the need to start the 
development of a new, appropriate international business strategy, managerial system, and corporate 
culture for both for HQ and operations in the home and overseas markets.  
2. Increasing shares in subsidiaries to 100% where it could be done or leave the operation 
abroad: strategy “Up or Out”, meaning achieve control or leave the company. 
This important process was launched after “T”’s top management decided to develop the new 
international strategy.  
We had to define a suitable image of “T” and its new role as a listed company, and 
we needed to increase our influence in the subsidiaries and obtain a considerable 
number of 100%-owned subsidiaries abroad. (Conversations with a former member 
of the Executive Board, responsible for HR worldwide, 2015)   
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As shown in the previous Chapter 5, at the end of 1999, “T” had nine operations in Russia alone, in 
different parts of the country – from the south (Stavropol) to the north (Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, St. 
Petersburg), in the western part of Russia (Kaliningrad) and in Moscow (VCom). In addition to the 
JVs in Russia, “T” owned shares in JVs in Ukraine, Central Europe, Western Europe and Asia, mostly 
in mobile operations. There were also small investments in the Internet, via a company which in this 
study is called NXR.  
In none of these operations did “T” have the majority position or, as it was called in the company, 
financial control (FC). Several of “T”’s key managers, who worked in international operations, 
confirmed this. 
We did not have control in our subsidiaries. We could not follow the company as the 
real investor. (Interview with an experienced manager working internationally; the 
respondent worked as a consultant in Russia at the end of the 1990s, 2015) 
We needed to get control in our portfolio, or it was not possible to be a good industrial 
investor. (Interview with a former member of the Executive Board responsible for 
mobile operations worldwide, 2015) 
Hence, the portfolio in just the mobile projects of “T”, as it stood at the end of Phase 2 (see Table 5.1 
in Chapter 5), shows that “T” had 14 mobile operations worldwide, having no majority in these 
companies. As a consequence of having only JVs in its portfolio, “T” did not have the power to make 
decisions over the composition of the BoD, appoint top managers, place “T”’s expatriates in key 
positions, provide a common managerial model across the whole portfolio or design and implement a 
common corporate culture. The possibility to change ownership forms in the portfolio could allow “T” 
to revalue its investments and, based on them, create a new international strategy, which focused on 
the ownership in the JV.   
In 2002, the newly appointed top management in “T” formulated a strategy for further international 
development, based on the new international thinking that the whole of “T” should be international.  It 
was decided that “T” would move from being a company with several small international operations 
spread around the different parts of the world, to become an international operator with a more 
consolidated portfolio. In order to achieve this strategy, “T” started the process of becoming an 
international company with 100% control of its operations abroad.  It was decided to declare the main 
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principle for this process in relation to the ownership structure: “Up or Out”, meaning to increase the 
ownership up to 100%, in order to either have industrial and financial control or leave the company.   
Control or “exit” is “T”’s strategy for international mobile commitments. The objective is to achieve 
the controlling interest wherever possible. (Annual report, 2003:17). The result of the implementation 
of the new strategy is shown in Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2. Mobile portfolio as of 2006 (based on the information from “T”’s website)  
 
Company Markets Percentage owned 
T Sweden Sweden 100% 
T Denmark Denmark 100% 
DT Thailand 65,5% 
DG  Malaysia 49% 
GRPh Bangladesh 55.8% 
T Pakistan Pakistan 100% 
T Hungary Hungary 100% 
T Montenegro Montenegro 100% 
KVS52 Ukraine 56.5% 
VCom53  Russia 43% 
 
As visible in Table 6.2, there were several subsidiaries that “T” removed from its portfolio, specifically 
those related to the operations in Western Europe. As one of the managers in “T” explained, the reason 
to sell these operations underlined the fact that the price to increase its ownership in Western Europe 
was too high, and the level of maturity of the markets was also high, both factors that could not provide 
the expected profits. These parameters were the main reason for selling the shares in the Western 
European countries and concentrating its international expansion on the emerging markets, despite the 
high risks.  
                                                 
52 JV in Ukraine 
53 JV in Russia 
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We called it “the window of opportunities”. The opportunities for further 
development were poor in the Western Europe markets. Although the investment 
climate was more predictable, we decided to sell up the operations in Western Europe 
and go for investments in the emerging markets in Eastern and Central Europe and 
in Asia, where the window of opportunities was open, and where we could use value 
creation in the long term. (Interview, 2015) 
“T” retained five  overseas operations in its portfolio, where the ownership was not 
100%: VCom (Russia, 43%); GRPh (Bangladesh, 55.8%), DG  (Malaysia, 49%), DT 
(Thailand, 65,5%)  This strategy built on the antecedent conditions mentioned above, 
in which 100% ownership could not be achieved in three of the operations because 
of local legislation; “T” knew that and made the deliberate choice to retain these 
operations in its portfolio. The reasons for keeping these companies in the portfolio 
were the attractiveness of the markets and, at the same time, the well-developed 
companies where “T” had established operational control (conversation with a 
former member of the Executive Board responsible for worldwide operation, 2014). 
The operation in Ukraine “T” did not manage to increase ownership to 100% because of the acquisition 
process in the company, when both “T” and a Russian co-partner acquired the shares that were 
available. This was a part of the natural development in JV KVS54. 
3. “T” changed its strategy in merger and acquisitions processes, when the cost issue was not 
dominated by the question of international expansion and investments. “T” developed 
“geographical-cluster thinking”.  
According to a former member of the Executive Board responsible for mobile operations worldwide, 
it was decided to construct a new international strategy, focusing on following geographical markets 
or clusters: 1) the home market (Scandinavia), 2) the Central and Eastern Europe markets, and 3) the 
Asian markets. 
Money was no longer an issue. We no longer needed to go for the low-cost concept. That gave us a 
free hand. (From an interview with the executive responsible for operations abroad, 2015) 
                                                 
54 KVS – a company in Ukraine which in this study is called KVS 
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We started to think in clusters in our international expansion. Cluster thinking helped us to organize 
the teams in HQ, and we understood that it was easy to manage several operations in one cluster. We 
called it the synergy effect. (Conversation with one of the executives in the Europe region, 2015) 
4. “T” started to develop an appropriate governing philosophy for a listed international company 
in growth and made the necessary structural changes in its managerial strategy. “T” needed 
more international experience and built an international team. 
Several respondents shared almost the same thoughts about the new managerial system introduced in 
“T”, and which was developed step by step.  
We started to think about what it means to be a manager in “T”, and how we wanted 
to be identified. Who were we? During one of the gatherings dedicated to the new 
managerial philosophy, we had to answer the question: What is “T” as a person that 
we see now, and how would we want to describe “T” in the near future? The majority 
said that, although “T” is a dynamic “guy” in international projects, its image is an 
old-fashioned middle-aged man because of the heavy representation and lack of 
«cool” design in the home market. We said that everywhere – in both Norway and 
abroad – we want “T” to look like a young, dynamic, cool and efficient person. We 
understood that we needed to create a new managerial system, in order to educate 
the new international team and the whole organization. We needed to create a new 
DNA for “T”. (Interview with one of executives, 2016) 
On the question of what the criteria for the new managerial thinking were, one of the senior managers 
who worked both in HQ and abroad as an expatriate said: 
The most important thing is to be a 100% owner, then to compose the BoD from 
people that have “‘T’’s DNA” – the necessary package of knowledge, attitude, values 
and loyalty; then to appoint the top management of the subsidiary in order to provide 
the strategy from HQ; and then to implement and practice common rules, understand  
corporate governance… Expatriates are important. We needed to create a new 




5. The technological platform was decided – “T” is an international mobile operator. “The 
technology met people”. 
After a long process, during which different technologies were tried in the process of 
internationalization, mobile technology was chosen as the main strategic platform.  Despite the fact 
that “T” had operations abroad based on satellite, fixed and broadcasting technologies, the mobile 
operations dominated in the portfolio. A former member of the Executive Board responsible for 
worldwide operations shared his thoughts about this choice:  
The choice of the technology was important. The right technology gave rapid growth 
related to the “right” growing markets. Inexpensive mobile technology met the large 
number of people (potential customers). This was a success factor. We invested in 
risky markets, with a lot of political challenges and economic instability, but the 
mobile technology supported us, and we “planted the flags” in markets with 
growth…. It is easy to use mobile as a tool. … It is a universal tool for people all 
over the world...  Even in most poor markets, such as in Asia, with the help of the 
mobile phone, from nobody people started to become somebody. (Interviews, 2014, 
2015) 
6.3. Control mechanisms used to achieve influence during “T”’s process of 
internationalization 
Ownership: WOS is preferred. Top management in subsidiaries are from HQ. 
After “T” had “planted the flags worldwide like Vikings” (this definition was taken from a 
conversation with one of the executives who worked in “T” for over 40 years), and after the top 
management had decided to change the  international strategy and “T”’s profile and create a new 
managerial system,  the question about  influence  and control in the subsidiaries started to become 
central. The clear majority of the respondents provided the opinion that, in order to increase influence 
and control in the subsidiaries abroad, “T” needed to increase the level of ownership in its subsidiaries. 
The WOS form of ownership was preferred, where possible. Where it was not possible to have WOS, 
“T”’s intention was to strive for a majority, or to achieve an influential position as an owner. 
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After the merging with “TA” was stopped, and stock listing in NY was a fact, we 
understood that we could manage the operations both in Eastern and Central Europe 
and in Asia ourselves.  It was obvious that we needed to establish influence and 
control and to be stronger in our role as an industrial investor, in order to take an 
industrial grasp… We needed to change the form of ownership in our subsidiaries. 
The strategy “Up or Out” was improved, and we started the process of merging and 
acquisitions (M&A), in order to own 100% in the subsidiaries, where we could 
achieve WOS.  It was crucially important for us to own 100%, in order to build up 
the system of management control. There were some operations where we could not 
achieve WOS. In this case, we had to evaluate how important it was for us to keep 
the company, and what we would do to increase influence – it could be the majority 
position or other mechanisms that could give us influence. (Interview with one of the 
executives, who worked in mobile projects worldwide, 2014)  
In addition to the matter of the importance of having influence via ownership, the connection between 
the influence via ownership in the subsidiary and the other mechanisms of control that create a kind of 
“a chain of controls” was proven crucial. 
The owner of a subsidiary (HQ) can appoint the BoD, as long as the mother company 
(HQ) is a 100% owner and has the financial control (FC). The BoD appoints top 
management. Top management is responsible for appointing the management team 
and therefore day-to-day operations. (Interview with a former executive, who 
worked in several European countries, 2015)   
One respondent, who worked in international operations (interview, 2016), described two mechanisms 
that “T” used in order to gain influence through establishing control mechanisms in international 
strategy via ownership. The first one was to establish WOS using the Merger and Acquisition (M&A) 
processes. The respondent connected this process to the issue of achieving FC. 
The best influence is through ownership. The more you own, the more influence and 
control you have. We call it achieving FC. Our model in the 1990s, when we didn’t 
have control, was bad. I worked with two small Russian companies; I saw that we 
needed control and that, unfortunately, we didn’t have it. I had to “clean up” in two 
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small Russian JVs. It is difficult to clean up the companies when you do not have the 
necessary influence and control. (Former expatriate in Russia, interview, 2016) 
The second mechanism for achieving influence via ownership without having FC is to establish a 
system with a wide range of controls, including the various financial controls, without having the WOS 
and the formal FC as an owner, as was done in Malaysia.  The respondent explained that, in Malaysia, 
there is a complicated form of ownership, which entails that “T” owns 49% of the subsidiary, and 51% 
belongs to a large number of local owners via the local stock exchange.  
Because of Malaysian legislation, a foreign company is not permitted to own more 
than 50% of a Malaysian subsidiary. Using the mechanisms of General Assembly, 
“T”, as a co-owner of its subsidiary in Malaysia, selected all members of the BoD by 
being present under the voting procedure. This gave “T” the opportunity to appoint 
the Chairman of the BoD and the top management of “T”’s subsidiary in Malaysia. 
(Interview with one of the former executives, 2015) 
At the same time, one respondent confirmed “T”’s role as an industrial investor and linked it, further, 
to the necessity to achieve WOS or another form of FC in subsidiaries, in order to achieve influence. 
It is important to understand that the industrial investor must have FC, in order to 
have control inside the BoD and make decisions about the strategy and the operations 
in its subsidiaries. (Interview with a former member of the BoDs in Eastern Europe 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s, 2014)  
Another respondent also confirmed the differences between the industrial and financial investor in the 
matter of influence via ownership: 
It is important to understand the differences between being the financial investor as 
an owner and being the industrial investor as an owner.  The financial investor is not 
interested in FC, but the industrial investor is very interested, in order to develop the 
company further in the long run. (Interview with a former executive, who worked in 
several European markets, 2015) 
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Reflecting on the process of internationalization and establishing a system of managerial control that 
could provide more influence, one of the respondents described his experience of being an expatriate 
abroad and stated that it took time before “T” found the best form of achieving influence, in relation, 
also, to the issue of ownership. 
We experienced a kind of adjustment in our way of finding the best solutions to 
achieving influence. We tried several forms and mechanisms and understood that 
having control via ownership was crucial; we could really control the operation. 
(Interview, 2016)  
It was emphasized that, despite the fact that WOS was the absolutely preferable form of ownership 
during this phase of internationalization, providing maximum control, “T” had to continue to deal with 
a few JVs, where the level of ownership was variable: from a minority position, as in Russia and 
Malaysia, to a majority position, as in Ukraine and Bangladesh.  In this connection, “T” needed to find 
out how to utilize the role of being an owner in JVs where it had a majority position, and how to handle 
the at the same time being in a minority position in the new reality, when “T” became an experienced 
international player in telecommunication. “T”’s strategy was as follows:  in JVs in Russia, with the 
minority position, “T” targeted building good co-operation with the co-partners in the JVs, based on a 
mutual understanding of the common targets, protecting their own interest and supporting the JVs with   
telecommunication know-how.  In this way, “T” tried to maintain the possibility of influencing the JV, 
while understanding its limitations. “T” was also interested in introducing   corporate governance, 
based on Western European traditions (Based on conversation with an executive, who worked 
internationally, 2016).  
In the JV in Malaysia, “T”, being a minority shareholder, used another strategy to achieve influence 
as it was described above - using the mechanisms of General Assembly.   
Being a majority shareholder in JVs (in Bangladesh and KVS), “T” had greater influence and several 
possibilities to utilize the mechanisms of control and establish a system of corporate governance, 
according to its guidelines. At the same time, not being the only shareholder in JVs, “T” was limited 
in its actions.  This concerned the decisions in the BoD, the appointment of top management and the 
implementation of corporate rules.  
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 Moreover, during its several phases of internationalization, “T” experienced the importance of treating 
partners with the respect and understanding the local business culture and traditions.  
We had challenges; we came from different cultures.  We were forced to negotiate 
and find compromises. (Interview with a former top manager, who worked 
internationally, 2018)  
The presented interviews hereby confirm that WOS was the form of ownership that provided 
substantial influence in subsidiaries, through the establishment of different control mechanisms. The 
respondents confirmed that the ownership in WOS offered FC, and that can be considered the crucial 
mechanism in establishing the “chain of controls” in subsidiaries.  At the same time, the possibility of 
having a high level of influence in a subsidiary without having FC, by using other mechanisms, was 
described. It was emphasized that changes in the form of ownership have an impact on the development 
of the system of control in subsidiaries.  At the same time, it was highlighted that the process to find 
the right form of ownership in subsidiaries, and then to develop an appropriate system of management 
control, was one that can be described as adjustment, or, as it could be called, a “turning” during the 
process of internationalization.   
BoD:  WOS provide influence in the BoD and provide SC and OC. The members of the BoD are 
top managers from HQ, most of them with financial/economic skills or people that are approved 
by HQ; the members have a clear agenda, approved by HQ.  
The composition of the BoD is an important mechanism in achieving influence in subsidiaries, as it 
links directly to HQ, provides the strategic decisions and strategic control (SC) and links management 
between HQ and subsidiaries.  
I have had long experience of being a BoD member in subsidiaries abroad. The BoD 
is an important tool in achieving influence. The BoD’s activities are a link between 
HQ and the subsidiaries or act as a mediator between the subsidiary and the staff at 
HQ. All the cases come to the BoD.  The BoD provides the HQ’s strategy. I can say 
that the BoD provides SC. The BoD supports the subsidiary in linking the 
management in the subsidiary to experts in HQ. (Interview with one of the top 
managers, who worked in operations in Central Europe, 2016)    
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 The BoD is responsible for the appointment of the top management in the subsidiaries giving the 
control situation on an operational level, that can be defined as an operational control (OC). At the 
same time, it is necessary to have FC, in order to decide on the composition of the BoD. 
The BoD uses important mechanisms in influencing  the  subsidiaries, such as the 
appointment of key persons for the subsidiary as  top management, expatriates;  close 
dialogue with management;  initiating key  projects for the subsidiary and linking 
the projects to the HQ/group level, in order to get more expertise or to be a part of 
the  HQ,/group level  common projects,  based on interaction between several 
subsidiaries.  Yes, it is OC. But it is important to have FC, meaning to be an owner, 
in order to appoint the BoD that will provide the strategy from HQ. (Interview with 
one of the top managers, who worked in several projects abroad and was a member 
of several BoDs, 2016)   
One respondent explained the model of a well-functioning BoD that could represent both SC and OC:  
While “T” had the FC in the subsidiary, the members of the BoD were appointed by 
HQ. The BoD acted in the interests of HQ and the subsidiary. The strategic targets 
were coordinated between HQ and the subsidiary, as long as the Chairman of the 
BoD was the manager from HQ. The operational committee oversaw operational 
excellence, using the best practice from HQ and the subsidiary and/or other 
subsidiaries. The close co-operation with the BoD provided the support and approval 
of the operational decisions. (Interview with the former chief of operations in the 
international mobile portfolio, 2017)   
At the same time, a special role for the Chairman of the BoD – in influencing the operations in 
subsidiaries when the Chairman could have direct dialogue with the top management – was underlined.   
I could have direct dialogue with the local management, and I saw who could provide 
the strategy decided at HQ and who could not. At the same time, I could connect the 
key persons in the subsidiary with the right staff at HQ. (Conversations with one of 
the former EVPs responsible for operations in Europe, 2015) 
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The manager in charge of the Hungarian operation in the period up to 2013 was of the same opinion.  
He was a member of the BoD in a WOS in Hungary and worked closely with the top management and 
other managers in “T”’s subsidiary, in order to observe the operations more clearly, and, at the same 
time, report back to HQ about them. The respondent underlined the importance of providing substantial 
support for the activities of the BoD from the resources in HQ. Such support would increase the 
efficiency of the activities of the BoD and increase its professionalism, which would have a positive 
impact on the operations in the subsidiaries. The respondent mentioned that the operational committee 
had such a supportive role. 
At the beginning of the 2000s, when “T” implemented the strategy of increasing the 
FC in subsidiaries, dedicated operational committees were established that could 
report directly to the BoD and have the coordinating function between HQ and local 
management in the subsidiaries. The purpose of the operational committees was to 
develop the subsidiary in the best operational way, according to the strategic goals. 
The alliance with the BoD was the key to success. (Interview with a manager, who 
worked in a subsidiary in Hungary, 2016)  
According to another respondent, one important role in supporting the activities of the BoD was that 
of Top Management Support (TMS), established in 2002 at “T”’s HQ in the process of active 
internationalization, known as an “Up or Out” strategy, in order to follow up the subsidiaries abroad.  
Each TMS had responsibility for one subsidiary. TMSs were senior vice-presidents in the departments 
that were responsible for the defined geographical clusters and functioned as mediators between HQ 
via the BoD and the subsidiary; they were always a member of the BoD in the subsidiary they were 
responsible for. The TMS worked closely with both the Chairman of the BoD and the top management 
in the subsidiary.   The role of TMC changed in 2016 because of the reorganizational processes in “T”. 
A special role was dedicated to TMS top management support managers; we were 
managers from HQ who were linked to both top management and middle-
management “on the ground” in subsidiaries and all levels of staff at HQ. We were 
also  members of the BoD and leaders of the Operational Committee related to “our” 
subsidiary. As a TMS, I had to know everything about the subsidiary. Absolutely 
everything. I spent more time in the subsidiary than in HQ. (Interview with a former 
TMS, 2015)  
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Describing the most effective managerial system, connecting HQ and the subsidiary with the strong 
involvement of the BoD as a link between HQ as an owner and the subsidiaries, one of the respondents 
presented his own opinion, based on his experience from the BoD work. 
There is a triangle, as interplay in good corporate governance: owner – BoD – 
management. It is important that this interplay functions because it can enhance the 
influence and control in a good way. The core issue in all operations is competence 
– among members of the BoD first of all. The BoD should be competent, in order to 
be a good link between the owner and the management. (A former member of the 
BoD in “T”, interview, 2015) 
Thus, the above-presented interviews described the BoD as an important control mechanism in 
influencing the subsidiaries, and utilize both SC and OC. It was emphasized that BoD has a special 
role in the interplay between HQ and the subsidiaries, being a link between them, enhancing the 
influence and control in the subsidiaries. It was underlined that, for the realization of this role, the BoD 
needs the framework of the FC from HQ to the subsidiaries and the support from several of HQ’s 
functions. 
Expatriates: “T” introduced the role of expatriates. From consultants to expatriates.  
The question of control started to be an important priority for “T”, following the changes in many of 
“T”’s organizational structures. As an important part of the above-named processes, “T” decided to 
transform the status and role of expatriates. The use of consultants was no longer considered sufficient, 
because the consultants did not contribute to the issue of improving control. In order to provide the 
control and to achieve HQ’s influence on newly established WOSs, the role of consultants changed. 
The new role as an expatriate was presented during the process of developing the new international 
thinking when “T” International became International “T”. The most powerful and dynamic 
organization after the above-described transformations in this period became “T” Mobile, which was 
responsible for the mobile portfolio worldwide. The top management of “T” Mobile introduced the 
new managerial tools; these were presented to the Executive Board and then adopted across the whole 
of “T”.  Among the presented tools, was the role of expatriates in the process of internationalization. 
The respondents described the role of expatriates as the natural development of the previously existing 
role of consultants (Interview with a former member of the Executive Board, Legal Director, 2015). 
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At the same time, it was confirmed that after “T” implemented the strategy, “Up or Out”, and increased 
its ownership to 100% or to the majority position when “T” could evolve sufficient control, the 
expatriates started to be managers in the top positions, not individual professionals or consultants. The 
development of leadership skills was important (Interview with a former member of the Executive 
Board responsible for mobile operations worldwide, 2015).  
Now, “T” had to formally appoint the key executives’ positions with the clear mandate to manage the 
subsidiaries and to achieve the required level of performance, in accordance with the HQ’s strategy. 
Thus, this period of internationalization was characterized by the fact that the institution of expatriates 
was formally established, with the expatriates being appointed to the executive positions in 
subsidiaries. They received formal responsibility for operations and reported to the BoD in WOSs or 
in JVs where “T” had the majority.  Due to their key position in “T”, the expatriates were closely 
connected with the executives in HQ; some of them were members of the BoD and even the Chairman 
of the BoD, which strengthened their position as executives and gave them the necessary contacts 
across the whole organization, in order to utilize their power in the subsidiaries. Expatriates were 
mostly Norwegians or Scandinavians.  
At the same time, several respondents mentioned that the expatriates should have “‘T’’s DNA”. As 
previously mentioned, this metaphoric definition was created by a former member of the Executive 
Board, responsible for operations in several countries, who worked in the company for more than 40 
years: 
It is important to have executives in subsidiaries whom we know well, that have 
“T”’s DNA. Good with the Norwegian culture abroad. We need to provide the same 
standards and the same business culture as at HQ. So, the expatriates were both 
executives and professionals and had the DNA from HQ. (Former EVP, responsible 
for international operations, conversation 2012) 
Most respondents connected the expatriate with an established  institution that  has  an important role, 
associating this role with a  “girder” or  “mainstay” in the subsidiary (SVP, responsible for operations 
in Central Europe) in order to enhance and help  the key values  evolve in practice  from HQ,  by doing  
the defined work, by watching  the processes  in operations, and by teaching the local staff how to do 




Expatriates have a key role; they should be in executive positions. They are active in 
projects and connect subsidiaries and HQ. They implement governance.  They are 
mediators, who understand the local employees, and it is important that they provide 
information back to HQ. (Senior manager, who worked as an expatriate in several 
countries, interview, 2015)    
The expatriates had the task of establishing different control mechanisms in WOSs, 
corresponding with the needs and the goals of HQ (interview with a manger, who 
worked as an expatriate in Eastern Europe, 2016).  
At the same time, several respondents shared the idea that expatriates themselves enhanced the 
operational control, as they were responsible for the operational results and reported to HQ about the 
WOS’s performance (Interview with a former top manager, responsible for the projects in Europe, 
2015). 
In the same way, being Norwegians, the expatriates could show, by their own example, the principles 
of corporate governance, and they were also responsible for the implementation and strengthening of 
the corporate governance in the subsidiaries.  Thus, the expatriates were responsible for the 
implementation of the corporate rules that were at the beginning of their development. The ethical 
platforms were important, in order to perform in an ethical way; being in the executive positions, 
expatriates could insist on the implementation and practice of the Code of Conduct. Hence, several 
respondents underlined the role of expatriates in the practice and implementation of the Code of 
Conduct – one of the central documents representing both the new international thinking and practice 
and focusing on the day-to-day dilemmas that were very relevant to the employees in subsidiaries, 
especially those from cultures which differed from the Norwegian business culture.  One interviewee 
told an interesting story about the implementation of the Code of Conduct (CoC): 
We started to work with the Code of Conduct because we understood that it was 
important to have an ethical platform for our business abroad. The Code of Conduct 
had to be signed by each employee in WOS and JVs, where “T” owned over 50%. It 
is important, when implementing the Code of Conduct, that it is understood as it 
should be. We visited all subsidiaries, arranged seminars, and explained the code and 
ethical dilemmas. Norwegian executives had to reorient their thinking from just 
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business purposes towards the issues of governance and values. They had to be 
drivers in the process – not all of them understood this; we worked hard. 
 One of the CEOs who was very interested in… the process said: “If you can 
convince my local management in… thinking … [in accordance with the CoC] I will 
consider that it is the most important contribution to the business purpose. The local 
employees had to have the same standards in doing business as at home in Norway. 
Unfortunately, not all CEOs were like that, though”. (Interview with a former EVP, 
responsible for HR, 2015) 
CCR: “T” needed to create an ethical platform, reflecting its new role as a considerable actor in 
the international telecommunication business.  
The Code of Conduct was adopted and implemented. “T” Way (TW) was introduced as a governing 
corporate platform: new images new branding strategy.  
The rapid internationalization process in “T” and the new “international thinking” followed the 
growing need to develop the corporate rules that “T” could implement in the subsidiaries.  “T” 
developed a Code of Conduct that was the first systematically collected Common Corporate Rules 
(CCR). All employees had to read the Code of Conduct and sign that they understood the code.  
The establishing of CCR linked to the process of internationalization was a natural 
part of its development when “T” announced that it is important to construct the 
common corporate culture and rules. (Interview with a former executive, who 
worked with HR, 2015)  
At the same time, the issue of national values started to be central for “T” at exactly the period of “T”’s 
new international thinking and identification of itself as a considerable player in the international 
market. 
The question about the Code of Conduct came with “T”’s expansion abroad. We had 
to be clear about our values; that’s why the question of the Code of Conduct came 
onto the agenda. (Top manager, who worked in the HR department, interview 2014)   
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Before the Code of Conduct, “T” had the Ethical Guidelines and Ethical Council.  
They are almost the same.  We understood that in Eastern Europe – Ukraine and 
Russia – the managerial style was different.  We needed to be sure of our values; the 
Code of Conduct was established in 2000-2001 and based on Norwegian values.  In 
order to present our managerial values to the organization, to the subsidiaries, and to 
be a part of the established international community, we had to have the value 
platform.  And, in order for the partner to understand, we had to present our core 
values. (ibid.) 
Hence, the interviewee emphasized that, for “T”, as an owner in subsidiaries, and to position itself as 
an international player, it was important to present the value-based rules and its governing platform, 
according to established international practice; the presented CCR were built upon the national values 
of HQ and had to be presented in all subsidiaries abroad. 
 In order to follow further “the international thinking” and to set the Code of Conduct in the framework 
of corporate governance, “T” started to work on another document that represented the value-based 
employee’s attitude and behavior across the whole of “T”.  This document was named “T Way” (TW) 
and can be defined as CCR. Historically, TW was initiated after the Code of Conduct was created and 
implemented.  
The idea to develop TW came after the Code of Conduct. We needed a kind of 
platform for governance, a behavioral platform to explain who we are and how we 
do business.  Before internationalization, we had The Ethical Council, which didn’t 
work. The council was just a meeting place for some concrete and separate cases 
without any platform or value.  The Code of Conduct was a gathering of concrete 
rules that the employees had to accept.   But we needed to go further and create a 
platform, like a philosophy. TW started as a managerial platform. I had the task of 
developing this new platform for the new international management in 2001, when 
the new CEO was appointed. We had a meeting with the top managers as a 
workshop; the LOTS55  process was arranged in order to understand what kind of   
new managerial style we needed.  I asked them again: “Do we need “T” as a young 
and promising but arrogant person who messes with others, and that’s why he is 
                                                 
55 LOTS® is” a leadership tool used for facilitating leader, team, and business or organization development” see: 
www.lots.se). Hereafter in the text, it will be used LOTS. 
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intolerable…?” We needed to do something with that. (EVP in 2001, responsible for 
HR and TW)   
Later on, several important elements were added to TW, such as “Values”, which became a central 
element; “Visions” and “Code of Conduct” were included in TW, as well as “Group Processes” and 
“Procedures”, as an important part of the framework. The concept of TW developed over several years 
and was implemented in HQ and the subsidiaries after it was approved at the level of “T”’s BoD in 
2006. 
TW was presented to the BoD in 2006 as a comprehensive managerial philosophical 
platform in “T”. The CEO and TW team fronted it in the meeting for “T”’s BoD.  (A 
former “T”’s BoD member, interview 2014) 
Although TW was the main platform for managers and employees, the concept did not receive a precise 
definition. On “T”’s website, it just states that TW is “how we do business” (“T”’s website). Different 
managers in “T” understood TW in their own way and gave their own definitions, underlining their 
different ways of understanding how to use the concepts of CCR. 
Some respondents link TW to corporate culture and how it is important to establish common rules, in 
both HQ and the subsidiaries.  
The subsidiaries have their own culture, but they should feel that they are a part of a 
common corporate culture. There was a positive attitude to TW when it was 
presented in all the subsidiaries, and all managers were educated in TW. (A manager 
worked with TW, interview 2014) 
The respondents connected TW and the Code of Conduct, as a part of TW, to the corporate rules that 
could influence the subsidiaries. CCR have been linked to the control mechanisms, as behavior control. 
TW is a management control system in terms of to set the framework for the 
corporate behavior and important tools for the process for internationalization. We 
need common concepts and common understanding of how to manage. I could say 
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that TW represented behavior control in the organization. (Interview with a manager, 
who worked internationally, 2014)  
TW is a control. The behavior had to be controlled; corporate rules help us, especially 
abroad. (Manager working internationally, short conversation, 2014)  
We introduced “T”’s values abroad as a management style from Norway via TW. 
TW is a cultural platform or managerial platform. When we did not agree with the 
local employees on how to do business, we pointed to TW and the Code of Conduct 
and said, “Here are our common rules, representing business behavior and attitude 
in organizations. Please, follow the rules.” (Interview with employee, who worked 
as an expatriate, 2016) 
Later in the process of developing TW, the HR team insisted on starting with a common performance 
management platform (TDP – “T” Development Program). The purpose of TDP in a framework of 
TW was to combine the tasks and job activities with the question of “how we do business”.  This could 
offer support, focusing not only on the subsidiaries abroad, where employees are used to doing 
business in a different way because of the cultural differences, but also on employees in Norway.   TDP 
became a part of TW as the practical tool, and the CEO supported it.  
When the CEO was informed about TDP, he asked, “How much time does it take for 
a TDP conversation between a manager and an employee?”  We answered, “One – 
two hours.” The CEO calculated: “One hour and a half multiplied by 10,000 
employees??? How much it will cost?” The TW team managed to persuade him and 
the BoD. TDP was improved. (ibid.) 
Establishing and practicing the CCR is the strongest way for HQ to influence the 
subsidiaries, because it is through the CCR that we can communicate common 
values. If we can communicate common values, we can implement a common way 
to do business. But it is important to practice CCR and not to have them just as a pro 
forma. (Interview with a former executive, who worked in HR, 2015) 
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 The interview with the former HR manager, who worked with TW, presents the idea of the importance 
of practicing CCR – not only in the process of implementation but also in daily business activities; 
otherwise, the CCR cannot influence the behavior in subsidiaries. In order to implement the TW 
thinking and practice, and almost to “live in the corporate governance”, CCR should be accepted by 
top management in HQ and in the subsidiaries as a mindset and daily practice. 
CCR should be accepted by the BoD and at top management level, in order to create 
the atmosphere of common understanding of the values, missions and visions.  We 
insisted that TW and the Code of Conduct should be handled at the highest level of 
“T” Group. There should be daily attention to the rules, or nothing will work. The 
top management should demonstrate the behavior through example. (Former TW 
responsible up to 2001, interview 2014)    
 According to the TW staff, they often asked themselves: “How does TW developed in HQ affects and 
change in attitude to ‘how we do business’ in the subsidiaries?” and “Can the rules, developed in HQ 
make the subsidiaries closer to HQ, and how can TW as CCR strengthen the HQ’s influence on the 
subsidiaries?”   
To illustrate that CCR worked in practice and really changed the behavior in the subsidiaries, despite 
the local cultural traditions, which were far from Norwegian culture, the following story is told.   
A story from Malaysia – how the local employees were afraid to cross the line left from the eliminated 
office of the CFO (told by the former EVP, HR) 
Malaysians respect authority and bosses. All bosses in “T”’s subsidiary in Malaysia 
had a separate office with a secretary in front of it, as it was in the old “T” building 
in the center of Oslo. When “T” gained its position in the company, the BoD decided 
to start implementing the concept of TW. One of the biggest challenges was how to 
change the attitude among the local employees towards the leaders and to each 
other, so that the principles of respect, equality and delegation could be 
implemented. The strongest symbol of the old power in the company was the office 
of the CFO.  Those Malaysians who had to deal with the CFO had enormous respect, 
mixed with a good portion of fear, when they approached this office. The new 
Norwegian management decided to organize the working space in the company as 
156 
 
an open landscape, following the model from Fornebu, where the HQ is located. In 
practice, this meant destroying all the offices, included the office of the top executives 
– the CEO and CFO as well. After several rounds of negotiations, the CFO’s walls 
were eliminated.  It provoked a shock among the Malaysians.  Employees started to 
visit the executives’ location to be sure that what had happened was not just gossip.  
It took time before the markings on the floor, from the destroyed walls, were painted 
over. Even then, the Malaysians did not feel comfortable crossing the stripes on the 
floor and went around: so powerful were the behavioral traditions among the local 
employees. Several years have passed, and the local employees smile about the 
situation. For many new employees who started working in the company later, being   
a natural part of the managerial and behavioral cultural platform called TW, the 
story told above can seem absurd.  Thus, TW influenced the behavior of the local 
employees, changing the traditional established practice. 
The story illustrates the effect of TW mediating for the local employees abroad, in order to influence 
their behavior as “T” employees. As a result of TW implementation, the new attitude towards business 
culture, which was established in “T” Group, started to change the national traditions and the new 
concepts, based on “T” values, were taken into use. The story shows that the new business attitude, 
important for HQ and “T”’s image as an international player with Western-oriented values, started to 
be understood across the whole “T” Group. The respondents related several examples from different 
situations of how the concept of being a corporate citizen should be practiced. In this story, the issue 
of behavior control is strongly connected with the issue of implementing, understanding and practicing 
the CCR from HQ.  
The interviews presented above show that TW as CCR played an important role in establishing the 
“HQ” culture in the subsidiaries, utilizing influence in subsidiaries and being the mechanism of 
behavior control. It was indicated that CCR can work as a behavior control mechanism, on the 
condition that they are the practiced, that they are a part of the strategy, and that the CEO and top 
management in both HQ and the subsidiaries promote the practice of the CCR and demonstrate 




CEO: International team around, close contact with CEOs in subsidiaries in the established 
CEOs/Top management Forums, new routines, in which the CEO was strongly involved, in 
order to have detailed information about the subsidiaries abroad: business reviews. 
The new CEO was appointed in 2001. He understood that “T” needed to start the process of 
internationalizing the organization.  In order to meet the new business environment,  maximize synergy 
across the organization, including the subsidiaries in different countries, and to be capable of dealing 
with the challenges of working in a multicultural environment,  the top management of “T” in 2001 
initiated internal processes in the company; the ideas connected, first of all, with the issue of leadership 
expectations and  common managerial  processes.  Several important arenas were established, to co-
operate more closely with the CEOs in the subsidiaries.  
We needed to teach leaders to think internationally and to work internationally. As a 
top leader for the company, I had to build a new international team that could meet 
the challenges of the global world.  I wanted to better understand the CEOs in the 
subsidiaries; we started MMB – Mobile Management Board: CEOs from the 
subsidiaries were invited to participate in it four to five times a year. They came with 
their closest executives. We met different subsidiaries, learned the experience, 
shared the knowledge. We took the best practice from the group and shared our 
know-how with our colleagues. (Interview with a former CEO, 2013) 
The new CEO changed his focus from domestic to international issues. Traditionally, when “T” 
experienced, for example, technical problems in Norway, journalists and responsible people from the 
authorities called “T” CEO?  It took time to change this tradition. The new CEO always tried to explain 
that, although he was the top leader of the company, the CEO of “T” Norway was in charge of such 
issues.  
A story about the new role of CEO of “T”. 
I remember one situation in particular, when, a short time after he was appointed, it 
was agreed that he would visit the local directors in the biggest cities in Norway.  
This visit was well prepared, and the new CEO had to start a visit on one particular 
day. Suddenly, we received a message that a partner from one of “T”’s subsidiaries 
wanted to come to Oslo: it was urgent, important, and he had several issues he 
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wanted to discuss with the CEO directly. His schedule was very busy, and the partner 
wanted to come on the day that the CEO had to start his trip.  The situation was not 
easy, and the staff around the CEO were divided in their opinion as to what the new 
CWO should prioritize. The head of communication, who had worked with the former 
CEO and was used to having a favorable focus on domestic issues, insisted on the 
trip, as it had been planned. It was not easy to get all the directors together on the 
same day. New people who always worked internationally argued that it was 
important to stay and to meet the partner. There were several meetings, several 
argumentations, the CEO was in doubt. Even I was asked for advice. After the CEO 
had heard arguments from all his advisors and his   EVPs, he finally made a decision. 
For the first time, he really marked that the new culture was on its way to “T” – he 
stayed, met the partners, had very good discussions. This meeting, as we understood 
later, had significant importance for the future co-operation. (Personal observations 
from 2001)  
This story illustrates that the CEO had a focus on the international and prioritized having a personal 
meeting with the CEO in a challenging and important subsidiary, in order to discuss business matters 
and influence the decisions that the local co-partners insisted on.  The case is related not to a WOS but 
to a JV, where “T” had a majority, and, for the CEO, it was important to provide his direct opinion on 
challenging matters. At the same time, there were several other examples of the CEO’s personal 
involvement in discussions with the local employees in WOSs; in particular, meetings with the 
authorities in the local markets were always prioritized.   
The new CEO and his staff started to work to develop the concept, describing what the most important 
arenas worldwide were, where the CEO could participate, presenting “T” and influencing, first of all, 
the authorities from the countries where “T” had subsidiaries. Thus, the CEO could support and protect 
“T”’s business abroad, lobbying decision-makers, especially on the issue of legislation.   The first big 
international event, in which the CEO participated, and where he had fruitful and constructive meetings 
with the politicians, authorities and partners in one of the most challenging “T” subsidiaries, was the 
St. Petersburg International Forum in 2005, which had an impact on “T”’s business in the subsidiaries. 
Thereafter in the text, CEO participated in all the St. Petersburg Forums, until he resigned in 2015. 
In order to have greater influence on business performance, the CEO started to develop new business 
routines:  business reviews related to each cluster and each subsidiary; close co-operation with the 
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CEOs in the subsidiaries; business trips to all the clusters, etc. (more information will be provided in 
Chapter 7). The new routines began at the end of 2005 and were finalized in 2006.  
6.4. Perceived influence – challenges during the process of internationalization 
1. “T” did not have sufficient control, despite the WOS ownership 
Despite the developed and implemented strategy that conceptualized the idea that, with FC in 100% 
ownership in subsidiaries (WOS) or majority ownership in the important JVs, “T” did not manage to 
achieve the substantial influence in the subsidiaries and to build “the chain of control” as indicated in 
the interviews above.  Some of the respondents indicated that HQ did not have sufficient influence or 
control over the subsidiaries, even where “T” (HQ) had obtained 100% of the ownership in its 
subsidiaries.  Some respondents said that all forms of control and all mechanisms of influence from 
HQ towards “T”’s subsidiaries just happened on the surface. One respondent (an experienced 
employee, who worked with the procurement issues, interview, 2014) used the word “iceberg” as a 
metaphorical example to describe the processes of control in “T”’s subsidiaries. The respondent 
indicated that only the local employees knew the real situation in the subsidiaries, and they managed 
to hide it from HQ. The respondent meant that the local employees “had learned to report nice” as the 
HQ requested, but, in reality, they did what was suitable for them. “In Bangladesh, as an example, 
corruption was blooming, but the Norwegian top management could not discover it” (ibid.). The 
respondent underlined the importance of the cultural aspects in doing business and that “T” needed to 
understand how to do business in countries with a different business culture from that of Norway. The 
respondent also emphasized that “employees should be dedicated, well-trained and qualified in cross-
cultural management issues, including the top managers from HQ. Only managers like managers can 
build new cultural business traditions in subsidiaries without being fooled” (ibid.).  
2. Disagreements with local partners caused challenges in the BoD in JVs, even when “T” had 
the majority of ownership and thought that it had the FC and influence in the BoD. 
In this period, “T” noticed the first serious disagreements with local partners in JVs, where “T” had the 
majority and should, in theory, have had substantial influence in both the framework of the BoD and 
the local company. Most of the discussions and disagreements with local partners were connected to 
the questions of control: who has influence in the company? During the period of active growth in JVs 
and transformation to WOS, it was important to implement “T”’s governing principles in doing 
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business. Many private local partners were not ready to do that and continued to work as before. The 
partners behaved as if they still were the big bosses and wished to receive further support from “T”. 
While business developed, “T” wanted to achieve more influence and utilize more control 
mechanisms. 
We had ownership, but we did not have influence. We started serious negotiations 
with our local partners in Eastern Europe. In one of the companies, we could not 
change the CEOs because of their connections to the political circles, but we could 
place our people in executive positions. Unfortunately, for the same reasons, we did 
not have the position of the Chairman of the BoD. We did not manage to increase 
our ownership to 100% and had to deal with the partners further. The problems 
became greater and greater; it was obvious to us that we stood for different corporate 
governance with different business targets. We had the FC, but we did not have 
control in the company, as long as we did not have other controls. (Interview with 
an EVP responsible for mobile operations, 2015) 
3.  The BoD did not see the challenges “on the ground”, even when members reported 
them to HQ.  Several issues were underreported; top management were not consistent 
in what was and was not reported. 
Despite the fact that the majority of respondents connected the BoD to the mechanism of 
influence and SC and OC control, one respondent noted that OC is to “go onto the ground” 
and operate among all the segments in the subsidiary.  
The BoD did not function well in understanding the needs on the ground – the 
members of the BoD and the Chairman only dealing with the top management, and 
they did not report everything (conversation with a former experienced manager, 
who worked abroad in several countries, 2016). 
The BoD did not see the situation on the ground, does not do it, and didn’t have 
control “on the ground”. They accepted what was reported to them, and they read the 
documents. There are many things you can write in the documents; the reality can 
be different. Many of the decisions that were made by the BoD were made because 
they did not know the situation “on the ground”. It was easy to hide many things, 
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especially in marketing, where a company can have “sudden costs”. (A former 
international manager, interview, 2014 and 2018)  
Thus, the respondents underlined the gap between the perception of the situation by the BoD members 
and the real situation in the subsidiaries.  Decisions that were made by the BoD were based on 
insufficient information from the company. 
4. Continued problems with expatriates in JVs where “T” did not have the majority. Tuning of 
the expatriate staff where “T” had the majority. 
In this period, there were two different causes of the problems with expatriates. The first was connected 
to the group of expatriates, who were in executive positions in JVs where “T” did not manage to 
transfer its ownership to WOS. The relationships with them were regulated by the MA, but companies 
were not enthusiastic about paying the high fees and tried to force “T”’s expatriates out, presenting 
them as unprofessional. For instance, according to the MA, “T”’ had to cover five to six positions in 
Ukraine. At the end of this period, there was just one person in an executive position. He was married 
to a Ukrainian and had a good personal relationship with the local management and partners 
(Conversation with a former top manager, who worked in Eastern Europe, 2015). 
Another possible cause for the challenges with expatriates in executive positions was connected to the 
level of their competence because of the traditional system of recruitment in “T”.  Thus, one of the 
managers, who worked internationally, expressed that the expatriates had low competence within how 
to work abroad, and “T” had a focus partly on the professional skills performed in Norwegian 
operations, or/ and on the factor of the personal contacts. The statement was supported by another 
manager that illustrated that the process of the recruitment in “T” 
It was enough to be Norwegian. Everybody knew everybody and appointed those 
who they knew. It was a low focus on the competence to work internationally 
(Interview with a manager, who worked internationally, not Norwegian by 
nationality, 2015)  
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The top management in “T” perceived that it was necessary to start the targeted education of a new 
pool of expatriates and managers. The Corporate University in “T” started module-based courses, 
where participants could visit several operations abroad.  
I myself participated in the first pool of selected managers; we were 20. 
Unfortunately, the choice of the program was not based on the deep evaluation of 
the business activities. We had a gathering in Barcelona in order to look at “T”’s 
activities in Spain; shortly after the course was over, “T” sold its operation in Spain. 
We had a gathering in St. Petersburg. This operation was incorporated later into one 
of the subsidiaries in Eastern Europe. This ownership gave “T” several serious 
challenges. We had a gathering in the USA that was not connected to any of “T”’s 
activities but to give a “lift” in education in modern international management. No 
one I met under this educational process got the position of expatriate. Later, the 
process of recruiting expatriates changed, but there were many strong opinions about 
this issue in “T”, related to the topic of the transparency of the process. Who were 
recruited and why?  (Personal experience) 
5. CCR were just “paper rules and big words”.  
Several respondents stated that, after TW was introduced, it should “be practiced” daily, but TW was 
not practiced as intended; “TW was just a concept on paper” (Conversation with one of the a former 
TW managers, 2014).   
Many respondents drew my attention to the fact that, in a short period, TW started to represent a gap 
between what stood on the website and in various other related documents, and how managers and 
employees really behaved in practice.    
TW is a process. If it is not being practiced, the process is dying. The new managers 
joined “T” afterwards, as part of the process to recruit the international team. They 
were not so interested in TW. There is no passion around TW.  There are no 
ambassadors as there were at the beginning. I notice a gap between the words on the 
paper and what is happening on the ground. (Senior manager, interview 2014)  
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In a short conversation about how TW works, one respondent stated that “ it stands  fine words on the 
intranet, but managers do what they  want” (Employee in HQ, 2014). 
At the same time, one of the respondents mentioned that, in one of the JVs in Eastern Europe, where 
“T” could not demand the implementation of TW, but nevertheless introduced the concept, TW was 
enthusiastically accepted by employees, top managers, the CEO, and the Chairman of the BoD. This 
was despite that fact that the partnership in this JV was rather challenging because of the differences 
in attitude towards corporate governance.  One of the employees explained why TW was accepted 
without any problems: 
For us, employees, there was a hope that we would get the Western style of business 
in the company, but for the top management TW was just a nicely written document 
that they could present to the authorities and publish on the website, showing that, 
as top managers, they were working in the Western way, in contrast to many other 
companies in the country. They wanted to position themselves as the pro-Western 
and modern managers. In reality, the written document was not meant for practicing, 
it was just a picture to be glanced at. We worked as we worked before, in the local 
way. (Interview with a local employee in a JV in Eastern Europe, 2018) 
 To organize the location of the subsidiary in “Fornebu-style” (HQ in Norway –style) 
is to link the subsidiaries to HQ’s culture and values. We liked it – we understood 
the Norwegian organizational culture of delegation, trust, respect, and flat structure, 
that was extremely important for the modern business, but life is life, and seminars 
are just seminars. (ibid.)   
There were divided opinions about TW. Those who work or worked with TW are very enthusiastic 
about TW; at the same time, there are many employees who were critical of TW, saying that TW are 
just nice words. Here are some statements from different respondents: 
TW abroad is not TW but “T” Norway – I have heard it myself.  TW is just words. 
Why is TW not on .com - just on the intranet? (Employee working internationally, 
traveling a lot, 2014)  
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The CEO is not interested in TW. It should be a part of the Business Review process.  
The Code of Conduct should be practiced; it is meaningless to have a Code of 
Conduct just on paper and not read or practice it.  Now the Code of Conduct is just 
for having on paper or to punish somebody if something happens. (Employee in 
Norway, conversation 2015)  
TW is a décor for the management. Almost nobody believes in it, even the top 
management. (Employee in Norway, middle manager, conversation 2014)  
TW is nonsense, just words. But culture is important. (Manager working 
internationally, travels a lot, meets different subsidiaries, conversation 2014)  
TW are just big words. I didn’t notice any respect from the managers towards the 
ordinary employees. (Conversation with an ordinary employee, working in “T” 
Group in Norway, 2015)  
The interviews presented above indicate that CCR, as TW and the Code of Conduct, did not engage 
people in HQ. Those top managers who worked with TW were positive, while top managers who were 
not involved in TW considered it as CCR, and some representatives of ordinary employees were 
negative. At the same time, some ordinary employees in “T”’s subsidiaries had a positive attitude to 
TW, as they appreciated an understanding of the Norwegian business culture and Norwegian values, 
proudly working for a Norwegian company. At the same time, employees abroad looked at TW from 
the “owner-perspective”, underlining that the CCR are needed because the HQ is saying that CCR are 
important (Conversations with several employees in European subsidiaries 2011-2015). Many 
employees admitted that they practiced their own rules “on the ground”. CCR were not yet functioning 
as the common governing platform and did not always provide the influence in subsidiaries, in order 
to enhance behavior.  
In order to continue the further development in a process of internationalization and further position 
itself as the global company that “T” had become at the end of 2006, top managers in “T” perceived a 




Chapter 7: Phase 4.  2005/2006-2015: From International “T” to MNC: 
“Different companies – one group”, further building of the system of 
corporate governance and management control 
From 2005, “T” positioned itself as an MNC in strong international growth that continued to remain 
one of the fastest-growing providers of mobile communications worldwide.  
The company put industrial ownership at the top of the agenda, emphasizing that the importance for 
“T” was to be an industrial investor that develops industrial competence in WOSs from a long-term 
perspective.  
The company continued its international development, hunting “green fields”56, supported by an active 
M&A strategy and targeting those investments with high possibilities for growth. Thus, in this period, 
“T” continued its international expansion, mostly in Asia and in a few projects in Europe, strengthening 
its footprint in global markets. 
At the same time, “T” concentrated its focus on the processes of building corporate governance, a 
common corporate culture and a common managerial system: 
1). “T” changed its name to “T” Group (in this research, “T” will be used), in order to underline the 
size of the company as an MNC, its global footprint and a new strategy: “Different companies – one 
Group” (“T” website, 2013).  2). “T” started to define itself as an MNC and announced organizational 
changes, aiming to be structured as an MNC. It can be defined as an “internationalization processes 
inside organization”: new internal routines were established, in order to have a greater focus on 
performance management. Business Reviews related to the performance in “regions/cluster” presented 
by  the responsible manages to the CEO and CFO (Chief Financial Officer), were implemented; “the 
best practice idea” was announced, aiming to transfer the best “know-how” solutions from different 
subsidiaries across the whole group. 
                                                 
56 A green field investment is a type of foreign direct investment (FDI) where a parent company builds its operations in a 
foreign country from the ground up. In addition to the construction of new production facilities, these projects can also 






7.1. Antecedent conditions 
1.  Opportunities to make new investments in Europe and Asia. 
There were several opportunities to obtain licenses for investments during this period, mostly for 
several reasons:  
- “T” had enough capital to invest in the projects that were available for acquisition, according to 
develop and strengthen its Cluster - strategy  
- Being a global player in the markets, “T” had gathered enough knowledge and competence, and 
could create value in international subsidiaries  
-  There were   active processes of M&A, in both Europe and Asia that led to opportunities for 
investment, when “T” participated in auctions and won.  As an example, in connection with the 
investments in Bulgaria in 2013, “T”’s CEO underlined the skills, beneficial for the development 
of the local markets. 
Based on our experience in “T”’s well-performing operations in the region, we strongly believe that 
we will be able to create value in the Bulgarian market. By contributing with our scale and experience 
to Gl57 competence and market knowledge, we can offer even better quality and more advanced 
services to Bulgarian customers. (Press release, website, 2013) 
2. Technological development in telecommunications opened up opportunities for mobile 
operators to create advanced services and new products. 
 During this period, new services, like e-pay, e-finance, e-commerce, e-medicine, were developed. The 
traditional operators faced the new reality when the content providers started to be both important 
players on the telecommunication market and, at the same time, serious competitors to the established 
telecommunication operators in the mobile companies’ markets.   
                                                 
57 A company in Bulgaria, later on - “T” Bulgaria 
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3. Several new international arenas started to play an important role in discussions related to 
coordinating a common mindset to design  
the further development of society, where the impact of mobile communication is significant.   “T” 
became an active participant in these arenas as a global player, influencing the decisions of the 
telecommunication community, in relation to the technology, markets and legislation, and being 
influenced itself. 
One of the most influential arenas, The GSMA58 Mobile World Congress (hereafter in the text, 
GSMA), started to be one of the most important arenas for telecommunication companies aiming to 
create a network among the decision-makers in this field, in order to create synergy effects and to 
contribute to the development of telecommunication services, to meet the needs of the world society.  
GSMA is the world's largest exhibition for the mobile industry, incorporating a thought-leadership 
conference that features prominent executives, representing mobile operators, device manufacturers, 
technology providers, vendors and content owners from across the world (website, GSMA)59. 
The GSMA represents the interests of mobile operators worldwide, uniting more than 750 operators 
with over 350 companies in the broader mobile ecosystem, including handset and device makers, 
software companies, equipment providers and Internet companies, as well as organizations in the 
adjacent industry sectors. The GSMA also produces the industry-leading Mobile World Congress 
events, held annually in Barcelona, Los Angeles and Shanghai, as well as the Mobile 360 Series of 
regional conferences in different countries in the world (ibid.).   
“T” became an active member of the GSMA, networking from the beginning of 2001, first as 
contributor to the working groups as an experienced telecommunication operator.  The primary idea 
for the working groups was to provide competence, in order to support a forum for consensus building 
and harmonization among members, concerning the setting of frameworks and standards in respect of 
operational matters (ibid.).  When the CEO of “T” was, first, the deputy Chairman of the GSMA BoD 
from 2010 to 2013, and the Chairman of the BoD from 2014 to 2016, “T”’s activities in the GSMA 
Forum increased; special staff were employed in HQ, to provide the maximum professional synergies 
                                                 
58 Arena that represents the interests of mobile operators worldwide, uniting the broader mobile ecosystem, including 
handset and device makers, software companies, equipment providers and internet companies, as well as organizations in 
adjacent industry sectors.  Information is taken from: www.cdma.com 
 
59 Information is taken from https://mwcbarcelona.com 
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of the participation in GSMA organs.   The close cooperation between “T” and other global operators, 
members of GSMA, concerned developing and maintaining the guidelines, recommendations and 
processes necessary to support efficient roaming, interconnection and interworking; providing the 
enablers necessary for the successful development and rollout of new services, and collaborating across 
the GSMA membership to provide expert input and contributions where necessary (ibid.). Such close 
co-operation between all GSMA members had a serious impact on the technological development of 
“T” and extended its horizons as an MNC.  
7.2. International strategy during Phase 4: “A time to plant, and a time to pluck up that 
which is planted” (Paulo Coelho) 
During this period, “T” was focused on building itself as an MNC – in both the continuing international 
expansion and strengthening of the cluster mindset, and the “internationalization of organization” at 
all levels – from top management to ordinary employees in both HQ and the subsidiaries.   
1. “T” continued investing in the new markets and strengthened its cluster-based business 
strategy. 
 “T” strengthened its position in Asia and Europe, supporting the geographical “cluster-thinking” that 
was described in the previous chapter, to combine the operations in one geographic area and similar 
culture into one cluster. A head of each cluster was appointed and became a member of the Executive 
Board of “T”, in order to link the activities abroad even more closely to the top level. In this period, 
“T” nuanced the previous cluster-thinking that was described in Chapter 6.   Norway had been included 
in the Scandinavian cluster, making Scandinavia the domestic market. That led to closer co-operation 
and   synergy-building among three Scandinavian countries. In Eastern and Central Europe, two WOSs 
or OpCos60, as “T” started to call WOSs, were added to the Eastern and Central European Cluster: 
Serbia (2009) and Bulgaria (2010). The Asian cluster had experienced high growth, and several OpCos 
had been added to the portfolio: Pakistan (2006), India (2009), and Myanmar (2011).  In 2012, the 
thinking on the cluster strategy “turned” again. “T” announced the “cluster-based business model” 
(annual report, 2013). This model included the use of synergy effects, a popular phrase among business 
                                                 
60 WOS is a definition, used in this study, describing the 100%-owned subsidiary abroad. OpCO is an operational company. 
The definition started to be used in “T”’s HQ during the “Different companies – one Group” phase, in order to underline 
HQ’s involvement in its subsidiaries abroad at the operational level. This study will continue to use WOS 
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companies, meaning a situation when several entities or companies working together bring a 
particularly fruitful effect, greater than the efforts of a single company.  
In “T”, the synergy effect in the cluster meant close co-operation across national borders within a 
geographical cluster, in order to improve the operational excellence and business performance. That 
resulted in the opening of operational business centers that would coordinate the activities inside each 
cluster. 
Although Norway was a natural part of the Scandinavian cluster. It was taken out of the Scandinavian 
cluster portfolio and cultivated as a pure domestic market, in order to underline the importance of 
having a focus on their own local markets and local customers. Thus, during this process, two 
operational centers were opened: one in Norway, looking for synergy in Sweden and Denmark, the 
second in Serbia, managing the operations in Central Europe. These operational centers were managed 
from HQ and coordinated the synergy of OpCos from operational perspectives across country borders; 
technology and marketing were the focus.  The third cluster was the Asian one, which included the 
whole Asian portfolio.   
The Asian portfolio was different from the Central European one; there were OpCos with different 
levels of ownership:   there were JVs in Bangladesh and Malaysia (the rest of the OpCos were WOSs).  
This was a reason  why   an operational center  was not opened in Asia: the OpCos  of the different 
levels of “T”’s ownership did not give “T” the opportunity to  build common technological and 
managerial skills, due to the limitations of the licensing conditions that regulated certain activities at 
the national level and did not allow activities to be established across borders.  
Thus, in the Asian cluster, the “operational center” was replaced by the idea of building “a little” “T”’s 
HQ in the form of a large country office in Bangkok. The whole management team responsible for the 
Asian region – both Norwegians and employees from other nationalities – moved to Bangkok.  Firstly, 
it was important to save travel expenses and the time taken for business trips for employees who 
traveled from Norway to Asia. Secondly, it a was a short way from Bangkok to India, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Malaysia and, later, to Myanmar, in order to manage all the operations as a cluster. 
Thirdly, the executives and managerial staff who administered the Asian office could utilize the local 
presence and build up the Asian organization, reaping the benefits of working in local environments. 
“T” could update experience and knowledge from the Asian market, build a strong network and 
connections with the authorities and decision-makers.  
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The only operation that was not in any cluster – and was operated as an important JV because of the 
size of the markets the operation included – was VCom: a JV with Russian co-owners that itself was 
constructed as a cluster-based operation, having clusters in Russia, the CIS61 region, Western Europe, 
and Asia. 
 Table 7.2. The portfolio for “T”’s mobile projects, 2013 
Company Markets Percentage owned 
Scandinavian Cluster: 
T Sweden Sweden 100% 
T Denmark Denmark 100% 
Asian Cluster: 
DT Thailand 69.3% 
DG Malaysia 49% 
T Myanmar Myanmar 100% 
GRPh Bangladesh 55.8% 
T Pakistan Pakistan 100% 
UNI62 India  From 60% (2009) to 100% (2013) 
CEE63 Cluster: 
T Hungary Hungary 100% 
T Montenegro Montenegro 100% 
T Serbia Serbia 100% 
T Bulgaria Bulgaria 100% 
JVs without cluster: 
VCom LtD HQ Nederland 33% 
                                                 
61 CIS - Commonwealth of Independent States an alliance of former Soviet republics formed in December 1991, including 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan 
(http://www.cisstat.com/eng/)  
62 JV in India, and later on  - the  WOS  
63 CEE – Central Eastern Europe. Hereafter in the text, it will be used CEE. 
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2. “T” changed its name to “T” Group (in this research, “T” will be used), in order to underline 
the size of the company and a new strategy: “Different companies – one Group” (“T”’s website).   
Membership of the “MNC executive club” demanded organizational changes in “T”. 
Internationalization of the organization.  
“T” changed its name to “T” Group, underlining the importance of building one company, despite the 
fact that “T” had consisted of 13 mobile operations abroad and one operation in Norway. In addition 
to mobile operations, “T” had several operations in other business areas than mobile, such as broadcast 
and satellite communication. “T” proclaimed the strategy: “Different companies – one Group”, which 
included the following important activities: 
1) “T” Group changed the language in the company: English started to be the corporate language.  
This means that mail communication was switched to English (mostly for Group activities, 
which included close co-operation with the subsidiaries; “T” Norway mostly used Norwegian).  
All the governing documents were produced in English. All presentations on behalf of “T” 
Group were produced in English.  
2) A “chat” mode and Facebook were opened on the intranet that functioned “direct line” with 
voices from abroad. “T” started to arrange “Group campaigns” via the intranet, in order to 
create a “family feeling” across the Group, such as sending pictures from your holiday and 
telling about the favorite places you visited, quizzes, competitions for employees for the best 
name, or good ideas. Such activities via the common intranet were appreciated by employees 
of the subsidiaries and created a feeling of common values and one community: a citizenship 
of “T”. 
3) Both intranet and extranet started to be built to the same design, created in HQ (with exceptions 
in the JVs).  The common intranet functioned as an important tool regarding information from 
the Group, events, benefits for employees, etc. “T” Group intranet was produced in English 
and connected to the subsidiaries that had the intranet in two languages: local and English. “T” 
Norway also had the intranet in two languages: Norwegian and English. In this connection, 
employees across the Group could be updated on HQ’s and local news, order facilities where 
they were needed, apply for vacancies, and find relevant information about Group policy, etc. 
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4)  Group-building was the central idea behind the development and implementation of “T”’s 
common governance. “T” realized that active international expansion, global presence and the 
size of the investments outside Norway   demanded a strong and professional organization.   
“T” started to promote itself as the MNC, understanding that that the company needs to start 
changes in the organization.  
We had joined the executive club of MNCs, and that placed MNC – thinking on the 
agenda for the top managers, and later it was transferred to the whole organization. 
We needed changes for the whole organization. (Interview with one of the 
executives, who worked in HR, 2016) 
The staff of different professional services were organized across the subsidiaries under the 
management of the Group. For example, once a year, the head of the Group entity from HQ invited all 
colleagues from the same entities from the subsidiaries to an annual meeting to discuss important 
issues, such as strategy, good practice, etc. Thus, the Head of Group Communication invited all leaders 
for communication activities from all the countries, as did other heads of the corporate or Group 
entities:  legal services, corporate affairs services, technical services, etc.   The Head of Corporate Staff 
Services worked not only with his group in Norway, but with the staff in the subsidiaries. The same 
model was described in the previous chapter, in relation to the CEO’s activities regarding TMB64.  The 
Group Staff leaders started the same practice, as did the CEO. The described activities supported the 
building of common practices and common thinking, regarding business, and connected the 
subsidiaries more closely to HQ.   
At the same time, the HR department developed a common platform for the shared services connected 
to HR issues, such as the “T” Development Platform – a performance platform to support the 
performance result for each employee in the Group.   Other common services related to salary, trip-
reporting documents, different leaves, etc. were launched. 
  
                                                 
64 TMB – Top management Board – arena for the top management in “T”. 
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3. Strong focus on ethical issues; the role of the state as an owner started to be visible when 
unethical issues became known.   TW became important as a managerial platform. 
As managerial governance in this period, TW started to have a greater focus on how to build a common 
corporate culture and governance, aiming to highlight the behavioral aspects of being a “T” employee 
in a global company.  The issue of sustainability and corporate social responsibility (CSR) started to 
be in focus. The CSR department was established during this period in 2005. 
Several  critical  publications appeared in  the media, in relation to operations abroad: Bangladesh (a 
case related to the issue of ownership, which was discussed even under the  ceremony for the Nobel 
prize  in 2008 ( a co-partner from Bangladesh accused “T” of not following the shareholders’ 
agreement);  several cases were related to “T”’s use of child labor (Pakistan, 2008; Bangladesh, 2008; 
Myanmar, 2014); Health and Environmental Safety cases in Pakistan (2008) and Myanmar (2014). 
Following these, “T” started intense work on Health, Environment and Security issues; a special 
department was established that started working on the obligatory procedures and rules across the 
whole Group.   
During this period, several serious issues of corruption were reported.   
Thus, in 2011, an Indian co-partner and Chairman in UNI was accused of corruption in India and was 
arrested. “T” requested that he step down from his position.  
On 19th October 2016, ABS News wrote that “T” “suddenly realized” that 96% of its customers live 
in countries with extremely high levels of corruption. Thus, according to the Transparency 
International Corruption Index (CPI), India is in 76th place, Bangladesh in 139th place, and Myanmar 
is in the 147th place in the world. This is compared, for example, to Denmark in 1st place and Norway 
in 5th place.   
There is a question as to why this “realization” came too late and it took a very long time for HQ to 
implement a systematic control system that could prevent several serious cases of corruption, the 
unethical use of child labor and issues of unsafety during the work process for several subcontractors 
in Asia. Does it mean that the control mechanism had not functioned as intended?  Several comments 
from “T”’s top management, in relation to the issues of both unethical work conditions in Asia and 
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corruption, indicate that “T” was not prepared for these issues and was surprised when the cases were 
disclosed by the media.  “We made some small mistakes before, but we never discovered such serious 
circumstances” (E24, 21.05.2008). It was stated that “T” entrusted its main contractors with how the 
work had been done. “The case shows that the main contractors were more occupied with the quality 
of the results than in checking the work conditions and work process” (ibid.). Based on a program 
made by Danish TV and shown on TV265 in Norway in 2008, E24 wrote that, when the inspectors 
from the JV in Bangladesh came to the working place where the local employees performed their tasks 
under the supervision of the subcontractors, the workers used helmets; after the inspectors had left, the 
workers took the helmets  and other  protection off. “The alarm regarding the fact that the security 
instructions were not being followed should have rung for us, but it did not,” one of the managers in 
“T” stated to E24 (ibid.). 
Second, “T” admitted that the constructors used child labor66, when the pictures from the documentary 
showed that boys aged below 14 years were working in workplaces with dangerous constructions and 
without protective gear.  “T” stated that its JV in Bangladesh immediately started investigations and 
identified that the child labor was used: not by a subcontractor to JV but by a subcontractor to a supplier 
of construction services. 
This clearly shows the dilemmas we face when doing business in developing countries. “T” […] is 
systematically working to evaluate and develop health, safety and environmental issues with our 
subcontractors, but there will always be challenges in developing countries and we have in the past 
few months concentrated on those that we are in direct relationship with. When we or others reveal 
unacceptable conditions further down the value chain, we will of course respond. We are now on to 
the case. (Press release, 2008) 
“T” stated that its JV in Bangladesh had more than 700 suppliers and had, as a part of its efforts to 
improve conditions, already conducted audits and courses at more than 160 suppliers. The progress of 
this work was good, and substantial improvements might now be observed in all these suppliers.  The 
BoD in the JV was informed, and all the board members expressed great satisfaction with the progress 
of this work.  
                                                 
65 “Et tårn av løfter”, a documentary by Tom Heinemann, 2008.  
66 “T”’s press release 4.11. 2008 (www."T".com) 
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“T” admitted that there are many countries in its portfolio, such as Bangladesh, Pakistan, Malaysia and 
Thailand, where child labor is a tradition, and this is a big ethical dilemma for “T”. 
“It is a fact that our presence and long-term work in countries like Bangladesh yield positive spin-offs 
for the society as such. Dangerous working conditions, including child labour, are a major problem in 
Bangladesh. Neither [“T”’s JV] or “T” […], however, take responsibility for all social wrongdoings in 
Bangladesh, but we have taken our share of the responsibility to improve conditions with our suppliers 
and to work for long-term improvements in all the communities where we operate” (ibid.). 
One of the executives in “T”, who worked with the cases in Bangladesh, said in an interview with 
NRK67 (2008), that  “T” had  experienced tremendous  speed in its internationalization and, in a short 
time, had developed from a state-owned monopolist, concentrating on domestic issues, to being the   
sixth largest telecommunication company,  with  172 million customers in 14 countries with 40,000 
employees (2008). That explained that “T”’s routines were developed in the same tempo as the 
development of the international activities.   
Third, according to the report, “Governing Corporate Social Responsibility: An Assessment of the 
Contribution of the UN Global Compact to CSR Strategies in the Telecommunications Industry” 
(Runhaar and Lafferty, 2009), “T” did not have control mechanisms over the   subcontractors.   
The evidence presented above shows that “T” had to do more work on the issue of control: not just in 
relation to the ethical issues related to child labor and safety, but also on the whole scope of the control 
mechanisms related to operations abroad, especially in countries where the traditions of doing business 
are so different from Norwegian  culture.  
After the above-described challenging situations regarding ethical issues, the Norwegian state, as the 
main shareholder in “T” (53.97%), came with clear demands to implement the necessary measures for 
awareness in relation to the ethical way to do business.  “T” needed to increase its work regarding 
questions of sustainability: an anticorruption policy, related to the guidelines and strict rules 
concerning the ethical way to do business.  
                                                 
67 Norwegian state-owned TV channel 
176 
 
In 2008, “T”’s BoD established four committees: The People and Governance Committee, the 
Sustainability and Compliance Committee, the Risk and Audit Committee and the Innovation and 
Technology Committee, all of which were preparatory working committees of the BoD. 
The Risk and Audit Committee supported the BoD’s responsibilities, with respect to financial 
reporting, internal controls, internal and external audit, risk management and risk framework, and was 
established in accordance with the requirements for Audit Committees in the Norwegian Public 
Limited Companies Act. 
The People and Governance Committee supported the BoD’s responsibilities, with respect to 
governance, remuneration, strategic human capital management, diversity and cultural development. 
The Sustainability and Compliance Committee supported the BoD’s responsibilities, with respect to 
addressing sustainability and the scope of compliance for the committee. In its work, the committee is 
guided by international conventions and guidance, “T”’s Code of Conduct, policies and manuals 
relevant to the scope of the CCR. The committee also supports the Board in fulfilling its responsibilities 
to specifically address climate & environment, human rights, labor standards, and anti-corruption. 
The Innovation and Technology Committee supports the BoD in its responsibilities with respect to 
innovation and technology development.  
“T” announced the strengthening of its practice, via the Code of Conduct, related, among other things 
to bribery. Corruption has always been in focus in the company, but, during this phase of 
internationalization, “T” started more systematic work dedicated to this issue. 
The practice of giving and receiving gifts was tightened up (2012) and followed, later (2016), by the 
introduction of a No Gift Policy, which added to the company’s existing efforts to drive ethical 
standards throughout its operations. Under the policy, “T” and its employees are not allowed to receive 
gifts from or offer gifts to business partners and external stakeholders. Branded corporate merchandise 
items and activities related to corporate events are exempted, subject to certain criteria being met 
(“T”’s press release, 2016). 
177 
 
“T” announced the concept of “zero tolerance” to corruption (2012) and stated that ethics and 
transparency are central to “T”’s business. “T”’s zero tolerance regarding corruption and ethical 
standards is set out in its Code of Conduct and in its anti-corruption policies.  
“T” also requires that suppliers and third parties that have a direct contractual relationship or offer 
products or services to the company must comply with its Supplier Conduct Principles, which define 
the minimum standards that “T” expects to see achieved over time, including on ethics and anti-
corruption tests (“T”’s press release, 2012). 
“T”’s BoD adopted the governance document related to ethical norms in doing business. 68 In addition, 
the anti-corruption whistleblower line was opened on the website in 2015, after the big corruption 
scandal in “T”’s JV, VCom.  
7.3. Control mechanisms to achieve influence during Phase 4 of “T”’s process of 
internationalization 
Ownership: compulsory WOS (100% ownership), with some exceptions, where it was not 
possible to achieve 100% ownership but, at the same, presence in the market was strategically 
important.  
Several respondents mentioned that investing in countries with a high level of potential corruption and 
political risks made it important to follow the strict financial routines from HQ in respect of the 
subsidiaries.   It was stated that “T” had even further strengthened the system of common reporting 
when the responsible staff from HQ’s financial department followed the approved procedures 
regarding each WOS and each JV.   At the same time, each cluster had its own financial controller, to 
follow the WOSs and JVs in the cluster. This financial controller worked closely with the financial 
departments in the WOSs and JVs that prepared the first draft for the financial report per quarter, before 
this document was approved in the cluster and then forwarded to Group Finance. These reports had to 
be produced in a strict policy from HQ and presented during the Business Reviews for the CEO and 
top management.     This means that the established financial reporting had several “rounds of control” 
that should secure the matter of influence from HQ and provide opportunities to discover unproper 
issues and unproper reporting.     At the same time, the business controllers from HQ admitted that this 
                                                 
68 (Redegjørelse for eierstyring og selskapsledelse, 2014). 
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system worked only because “T” both owned 100% in the subsidiaries and established corporate 
governance with the strict routines of financial control. In addition, it was mentioned that the whole 
process depended on real and proper information “from the ground”, meaning that information from 
the subsidiaries should be reliable and based on real information from the operations, without anything 
being hidden (Conversation with one of the  experienced financial managers, 2015).  
A story of corruption in Uzbekistan can illustrate that the established financial routines from HQ 
picked up a large example of corruption in one of “T”’s JV systems.  Although “T” was not the direct 
owner in Uzbekistan, but via a JV that had dedicated financial structures in the Netherlands that should 
have discovered the case of corruption, the corruption was not discovered. However, a controller from 
HQ in “T”, checking the routine financial information about the subsidiary of “T”’s subsidiary in 
Uzbekistan, discovered payments that had not been properly reported. This example shows that the 
established financial control functions in HQ, as corporate governance for all subsidiaries, are 
extremely important in order to have influence, especially in relation to JVs.  The whole “Uzbekistan” 
case illustrated that there should be established routines for when the controllers from   HQ will get 
the information from WOSs, JVs and JVs to JVs, and other entities in the chain that follows. One of 
the respondents admitted that there are limitations on which level in the chain it is possible to utilize 
the control function. In the respondent’s experience, this control stops at the maximum second or third 
level (Conversation with an experienced manager, 2015).   Another respondent again confirmed the 
importance of having a proper Management Agreement in JVs, so long as it secures a practical 
approach in the framework for the protection of the rights of the co-owners and the principles of 
common governance in JVs, on which all the co-owners are agreed.   
Thus, the ownership issue, regarding how to control subsidiaries abroad during   Phase 4, shows that 
there are few JVs in “T”’s portfolio: all of them in strategically important markets, where legislation 
did not allow “T” to be an owner in WOS.   While there are substantial challenges in controlling JVs, 
“T” should consider how important it is to be a co-owner in a JV, and whether HQ has enough 
mechanisms to establish influence. The mechanism of financial control via ownership should be 
supported by other mechanisms of control, using the whole scope of existing mechanisms in “T”. 
 “T” concluded that WOS is the form of ownership in “T”’s portfolio that allows it to utilize the 
functions of control that could provide a total-control situation, where the matter of influence will be 
established. As mentioned in Chapter 6, the WOS should be supported by a strong governance system 
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from HQ that will trigger the establishment of the scope or package of different controls, described by 
one respondent as: “a chain of controls”, so long as the FC leads to SC and OC and, further, to BC. 
BoDs in subsidiaries: did they start to be a pro forma because of the strong centralization of the 
routines and mechanisms of control in HQ for achieving total influence?  
One respondent (Interview, 2017) indicated that HQ had achieved strong influence and control in the 
subsidiaries via the BoD, by establishing the system described in Chapter 6. 
We had a good system when the Chairman of the BoD had a link to the top of “T”, 
also being at the top of “T” himself, and at the same time worked closely with the 
CEO in the subsidiary and top management. (Interview with a former manager in 
HQ involved in international operations, 2017) 
But, at the end of this period, the direct link between the CEOs in the subsidiaries and the CEO of “T”, 
and the top managers in HQ, strengthened the role of the CEO in the subsidiary but weakened the role 
of the BoD.    
I understand that top management and the CEO from HQ wanted to have more 
influence and to be more involved in operations. But it is wrong when the CEO in 
the subsidiaries can be very close to the CEO of “T”, and the Chairman of the BoD 
can be simply bypassed. (Interview with an experienced manager, 2017) 
This interview illustrates that the process of the strong centralization of power from HQ, in relation to 
the operational link to the subsidiaries, affected the established balance between the BoD in the 
subsidiaries – operations in subsidiaries and the involvement of the CEO and top management in 
operations abroad.   During this period, such tendencies of such centralization were noticed, but the 
respondents emphasized that the role of the BoD in subsidiaries became weaker, and the level of 
influence and control from HQ became stronger. The respondents confirmed again that the strong 
centralization of power in HQ minimized the role of the BoD as an independent mechanism of 
influence and control.  The respondent noted: “Everything started having to be decided at HQ” (ibid.).  
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The presented interviews were helpful in reaching an understanding of how the mechanism of the 
BoD’s function during Phase 4 of internationalization changed, when the routines of strong 
centralization were established at HQ.  The BoD lost its independency and became weaker, in terms 
of its influence in the subsidiaries.  Some of its functions were transferred to the staff at HQ.  The 
changes in the role of the BoD and the consequences for the operations were discussed with the 
respondents. One respondent explained the following: 
Despite that “T” had WOSs and expected to have influence that has been utilized 
through the control mechanisms designed at HQ, it is important   to be sure that the 
corporate governance in the subsidiaries are implemented and practicing.  Thus, it 
was important both for the HQ and subsidiaries which have the BoD as the supreme 
governing body, meaning to utilize the best solutions and decisions in the concrete 
company in the framework of the decided rules and routines, keep this practice.   The 
subsidiaries should have opportunities to use the local approach and the local 
understanding of how to do business.  The respondent used the example that, when 
TW was designed, in the period of active consolidation of JVs, “T” could use the 
model – which is used in many MNCs – to have a thick book with detailed guidelines. 
“T”’s HR staff decided that it is most important to not have so many rules but that 
these rules should be based on common values, and the practice should be local. The 
respondent underlined the importance of the local context (Conversation with one of 
the HR managers, 2016). 
Expatriates: Expatriates started to be a pool of high professionals in the top positions in the 
subsidiaries. 
The expatriates started to play an important role in establishing the processes of understanding and 
implementation of corporate governance and corporate culture in the subsidiaries abroad, in 
accordance with TW, to develop common corporate governance and culture, for both HQ and the 
subsidiaries. In this connection, each expatriate – now the CEO and executives of a “T” subsidiary – 
started to be significant key persons, playing an important role in the global business community that 
demanded special skills: professional, managerial and individual. Most respondents associated the 
institution of expatriates with the important role of being a “mainstay” in a subsidiary, in order to 
provide the key values from HQ and watch the processes in operation. This informant emphasized the 
importance of expatriates as carriers of HQ’s DNA to the subsidiaries.  
181 
 
Expatriates had a key role; they had to be in the executive positions. They were active 
in projects and connected the subsidiaries and HQ. They provided governance. 
Expatriates played a serious role in influencing the employees in subsidiaries, by 
representing the culture and norms from HQ and, at the same time, following the 
business. They were mediators who understood the local employees and provided 
information back to HQ. (Former SVP, interview 2016) 
… expatriates are supposed to be people of high competence who have a high level 
of professional skills and understand well the values of “T”. In other words, 
expatriates should have “T”’s DNA”, in order to implement the strategy, practice 
and values of HQ in the subsidiaries… It is important to have executives in 
subsidiaries that we know well, that have “T”’s DNA… We needed to provide the 
same standards and the same business culture as at HQ. They could choose the staff 
around them. Now they can communicate in English, it makes the communication 
better. (A former EVP, interview, 2017) 
Local employees should get HQ’s “DNA” via practice – working together with Norwegians at HQ and 
in the subsidiaries, being involved in different network arenas in a Group – HQ and subsidiaries 
together. The expatriates were forced to pay more attention to values and governance. The “institution 
of expatriates” is closely connected to the professional teams from HQ responsible for the different 
skills; these teams can always be used as high-level consultants or experts from HQ. Those employees 
are not long-term executive expatriates but temporary/short-term expatriates, used by the executive 
expatriates in concrete purposes, in order to train the local staff or to solve certain concrete problems. 
At the same time, the executive expatriates are closely connected to the top management on the issues 
of the development of strategy and the strategic development of “T”.  In addition, the expatriates are 
the executives in the subsidiaries themselves, providing operational excellence in the framework of 
the corporate strategy.  
When the expatriates were established as a team, we did not talk about DNA – this 
came later, when the institution was established – high professionals that understood 




HQ either trained or hired expatriates as carriers of its DNA. “T” established a “DNA pool” of 
expatriates, in order to provide the right recruitment in the key positions. Special criteria to be a part 
of the “DNA pool” were decided among the HQ’s executives, who were responsible for the personal 
selecting of expatriates for the CEO positions in WOSs, one of which is experience working 
internationally. On the question of how the recruitment took place, a former HR Executive VP 
explained:  
“T”’s top executives were responsible for the recruitment of the CEOs in WOSs 
(other expatriates in WOS were recruited by the CEO of WOS in coordination with 
HR and executives responsible for the region). The photographs of the actual 
candidates prepared by HR and the executives responsible for the region needing the 
CEO/CEOs were placed on the wall as in a fair. The members of the Executive Board 
of “T” walked from picture to picture and put their remarks on a paper near the 
picture – both positive and negative comments. After several rounds, the discussion 
and opinion exchanges followed.  The important criteria were that a person should 
have leadership experience and experience of working internationally. There were, 
of course, other important criteria as well, related to professional skills.  This tool 
worked well, [but] sometimes the wrong person was appointed to the position – the 
personal skills were not paid much attention on, unfortunately. But we always 
managed to correct it. The CEO had the last word. (Former EVP, interview 2017) 
Another interviewee confirmed that the principle of best practice also had an impact on the process of 
appointing expatriates. 
Proclaiming the idea of “Different companies – one group”, we meant having the 
common guidelines of doing business and our corporate governance and culture, but, 
at the same time, we wanted to transfer the best practice from all subsidiaries into 
common use. We could select what is the best not just for one country, or one region, 
but for the whole group. The same applies with expatriates – we take the best practice 
performed by expatriates to different subsidiaries. (Former executive manager, 
worked a lot abroad, 2016) 
There were several interviews, which described that the expatriates should still be Scandinavians. One 
of the respondents explained: 
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Foreigners who cannot represent “‘T’’s DNA”– being a good professional – could 
not be expatriates; they didn’t understand the issue of culture, values and governance, 
being influenced by their own culture. (Interview with an employee in HQ, who 
worked abroad a lot, in both Europe and Asia) 
At the same time, “T” started to include more and more non-Scandinavian-by-nationality employees 
in the “DNA pool” of expatriates. 
The company developed as a global entity; we had many executives working in 
different positions around the world. The top management decided that all employees 
who had the ambition to be appointed to an executive position, in either HQ or the 
subsidiaries, should have the experience of working internationally. This means that 
more and more expatriates of different nationalities came into the Group. But they 
had to have the same DNA approach, in order to transfer it to the employees in the 
subsidiaries: “T”’s DNA based on “T”’s governance. (Former EVP, responsible for 
HR, interview 2016) 
During the last years of this period, more and more foreigners were included in the “expatriates’ DNA 
pool”; they were invited from the different subsidiaries. “T” started to practice the principle of rotation: 
the expatriates could transfer the best knowledge and best practice from one subsidiary to another. The 
appointment of the executives to HQ started to be connected to the issue of being from the “expatriates’ 
DNA pool”. No executive was appointed to the position of executive, unless that person had worked 
abroad in the subsidiaries.   
CCR:  New “TW” is a governing platform for “T” that presents the new managerial relationship 
and behavioral framework from “T” as an MNC.  
Here is how TW was presented on “T”’s website up to the beginning of November 2014:  
The TW links the different elements of our culture and defines and structures how we do business 




In “T” Group you are encouraged to make your own choices and to find the best approach to your 
work. You have freedom, but you also have a responsibility to act according to the standards we have 
in “T”. In other words, you must know what is valued and what is unacceptable.  (“T”’s intranet, 2013)        
According to “T” the following elements define the behavior that is expected of employees in “T” 
Group:  Our Vision (Empower societies) – “we provide the power of digital communication, enabling 
everyone to improve their lives, build societies and secure a better future for all” (ibid.). Our mission 
– “we’re here to help our customers – we exist to help our customers get the full benefit of being 
connected” (ibid.); Our values (Make it easy; Keep promises; Be inspiring; Be respectful)   “serve as 
a guide for our everyday work and describe how we should serve our customers and work together as 
colleagues” (ibid.); Code of Conduct defines the core principles and ethical standards by which we 
create value in our company; Leadership Expectations (Passion for business; Change and continuous 
improvement; Excellent execution;  Empower people; Integrity and accountability).  
TW was in the process of change from 2004. Thus, in June 2014, the EVP Head of People Development 
(PD)69 presented for Group Executive Management (GEM) the revised concept of TW and a plan for 
its implementation that was approved by the leadership of “T”. 
The concept was adopted and published on “T”’s website in November 2014. “TW is the foundation 
for our business, standards for how we do business” (“T”’s intranet, November 2014). The new version 
of TW now includes Vision, Mission, updated Code of Conduct, Values and new Leadership Attitudes. 
Leadership Attitudes now consist of four specific values that leaders in “T” must incorporate in their 
managerial style (4Es):  Explore, which means Innovation and encourages leaders to be innovative; 
Engage, which means Collaboration and encourages leaders to be cooperative across “T”; Empower, 
which encourages leaders to enable team members to find the best solution; and Execute, which 
encourages leaders to retain “T”’s strong results orientation. At the same time, the Policies and 
Manuals are no longer part of TW, which was explained by the need for simplification of   TW (“this 
change was made to simplify the TW” (ibid.).   
Another adjustment in TW’s concept that has been introduced in TW is TW Commitment. As defined 
by “T”, TW Commitment “spells out what you sign up for when you join ‘T’ and allows all of us to 
reflect on this” (ibid.).   
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185 
 
The Code of Conduct has been upgraded, in order to “reflect the development of ‘T’’s business and 
changes in society that require an even sharper focus on issues such as corruption, conflict of interest, 
terrorism, cybercrime and fraud” (“T”’s intranet, 2014).  
The important part of the previous TW, such as Policies and Manuals has been taken away from the 
new version of TW. “T” explains that, since policies and supporting manuals are relevant just in certain 
internal processes or just for certain groups of employees or for all employees (like a sourcing policy, 
accounting policy and a brand management policy), it was decided to take them out of the TW (ibid.)  
As of the important elements in TW, as Governing Documents - presentation of 
minimum set of formal standards for how to be a good corporate citizen, has been 
incorporated in “T” Group.  We did not need these documents in TW. (Interview 
with a former Director for TW process in “T”, 2014) 
The essential changes in the new version of TW were connected to the statement that “T”’s culture is 
connected to issue of values. Thus, if, previously, it was informed that TW was based on Scandinavian 
values (“In 2005, we pointed to our Scandinavian heritage in our messages”) (ibid.), now “T” is an 
organization where “ideas, practices and people flow in many more directions” (ibid.).  “T” did not 
explain in detail about the issue of values but further linked the information about values to the question 
of corporate culture. 
What was the reason for the refocusing of TW?   
We must continue to build a strong culture across all “T” markets as the basis for our long-term success. 
That’s why we have now refocused the TW. (A former President and CEO of “T”, “T”’s intranet, 
2014)  
Explaining the idea of establishing a common corporate culture, “T”’s management declared that, “We 
are moving from a holding-company approach to a more collaborative united force, where we will 
build a common culture and stimulate best practice sharing and co-operation between markets, while 
maintaining the local edge and market relevance” (ibid.). 
The new “T” illustrates that the process of centralization was important for “T” in this period. “T” 
focused on the issue of behavior-based values, with the development of a kind of “‘T’ citizenship". 
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That’s why implementation of the Commitment is a behavioral confirmation of belonging to “T”’s 
family.   “T” linked TW to the behavior aspects of control, since employees had to sign a document, 
committing themselves to follow the approved rules and ethical conduct. At the same time, the new 
version of the Code of Conduct strengthened the behavioral attitude to the ethical question, making 
the employee responsible for not following the rules. Leadership Expectations had the same function: 
behavior control of managers in “T”; if top management proclaimed their commitment to follow the 
expected behavior as “T”’s leaders, they should follow it themselves.  
Thus, the CEO of “T” stated:  
Management expectations are embodied and formulated on our website, and here 
everyone can enter and see that leadership in “T” will be exercised with transparency, 
integrity, clarity and passion. Management in a company such as “T”, with so many 
employees, with so many departments, countries and cultures, is a demanding 
exercise. That's why it can be measurable, when everyone's expectations for good 
leadership in all contexts and expectations can be adjusted regularly with the 
company's development. 
We conduct an annual internal survey, in which all workers evaluate the company's 
management, vision and values. Periodically, we use ratings and reports on each 
individual manager. Also, as a senior manager, I get a score from the staff and the 
people around me, whom I have to deal with. So, I needed to change myself a little 
each time. (Conversation, 2015)  
From the interviews presented above, it follows that, through TW, the corporate rules (CCR) started 
to be more focused on the issue of behavior, representing behavior control. TW aims to support its 
governing structures in building the corporate culture, that, as “T” proclaimed, will be built – not on 
Scandinavian values, as written in TW from 2004/5, but on universal values, since “T” is becoming an 




CEO: new routines in line with MNC practice worldwide: business reviews, top management 
support institution, profiling in the VIP international Business and Political arenas (World 
Economic Forum, St. Petersburg Economic Forum, GSMA World Congress in Barcelona, etc.).  
One of the priorities for the CEO was to establish new business practices that would give him an 
opportunity to be closely informed about all the business activities across “T”.  
The CEO and CFO have changed the practice of reporting. Business reviews were 
started when the financial controls, TMSs, leaders of cluster reported on the financial 
and other activities in WOS.  It is a hard, but useful dialogue. The CEO is a front 
person in the quarterly reporting. He has to know everything. The same is related to 
Capital Day – a meeting with the business analysts, journalists, investors. 
(Conversation with a financial manager, 2016) 
The institution of Top Management Support (TMS) (see Chapter 6) was strengthened, TMSs became 
obligatory members of the BoDs in the companies they were responsible for. The CEO strengthened 
direct contact with the TMS via the business review practice. 
At the same time, several respondents described that the CEO and his staff established several arenas 
for the CEOs in the subsidiaries, in addition to MMB (Mobile Management Board), described in a 
previous chapter. The CEO himself visited subsidiaries; the CEOs were invited to all top management 
events that were established by the initiative of the CEO. The CEO included the CEOs in the 
subsidiaries in the pool of executives that he used, in order to rotate the executives abroad or to place 
in HQ.  
Understanding the importance of the CEO’s role in promoting “T” as a global company, the CEO 
started his active participation in the international business arenas. He began to participate in the World 
Economic Forum, the GEM Congress in Barcelona, the St. Petersburg Economic Forum and the Asian 
Economic Forum.   
The CEO was selected for the BoD of the Global Mobile Congress in Barcelona and used this arena to 
both promote “T” and establish good links between “T”’s executives and the executives from foreign 
MNCs. The CEOs in the subsidiaries, the staff in “T”, were a kind of “T” pool in this process. The 
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CEO knew the organization well and used informal ways to approach people, often ignoring the 
previously established procedures; he liked to obtain information from his conversations and meetings 
with the people he knew from his wide network. 
I participated with the CEO in the Economic Forum in St. Petersburg.  The forum 
gave a unique opportunity to obtain direct information about the investor climate in 
Russia and, at the same time, to share information about “T” and attract positive 
attention to “T” as a global company.  It was obvious that it was very important to 
build relations with the business community, politicians and authorities.  The 
informal events gave such opportunities. At the same time, the CEO was very curious 
about all kinds of knowledge about such an important market as Russia. He took time 
for personal observations, liked to visit museums, walk around St. Petersburg – he 
wanted to understand many things himself and use this knowledge for business 
purposes. (Personal experience)  
 The evidence described above illustrates the process of strengthening the CEO’s role in an 
organization that started to be more centralized.   
7.4. Perceived influence - challenges in the process of internationalization during 
Phase 4. 
1.  Challenges in JVs even when “T” had the majority position. Ownership in JVs did not give 
the expected control.  The BoD mechanism did not function optimally.  
During this phase of internationalization, “T” met the first serious challenges connected to the issue of 
ownership in a cross-cultural context in Russia, Ukraine, Thailand, Malaysia, India, and Bangladesh.  
“T” was involved in several protracted juridical processes, especially in Eastern Europe – Russia and 
Ukraine. Disputes were mostly related to the ownership issues and governance principles and practice 
in JVs and brought considerable challenges for “T”, in its relationship with its partners in JVs abroad. 





Start of a conflict - URS WCom70 
In 2004, VCom’s management proposed acquiring URS WCom, a small and loss-making Ukrainian 
mobile operator. After analyzing the company, “T” concluded that the price asked for the company, 
231 million USD, was grossly exaggerated and that it would require large investments to make the 
company survive and grow – if even possible. Two months earlier, GT71 had turned down an offer to 
buy the company for 100 million USD. “T” requested to know the identity of the sellers: information 
which, to date, has not been provided. 
As a supermajority vote was required when the acquisition proposal was presented to the BoD, “T”’s 
“no” to the proposition stopped the plans. However, instead of accepting the decision, a longish fight 
started between co-partner Aa72 (AG) and “T”, which would later end in the acquisition being forced 
through by circumventing both Board and Charter.  
This fight took 11 years; the arbitrations took place in different places in Russia (Krasnodar, Temruyk, 
Omsk, Tymen, Moscow), in Ukraine (Kyiv), and in New York, Geneva and Stockholm. 
Later, in 2005, this conflict grew over the disagreements in Ukraine, and was focused on the issue of 
governance: settlement of BoD, appointment of top management, payments of dividends, acquisitions.  
Aa started a number of litigations in Ukraine through its affiliate, Stm73, contrary to the shareholders’ 
agreement, which specified that any conflict should be settled by arbitration in New York. The 
litigation included invalidation of the KVS74 Charter, as only shareholders can be Board members, 
according to Ukrainian law, and the selected Board members were not. This ruling eventually led to 
the Charter being changed three years later, when arbitration awards and court rulings in New York 
forced Stm75 to again start appearing at shareholders’ and Board meetings. Some of the 15-20 
litigations were quickly overturned, such as attempts to nullify the service agreements between “T” 
and KVS, as well as the appointment of a local CEO and to nullify Board decisions made in 2005, to 
mention a few. 
                                                 
70  URS WCom is a company in Ukraine that “T” and a co-partner in JV in Russia had a conflict about 
71 GT is a “T” s JV in Russia that has been merged with VCom 
72 Aa changed its name later to AG, co-partner to “T” in CIS 
73 Co-partner in KVS in Ukraine 
74 KVS – “T”’s JV in Ukraine 




In August, “T” won a total victory in the UNCITRAL Arbitration proceeding in New York against 
AG76 subsidiary, Stm, in connection with S’s violations of the Shareholders’ Agreement in KVS. The 
award was unanimous, meaning that the AG-nominated arbitrator also voted against AG. The award 
ordered AG to return to shareholders’ meetings and Board meetings in KVS and to reduce their stake 
in competing businesses (source: “T”’s website).  
Conflicts with the co-partners 
Conflicts have occurred in both Europe (Russia, Ukraine) and Asia (Bangladesh, India, Thailand, and 
Malaysia).   
1. The conflicts mostly occurred in JVs, where “T” did not have the majority, such as in a company 
with Russian co-ownership.  
“T”’s previous experience was that JV was not the best form of ownership abroad, and it had been 
prepared to deal with that, using its experience in the Russian market.  One of “T”’s managers, who 
worked in the Eastern European projects, said the following: 
We thought that the Russian co-owners did not have any ambitions in be industrial 
investors, just financial. We were wrong. A short period after the Russians became 
our partners, they established a telecommunication company, employed several 
professionals from telecom, and showed us their industrial ambitions.  We disagreed 
on strategic things, because two industrial investors with a different agenda met on 
the same BoD as owners.  Nobody wanted to give up their influence in the company. 
(Interview, 2015) 
 At the same time, the respondent said that there were conflicts in the companies where “T” had the 
majority and had FC: 
We were in a long conflict in Ukraine and did not manage to stop it. The conflict 
escalated.  At the beginning, we disagreed, and we managed to negotiate before 
coming to agreements. When the business became bigger, the interests of the each 
of us were also bigger. We reached an open conflict.  For example, a PR agency that 
                                                 
76 AG – “T”’s co-partner in Russia and Ukraine 
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worked for “T”’s co-owner used different tricks to destroy “T”’s reputation. Once, 
when we came to Kyiv to have a BoD meeting, we saw that the center of Kyiv was 
decorated with posters with a message in Ukrainian: “Norwegians, obey the law!” 
The message was related to the new round of court hearing that were starting in Kyiv 
about the conflict between “T” and its co-owner, regarding strategic issues. 
(Conversation with a manager, who worked in Eastern Europe, 2015) 
This interview demonstrates that “T” did not manage to utilize the mechanisms of influence through 
ownership in JVs. Despite holding the majority position as an owner, a disagreement over a long period 
led to the escalation of the conflict.  
Juridical processes as a part of the conflicts with co-partners.  
In Russia and Ukraine, “T” was involved in several court processes against co-partners, arguing about 
the strategy of the expansion outside Russia. Being in the minority position, “T” could not decide the 
framework of the BoD and protect its interests.  “T” and its co-partners disagreed strongly on the 
strategic view.  “T” experienced an attempt to arrest its shares and the threat of losing them. 
In JVs in Ukraine, where “T” did not have the majority position, the disagreements were also strong, 
and its level of influence in the JVs was low.  
A co-partner was tough and wanted maximum control in the company. We had to 
fight in the courts of several countries. It was not pleasant; it took many resources, 
but we showed that we could fight and defend ourselves. We had the money for such 
a battle, but what about companies that were not as big as us? They could lose 
everything. (Interview with a former EVP, worked a lot abroad, 2015) 
At the same time, there are several examples to illustrate the breaking of established stereotypes, such 
as that HQ has control and influence over the subsidiary, when HQ owns 100% of the subsidiary 
abroad.    
Several respondents mentioned that “T” has operations in countries with high risks of corruption, such 
as Thailand, Bangladesh, Pakistan and India, and that it is extremely important not just to establish  a 
good system of control  in the subsidiaries but to work with good  practice daily, explaining to the local 
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employees that the corporate culture comes above the national local traditions. The respondents stated 
the following:  
HQ’s routines were abused. I know that there was corruption in our subsidiaries, but 
it is so difficult to catch it. The local people did things their way; maybe they did not 
think that it was corruption or that they were breaking “T”’s rules. They perhaps 
thought that they were doing things based on the local traditions, national habits – 
such as gifts, protectionism, family services, keeping the information, not telling the 
truth…  We needed to train and train the local employees, explain corporate 
governance, and warn about the consequences if the rules were not followed. 
(Interview with an employee at “T”, who worked abroad as a manager, 2016) 
Cases of corruption and disagreements with the co-partners 
At the same time, “T” met the first serious challenges connected to the issue of ownership in a cross-
cultural context in Asia (Thailand, Malaysia, India, and Bangladesh) and in operations in JVs in 
Uzbekistan.    
In India, “T”’s co-partner was accused of corruption (2012). In Bangladesh, “T” was confronted by a 
co-partner, who accused “T” of changing the rules of the partnership agreement.  The co-partner, who 
was awarded the Nobel Peace prize in 2006, even used the arena of the Nobel prize ceremonies to try 
to explain his disagreements with “T”.  
In Thailand, suspicions of financial crimes were reported. The investigations showed that some local 
partners were unable to provide sufficient documentation of ownership of the land where the base 
stations were located. The rental agreements were in accordance with common industrial practice in 
Thailand but not in line with “T”’s internal guidelines. “T”’s subsidiary, therefore, changed its rental 
agreement routines and initiated a process to ensure that ownership was clearly documented in all 
rental agreements (“T”’s website, 2015).   
Another case was also discovered in Thailand.   “T”’s audit uncovered matters related to suspicions of 
financial crimes and reported these to the local police (ibid.). 
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The first time “T”’s audit uncovered unacceptable sponsorships in Grameenphone in Bangladesh was 
in 2013.  The most serious breach was the sponsorship of a sports tournament, related to the 
Bangladeshi military. The case was reported to the Head of the Asian cluster, who, at that time, was 
Head of Asia and Chair of the Grameenphone Board of Directors. The company initiated several 
measures, including a review of the sponsorship guidelines and the establishment of a sponsorship 
committee to approve all sponsorships (Website, 2013). 
But, in 2016, “T”’s audit conducted a compliance review of the new guidelines and uncovered a new 
set of unacceptable sponsorships. It was uncovered that 11 of 250 sponsorship agreements breached 
the company’s internal guidelines.  “T” made a statement: 
“Breaches of our internal guidelines are unacceptable, and corrective and preventive measures have 
therefore been initiated” (ibid., 2016) 
In 2014, a big corruption scandal started in “T”’s JV, VCom, which had a business in Uzbekistan. The 
story is described in Chapter 4.   As the consequence of this case, several top managers had to leave 
“T”.  Later, “T” announced that its ownership in VCom could not utilize the issue of control via either 
mechanisms of ownership or the BoD, or in any other way. 
D77’s lawyers delivered their final report, with a review of how “T” had handled ownership in a JV 
partly owned (33%) by “T”. 
“The report states that no ‘T’ employees have been involved in corrupt actions. It gives ‘T’ partial 
credit for its handling of the ownership in VCom, but also points to weaknesses in organizational 
structure, communication and leadership in this matter. This is serious. The Board and the management 
recognize that we must improve how we work. It is obvious to follow laws and regulations, but we 
have to reach further. There should never be any doubt that we in ‘T’ are fully compliant with our 
ethical guidelines,” says Chair of the Board of “T”. (Website, 2016) 
  
                                                 
77  D - law firm used by “T” in several cases 
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In 2015, “T” decided to sell its shares in the JV, VCom, where the Russian partners dominated.  
“The VCom asset, where ‘T’ holds a minority position without the possibility to fully control the 
company, has been challenging. Based on a strategic review by the Board and the CEO, and after due 
considerations, T has decided to divest its shares in VCom Ltd. The disposal of our shares is in the 
best interest of our shareholders, and in accordance with ‘T’’s long-term strategic focus,” said 
Chairman of the Board of Directors of “T”. (Press release, “T”’s website, 2015) 
VCom Ltd. has gradually contributed less to the value of “T. (ibid.) 
The statement from “T” shows that the loss of the control and influence in the JV led to the loss of the 
values of the JV and had a negative impact on the value creation of HQ. 
2. “T” needed to deal with the issue of the strong link between business and politics in some 
countries.   
Can external factors, such as the political situation and investor climate, in the markets where “T”’s 
subsidiaries are, influence the relationship between HQ and the subsidiaries? 
Substantial investments in several countries attracted special attention from politicians in several 
countries.  Several respondents mentioned that external factors, such as the strong link between politics 
and business in some countries, represented issues that were difficult to deal with, and that could 
destroy “T”’s business existence.   On the question of how politicians and authorities, who represent 
the external power for any owner and company, can influence the relationship between HQ (an owner) 
and the JV or WOS subsidiaries in a local market, one respondent said:  
Top management and local partners in Ukraine were closely linked to the top 
political level in the country. It was challenging. Sometimes it was difficult to 
understand – who decides in the company? (Interview with a former EVP, worked a 
lot abroad, 2015) 
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The respondent described the link between local management and/or local employees and authorities 
as an invisible link that can take away power from the foreign investor and re-shape the real influence 
and control in the subsidiary.  
Several respondents told about cases in which the authorities in the local markets changed the 
conditions for the licenses (India, Hungary, Russia, Ukraine), and that, as a foreign investor, “T” had 
to deal with that. The changing of license conditions is one of the most common reasons for leaving 
the market.  To protect the business, foreign investors need to influence local authorities, in order to 
create a positive investor climate. Without a predictable investor climate, it is impossible for the 
business to evolve. In this connection, the matter of influence in the subsidiaries is linked to the level 
of influence over the authorities. 
We always needed predictability in all markets; we understood that we needed to 
deal with that: have a dialogue with the authorities, convince them that it is important 
to have a good investor climate. We participated in seminars, conferences, forums. 
We were sponsors of the most influential arenas that could give us the right profile.  
We even created a special area for such activities – Business Environment 
Management (BEM). Several BEM people from HQ and the subsidiaries   worked 
in all markets. BEM was included in the external affairs activities… We needed 
BEM from HQ, in order to have information from the local markets on the possible 
challenges.  We used BEM as a tool, and that helped us to “keep track” in the 
subsidiaries.   How could the sponsoring of the Bolshoi Theatre help us with the 
challenges in Russia? Ballet is a part of the national identity in Russia. We were 
asked to support it – we did it. (A manager, who worked in Eastern Europe, 
conversation, 2016) 
The presented interviews show that “T” needed to pay more attention to the external factors that can 
be a matter of strong influence from the macro world, including politicians and authorities, and can 
have an important impact on the values of the company and, further, on the relationship between HQ 




 3. Corporate identity challenges: TW as a governing document did not convince the employees 
and probably did not enhance behavior control as it was expected to. 
Many respondents were surprised by the question about TW in the context of influence and control.  
They considered TW as something created to have on the intranet or website.  
There are too many beautiful words that do not mean something concrete… Several 
parts of TW are unclear.  The most valuable part of TW is the Code of Conduct – it 
is clear, concrete and practical and can be used. (Interview with a manager in “T” 
Norway, 2014)  
TW does not mean much to me. I feel that these big words are needed by the 
managers, maybe top managers, to “get me” if I am doing something wrong.  Top 
managers are working according the rules they proclaimed. TW only exists on paper. 
(Conversation with an employee, 2016) 
TW is “T” Norway – you from Norway want to teach us how to work; we also have 
our own experience. (Conversation with an employee from a subsidiary, 2015) 
The reaction from several respondents on the statements from the new TW demonstrate that employees 
are not convinced about the value of this managerial platform.   Some foreign employees reacted by 
saying that TW arrived as a governing platform from HQ, without taking into consideration any ideas 
from the subsidiaries. 
At the same time,  it can be underlined that managers  were more positive to TW: “TW is important 
for the whole of ‘T’”; “ we need to use it in order to create a corporate culture”;  “TW is a philosophy 
for us”; “TW is an important tool for creating a common feeling” (conversations with top managers 
and senior managers). Middle-level managers and employees looked more skeptically on TW, 
underlining that TW is not practiced and exists as a declaration on the website.  
At the same time, the respondents underlined the generalization of the TW concept and were doubtful 
about its practical usefulness.  Attention focused on the fact that many parts of TW are unclear, and 
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that the most concrete documents were removed from TW. The Code of Conduct is still the most 
popular document that employees want to use.  
I like the Code of Conduct. I understand the concrete rules, and it is easy to follow 
them. At the same time, I have a feeling that the Code of Conduct was written in 
order to “get us”. If I see something, I can say, “Look, here is the Code of Conduct; 
we need to follow it”. (Conversation with an employee working in Norway, 2016) 
 Many respondents working in Norway underlined that “TW is more needed abroad, 
in order to show the OpCos how HQ is doing, but it is not so important in Norway” 
(conversation with an employee, 2016). 
The presented interviews show that “T” needs to work further with TW as a common managerial and 
governing platform, in order to convince employees, both in Norway and abroad.  
One respondent said, “TW is not corporate culture. It will take a long time before TW will be a culture 
that will represent all ‘T’ citizens” (Conversation with an employee from Norway, 2016). 
4. Challenges with expatriates. 
At the same time, several negative comments regarding the role of expatriates were mentioned.  
Firstly, the institution has become too powerful and difficult to get into. 
Expatriates have too much power; they are power-oriented people and want just to 
be abroad and be moved from country to country. They do not come back to HQ and 
do not share the competence but jump from chair to chair abroad…  Some bad culture 
is established among “local Norwegians”, covering many things. The whistleblower 
culture is not well developed. Some suspicious episodes were ignored. (Former 
manager, who worked internationally in different countries, 2014) 
Secondly, several respondents commented that the process of recruitment to become part of the “DNA 
pool of professionals” is not transparent and not clear. There is very little information about it in “T”.  
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They started to be an exclusive group, and it is almost impossible to join this club! 
(Interview with an employee, 2014) 
Thirdly, the institution of expatriates can be damaged by the “private driver syndrome”. Local staff 
react negatively to the benefits that expatriates receive, compared to what is common locally. The 
expatriates are surrounded with luxury, with private drivers, huge apartments and household help. 
Many of them are not willing to return Norway and just “change chairs” from country to country. 
The interviews show that “T” needs to work further with the development of expatriates’ “DNA pool 
of professionals”, focusing on transparency, inclusivity, meaning the inclusion of expatriates from 
different nationalities, providing the best practice across “T”. “T” should include the issue of cross-
cultural management in its training, in order to make a clear distinction between corporate culture and 
governance and national traditions. “T” needs to discuss what is more important – corporate culture or 
national culture – and how the practicing of common corporate rules can have greater influence on the 
behavior of “T”’s citizens across borders.  
5. Media focus increased with “T”’s involvement in international operations and put “T” under 
pressure.  The CEO is connected to the “T”’s image, his image can be damaged as well as that 
of “T”.  “T” could not control the media.  
With the increase in international expansion, “T” media’s focus on activities abroad increased 
dramatically.  The focus was against “T” as a company, its management and its partners.  
Media training started to become an important part of the new practice for managers: and it 
was a challenging situation. 
I was responsible for the BoD trip in the CEE region. The BoD had to visit three 
countries. One of them was Russia. It was the period when “T” had finalized its 
negotiations with its powerful Russian partner, AG.  A journalist from a Norwegian 
paper called me and tried to get information about the trip and possibilities for getting 
interviews. After discussions, it was decided to limit media involvement in the trip.  
No was not enough for the journalist. I received a direct message that his team would 
follow the group, take pictures and try to get comments.  I had to work out a new 
“roadmap”,  including the details of safe arrivals and departures: where the buses 
should pick us up, that the group would leave the hotel  from the backyard; how the 
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Chairman of the BoD and the CEO should react if the journalists and the cameraman 
should suddenly appear on the  street and try to stop them. 
The journalist and a cameraman appeared. They tried to follow the group: even when 
the group had a 30 min break from the tight schedule and wanted to see Red Square. 
They even followed the CEO to a church, trying to get comments. (Personal 
experience)  
This story shows that, with the growing business abroad, the media focus also grows, and “T” needs 
to be aware of the issues of how to control the media as a strong factor that can influence the  image 
of both “T” and of top management, which can have a direct  impact on the values of the company. 
6. The CEO and top management’s course, directed to the strong centralization of all the 
functions and mechanisms of HQ, can weaken some functions in the subsidiaries. 
Several respondents mentioned that, during this period, “T” started the strong centralization of power 
in the hands of the CEO and his staff.    The CEO and “T” Group executives established direct contact 
and arenas across the whole Group.   
The respondents mentioned that the processes of strong centralization could perhaps be referred to as 
a process of too much austerity, when, even at HQ, employees can feel themselves to be foreigners.  
One respondent mentioned that it is not easy to register a vacation now – all the processes are in 
American English! It is not as easy as before to book the company cabin – there is a long and 
complicated process, and in the old days, you just could call and talk to a person.  
We are all together in a digitalized world, where the HR personnel are sitting in India, 
and the processes in HQ are described as if we are in Chicago! Does that mean that 
we are global? (Conversation with an employee, 2017) 
Another respondent shared his impressions from working in the subsidiaries: 
I saw that many initiatives that had previously been created in the subsidiaries were 
replaced by instructions and directives from HQ. I think that it can “kill” the initiative 
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on the ground. We need to find a balance for how to combine the local approach and 
what HQ wants. (Conversation with an employee, who worked abroad, 2016) 
The interview illustrates the need to “tune” the strategy focused on centralization that can be described 
as institutionalization of the managerial mechanisms and routines, in order to create a citizenship, 
based on common values and inclusive governance.  
From the presented interviews, it follows that, during the 4th  phase of internationalization, “T”  
reached a  situation in which the WOSs constituted the majority in “T”’s portfolio, and “T” managed  
to develop and implement    corporate governance, which united all “T”’s subsidiaries into one group, 
triggering strong influence and a large range of control mechanisms, such as FC, SC, OC and BC.  
However,  there were several processes and tendencies  in “T” that illustrate that the company still 
faced challenges in achieving influence in most JVs (the exception can be related to the  JV in 
Malaysia, due to the  way the ownership in this JV was utilized, and that, without having FC, “T” was 
able to achieve the SC, OC and BC).   At the same time, the interviews show that the tendencies 
towards strong centralization around HQ during this phase of internationalization led to a situation of 
perceived influence, when many of the processes started to be a pro forma, which weakened the local 
initiatives and institutions in the subsidiaries.  In addition, “T” understood that the external factors in 
the markets, such as political influence, legislation and investor climate, can have an impact on the 





Chapter 8. Discussion 
This chapter is dedicated to discussing the key empirical findings presented in Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 
regarding how the HQ of an MNC can achieve influence over its subsidiaries in the process of 
internationalization. Further, the changes of controls in the international settings will be explained, by 
focusing on how managers in the HQ of an MNC, during different phases of the internationalization 
process, have perceived the outcomes of the several control processes and how those perceptions have 
influenced changes in the configuration of the HQ’s control mechanisms, in order for the HQ to achieve 
influence over its subsidiaries. 
This study has particularly addressed three research questions: 1) How has the internationalization of 
“T” happened? 2) What control mechanisms were in place during different phases of 
internationalization? 3) How have managers and employees perceived and initiated changes to those 
controls? 
8.1. The first research question: How has the internationalization of “T” happened? 
“Learning by practicing” – from small steps to a global presence as MNC”.                           
The content of the four chapters (Chapters 4 to 7) presents a picture of how the process of 
internationalization in “T” has evolved.  The empirical findings illustrate that the process of 
internationalization can be divided into four phases and four different international strategies, affected 
by the different antecedent conditions. The empirical findings will be supportive in answering the first 
research question: How has the internationalization of “T” happened? 
Use of the guidelines from process theory (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995; Poole et al., 2000; Mähring 
and Keil, 2008; Kraus and Strömsten, 2016) are supportive in identifying a sequence of events in a 
historical retrospective to define and distinguish conditions for the changes in an organization. Van de 
Ven and Poole (1995) identified such conditions as determining antecedent conditions in advance of 
sequences of events that influence the process of change in an organization. In the empirical part, 
conditions from the macro and micro worlds were identified that forced the need to create and tune an 




Many of the processes during the four phases of internationalization changed, affected by antecedent 
conditions, as both macro- (external to the company) and micro conditions (internal within the 
company). 
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During “T”’s internationalization process, the antecedent conditions from the micro- and macro 
worlds78 had an important impact on the   development of “T”’s international strategy as a “catalysator” 
for the start of the first projects and further careful “international thinking”.  
“Small company – small international steps - Phase 1 
During Phase 1 of internationalization, an EU directive about the opening up of competition in Europe 
(macro condition) could have had serious consequences for such a small company as “T”, when the 
big European operators had the opportunity to start operating in Norway.  Using the possibilities in the 
Western European, Eastern European  and Asian markets, which started to be open to foreign 
investments (macro  condition), and  the technological advantage of mobile telephony that were in 
demand  in this period (macro condition) and in which “T” had developed good competence (micro 
condition), “T” took its first steps in international expansion. However, as the empirical findings show, 
“T” started international expansion without a clear strategy of internationalization. Firstly, “T”’s first 
international projects were a part of a political process in the framework of Barents co-operation. It 
seems that “T” did not have clear plans for an international strategy, despite having been involved in 
several international projects. Thus, projects were “hunted” for by “passionate ambassadors” in the 
regions where it was possible to obtain them and, later, the activities were “tuned” to the strategy.   At 
the same time, “T” had a goal of trying to participate in the first international projects and an ambition 
to implement a kind of practical solution in its realization.  
Secondly, “T” was often invited by local partners to participate in different consortiums for investment, 
initiated by authorities or international operators who wanted to build up alliances because of “T”’s   
high technological competence (micro condition). This means that the markets for expansion were not 
clearly defined. 
Thirdly, the technology for the investment projects was not clear: in some projects, there were 
investments in fixed network telephony, in others, mobile telephony. The ownership model of the 
international business was the joint venture (JV).   
                                                 




Fourthly, several international small projects were “pushed” because of the organizational changes in 
“T”, as the result of the transformation from being a part of the ministry to becoming a company.   “T” 
was allowed to make “pilot international projects” in order to gain international experience.  
Nevertheless, analyzing the results of “T”’s activities abroad, the respondents reflected over the 
practice of “tuning” the strategy, in relation to the “tuning” of the geography of “T”’s activities and the 
technological platforms   of the investments.   In practice,  the following “tuning” was carried out: 
projects from the area near the Norwegian-Russian border  were “tuned” to the  bigger area, such   as 
the northern part of Russia, where “T”  managed to build up a good network and, using the experience 
from the first steps in internationalization,  could participate in tenders  to be part of the bigger project.  
In addition, “T” extended its investments by “tuning” the fixed telephony in the Murmansk and 
Arkhangelsk areas to the mobile projects in the northern part of Russia. At the same time, a feeling of 
growing dissatisfaction was expressed in “T” because the company could not use its ambitions as an 
investor, putting in practice knowledge and positive experiences from working abroad. 
“The “Viking strategy” - Phase 2 
During Phase 2, “T” experienced increasing international expansion, by establishing several JVs 
abroad. From the period 1996-2000, using the new legislation that opened up possibilities for foreign 
investors (macro condition), a number of small acquisitions was made in Western Europe, Eastern 
Europe and Asia that built up the framework around the international expansions and the foundation 
for the further development of the international strategy.  
“Passionate ambassadors” travelled where they could find available projects and “planted flags” as 
“Vikings”, using the first positive experiences from the international markets (macro condition). 
During this period, JVs were still the preferable form of ownership, but both the first challenges related 
to the conflicts with partners and the unpredictability of the legislation climate meant that “T” faced a 
new strategy, based on the consolidation of its portfolio.  For “T”, it was important to convey its role 
as an industrial investor. At the same time, the empirical evidence shows that, despite the strong focus 
on the operations on the domestic market, the top management of “T” started to develop an 
international strategy, understanding the possibilities of the potential growth for “T” on the 
international markets. In these terms, “top management” functioned as a catalysator for “T”’s 
international expansion (micro condition).  
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To summarize, this period of internationalization was characterized by several aspects. For the first, 
despite the high risks and unpredictability, the emergent markets were considered good for investments 
because of the potential growth and the low entry price. “T” did not insist on the majority position in 
subsidiaries on the emerging markets, prioritizing the matter of learning   how to do business in 
challenging markets and building up good relationships with local partners. 
Secondly, despite the potential growth and the low entry price, the conditions of high risks and the 
unpredictability of the emerging markets represented a challenging business environment. “T” 
evaluated that JV ownership could reduce the risks in the challenging markets. At the same time, “T”, 
experiencing its first disagreements with local partners because of the lack of influence, started to 
“tune” the strategy, thinking from the long-term perspective, and began to consider the wholly owned 
subsidiary (WOS) form. 
Thirdly, some of the top managers, wishing to achieve predictability in investments abroad, argued for 
investment in the mature markets in Western Europe, rather than in the emerging markets, which 
represented high risks and unpredictability.  In this case, “T” should make a conscious decision to 
always be the minority stakeholder in its alliance with strong European operators. 
Fourthly, the debate related to the development of international strategy reflected that there were 
several parallel processes in “T”, that were evaluated; then, by the process of “tuning” investments 
from mature markets to emerging markets, the new strategy was adopted.    The wrong “tuning” could 
dramatically change the internationalization of “T” and the further development of the company.  Thus, 
investments in mature markets, together with a strong partner, could give predictability in investments, 
but not 100% ownership and not sufficient influence and control, and probably not such high financial 
benefits, due to the low level of ownership. “T” chose a path for its internationalization that linked to 
the estimations of the potential growth, in both the emerging markets (increasing the market share) and 
low-cost subsidiaries (increasing the ownership). From the long-term perspective, this strategy gave 
higher income and the theoretical possibility of influencing the subsidiary in order to provide the 
strategy from HQ. According to several respondents, this model created “T”’s success in 
internalization. The examples used by the respondents illustrate that the particular qualities of some  
international markets, and even the geographical positions  of the markets, can have an important 
impact as antecedent conditions on international strategy and on the form of ownership in the 
subsidiary, which, further, can link to the possibilities  to establish the mechanisms of influence and 
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control from HQ towards subsidiaries abroad.  Decisions about the further development of the 
international strategy were made in Phase 3.  
Fifthly, the majority of the interviews gave the impression that, to the end of this period, they 
experienced dissatisfaction from working in subsidiaries as consultants without having influence. The 
need to increase control over the subsidiaries was described.  The respondents explained that the lack 
of influence and control they experienced in subsidiaries abroad has been understood by   managers as 
a recognition of both the need to have influence and control, and, at the same time, the lack of ability 
to achieve influence and control over the subsidiaries that was wished for and needed to be established 
by HQ. 
“Up or Out”- Phase 3 
During Phase 3, to the end of 1999, “T” was one of the most rapidly developing European companies 
that moved outside the Norwegian borders, with 14 JVs abroad, using the possibilities of the evolving 
international expansion in Europe and Asia (macro condition). Using the knowledge from the previous 
period about legislation in the emerging markets (macro condition), the strategy was changed, and “T” 
decided to focus on the emerging markets in Eastern Europe and Asia. In this phase, the company 
recognized the need to develop a formal internationalization strategy and formal governance and to 
establish the mechanisms for the HQ to achieve a higher level of influence over its subsidiaries.  The 
hope of building up a strategic alliance with a big Swedish company, in order to advance more quickly 
internationally and achieve a strong global position for the future, failed in 1999. In order to fulfill its 
new strategy, “Up or Out”, “T” started an active process of mergers and acquisitions (M&A); the JVs 
in which “T” could not increase its ownership to 100% were sold. In this period, the WOS form of 
ownership was preferable. Following the practice of paying strong attention to the issues of corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) and an ethical attitude to doing business in the world (macro condition), 
the first governing platform for behavior appeared, as the Code of Conduct (CoC); later, the “T” Way 
(TW) was created. The newly appointed CEO started the process of “international thinking” (micro 
condition), aiming to create a suitable attitude in “T” that could support the international strategy; thus, 
“T” international was changed to International “T”, marking the paradigm shift for “T” in the HQ and 
subsidiaries. New routines, based on the new governing managerial platform as TW, started to be 




“Different companies – one Group”- Phase 4 
 
During Phase 4, “T” continued its international expansion, mostly in Asia, and strengthened its 
footprint in Europe, following the possibilities in new markets (macro condition) such as Pakistan, 
India and Serbia.  In 2005, “T” positioned itself as a company in strong international growth that 
continued to remain one of the fastest-growing providers of mobile communications worldwide, as an 
MNC and as a member of the “MNC-club” (macro condition), having put industrial ownership at the 
top of the agenda. WOS started to be the almost obligatory form of ownership, in order to have 
influence and control over the subsidiaries. A common corporate governing platform, called TW, was 
developed and implemented in HQ and the subsidiaries. The strong international focus on the ethical 
attitude to doing business strengthened “T”’s corporate governance in this issue (macro condition), 
such as zero tolerance of corruption, health-environment and security issues.   “T” started the process 
of internal internationalization and structurally organized itself as an MNC: WOSs placed in 
geographical clusters (macro condition) reported to HQ.   The empirical findings described the 
tendencies towards a strong centralization of power and in HQ, initiated by the CEO (micro condition) 
that changed several independent institutions, as BoD, administrative units, to be   institutions that 
have the line subordination to HQ. This process made several central institutions in subsidiaries weaker 
and more depended on the instructions from HQ.   
To summarize, the empirical findings presented in Section 8.1 highlight how the internationalization 
of “T” happened. The internationalization process was a search for compromises between 
opportunities in international markets but also heavy constraints like financial resources, lack of 
knowledge, experience, impossibility of changing local legislation and local cultures. A large part of 
the internationalization process was also linked to the HQ’s search for influence and control over its 
subsidiaries. 
The next section will present a summary of the findings in relation to the control mechanisms that were 
in place during the different phases of internationalization. 
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8.2. The second research question: What control mechanisms were in place during 
different phases of internationalization? Use of the control mechanisms in order to 
achieve influence in the process of internationalization: empirical findings and findings 
from   research domain. 
The empirical evidence shows that internationalization happened as a process of change: from small 
steps in international projects to activities in global business as an MNC. This section presents the 
empirical findings of how control mechanisms were used during the process of internationalization; at 
the same time, it carries out a empirical analysis, by demonstrating a theoretical framework and 
previous research in the research domain, and answering the second research question: What control 
mechanisms were in place during different phases of internationalization?  
8.2.1. Influence via Ownership – control mechanisms 
The empirical findings summarized in Table 8.2.1 show how the mechanism of ownership provided 
influence from HQ towards subsidiaries. The following aspects have been in focus: 1) Influence in JVs 
and WOSs; 2) What kind of control represents ownership? 3) Have the ownership forms changed 
during internationalization? 4) How does the interplay between ownership and control influence the 
performance of the subsidiary 
Table 8.2.1.  Influence via Ownership – control mechanisms 
 
Control mechanisms:  
Ownership 
Empirical findings 
What ownership is most 
relevant for MNC: WOS 
vs JV? 
   
 
-JV form ownership gives less influence than WOC  
-Difficult to streamline forms of ownership in “T”’s portfolio according to strategy 
due to legal and political constraints  
How ownership and 
control are connected?   
-Ownership represents the Financial control (FC) 
-WOS via FC triggers further expansion in the scope of several controls.  
-WOS with the achieved FC represents the high influence 
-JV with the minority ownership and limited FC, can give high level of controls and 
influence (case Malaysia) 
-JV with the majority ownership and FC can give reduced controls and low 
influence affected by political macro condition (case Ukraine) 
Ownership in 
subsidiaries during 
different phases of 
internationalization.  
-WOS is becoming preferable compared to JV, but JV was kept in 3 subsidiaries due 
to either the importance of these markets or to the excellent operational performance 
of the concrete subsidiaries/ or both conditions.  
Impact of ownership 
model on   the 
performance of the 
subsidiary 
-WOS gives the control impact on BoD, expatriates, CCR. 




JV versus WOS 
The collected data show that the issue of the international expansion of “T”  during Phase 1 was clearly 
connected to the question of ownership in the subsidiaries, and that “T” chose the JV as a form of 
ownership: 1) to share the political risks in emerging markets; 2) to avoid tying up too much capital  
and,  therefore,  not having  enough for  further investment; 3) to  secure the role as a small partner in 
alliances with a bigger partner, in order to better protect its investments in mature markets; 4)  to be a 
co-partner with influential local partners in emerging markets  where  “T” did not have the right 
network or experience. One respondent mentioned yet another specific reason for “T” choosing the JV 
model: because “T” started its international expansion late, compared to other European operators, and 
there were no available licenses left in the European markets.  However, while the research literature 
has established that the WOS is the preferable form of ownership for an MNC (Mutinelli and Piscitello, 
1998; Barbosa, and Louri, 2002; Álvarez, 2003; Desai et al., 2004), limited attention has been paid to 
companies in a change process. Hence, “T” started internationalization as a small company and grew 
to become an MNC. During Phase 4 of internationalization, “T” still, and contrary to theory, chose JV 
ownership in India, affected partly by antecedent conditions and understanding that the size and 
possible challenges of the market could be easier to deal with in a partnership with local co-owners. In 
this respect, the findings from the study differed from those of the previous literature and illustrated 
that “T” made a conscious choice to establish JVs, both during the first steps of internationalization 
and later.  During the first steps of internationalization, “T”  established JVs, mostly because of the 
lack of experience and knowledge about how to  work internationally;  in the later period of 
internationalization, the choice of JVs was made because of the  challenging conditions in the specific 
markets,  such as India, when “T” wanted to obtain the benefits from  the local competence and  
contacts.  When “T” understood that it could manage the challenges itself, the form of ownership 
“turned” to WOS. 
How ownership links to influence and/control? 
Most respondents connected JV ownership to the low level of influence and control, explaining that 
low level of ownership gives a low level of influence. This empirical finding supports previous studies 
(e.g. Mutinelli and Piscitello, 1989; Barbosa and Louri, 2002; Álvarez, 2003; Desaia, et al., 2004; 
Chalos and O’Connor, 2004), which show that MNCs prefer WOS because JV- ownership means the 
sharing of residual control rights. WOSs also mean greater influence and control but also require a 
major commitment, in terms of resources, and imply both greater risk and less flexibility (Desai et al., 
2004). However, it seems that “T”’s HQ was willing to take this trade-off between less control but also 
less resources committed that.  
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Most of the respondents who worked abroad in different positions were clear in their opinions that 
ownership is connected to financial control (FC) and that a low level of FC is linked to a low level of 
influence. The findings support the research literature, which states that the degree of ownership 
increases influence and control (Chalos and O’Connor, 2004). At the same time, by presenting the case 
from Malaysia, the empirical findings illustrate that, despite the fact that “T” had the JV ownership as 
a minority stakeholder without FC, “T” managed to establish influence in the JV, using the voting 
mechanisms under the meeting of the General Assembly and the implementation of a Management 
Agreement (MA).  
The empirical findings reveal that the level of ownership is closely connected to FC and utilizes the 
mechanism of FC, meaning the control from the owners.  That differs from the previous research, 
which shows that ownership utilizes strategic control (SC) (Chalos and O’Connor, 2004).  At the same 
time, some scholars argue that the use of WOSs and JVs links to the utilization of various types of 
control mechanisms that include expatriate staffing, socialization practices, delegated decision-making 
responsibilities, parent company communications and manager performance incentives (Al Farooque 
et al., 2010), which increase the HQ’s influence over its subsidiaries. The empirical findings reveal 
that FC does not operate alone and is linked to several controls in subsidiaries and reveal that WOS 
ownership can trigger the scope of different controls that constitute and can function as a package 
(referring to the Malmin and Brown (2008) framework).   
At the same time, the empirical evidence shows that, in some situations, when the macro conditions 
start to be too influential and have a negative impact on the company’s activities, the owner/HQ, having 
the FC anyway, does not have the scope of controls, and loses influence. Thus, “T” had such a situation 
in Ukraine, when the co-owners had strong political connections that challenged “T”’s ownership role 
as a majority stakeholder. Hence, “T” could not change the CEO, and some of the top managers; it 
could not implement the corporate rules, and the control over the decisions in the framework of the 
BoD was limited, as long as the local co-owners had the position of the chairman of the BoD. In this 
connection, the research literature could pay more attention to the issues of how to streamline forms 
of ownership in a company’s portfolio, according to a strategy, taking into consideration the legal and 
political constraints that have a substantial influence on the choice of the form of ownership and the 
possibility of its utilization, aiming to achieve influence in subsidiaries.  The research literature in 
management and strategic domain describes that a strong concentration of power and influence in 




The empirical findings reveal that as long as the ownership form can be changed in subsidiaries, the 
level of FC can also be changed or “tuned” to the level of utilization of the ownership (as was 
mentioned by the respondents).  In this respect, the previous literature has paid limited attention to the 
issue of change of FC and its impact on the establishing of the HQ’s influence over its subsidiaries. 
8.2.2. Influence via Board of directors – control mechanisms 
The empirical findings summarized in Table 8.2.2 show how the mechanism of the BoD provided 
influence from HQ towards subsidiaries. The following topics will be highlighted in this section:  1) 
What is the role of the board of directors? 2) What kind of control does the board of directors exercise, 
in order to influence the subsidiaries? 3) What is the link between influence and the role of the BoD, 
as control mechanisms in the subsidiaries 
 
Table 8.2.2. Influence via BoD- control mechanisms 
 
Control mechanisms: BoD Empirical findings 
What is the role of the BoD? BoD is rather a link between owner and subsidiary  
What kind of control the BoD 
exercise in order to influence 
subsidiaries? 
BoD provides strategic control (SC) and influences on the operational 
control (OC) so long BoD appoints the top management 
The role of BoD has been 
changed in the process of 
internationalization  
BoD represents a controlling role in WOS but have the advisory role in 
JVs. “Proforma role” with the strong “centralization by 
decentralization” process.    
 
What is the link between 
influence and BoD as control 
mechanisms in subsidiaries? 
What is the link between the 
ownership- form and the role of 
BoD? 
-BoD providing the decisions from HQ to subsidiaries, reports the 
performance in WOSs, JVs and establishes influence. 
-Challenges with BoD’s role in JVs, where the investment climate is 
not positive.   
-TMS79 as an active mediator between HQ – BoD in WOS/JV in 
monitoring/ support/ influencing the subsidiaries. 
How BoD influences on the 
performance target? 
 
With a strong link to HQ, BoD can get the competences from HQ 
influencing performance.  
 
The empirical findings reveal that the BoD has an important role in influence and control in 
subsidiaries, being the link between HQ and subsidiaries, and implementing the decisions from HQ in 
the subsidiaries.   This supports the findings from the research domain both in accounting literature 
(Chalos and O’Connor, 2004) and in management literature (Bijman, Hendrikse, van Oijen, Aswin, 
2012).   
                                                 




The study illustrates that in cases where the members of the BoD were appointed by HQ, the majority 
of them came from HQ, they were familiar with the organization in HQ, using the resources of HQ in 
order to provide the competence from HQ in the subsidiaries representing the interplay between 
influence, ownership and value creation (Ben-Amar, 2006 Andre et-al, 2004).   
The role of the BoD has changed in the process of T”’s internationalization. Thus, during Phases 1 and 
2 of internationalization, members of the BoD   had limited influence and control in the framework of 
the BoD, as long as “T”’s   operations abroad in this period were JVs, “T” was a co-partner with the 
local co-owners and held the minority positions.  The Norwegian members of the BoD had a 
challenging situation in the framework of the BoD, while their influence was limited. The empirical 
evidence shows that the local co-partners behaved as if they were the only owners of the JVs, as long 
as they were both members of the BoD and local top managers at the same time or working chairman 
of the BoD, without separating these roles. In this challenging situation, “T”’s members of the BoD,  
in addition to their professional tasks as the members of the board, functioned  as mentors or 
consultants for the local members of the BoD, as long as there was a lack  of technical skills among 
most of the members of the BoD, and  the  members of the BoD from HQ were mostly people with 
technical  skills. In this period, the main priority for the JVs was to build up the mobile network, and 
the local co-partners were not very experienced in modern telecommunication.  
During the later phases of internationalization (Phases 3 and 4), the BoD had a role as a mediator or 
link between the subsidiaries and HQ. Most of the members of the BoD had economic or/financial 
skills and were professional managers. The empirical findings described the link between the BoD and 
HQ and support the findings from the previous literature in management control domain, which argues 
that the board’s activities are linked to the processes used by organizations to measure, control and 
manage their performance, to implement strategies (Bisbe and Otley, 2004). 
At the same time, the empirical findings reveal that the BoD had the intention of utilizing the control 
function towards subsidiaries as strategic control SC (Bisbe and Otley, 2004)), in terms of the fact that 
the BoD had responsibility for the strategic development of the subsidiaries, as was the normal practice 
in Western companies.  That supports the evidence from the research literature, which shows that the 
BoD support for achieving their framework was related to the process of setting performance targets 
and represents strategic control (Bisbe and Otley, 2004).  At the same time, the some previous literature 
in accounting domain looks broader on the role of the BoD as control mechanism, describing it as 
"bottom-line control” (Mizruchi, 1983) so long the BoDs hire and fire the CEO (Yan and Gray,1994).  
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However, the findings reveal that, in many situations, the understanding of the strategic development 
of subsidiaries between the local partners and “T” was not the same and was followed by tensions.  
The cases illustrate that the BoD’s role had more challenges in JVs than in WOSs, illustrating, at the 
same time, the more nuanced picture of when the BoD had both sufficient influence in subsidiaries in 
JVs (cases of Malaysia and Bangladesh) and limited influence (cases of Russia and Ukraine). 
Another important finding about the role of the BoD as the control mechanism is related to the topic 
of that BoD provides the mechanisms of operational control. As the research literature claims, the BoD 
can have indirect operational control (OC) (Geringer and He´bert,1989; (Yan and Gray, 1994). The 
empirical   findings show the more nuanced picture, illustrating that, having the active role in 
subsidiaries in Phase 3 and Phase 4, “T” was strongly involved in the operational activities in WOS 
but had limited OC in the JVs. Thus, establishing in HQ the role of top management support (TMS) as 
a link between HQ, the BoD and the subsidiaries structurally supported the role of the BoD as a 
mechanism of OC.  TMSs were both responsible for the monitoring of the subsidiary and, at the same 
time, reported to the BoD and executives of the HQ about operational excellence, involving the BoD 
more strongly in the operational activities of the subsidiary.  However, the findings reveal that the 
challenges to utilizing OC in JVs, especially in the markets, where the external conditions from 
antecedent conditions, connected to legislation and political traditions, had too close links to business 
activities (the case in Ukraine and Russia).  
The empirical findings demonstrated that, at the end of Phase 4 of internationalization, the tendencies 
towards strong centralization in HQ started to be implemented. Several respondents reported that, in 
this new situation, the BoD in subsidiaries started to be weaker and could function as pro forma. From 
one side, the strong centralization strengthened the governance and routine, but, at the same time, it 
provided possibilities for employees from subsidiaries to be more involved in the networks in HQ.  
The research literature in management and strategic domain argues that MNCs represent hegemonic 
influences over subsidiaries based on the significance of hierarchy (Watson S., Weaver G. R. 2003). 
However, the study reveals that the process can be called centralization by decentralization and can 
lead to the changes of the established before practices   of business culture in subsidiaries. Thus, the 
new tendencies of decentralization can   make the role of the BoD weaker and with lower control.  
At the same time, the empirical evidence reported that perceived influence and control situations 
related to role of the BoD as the mechanism of control were experienced by respondents. These 
situations were connected to the activities in Phases 1 and 2, when “T”’s members of the BoD had the 
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impression that they did not have enough influence and control in the subsidiaries.  The episodes 
connected to the cases related to corruption, unethical ways of doing business or conflicts with partners 
were also experienced as perceived influence and control (corruption cases in Bangladesh and India; 
CSR challenges in Asia; conflicts with co-partners in Russia and Ukraine). 
Thus, the empirical findings related to the  role of the BoD as a control mechanism, mostly in the WOS 
form of ownership  and limited in JVs (except in a few cases  when “T” managed to utilize FC as an 
industrial investor),  extend the knowledge from the previous literature about how HQ achieves 
influence over its subsidiaries, using the mechanism of the BoD, illustrating that the role of the BoD 
was not static and had undergone changes in different phases of internationalization, utilizing both 
strategic control  (SC) and operational control (OC).  Challenges for the BoD in JVs were affected by 
either the antecedent conditions, linked to the legislation and political situation, or the limitations of 
the JV as a form of ownership for industrial investors. 
8.2.3 Influence via the role of expatriates – control mechanisms 
The empirical findings summarized in Table 8.2.3 show how the mechanism of the role of expatriates 
provided influence from HQ towards subsidiaries. In this section, the following questions will be 
answered: 1) Who were expatriates in “T”? 2)  Was the role of expatriates static, or did it change 
during the process of internationalization? 3)  What kind of control has been utilized via the role of 
expatriates?  





Who are expatriates? 
 
- “Pre-expatriates” – a new role in organization that were not expatriates but 
had an important role in establishing the contacts, got the knowledge about 
the markets abroad and brought it to HQ. Had influence on the learning 
process in “T”, influenced top managers. 
Who are expatriates in MNC? - Expatriates are “the girder”/mainstay  
- Expatriates transfer knowledge 
What kind control can   
expatriates utilize?  
-Expatriates represent the operational control (BC, OC) being on key 
positions. 
-Expatriates can utilize the behavior control via implementation the CCR 
The role of expatriates has 
been changed during the 
process of internationalization 
From consultants to the local executives, ‘to the institute of DNA 
professionals of key executives   
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The empirical findings illustrate that the role of the expatriates has not been static, but it was changed 
by tuning during the internationalization of “T”.  The process at the beginning of internationalization 
showed that the expatriates had a role as “passionate ambassadors” (as a pre-expatriate role), who 
established the first contacts abroad, provided HQ with knowledge, influencing top management, and 
participated in important networking arenas in the markets where “T” had its interests, in order to 
influence the decisions of the local partners or authorities. During the phase of the first investments 
abroad, when “T” established its activities in several JVs, the expatriates were the individual 
consultants, aiming to support the local top managers in solving problems. During this phase, the 
expatriates were the “problem-solvers”. The study agues with the previous literature in management 
and strategic domain which present expatriates role as is a manager deputed from the MNC’s HQ to 
overseas JVs (Delios and Bjorkman, 2000), and reveal that expatriates in “T” exercised the different 
roles, and that the role of the expatriates was in a dynamic development during the process of 
internationalization.  
During the next stage of internationalization, when “T” developed the strategy of consolidating its 
activities abroad, the expatriates started to play an important role in establishing the new strategy. They 
received roles in subsidiaries as top managers that could bring the necessary professional expertise 
from HQ and establish a team of professionals around them in the subsidiaries. Most of the expatriates 
were experienced employees in HQ, who had worked in the company for a long period, and Norwegian 
by nationality. The previous literature in management domain presented the phenomenon of the 
“ethnocentricity” in staffing policy, when the expatriates’ team are culturally dominating in WOS/JV 
(Brannen and Salk, 2000; Toh and Dennis, 2005). The study supports this, but at the same time reveals 
that the picture of the issue of ethnicity of expatriate’s stuff should be nuanced.  Thus, in the period of 
the strong consolidation the function of expatriates was described as “a girder”/mainstay, which 
underlined the fact that HQ represents its strategy and implements its policy in subsidiaries, using the 
position and professional skills of expatriates and their good understanding of the behavioral issues, 
based on the corporate culture.  That explains the dominance of Norwegians by nationality among the 
expatriates who were key managers represented cultural and social level of communication (Charlos 
and O’Conner, 2004). 
Finally, during the mature phase of internationalization, the institution of expatriates became a pool of 
highly profiled and powerful managers that were supposed to establish in subsidiaries “the company’s 
DNA”, i.e. carriers of the HQ’s values, culture and governance – a way of how to do business. During 
this phase, “T” started to recruit expatriates for manager positions from subsidiaries abroad and outside 
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“T”. People from different nationalities represented “the expatriate’s pool”. The findings in the study 
show that the role of expatriates was “tuned” with the needs of the internationalization strategy and 
that the institution of expatriates was gradually established, adapting the changing business conditions 
and relationships between HQ and the subsidiaries.   
The empirical findings reveal that the changing role of expatriates is strongly connected to the issue of 
the internationalization process of “T”, when the question of the development   of management control 
mechanisms started to be the critical conditions of success abroad.  
Thus, this study shows that there is a close link between the role of expatriates as one of the 
mechanisms of HQ’s influence and control over the subsidiaries and the form of ownership in 
subsidiaries. Hence, being consultants in JVs, the expatriates did not manage to utilize the functions 
of influence and control and had just an informal role as the “eyes and the ears” in the JV, with the 
possibility of reporting informally to HQ. Thus, the findings support the previous research in 
management domain expatriates had two primary functions: influence/ control and transfer the 
knowledge from HQ (Delios and Bjorkman, 2000).  At the same time, being the expatriates in WOSs, 
they could utilize the functions of influence and control, providing the policy and strategy from HQ. 
The study contributes to a broad examination of the system of control in the MNC, where the interplay 
of different forms of controls was the main trigger for the process of internationalization and the 
establishing of the HQ’s influence over the subsidiaries.  
The empirical findings illustrated that expatriates provide the operational control (OC), which differs 
from the previous literature that pays limited attention to the issue of control connected to the role of 
expatriates and concentrates mostly on the role and tasks of expatriates. Thus, attention is paid to the 
fact that expatriates can influence organizations abroad in behavioral, cultural and social level of 
communication (Chalos and O’Connor, 2004). Scholars argue that expatriates are conceptualized as 
performing two primary functions – influence and control – and transfer the knowledge from the parent 
company/HQ (Delios and Bjorkman, 2000). At the same, several scholars linking the role of 
expatriates to influence on   employees’ performance in subsidiaries (Groot and Merchant, 2000; 
Harzing, 2001; Legewie, 2002; Chalos and O’Connor, 2004; Peterson et al., 2000). This the findings 
reveal that the role of expatriates is more nuance as it was described in previous literature in 




The findings reveal that, while at the start of the internationalization process, and demonstrate that “T” 
experienced the changing patterns of staffing of expatriates in the MNCs (Harzing , 2001). HQ decided 
to use expatriates on a short-term base, as long as there worked as  consultants on  temporary positions 
and had the temporary tasks -  to train the local employees in a limited time, the HQ’s policy changed 
in the mature phases of internationalization (Phases 3 and 4), leading to the permanent order in 
organizational structures of having a close link between HQ and subsidiaries and utilizing control 
function   via the institute of expatriates, in order to achieve influence.  
The collected data illustrates that HQ started to use “DNA-trained expatriates from the existing 
executive pool” that were not Norwegian by nationality. Thus, if at the beginning of Phase 3 of 
internationalization there were only Norwegians in all executive roles in WOSs, then, in Phase 4, many 
non-Norwegian executives were recruited.  Nevertheless, several respondents working with the matter 
of expatriates are in doubt as to whether it is right to recruit non-Norwegians and those who did not 
grow up in Scandinavia as executives in WOSs because they think that, to a considerable extent, “T”’s 
“DNA” is built on national values and traditions.  
Another important conclusion relates to the discussions in previous literature about the issue of 
“ethnocentricity” in staffing policy, when the manager’s or the expatriate team is culturally dominant 
in subsidiaries (Brannen and Salk, 2000; Toh and Dennis, 2005; Chung et al., 2006). The empirical 
findings illustrate that the question of nationality during the mature phase of internationalization is 
slowly transforming into a discussion about the understanding of values, or – as formulated by several 
respondents – it is important to have “T”’s DNA, meaning to live and practice the values of the 
company. In this case, we see that the values of the company started to be a more important issue than 
the values of the country.  
At the same time,  attention was paid to some negative attitudes related to the status of expatriates, for 
example that the recruitment process for expatriates was not sufficiently transparent; that expatriates 
should pay more attention to sharing their experience and knowledge, as the organization started to 
become  big, and it was difficult  to find channels and arenas for informal communication;  that HQ 
should be more professional in the recruitment process, as there were several negative examples, 
related to expatriates, mostly due to people not being sufficiently trained in  “T”’ DNA” and not able 
to understand the values and culture;  that expatriates started to be people with too much luxury in their 
packages of benefits.   
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The study’s findings also contribute to the literature on expatriates, in which limited attention has been 
paid to development, such as the “tuning” of  the role of expatriates,  from  the established role of 
expatriates in each phase of the internationalization of “T”  according to  the adopted strategy, to the 
new/“tuned” role that is more suited to the “tuned” strategy influenced by the antecedent conditions 
and the recognition that  “T” could not achieve its desired level of control. Such “tuning of the role of 
expatriates” can give a more nuanced understanding of the processes of internationalization, in 
connection with the role of expatriates in it. 
Thus, the empirical findings about the  role of expatriates extend the knowledge in the research 
literature in relation to the role of expatriates in the process of internationalization, illustrating the 
changes in their role  in different phases of “T”’s internationalization, and   that  the role of expatriates 
provides as well  the operational  in HQ’s search the most optimal system of control mechanisms in 
subsidiaries. 
8.2.4. Influence via Common Corporate Rules– control mechanisms 
The empirical findings summarized in Table 8.2.4 show how the mechanism of CCR provided 
influence from HQ towards subsidiaries. The following topics will be presented in this section: 1) 
What is the role of CCR? 2)  How did the development of CCR happen during the process of 
internationalization? 3)  What kind of control was utilized by CCR? 4) What are the challenges 
connected to the role of CCR as the control mechanism?  
 
Table 8.2.4.   Influence via Common Corporate Rules (CCR)– control mechanisms 
 
Control mechanisms:  Common 
Corporate Rules  
Empirical findings 




Knowledge transferring that are not 
technical knowledge, but behavioral/ 
ethical/ cultural –has been transferred 
to subsidiaries 
- CCR represent behavior control, even behavior control sounds 
negative in Norwegian culture. 
 -TW functions   as a governing platform for behavior,  
 
- HQ transfers knowledge about how to be a citizen in “T”. 
 
CCR have been changed during the 
process of internationalization 
- CCR in has been changed/ “tuned” in a line with the needs of 
“T” in its expansion of business abroad (first, paper brochures, 
then Ethical Council and later a TW platform) 
The collected data show that CCR was not a static platform during the internationalization process but 
changed according to the needs of “T”. hat differ from the previous literature both in accounting and 
management control literature, and in management literature. Thus, during Phase 1, “T” developed 
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ethical rules in a brochure form in Norwegian, with general recommendations for employees who 
would go on business trips abroad. During Phase 2 of active internationalization, the Ethical Council 
was established, in order to work with concrete cases and form a more general ethical attitude.  
During Phase 3, the Code of Conduct (CoC) was developed as the first common document for HQ and 
subsidiaries as an ethical framework.  All employees had to sign to confirm that they had read the 
document. Seminars were organized for the employees in HQ and the subsidiaries, explaining the 
ethical dilemmas in international business. Later, TW started to be a platform for the new managerial 
governance in “T” as an MNC.  
During Phase 4, TW was developed into the cultural platform of being a citizen in a global “T”, where 
the behavior aspect of being an employee in “T” started to be in focus.  To the end of Phase 4 of 
internationalization, the CCR were more than a TW platform. There were several parts in CCR, such 
as CSR, sustainability of business, anti-corruption policy, issues related to health, environment and 
security, “whistleblower – line” on intranet for employees, etc. The findings support the previous 
research in management domain (Kurucz et al. 2008) and reveal that the development of the common 
rules was important for the global identity of “T” as MNC (Tayeb, 1998). 
The empirical findings show that TW was aiming to create a common way to work in “T” Group, as 
it needed the tools to control how HQ and subsidiaries work, based on the governing principles of 
“T”. The respondents stated that it was important to implement the common way of thinking and the 
common way of doing business.  The findings support the research literature that claims that 
establishing corporate rules and norms, in order to increase the influence from HQ towards the 
subsidiaries and JV operations, is linked to “the stakeholder interests, when seeking win–win outcomes 
through synergistic common value creation across the whole MNC” (Kurucz et al., 2008, p.91). The 
findings illustrate the important role of one corporate language in MNC as an important element of 
influencing from HQ towards subsidiaries and support the knowledge from the research literature in 
management domain (Lincoln, 1995; Kim, 2001; Harzing and Feely; 2007). At the same time, the 
findings reveal that the CCR are connected to the competence, learning and knowledge transferring 
from HQ towards subsidiaries (Birkinshaw and Fry, 1998; Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998; Birkinshaw, 
2000; Geppert, 2005), and that it is important for the relationship between HQ and subsidiaries.  
The empirical findings reveal that the CCR represent behavior control, aiming to build the shared 
vision and individual commitment (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989), even if there is no information about 
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it on “T”’s website, because behavior control sounds negative in Norwegian culture. At the same time, 
the TW documents and other CCR-related documents were focusing on the issue of how to be a citizen 
in “T”, from an ethical point of view, and how to behave in “T”.   The procedures described in CCR  
also underline the ethical   side of governance and the way to do business; taking into consideration 
the aspects of zero tolerance of corruption and child  labor,   a CSR/TW  video was introduced for 
employees as  material  for  learning purposes, as well  as addressing  the ethical dilemmas related to 
the behavior of employees  from different countries   in challenging  business  situations.  The findings 
support the research literature in accounting and control domain which links the   development of 
corporate rules to the issue of behavior (Chow, Shileds and Wu, 2010,) paying attention to the topic of 
how internationalization influences corporate ethics and affects both formal structures in the MNC and 
informal management behavior (Watson and Weaver, 2003). 
The empirical findings illustrate that CCR have a role in influencing the subsidiaries, via the 
implementation of the rules and norms that HQ stands for.  According to the empirical findings, the 
most important part of CCR was connected to the issue of understanding the CCR and practicing them 
in daily business situations, in order to be a part of the HQ’s international thinking and behavior. That 
is in line with the previous literature, which confirms that the platforms from HQ have an important 
impact on relationships between HQ and subsidiaries in terms of influence (Chow, Shields and Wu, 
2010). Nevertheless, the empirical findings differ from the conclusions of the research literature, 
underlining the importance, first, of finding the right platform for the common corporate culture, and 
then establishing the relationship between HQ and subsidiaries, in order to avoid these relationships   
causing a feeling of not-equality (Doz and Santos, 1997). Thus, empirical evidence highlights that “T” 
experienced a transformation in its understanding of what kind of CCR and later cultural platform “T” 
needed to practice “learning by doing” in its development from an incumbent of the domestic market 
to a   global MNC. Hence, during Phase 4, when it positioned itself as an MNC, “T” started to be aware 
that CCR, and TW as a common cultural platform, could not be built on one national culture and the 
national values representing this culture.  When the TW concept was presented in 2004/2005, it was 
announced that the platform was built on Norwegian values. Later, TW wrote that it was based on 
Scandinavian values, and, just in 2013, when it presented the new version of TW, “T” introduced it, 
stating that common global values formed the governing managerial platform in “T”.  This supports 
the research literature in management control domain conclusions that influence via the establishment 
and practice of corporate rules is very much connected to the process of creating common global 
corporate values and culture (Chow, Shields and Wu, 2010), implementing company rules, in HQ and 
in subsidiaries and JVs abroad, and practicing these rules.  However, the empirical evidence shows 
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that the TW team suggested that the subsidiaries could create their own practical rules, based on the 
TW platform, and that a strong centralized platform with concrete rules and norms was not needed to 
control the behavior in subsidiaries, as several other Norwegian companies did.   Anyway, as the data 
collection shows, the employees from HQ supported having several rules and norms in a written form, 
based on Norwegian norms, traditions and values, in order to remove any possibility of utilizing the 
gap between HQ’s attitude and practice in the subsidiaries in informal management behavior (Watson 
S., Weaver G. R., 2003) that can be a part of the culture in the subsidiaries,  
At the same time, the managers, in opposition to the employees, meant that TW was important in the 
development of the behavioral attitude in HQ and subsidiaries, while the employees experienced the 
declarations on “T”’s website as being far away from what was needed in daily business life, both in 
HQ and WOSs. However, the employees had strong support for the Code of Conduct, as a part of 
TW/CCR, as long as there were concrete rules and norms  that were easy to follow, but the TW concept 
as a cultural platform, in the opinion of the respondents, was not concrete and it was difficult to  see 
the relevance of it in practice. 
The empirical findings illustrate that the WOS is important in order to implement and practice CCR in 
subsidiaries.  The case of Malaysia is unique, as “T” managed to implement CCR as the modern and 
sustainable way to think as a benefit for the JV.  From the other side, the case from Ukraine showed 
limited controls via the BoD in the JV, despite the FC, which affected the implementation of CCR, 
created by HQ.  The Ukrainian JV agreed to publish the information about CCR (CoC as a central part 
of it) on the website, describing it as a new Western culture in the company, and benefiting from it in 
the positioning on the market, in order to be more attractive to customers. However, in practice, the 
Ukrainian JV did not pay sufficient attention to the issues of CSR, sustainability and ethical attitudes 
to doing business. In this respect, the CCR rules, introduced by “T”, as a majority co-owner in JV, and 
approved by the BoD, were not followed up in practice. The empirical evidence, however, illustrated 
that practicing of CCR in this case was far from what was declared on the website. “T” could not 
change the situation because of its lack of control and influence in the JV, leading to dissatisfaction on 
“T”’s side.   At the same time, the findings show that employees in “T” were confused over  how to 
understand the CCR in “T”  and explained that CCRs are presented nicely on the website, but, in real 
life,  there is either  a gap between  practice in HQ and subsidiaries (as in several cases of corruption 
in Asian subsidiaries where the CCR were implemented), or there is a gap between the proclaimed  
ideas and  practice, as  in examples illustrating  the leadership expectations described in TW and the 
experience of real business life. Thus, the empirical findings illustrate the situation of the deprivation 
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of control related to the behavior control, when the managers have established the system of the 
corporate rules that has not worked optimally. 
In addition, the findings illustrate the lack of practice of CCR; at the same time, several cases were 
described, connected to corruption, child labor and lack of ethical attitude, which were discovered in 
WOSs and JVs in Asia, despite the implementation of TW norms and rules there, represent “the 
stakeholder interests through synergistic common value creation across the whole MNC” (Kurucz et 
al. 2008, 91) At the same time, the topic of the cross-cultural paradigm and cross-cultural control 
mechanisms that link to the process of influence in the multicultural context (Bhimani, 1999; Scheytt, 
Soin and Metz, 2010) also linked the issue to the practice of CCR. Even though the managers explained 
that it should be the same rules and the same norms across the Group, the empirical evidence illustrates 
that the local employees in WOSs and JVs could understand the CCR from their cultural background. 
In this connection, the necessity to find control mechanisms to monitor the practice of the rules and 
having a focus on the rules on a daily basis in HQ and subsidiaries was expressed.  The practicing of 
CCR in subsidiaries was linked both to the strong role in the key positions of expatriates, who could 
ensure a better understanding and practicing of CCR and, in general, to the importance of having a 
strong FC via ownership that could give a guarantee for the whole scope of controls in subsidiaries.   
The findings illustrate that the process of knowledge transferring does not refer to knowledge for 
technical skills, but knowledge related to cultural, social and behavioral skills – in order to develop a 
common corporate culture that could strengthen HQ’s influence over the subsidiaries – that the top 
managers in subsidiaries should stand for. This means that the expatriates are playing the central role, 
not just in transferring professional knowledge but also in providing the HQ’s behavioral standards 
and norms. The research literature claims that the transference of common competence is important 
but does not nuance who should play the central role in it (Birkshaw, 2000; Geppert, 2005).  
 The  empirical findings reveal that,  in “T”, they established  the “best practice” attitude  by 
establishing common corporate norms, as “T” declared, such as  “do good by doing what you do best” 
(from “T”’s website), which has a positive impact on subsidiaries,  supporting  the establishment of 
good  communication from the subsidiaries to HQ in order  to bring in their own positive practice and 
practical findings that can be used across the Group.  The research literature gives another 
interpretation of the process of spreading best practice: as the establishment of the global diffusion of 
“best practices” (Meyer, 2000) and the spreading of global best practices in MNCs, which are called 
“global organizational effects” and will override national institutions and cultures (Mueller, 1994).  
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Thus, the empirical findings contribute to extending the understanding, then the research literature in 
the knowledge related to the role of CCR as a control mechanism, in order to achieve influence in these 
terms: 1) CCR has been changed in the internationalization process because they exercised different 
tasks and different strategies in different phases of “T”’s development. The above-mentioned 
differentiation is strongly connected to the form of ownership of subsidiaries abroad; 2)  CCR utilize 
behavior control from HQ towards subsidiaries and provide a link between HQ and subsidiaries, based 
on a common cultural platform, even though there are different opinions about the values on which the 
cultural platform should be based (common human values versus Scandinavian values);   3)  It is 
challenging to implement   CCR in JVs, and WOSs are needed in order to implement and follow the 
practice of CCR in subsidiaries. At the same time, several cases were illustrated:   JVs with minority 
ownership, JVs with majority ownership with the FC and without the FC, implemented CCR and not 
implemented CCR from HQ as the governing platform. In these different JVs, the CCR were practiced 
in different ways, affected by both the antecedent conditions from the macro world and the limitations 
of the JV form of ownership.   These cases extend the existing knowledge about CCR as the control 
mechanism by giving a more nuanced picture of the use of CCR, both in HQ and towards subsidiaries.  
At the same time, different opinions are highlighted in relation to the needs of the CCR for both WOS 
and JV, in terms of the fact that concrete rules are appreciated by employees, in opposition to managers, 
more than the general cultural platform.    
This section illustrated that the dissatisfaction with influence and control related to CCR is connected 
mostly to the gap between the declarations and practices in HQ, WOSs and JVs. 
8.2.5 Influence via the role CEO– control mechanisms 
The empirical findings demonstrate that the role of CEO in achieving influence from HQ towards 
subsidiaries was not always visible in relation to the control mechanisms and does not always have an 
impact during the process of internationalization. The summary of the empirical findings   focuses on 
the following topics: 1) Why does the role of CEO differ in different phases of internationalization? 2) 
How does the CEO represent the control mechanism, in order to achieve influence? 3) What kind of 





Table 8.2.5. Influence via the role of CEO- control mechanism 
 
Control mechanisms: CEO Empirical findings 
The role of CEO is different in 
different phases of internationalization 
CEO represents influence, and coming 
strong in the period of 
changes/transitions   
-CEO’s role is visible for respondents in a period of transition. 
CEO is a visible institute of influence and decision-making. 
What kind control represents CEO?  -CEO represents new institutions/routines as an “all over control” 
- Utilization of FC; SC; OC; BC- from HQ towards subsidiaries  
-CEO starts the new international mindset both related to” all over 
control process”, specially control related to the behavior control. 
CEO initiated a new version of TW with a focus in behavior. 
 
“Centralization via decentralization”  -CEO experiences influence from CEOs and other employees in 
HQ and in subsidiaries because of the strong ties between him 
personally and the executives and employees in HQ and 
subsidiaries. 
-The strong cross-cultural impact links to a Norwegian 
organizational culture as networking and flat relationship structure 
in “T” HQ and subsidiaries 
During the interview process for this research, interviews were conducted with the CEOs who worked 
in this position during the whole period of “T”’s internationalization, described in this study (1992–
2015). The empirical findings reveal that the role of CEO in the process of internationalization did not 
stay the same, it changed and was not always visible to the respondents as a driving force for the 
international expansion of “T”.   
The empirical findings describe that, during Phases 1 and 2  of internationalization, the CEO mostly 
concentrated on domestic issues,  even though,  as the data collection shows, the CEO had started the 
important  reorganization process for “T” and  was the driving force  behind the transformation  of “T” 
from being  a part of the Ministry as a SOE to becoming a state-owned public company.  At the same 
time, there is considerable evidence illustrating that the CEO in Phases 1 and 2 was personally very 
much interested in operations abroad, but the structure of “T” as a company and the business focus of 
“T” at that time pushed his attention as CEO more onto the domestic issues. 
 When the new CEO was appointed in 2001, he started the processes of “internal internationalization” 
of the organization, in addition to the “external” internationalization towards subsidiaries and 
developing “T” as an MNC, in order to establish the new governing system in “T”.  Thus, “T” 
international became International “T”, aiming to make the whole organization, in both HQ and the 
subsidiaries, think internationally. New routines were implemented that connected the CEOs from the 
subsidiaries to the CEO in HQ with a target of monitoring the operations abroad. Thus, Mobile 
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Management Boars (MMB) had meetings 4-5 times a year to share knowledge across the Group and 
share experiences, establishing personal contacts.  A strong centralization was implemented during the 
last phase of internationalization.  At the same time, it was reported that the executives from HQ and 
the executives from the subsidiaries also participated in these meetings, which created a kind of 
informal network for the top management in the Group.   The meetings were organized in different 
countries, where “T” had subsidiaries, leading to the establishing of an informal relationship with the 
employees in subsidiaries. In a period of strong centralization of influence and control in HQ, many 
informal contacts across the Group had the effect of decentralization, where the personal contacts were 
important, having a strong impact on the influence   at the personal level, bypassing the line 
subordination.   The management research literature pays attention to this topic and shows that the 
MNC’s subsidiary managers are able to influence HQ decisions regarding the implementation of 
decentralized management systems in ways that go beyond the immediate interests of corporate 
headquarters and are counterintuitive to the traditional view of organizational power and hierarchy 
(Watson S., Weaver G. R. 2003;  Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard, 2006).  In this respect, the findings 
highlight the   impact of the cultural context in this issue, as the Norwegian organizational culture   is 
characterized by the networking attitude and flat structure (Hofstede, 1980). 
At the same time, the CEO started the Business Reviews, where, together with the CFO80  and 
managers from the financial department, TMSs and managers responsible for the geographical units 
focused on the detailed monitoring of the performance in subsidiaries.  
In this period, the CEO started to be a visible leader in the global telecommunication world, 
participating in different arenas worldwide as a top manager of an MNC, positioning himself as a 
visionary executive, focusing on global challenges and the ethical issue.   These arenas were related to 
both the telecommunication industry, such as the GSMA Mobile Congress in Barcelona, and the 
economic development of societies, such as the World Economic Forum in Davos. The empirical 
findings support the knowledge from the previous literature about the top management in MNC, 
claiming that executives of multinational firms do recognize the ethical complexities presented by the 
internationalization of business (Watson and Weaver, 2003, p.76) and their own responsibility.  
At the same time, the empirical findings link the role of CEO to the issue of control. The respondents 
had difficulty in defining the kind of control that the role of CEO was utilizing.  Many of the 
                                                 
80 CFO – Chief Financial Officer  
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respondents, underlining the important role of the CEO in issues of influence from HQ towards 
subsidiaries, nevertheless could not link this role to the issue of specific control.  One of the former 
managers in “T” stated that the CEO has control over all the controls in the company, as he appoints 
executives in the key positions and follows the performance in subsidiaries very closely. The interview 
supports the observations from the management research that show that the CEO   personalized the 
control routines (Collings, Morley and Gunnigle, 2008) from HQ towards subsidiaries and acted as a 
control institution in relation to the group of the executives and to the several network arenas in the 
company.  These findings partly support the research literature that points out that leadership style 
influences the use of planning and control systems as predicted (Abernethy, Bouwens, van Lent, 2010) 
and that the CEO as a person with power is able to influence the course of organizational development, 
through both control over valued resources and the use of symbols by which organization members 
mediate their experience (Smircich, 1983). The collected data reveals that the CEO’s role in 
influencing both the HQ and subsidiaries was more nuanced and had at least dual functions. In addition, 
the line subordination was supported by personal contacts from the participation in different networks 
arenas, both inside and outside the company.  
Summarizing, the empirical findings show that:  firstly,  the role of  CEO was connected to many forms 
of control, such as behavior control (he focused on ethical behavior in “T” Group);  strategic control 
(he initiated  the processes of the  new strategic thinking in “T” regarding internationalization);    
financial control, as he represented HQ as an owner, visiting subsidiaries; and operational control (the 
CEO was very much detail-oriented  in the process of the Business Reviews).  Secondly, the role of 
CEO as a mechanism of control was not always the same and was not always visible in all phases of 
internationalization. This role was strong in the transition processes, especially when “T” changed 
from being a Norwegian company with international subsidiaries to a global MNC.  The CEO fronted 
this process, was strongly personally involved in it, and represented the scope of several controls, 
having a role as an “owner” of the subsidiaries. Collings, Morley and Gunnigle (2008) underlined that, 
in the modern global environment, senior managers play a critical role in the implementation and 
influencing of organizational strategies, structures and processes, the establishment of the subsidiary 
the staffing composition in the subsidiary. Thirdly, the empirical findings highlight that there are no 
good mechanisms for influencing and controlling the CEO. Thus, the findings show that, in some 
processes, the CEO had strong personal opinions related, for example, to the appointment of some of 
the executive managers, even when many other executives in the company warned the CEO about the 
consequences. The situation shows that the CEO, having the wrong perception in relation to several 
key persons, influenced in a negative way the development of some departments in “T”, that later were 
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corrected.  These processes were presented by the respondents as examples of dissatisfaction during 
the process of changes in “T”.  
Another important conclusion is connected to the new understanding of the role of CEO as a part of 
the antecedent conditions (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995; Poole et al., 2000), having a significant impact 
on the development and changes of the international strategy of “T”. Thus, the CEO represents a 
human condition in the antecedent conditions (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995; Poole et al., 2000) from 
the micro world that have a strong influence on the process in the company. This differs from the 
literature on process theory which does not include the human factors in the antecedent conditions. 
8.2.6. Summary 
Based on the discussions presented above, Table 8.2.6 summarizes the important findings from the 
empiric part in relation to the research question: What control mechanisms were in place during 
different phases of internationalization? As was also discovered, the phenomenon of the perceived 
influence and control are related to all mechanisms of control described in this section.  The findings 
are presented in the table. The discussion related to this aspect of the control mechanism follows in 
Section 8.3.  
Table 8.2.6 Changes in several control mechanisms during the process of internationalization and their 
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81 MA – Management Agreement between “T” as a co-owner in a JV abroad and the management of the subsidiary 
82  AGM – Annual General Meeting: gathering of the directors and stockholders (shareholders) of every incorporated firm, 
required by law to be held each calendar year. The main purpose of an AGM is to comply with legal requirements, such as 
the presentation and approval of the audited accounts, election of directors, and appointment of auditors for the new 
accounting term. Other items that may also be discussed include compensation of officers, confirmation of proposed 
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In summary of the discussions related to the question of what kind of control mechanisms were utilized 
during the different phases of internationalization, the following is highlighted: 
Firstly, the empirical findings support the claims from the literature review (e.g. Chalos and O’ 
Connor, 2004; Wickramasinghe and Hopper, 2005; Ahrens and Mollona, 2007; Scheytt et.al., 2010;  
Bourmistrov & Kaarbøe, 2013),  in management and strategy literature (Banai et al., 1990;  Child and 
Yan, 1999; Birkinshaw, 2000;  Geppert, 2005). Butler and Anchor, 2000; Watson S., Weaver G. R. 
2003; Tahir and Larimo, 2004; Karhunen, Kosonen, and Leivonen, 2004; Dörrenbächer and 
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Gammelgaard, 2006;  Karhunen, et al, 2008; ) and finance literature  (Desaia et.al., 2004; Al Farooque 
et.at, 2010)    that HQ achieves influence over subsidiaries in the process of internationalization through 
the mechanisms of control, such as ownership, the BoD, the role of expatriates, CCR and partly via 
the role of CEO. It was discovered that the role of CEO functioned as a mechanism of control in the 
period of transitions, when “T” started active internationalization on the way to becoming an MNC. 
Secondly, the above-described mechanisms of control changed carefully/” tuned” during the process 
of internationalization, in small steps. The changes were interrelated by the new international strategy 
from phase to phase.  This issue, to our knowledge, has not got enough attention in the previous 
research literature. The influences from antecedent conditions (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995; Poole et 
al., 2000), from the macro world (external conditions, such as legislation, new licenses, political 
investment climate) and the micro world (internal conditions in the company, such as top 
management’s engagement in the processes of internationalization, personal engagement and the 
active role of the CEO) were important. The role of CEO was described as a strong human condition, 
which influenced the changes in the organization and can be presented as a human condition in 
antecedent conditions (Ibid.).  This differs from the teleological change literature (Ibid.)  and   reveals 
that the CEO has a strong impact during the transition periods on the changes in HQ, influencing the 
subsidiaries.   
Thirdly, the empirical findings presented a more detailed and nuanced picture of each control 
mechanism that evolved in the process of internationalization, the empirical findings have extended 
the existing knowledge in the research domain of accounting and management control and 
management in relation to the effect of the mechanisms of control in the process of internationalization. 
Thus, the study reveals that BoD can represent both SC and OC, the expatriates can exercise both OC 
and BC, and that CEO can represent a scope of controls, having a special strong role during the period 
of the comprehensive organizational changes.  At the same time, practical implications from the study 
will be important for both the research and the practitioners. 
Fourthly, the empirical findings reveal that the ownership is important for the issue of influence and 
support the previous research in management control literature (Chalos and O’Connor, 2004) and 
finance literature (Desaia, et.al., 2004; Al Farooque et.at, 2010), and highlight a special role of 
ownership as a mechanism of control that triggers the scope of control mechanisms and has a strong 
impact on the issue of influence.  
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Fifthly, the findings reveal that the issue of perceived influence and control (Bourmistrov and Kaarbøe, 
2013) had a strong relationship to changes in the international strategy and creating a new improved 
system of management control that will be more suitable for the new strategy in the new phase of 
internationalization. 
Sixthly, the empirical data illustrates challenges related to legislation and political impacts that 
minimize influence in both WOSs and JVs with different levels of ownership. Thus, JVs with the 
majority ownership in markets with restrictions against foreigners owning 100% can give both low 
influence – because of the negative impact from legislation and political climate for the investors – 
and high influence if the political climate in the markets is supportive for the investors.  Empirical 
findings reveal that these important for the successful investments factors can be latent and can 
suddenly be active and influential and have a considerable impact on the business results for the 
company.   In this connection it is important to evaluate these factors which have impact on the 
realization of the chosen strategy, nd include them as issue management for the strategic work. 
Seventhly, the empirical evidence provided a reason to look at the presented control mechanisms from 
the perspective of the interplay between the control mechanisms and to develop the configuration of 
control mechanisms that has, as its outcome, the indicator of the level of influence in different 
configurations (see Model 8.2.7). 
8.2.7. Changes in control configurations during internationalization  
The above-presented empirical findings   and the integrated analyses of the control mechanisms in the 
framework of the research domain highlight the   importance of considering the control mechanisms 
as a package, where the interplay   between the different   control mechanisms can be presented as a 
configuration. The analyzing of the empirical evidence from “T”’s portfolio  in 14 countries on 
different markets  in a period of  23 years   led to the    observations that  the level of influence in 
different subsidiaries depends on the configuration of different  control mechanisms and factors  both 
from the macro world and   that had an impact on the possibilities of realizing the strategy. 
The empirical findings suggest that, in order for the HQ to achieve   influence over the subsidiaries, it 
is necessary to use several control mechanisms synchronically as interplay between different control 
mechanism, as ownership, BoD, the role of expatriates, CCR and the role of CEO  ( e.g. Chalos and 
O’ Connor, 2004;  Wickramasinghe and Hopper, 2005; Ahrens and Mollona, 2007; Scheytt et.al., 
2010;  Bourmistrov & Kaarbøe, 2013), in finance literature (Desaia,  et.al., 2004; Al Farooque et.at, 
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2010), and    in management and strategy literature as well (Banai et al., 1990;  Child and Yan, 1999; 
Butler and Anchor, 2000; Tahir and Larimo, 2004; Karhunen, Kosonen, and Leivonen, 2004; 
Karhunen, et al, 2008).  That differ from the previous research in accounting and management control 
literature which, to our knowledge, has more focus on each separate mentioned above mechanism. 
Hence, this study suggests that in order to strengthen the HQ’s influence over subsidiaries in the 
process of internationalization it is needed to configurate different controls in packages that illustrate 
the different outcomes related to the level of influence. The study reveals the importance to pay 
attention on the issue of the interplay between different control mechanisms. The second-order findings 
of the changes in the packages of control mechanisms in the process of internationalization, based on 
the discussions of the previous sections, can be conceptualized in the presented. 
Model 8.2.7 that shows the configuration of the different control mechanisms in different packages 
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Both the empirical findings and the literature from the research domain describe different controls used 
during the process of internationalization, such as FC – financial control, SC – strategic control, OC – 
operational control, and BC – behavior control. As the findings show, in order to achieve influence, it 
is necessary to utilize several control mechanisms as a package. 
Although the previous literature in the research domain did not pay enough attention to the issue of 
FC, it states that the level of ownership is connected to the level of influence (Chalos and O’Connor, 
2004). The empirical findings illustrated the importance of FC in the process of internationalization. 
Thus, the FC can be utilized via ownership. A bigger stake in ownership gives FC in the framework of 
the General Assembly and the possibility to decide the composition of the BoD.  
The findings reveal  the issue of strategic control (SC) as a control that the owner needs, in order to 
realize the strategic goals and strategies (Bisbe and Otley, 2004) in approving business plans, profit 
distribution, investments, important financial decisions (Geringer and He´bert, 1989), and in 
appointing key executive positions (Yan and Gray, 1994). Higher levels of the owner’s control link to 
higher levels of influence (Chalos and O’Connor, 2004). 
The findings reveal that operational control (OC) is involved in the day-to-day operations in a company 
and can be utilized via the top management team and/or expatriates that are appointed by the BoD or 
HQ (Mizruchi, 1983; Yan and Gray, 1994). Using OC, expatriates as key managers can influence, 
exercise control, and transfer knowledge from HQ (Delios and Bjorkman, 2000; Chalos and O’Connor, 
2004). At the same time, they can provide control functions from the MNC’s HQ to overseas JVs 
(Delios and Bjorkman, 2000), protecting the stakeholders’ interests (Kurucz et al., 2008). 
The findings reveal that behavior control (BC) represents the stakeholders’ interests, through 
synergistic common value creation across the whole MNC (Kurucz et al., 2008), and is based on a 
common global control system, included in the culture-based preferences appealing to local employees 
(Chow, Shields and Wu, 2010).  BC can be utilized via corporate rules (CCR) that reflect the changing 
cross-cultural context of the global presence (Tayeb, 1998) and support the transference of 
competence, learning and knowledge, which is important in the relationship between HQ and the 
subsidiaries/JVs (Birkinshaw and Fry, 1998; Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998; Birkinshaw, 2000; Geppert, 
2005). The findings reveal that BC is strongly linked to the idea of building a “strong” organizational 
culture, creating “pluralistic definitions of corporate global values” (Kurucz et al., 2008, p. 91), based 
on a shared vision and individual commitment (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989).   
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At the same time, it is necessary to mention that the empirical findings suggested a nuanced picture in 
relation to each of the described control mechanisms. Hence, ownership can utilize FC and partly SC 
(Chalos and O’Connor, 2004); the BoD can utilize SC (Bisbe and Otley, 2004) and partly OC, by 
appointing key executive positions (Yan and Gray, 1994). At the same time, the BoD exercises 
"bottom-line control”,  via its hiring  and firing of the CEO (Mizruchi, 1983);  expatriates can utilize  
OC and partly BC, providing a standardized approach to international assignments (Collings, Scullion 
and Morley, 2007); CCR  can utilize BC and partly OC,  by building a common control system that is 
based on  the  global cultural preferences  and appeals to employees  in HQ and the subsidiaries (Chow, 
Shields and Wu, 2010); the whole scope of controls  can be utilized via the institutional role of  the 
CEO, which  represents all forms of controls, influencing  structures and processes, the establishment 
of WOSs and JVs, and the staffing composition in WOSs (Collings, Morley and Gunnigle, 2008).  
The model also gives the status of influence in each presented package, the outcome related to the 
international strategy and the possibilities for changes in relation to either increasing the level of 
influence, where it is possible, or leaving the market, where it is not.  In addition, the model presents 
important factors that had an impact on the opportunity to realize the chosen strategy, with the 
configuration of the control mechanism packages in the different markets of “T” having the central 
place. The factors  that  had  an impact on the realization of the chosen strategy  where  the 
configuration of the control mechanisms packages are central are:  legislation  and  political climate in 
the markets for investments, especially in the emerging markets; established legal systems and practice 
that were supportive to foreign investors; partners in JVs that  “T” could professionally  co-operate 
with and that had the same understanding of corporate governance; a level of qualified knowledge 
about the international markets in HQ among managers and employees, where the investments were 
made in relation to the technology; national culture on the markets abroad;  “bad practice of doing 
business” as a tradition in the local context;  the development  of “maturity” in the central  “institutions”  
in HQ, important for international activities, such as  whistleblowing, anticorruption policy,  HSE 
functions, CSR functions,  the Code of Conduct and its practice,  institutions connecting to the issue 
of governance, anticorruption policy; lack of capital for the investments. It is necessary to mention the 
differences between the antecedent conditions described in Section 8.1 and the factors of the 
possibilities for realizing the strategy presented in the model. As described in the previous section, the 
antecedent conditions are a sequence of events in a historical retrospective to define and distinguish 
conditions (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995), in order, as interpreted in this study, to create a strategy in 
each phase of “T”’s   internationalization process. The factors that are presented in this model can be 
described, based on the empirical findings, as possible underestimated obstacles, influencing the 
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realization of the approved strategy. The factors are present in the markets and inside the company; 
both can lie latent and, at the same time, can be active and influential and force changes in the 
configuration of the control mechanism packages. 
In addition, it is necessary to underline that the empirical evidence points out “T”’s role as an industrial 
investor. Thus, the presented model is suitable for illustrating the situation in different markets with 
the different forms of ownership and different forms of control for industrial investors. For the 
financial investor, probably, it will be another outcome, and there will be a different model of the 
configuration of control mechanisms.  
The model presents the following configurations of control mechanism packages: 
Configuration -FC-SC-OC-BC as a package (Financial Control; Strategic Control; Operational 
Control; Behavior Control: “No influence, no control – accept it or get out”) gives almost  no influence, 
and, in this situation, a company should reconsider the existing strategy and create a new one that will 
include substitutional changes. In this connection, a new configuration of the control mechanism 
package should be presented. If the company will not make the necessary changes, it should either 
accept a situation with no influence or leave the market. The presented model supports the findings 
described in the processes of internationalization during Phases 1 and 2, when all the JVs in “T”’s 
portfolio were almost without influence. In order to change the situation, “T” worked separately with 
each of the configurations of control mechanisms, aiming to make the packages of control work”; thus, 
the idea of MA appeared during Phase 2. Hence, using the framework of MA, the members of the BoD 
in JVs could insist on some decisions, working with the local co-partners to achieve compromises, 
placing the consultants from HQ in JVs, and arranging different seminars in order to present the values 
of “T” and its governing principles. Discontent with the low level of influence started to be felt strongly 
at the end of Phase 2.  This configuration of controls demanded changes, as was noted in the empirical 
part.    
JVs in this configuration were very vulnerable to the unpredictable situations that can influence 
business in a negative way. The dashed-line arrow in the model illustrates the indicator of the necessity 
to make substantial changes in the configuration of the control mechanisms or to leave the market.  As 
an example, for this configuration, “T” did not manage to increase its ownership in Russia (global 
presence), having 43%, in a JV where several factors played an important role in not realizing the 
strategy. These factors were:  lack of capital (in the first phases of internationalization); legislation 
(telecommunication rather became a strategic business area, and foreign investors were not permitted 
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to own more than 50%); the legal system was challenging, and its practice had a local impact – “T” 
experienced between 10-15 court cases in different parts of Russia with various outcomes; the 
relationship with the local partners was influenced by  different business agendas, different ways of 
doing business, and different understanding of corporate governance, resulted by disagreements and 
judicial proceedings, initiated by local partners, and by “T”. In addition, “T” experienced serious 
corruption in a Russian subsidiary in Uzbekistan, which is described at the beginning of the study. “T” 
admitted later that management did not have enough knowledge about the local markets and 
underestimated the complexity of being a foreign investor in challenging markets, where the culture is 
far from Scandinavian (NRK - nett, 08.01.2019). As a result of the above-mentioned processes, “T” 
had to take the decision to sell its shares in this JV.83  
Phase 3 of “T”’s internationalization started with the consolidation of “T”’s portfolio, aiming to 
achieve a situation where the following configuration could be presented: +FC+SC+OC+BC (“Both 
influence and control, keep as long you can”).  During Phase 3, almost all JVs, where “T” managed to 
increase its ownership, became WOSs; these companies were kept in the portfolio. Other JVs were 
sold (except for a few JVs on markets that were important for “T”). Configuration +FC+SC+OC+BC 
gave a high level of influence and utilized the whole scope of control mechanisms.  At the same time, 
the empirical evidence pointed out the factors that  can have  a strong impact on the  conditions  for 
the realization of the chosen strategy: EU  directives and policy in the EU markets that influenced the 
local legislation and, in some situations, can dominate the local legislation (the case of Denmark, when 
EU legislation did not allow the  adjustment of the strategy and  merge  “T”’s and “ TA”); challenging 
situations with local partners and accusations of corruption that “T” managed to deal with; “T” 
underestimated the rapid development of the markets’ demands  for the  new technology and could not 
manage to provide new licenses for advanced  services (due to the lack of real knowledge on the 
market,  “T” had to leave the market in 2017/2018 with the loss of approx. 30 billion NOK);  the 
situations  in other WOSs in Central and Eastern Europe:  Serbia (100%); Montenegro (100%); 
Hungary (100%); Bulgaria (100%) showed   organic growth, but, at the same time,  the “maturity” of 
these markets became  possible earlier than estimated, and the situation of the profitability of the 
markets could change in the very near future, which resulted in “T” selling its subsidiaries, 
concentrating its strategy mostly on the emerging markets in Asia.  “T” decided to leave the CCE 
market in 2017/2018. In another case, in India, “T” “tuned” the package of control mechanisms to  the 
configuration +FC+SC+OC+BC, with the full scope of controls, but, being   affected by the factors of  
                                                 
83 “T” announced the sale of the JV in Russia in 2017  
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the  possibilities for realizing  the strategy,  had to leave the market, as the existing  factors,  which, at 
first were  more or less latent ( as the respondents implied),  then  started to be  visible. These factors 
are, as the following:  not sustainable way to do business; the underestimation of the complexity of 
some markets, when the   market’s conditions have been changed underway, when it was not possible 
to “tune” the license conditions; the underestimated rapid technological “maturity” of the markets. 
Hence, “T” decided to leave the market84. 
At the same time, there are two other configurations in the model, that are present in the markets where 
“T” did not manage to increase its ownership to the majority position because of local legislation. 
Making the choice to keep both models of JV (with the minority and the majority positions) in its 
portfolio, “T” had to find solutions for how to deal with the management control system in each JV 
and co-operate with its local co-partners.   
Configuration  -F+SC+OC+BC (“Limited influence,  high control,  up with the FC,  be careful, and 
adjust if possible”) describes, for example,  the JV in Malaysia (see Model 8.2.7), when “T”, without 
FC because of the limitations in  legislation related to foreign investors, achieved  the full scope of 
controls  in these  JVs, using the mechanisms of voting under the  General Assembly and later the 
framework of MA.  The title of the model contains the warning “to be careful”, underlining the possible 
impact of the antecedent conditions that can be changed, influencing “T”’s strategy, and  factors that 
allow “T” to realize this strategy, such as  the possibility to utilize the majority in the BoD, and 
implement the system of controls in JVs.  JVs in Bangladesh and Thailand have the same configuration 
of control mechanisms, satisfying “T” in the level of influence and control, despite some tensions 
related to the main co-partner in the JV in Bangladesh and the challenging political situation in 
Thailand, although “T” achieved a sufficient level of influence and control in the above-mentioned 
JVs. At the same time,  it is important to mention that “T”s position as a foreign investor  on the above-
mentioned markets was vulnerable because of the dependence  on: the legislation and political climate 
in the markets; supportive co-operation with partners and  a  deep understanding on “T”’s side; and 
the cultural traditions and  practices that were described in the empirical findings as the factors 
necessary for success and the realization of the strategy.   
The configuration  +FC+- SC-OC+- BS (“Low – influence”, “ change”) illustrates  the situation  when 
“T” formerly had FC via ownership in Ukraine but could not utilize it fully, influenced by factors  that 
                                                 
84 “T” announced the sale of the WOS in India in 2017 
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had a strong impact on the possibility to realize the  planned strategy,  such as   a  close link between 
the top management  and\co-owners in the JV  and  the  political elite in the country. This situation 
created substantial limitations for “T”, such as the appointment of the CEO and other key managers in 
the JV, the implementation of the principles of corporate governance.  “T” could not establish BC so 
long the local management in subsidiary did not allowed to provide the BC through the implementation 
of the CCR.  At the same time, it is necessary to mention that “T”’s position in the framework of the 
BoD was not without influence, as the local partners trusted “T”’s competence and expertise and 
utilized “T”’s connection in their relationship with vendors. The local partners also benefited from the 
trainee process for local employees in “T”’s HQ and increased the employees’ competence in the 
company. This explains the modus +- SC. As long as “T” did not have the OC, the local managers 
established absolute control, which explains -OC, and the power of the expatriates was limited; “T”, 
as an investor, did not have enough information about the activities “on the floor” and could not change 
the situation.  At the same time, the empirical findings show the paradoxical situation, as presented in 
this configuration related to +- BC.  In this case, the modus +- BC illustrates that the local management 
and local co-partners wished to position themselves as a modern Western-oriented company with a 
modern system of corporate governance. Thus, the above-described JV presented the CCR in the 
company that were created in “T”’s HQ, but the CCR were not practiced, even though they were on 
the website.  The arrow in this configuration is drawn in a dotted line, showing the necessity for 
substantial changes in the JV in order to increase the low level of influence. The factors that influenced 
the possibility to succeed in  this JV, according to the empirical findings, are as follows: the legislation 
and  political climate in the markets was more supportive for  foreign  investors and most important is  
how the laws work in practice;  the struggle with corruption was the highest priority for the political 
authorities, but nevertheless  there was the strong link between  the political elite and business;  the 
improvements in of the existing legal system and practice that were not corrupt  and did not  
discriminate against  the foreign investor; partners in JVs that had the same understanding  of   business 
agendas and corporate governance; the level of qualified knowledge in HQ about the local conditions 
and culture in the  market where the link between the political elite and business was too close; the 
development  of the  “maturity” of the central  “institutions”  in HQ as business controllers 
understanding the challenges in control reporting,  zero-corruption activities,  Code of Conduct and 
transparency in HQ. JVs in Ukraine (56%) was merged with “T”’s subsidiary in Russia, and became 
a part of its global presence; later, the subsidiary in Russia was sold85.  
                                                 
85 “T” announced the sale of the JV in Russia in 2017 
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To guide the discussion in relation to the configuration of control mechanisms in the process of 
internationalization, it is important to point out that the accounting literature did not pay enough 
attention to the issue of the configuration of different control mechanisms having an impact on the 
level of influence in subsidiaries during the process of internationalization.  However, the management 
literature paid more attention to this issue and suggested models for ownership of JVs abroad 
(Karhunen, Löfgren and Kosonen, 2008), where the different degrees of ownership and different 
degrees of control in the entities with foreign ownership were linked together. The research studied 
four types of international business practices in transition economies and presented four types of 
relationship between the above-mentioned parameters (see Chapter 2).   The model of configuration 
of control mechanisms in the process of internationalization presented in this research (see Models 8.2. 
1, 8.2.2 in Appendixes) can be an addition to Karhunen, Löfgren and Kosonen’s (2008) model, by 
suggesting packages that illustrate the processes of the interplay of controls in both JVs and WOSs as 
subsidiaries of the MNC in different markets, in different phases of   internationalization. This differs 
from the packages presented by Karhunen, Löfgren and Kosonen (2008), which described that several 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) worked at the same period on the same market. 
Summing up, answering the research questions about what control mechanisms were in place during 
different phases of internationalization the empirical findings reveal that control mechanisms in 
internationalization settings by describing use of mentioned above controls mechanisms related to 
ownership; related to the role of BoD ; related to  the role expatriates; related to the corporate rules: 
and the role of CEO of HQ. The findings of the current research reveal that these controls are 
interplaying with each other as the configuration of control packages and that each of the control 
mechanisms presented in the configurated package is not static and has been carefully changed during 
the process of internationalization. 
8.3.  The third research question: How have managers and employees perceived and 
initiated changes to those controls? Analysis of the empirical findings in the framework 
of the teleological motors of process theory. “Deprivation of control” and “tuning” as 
driving force of changes in the process of internationalization. 
Using the framework of process theory (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995; Poole et al., 2000; Mähring and 
Keil, 2008), which  supports identifying a sequence of events in a historical retrospective as antecedent 
conditions, the reason for the changes in an organization will be  defined and distinguished, answering  
the third research question:   “How have managers and employees perceived and initiated changes of 
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those controls?”  As described in Chapter 2, according to teleological theory, the progression in the 
organization happens as a development towards a goal that is socially constructed and cognitively 
shared as a common goal. “The purposiveness” (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995) is an important part of 
the teleological theoretical concept, which sets the premise for the understanding of how changes can 
be triggered, aiming to achieve the decided goals. Van de Ven and Poole (1995) identified the 
following important processes  in teleological changes:  the sequences of events as antecedent 
conditions that influence the  establishment of the strategy that leads to the creation of the system of 
controls, the evaluation of the goals in the framework of the system of controls, dissatisfaction with 
the results and  further processes  of change in the organization. Taking into the consideration the 
teleological motor of changes inside process theory (Poole, 1995), the  findings summarized in  Table 
8.2.6 and Model 8.2.7 will illustrate how and why the control mechanisms  being configurated as  
packages have been changed during the process of internationalization,  triggered by the chains of 
“dissatisfactions” (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995; Poole et al., 2000) in the context of this study.  
Thus, the empirical evidence describes the “interpretation” of the theological process of changes 
presented in this study, showing that changes to the packages of control mechanisms in the process of 
internationalization have happened, such as “tuning”.  
The definition of the phenomenon of “tuning” came from the empirical findings, when the respondents 
reported that the whole process of the internationalization of “T” had  a  “tuning-mindset”, meaning 
the careful adjusting of the processes, avoiding “ups or downs” or “rollercoaster” swings, in order to 
improve the existing way of doing business and to find the most efficient system of controls for the 
HQ to achieve influence over the subsidiaries.  
The respondents underlined that the Norwegian business culture   is based on a network principle, 
including employees in discussions, having a flat structure in organizations and communication 
between managers and employees as members of one team (Hofstede, 1980).  They explained that, 
based on this approach, the managers in “T” were open-minded and available for feedback from the 
employees working abroad. The small “tuning” steps were supportive in developing the company and 
in implementing changes in a smooth way. 
At the same time, the empirical evidence shows that processes of change, such as “tuning”, always 
happened with delays, meaning that, during the four phases of internationalization, “tuning” was 
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needed in each phase and was linked to all control mechanisms and to the packages of control 
mechanisms.  
As data collection from the previous sector shows,  the process of internationalization defined  several 
mechanisms of influence from HQ towards subsidiaries and showed its “tuning”  in each phase and 
described the processes connected to these mechanisms:  the tuning  of the ownership structure (from 
JV to WOS); the tuning of  the role of the BoD (from a supporting organ to a controlling organ);  the 
tuning of the role of expatriates (from “passionate ambassadors” and individual consultants to “a pool 
of professionals”); the tuning of common corporate rules related to behavior (from no rules and the 
use of common sense to TW as a common platform for attitude, relationships and behavior); and the 
tuning of the role of CEO. The findings show that the “tuning” model in doing business – the “tuning 
mentality” – has its roots in formal and informal communication and reporting  between employees  
and managers, leading to the processes of adjusting or “tuning” the business strategy  and changes in 
the  system of the control mechanisms  that  give the opportunity to utilize the model of  “doing by 
practice” or “learning by doing”,  as “best practice model”,  which was  in a constant “tuning mindset”, 
in order to give the best  result when  several important control mechanisms did not work.  
According to the respondents, situations, when managers experienced a lack of the control that was 
considered a necessity to gain influence and the recognition that they were not getting what was 
needed, will be defined as a deprivation of control.  
The empirical findings mapped the phenomenon of the perceived influence and control connected to 
each of the above-described control mechanisms. What were the drivers or motivations for the shift 
between different activities and events from phase to phase of internationalization in “T”?  
To answer the question, “What was the driving force for the changes in the process of “T”’s 
internationalization?”, the empirical evidence illustrated that the outcome of chains of change 
processes in control packages is a “deprivation of control”. 
“Deprivation of control” is a phenomenon that describes a state of affairs: the management situation 
that is characterized by HQ’s inability to get what is considered a necessity – in this study, a high level 
of influence over its subsidiaries. Hence, “deprivation of control” is a phenomenon of the recognition 
of the needs and what is absent and the outcome of the change processes in the configuration of control 
mechanisms. The phenomenon is closely connected to the managers perceptions which influence the 
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managerial judgment and beliefs about how the control system affects the relationship between the 
organizational behavior and its outcomes (Dermer & Lucas, 1986; Koeing et al., 1992; Bourmistrov 
and Kaarbøe, 2013; Seal & Mattimoe, 2014). 
The literature in the research domain has focused on the need for greater use of the approach from the 
psychological sciences. The literature review illustrated the call for, for example, the concept of 
perception related to management control (Hall, 1995).  At the same time, the empirical evidence in 
this study demonstrates examples of the situations with the perceived influence and control, when   
none of control mechanisms work in reality, and the existing system of mechanisms should be 
reconfigured, in order for the HQ to achieve influence over the subsidiaries, as the main strategic goal. 
As the empirical evidence described, the phenomenon of deprivation of control led to the lack or low 
level of influence in subsidiaries, obstructing the realization of the established strategy. These 
processes were experienced during all the phases of “T”’s internationalization.  Thus, deprivation of 
control, as an outcome of a chains change processes, when control packages were “tuned”, is a driving 
force for achieving influence and the result of the chain of dissatisfactions. 
Applying teleological lenses in order to analyze the empirical evidence from this research, and 
answering the question, “How have managers perceived and initiated changes of those controls?”, Van 
de Ven and Poole’s (1995) extended framework will integrate the phenomena of “tuning” and   
“deprivation of control”, and, as suggested  in Model 8.2.7 the  configurations of the controls as 
packages and the factors explained why  HQ’s managers were deprived of control in the different 
phases of “T”’s internationalization. In this respect, the discussion in the framework of the teleological 
motor of changes will be supported by Model 8.3.1.  
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Model 8.3.1: “The wheel of change”: The extended model of teleological motors of changes, combined 













Figure 8.3.1. (Source: the author built on the model of Van de Ven and Poole, 1995  ( model 2.1) and 
a research model 2.2 by the author) 
Model 8.3.1 explains the process of “T”’s internationalization as the chain of changes. Influenced by 
the antecedent conditions from the macro and micro worlds, “T”’s HQ developed an international 
strategy and, from the control perspective, based on the relaying of different control mechanisms 
configurated as packages. The control packages are designed as a configuration of control mechanisms, 
such as ownership, the BoD, CCR, the role of expatriates and the role of CEO.  The primary goals of 
T’s management were that HQ should strive to achieve a high level of influence in operations abroad 
(e.g. subsidiaries). The changes happened by the “tuning” of the developed packages of the 
243 
 
configuration of controls.  At the same time, the empirical data shows examples of how the control 
system affects the relationship between the organizational performance and beliefs and the goals the 
organization has because of the managerial perceptions of controls, influence and the managerial 
judgment. The empirical findings illustrate that, when managers experience a state of dissatisfaction 
with the control outcomes, they introduce changes in the configuration of control mechanisms, 
including the analyzing of the new antecedent conditions and the design of a new international strategy. 
Understood as a teleological motor of change, “the tuning” was triggered by these dissatisfactions at 
not being able to achieve the expected high level of influence. That motivated new searches for and the 
introduction of a more sophisticated configuration of control mechanisms.  The situation of a lack of 
ability to achieve the desired level of influence and control, in spite of “tuning”, and the recognition  
of this,  made the “deprivation of control” the  driving force of the changes, while, on one side, “T”’s 
managers tried to  “tune”  the packages of control mechanisms in order to gain maximum influence in 
the subsidiaries, on the other side,  they experienced deprivation of control, recognizing  that they were 
not getting what was needed. The recognition of the deprivation of control initiates the process of 
changes and leads again to the analyzing of the antecedent conditions, the development of an 
international strategy and of new packages of control mechanisms by tuning. The process functions as 
a constant rotation, which gave us the reason to call Model 8.3.1 a “wheel of change”. The appearance 
of deprivation of control can be explained as the outcome of the chains of change processes build up 
om the configuration of the control packages by tuning.   
The empirical findings described, and the factors explained why HQ’s managers were deprived of 
control in different phases of “T”’s internationalization.  Most of the factors came from how the HQ’s 
managers analyzed,  “interpreted”  and understood the perceived factors from the macro and micro 
worlds that could have or had had an impact on the realization of the established strategy and forced 
the “tuning” of the control mechanisms, in order to  develop an international strategy and, further, to 
create  the new configuration of the control mechanisms. The box presenting the perceived factors is 
drawn in both dots and lines, as the factors can be latent and active, which explains the constant delays 
in the processes of experiencing “tuning” and “deprivation of control”.  
To summarize, the above-presented Model 8.3.1 described several important interacting elements that 
illustrated the process of changes and explained the internationalization process of “T”. The empirical 
findings illustrating the presented theoretical and research model are collected in Table 8.3. 
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During Phase 1, internationalization started with small international projects.  The antecedent 
conditions (EU directive and opening the markets in Eastern Europe and Asia) were supportive to the 
established strategy to achieve the decided goal. The goal was to get international experience for a 
company that was going abroad for the first time. At this stage, the major control mechanism employed 
was the predecessors of expatriates (passionate ambassadors). Other mechanisms were not present in 
the first stage. As a result, the number of projects and JVs expanded, with the focus on “T” as an 
industrial investor. That gave “T” important first-hand international experience, leading to new 
247 
 
investments abroad. Although there were some control issues, there were few control problems at that 
stage.  Using the model of configuration of the control mechanisms, the configuration of -FC-SC-OC-
BC can show that “T” had practiced the model, without realizing that the company did not have a 
system of controls.   The dissatisfactions in this period were connected to the understanding that the 
“goal” during the first steps in internationalization had been achieved, and “T” needed either to go 
further in its internationalization and “tune” its international strategy, by reconfiguring the existing 
system of the controls or to refocus its international ambitions.  “T”’s understanding of the perceived 
influence and control was an important experience – despite the fact that “T” achieved its goals in this 
period, the influence during the first projects was very limited, and “T” wished to do more in the 
international arena. “Deprivation of control” was a  failure to establish the  system of controls that 
was considered to be a necessity for the HQ to  achieve  influence  over the subsidiaries and, at the 
same time, a  recognition  that “T” was not getting what it needed: the established system of controls 
did not give a high level of influence, and “T” needed to reconsider the antecedent conditions, interpret 
them, develop a new international strategy and “tune” the package of controls. The factors that 
“deprived” HQ’s managers from getting what they wanted to achieve (a sufficient level of influence) 
were: legislation, political climate and  how the laws were practiced in reality  on the markets for 
investments; lack of experience in working internationally; lack of the capital to avoid going for big 
international expansion; at the same time, a  belief in JV as the optimal form of ownership; partners in 
JVs that “T” could professionally co-operate with; the level of knowledge in HQ about international 
projects; established central  “institutions”  in HQ, important for international activities. 
During Phase 2 of internationalization, a number of JVs were established as a consequence of “Vikings 
planting flags strategy”.  The antecedent conditions (further opening up of the emerging markets to 
foreigners, and that top managers were a catalysator for expansion) were supportive to the establishing 
of the new strategy. The goals in this period were to increase the number of JVs abroad, where it was 
possible to “hunt” for projects, without thinking about the geographical areas. “T”’s “passionate 
ambassadors” transferred to becoming “Vikings” and achieved the goal, by establishing JVs (because 
of the lack of capital to invest in WOSs) in Western Europe, Eastern Europe and Asia. The issue of the 
technological platform for the investments was not on the agenda during this period, and “T” tried 
several technologies – from mobile, fixed and paging communication. 
“T” had established a system of control in this period; FC was established via the registration of 
documents, attention to the professional skills of the members of the BoD (the opposite to the same 
issue in Phase 1, when the “passionate ambassadors” were the members of the BoD). The configuration 
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of the controls was -FC-SC-OC-BC, meaning that, in JVs, “T” had limited influence and control but 
the advantage of being the leading and highly competitive industrial investor in telecommunication: in 
these terms – a highly appreciated co-partner abroad.    Expatriates were sent as consultants to the local 
executives, and some governing documents/institutions were created in HQ (the Ethical Council and 
the CoC were adopted at the end of Phase 2).  So, during this period, even though the configuration of 
the controls was -FC-SC-OC-BC and provided very low influence, “T” tried to create a system of 
controls that was suitable for the situation and support it with mechanisms that could strengthen the 
influence, such as MA. Nevertheless, the  dissatisfaction was a part of the experience in this period, 
connected with the  limitations of the challenges of ownership in JVs;  that   the role of the BoD was  
dedicated  mostly to the advisory tasks and  the monitoring activities; that expatriates, not being in the 
top positions, could not utilize sufficient influence;  and that the governing principles in JVs  were far 
from the Western practice of doing business. Perceived control was experienced in several situations, 
mostly connected with the recognition that JVs were not suitable for “T” because of the lack of 
influence and control (coming at the end of Phase 2) and the limitations of the BoD’s role in JVs. At 
the same time, “T” experienced negative practice, being a minority owner trying to achieve influence 
via consultants that could not provide it; the first conflicts with co-partners were registered in relation 
to different understandings of corporate governance. The lack of finance was an important element, 
having an impact on perceived control. Dissatisfactions started to be a trigger for the changes, such as 
“tuning”, in the further search for a new goal, new strategy and new configuration of the controls as a 
package. The deprivation of control as an outcome of this process was a recognition of the needs of 
“T”, and what was needed in order to achieve influence in the subsidiaries   and go further in the 
process of internationalization functioned as a driving force in this process. At the same time, it is 
important to mention that there were some factors that deprived managers from getting what they 
wanted: a high level of influence. The factors came from the managers’ interpretations of the macro 
impacts on the markets and micro impacts inside the company, such as   lack of capital in order to go 
for WOS; limited ability to fund the investments; belief in JV as an optimal form of ownership; 
investment climate on the markets,  legislation, and how  the lows are functioning in  practice ; partners 
in JVs that “T” could professionally co-operate with;  higher level of knowledge in HQ about 
international projects, as in Phase 1, and establishing “institutions”  in HQ, important for international 
activities, such as HES, CSR and Code of Conduct. 
During Phase 3, “T” started the strategy, “Up or Out”, and, in order to achieve its new goal, the 
company started the process of consolidation, meaning to achieve 100% ownership and develop JVs 
into WOSs or to leave the JVs where it was not possible to “go up”.   It was considered in advance that 
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there were five JVs from the portfolio (in Russia, Ukraine, Bangladesh, Malaysia and Thailand), where 
“T” could not increase ownership to become a WOS because of the local legislation. The antecedent 
conditions that affected “T”’s strategy were (from external conditions): listing on Stock Exchange; 
knowledge and experience from international projects; rapidly developing company; and (from micro 
conditions): a new CEO was appointed, starting the “international thinking in HQ”. “T” needed to 
establish a new international strategy with the goal of how to administer the change in foreign 
subsidiaries from JVs to WOSs, based on ideas about influence and control (100% ownership started 
to be the important criterion).   
The   changes were also related to other control mechanisms, such as the BoD, expatriates, CCR and 
the role of the CEO.   The BoD established corporate governance in the WOSs, providing decisions 
from HQ. The role of expatriates was changed under the processes from that of consultant to that of 
expatriates with a clear mandate to administer the WOS as executives.  The expatriates were described 
as a “girder” in organizations abroad, providing the HQ’s culture and governance.  The first 
presentations were made in “T” with the idea that “T”’s DNA should be implemented in WOSs.  CCR 
started to play an important role in the establishment of corporate governance, based on the CoC and, 
later, TW. In this period, using Model 8.2.7, the configuration can be presented as +FC, +-SC+OC+-
BC in WOSs.  Thus, “T” started to have FC, which led to the situation where “T” gained influence in 
the BoD, such as SC;  expatriates, representing the OC and BC, were appointed in the executive 
positions; CCR, representing BC,  were created in HQ, such as CoC and TW, and started to be 
implemented and practiced in WOSs;  the role of the new CEO was important in establishing the  new 
governance  in “T” and its subsidiaries, and as the starting of the reconfiguration of the controls 
mechanisms which the new CEO wanted to utilize via establishing the new routines,  such as Business 
Reviews.  
At the same time, there were still some JVs in “T”’s portfolio; the reason that they were kept in the 
portfolio as JVs was that the local legislation prevented “T” from increasing its share to FC.   The 
markets, Russia, Ukraine, Malaysia, Bangladesh and Thailand, were considered important for “T”, and 
the company decided to keep the JVs in its portfolio.   The configurations of control in JVs were   -
FC+SC-OC-BS in the situation with limited control and influence (Malaysia, Bangladesh, Thailand) 
or +FC+-SC-OC+-BC (Ukrainian case) in the case of low control and influence, and -FC-SC-OC-BC 
(Russian case) where there was no control or influence. “Dissatisfaction” in JVs with the scope of 
controls provided by HQ (Malaysia, partly the Bangladesh case, because of the tensions with the main 
co-partner) created the potential unpredictability for “T” as an investor, and was   connected to the 
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limitations in legislation and in the ability to achieve 100% ownership. This situation could lead further 
to the position when the new system of controls was not possible to established, despite the fact that 
“T” had  a sufficient level of influence and control.  
The perceived influence and control led to the “the dissatisfaction” because the decided strategic goals 
were not completely achieved. Thus, JVs, where the scope of controls was not established (Russia, 
Ukraine), were connected to limited or no influence and control and were characterized by serious 
conflicts with co-partners and tensions with the authorities. At the same time, the evidence shows “the 
dissatisfaction” in WoSs was related to those situations where “T” could not adequately control the 
way business was done, such as the case of unethical ways of doing business in Asia, unreported 
deviation in governance, cases of corruption.  “The dissatisfactions” intuitively   enhanced the 
development to a new phase, by “tuning”, establishing the new strategy and configuration of the 
controls.  The findings of this study showed that managers of “T” had the recognition of the necessary 
changes with the configuration of control mechanisms and understanding of what was absent in the 
control packages, in order to avoid the situation of perceived influence and control and trying to 
increase the level of influence. In these terms, the deprivation of control was both the outcome of the 
chains of change processes and the driving force for the change processes. The factors that “deprived” 
managers from getting what was considered necessary – the establishment of a system of control and 
the recognition of what was needed in order to achieve influence – were mostly the same as in previous 
phases, except for the lack of capital. At the end of Phase 3, “T” started to have sufficient capital for 
further investments.  The most crucial challenges were connected to legislation and regulation on the 
markets with an unpredictable investor climate in Eastern Europe and Asia, where “T” used substantial 
resources. In addition, “T” experienced CSR challenges, especially in Asia, both in JVs and WOSs, 
that negatively influenced “T” s image as an investor. At the same time, there were growing conflicts 
with co-partners, who had their own business agenda in JVs and had a strong link to the political 
authorities (these tendencies were widespread in both Asia and Eastern Europe).  “T” still needed to 
improve the level knowledge in HQ about international projects and work further to establish and 
implement central “institutions” in HQ, important for international activities, such as the anti-
corruption policy, CoC, HES, transparency and TW. 
Phase 4: During this phase, “T” experienced the strong impact of the antecedent conditions (external 
conditions), such as being a part of the “MNC club”, presenting a full international focus, cluster-based 
business, the strong impact of ethical governance,  and the strong role of the CEO as  an institution for 
the new  system of controls  as an MNC, and started the processes of centralization of power in HQ  in 
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providing  the strategy,  “Many companies – one Group”. The goal in this period was strong 
centralization for WOSs and JVs (where it was possible) around the governing managerial routines at 
all levels of the Group and around the governing cultural and behavioral platform, TW, aiming to make 
subsidiaries closer to HQ and create the feeling of being a citizen of “T”. At the same time, “T” utilized 
cluster-thinking and expanded its business in WOSs in both Asia (Pakistan, India) and Europe (Serbia, 
Bulgaria), that led to the further process of change and development of the configuration of the control 
mechanisms in the framework of strengthening the governing platform in “T”.   
Thus, WOSs were strengthened by centralization routines, including all levels of executives in formal 
and informal networking arenas administered by HQ. The research calls this process “centralization 
by decentralization”. In these terms, the role of the BoD started to be weaker and more dependent on 
the decisions in HQ; the traditional subordination in subsidiaries started to be more decentralized 
because of the close contacts between executives at all levels across the Group, in the framework of 
both the formal and informal network arenas, administered by HQ. The role of expatriates was 
developed further as a “DNA-pool of professionals”, supporting the processes of careful analysis of 
variations in the different practices of the expatriates by different nationalities, collected from different 
markets, then selecting the best practice, and finally retaining the best practice and its implementation 
both at the Group level of “T” and in WOSs abroad.   CCR was strengthened and developed into a 
managerial and cultural platform of HQ and subsidiaries. The role of the CEO started to be central in 
developing the control routines over top managers in HQ and in WOSs and JVs (the establishing of 
arenas for formal and informal communication, aiming to have possibilities to monitor and influence 
the performance in WOSs and JVs). The CEO also started to build “T” s image as a global MNC, being 
personally involved in these activities.  The model of configuration of control mechanisms suggests 
the following configuration of controls in this period: +FC+SC+OC+OC in WOSs. The configurations 
for JVs in Malaysia, -FC+SC+OC+BC, and for Bangladesh and Thailand, +-FC+SC +OC+BC, show 
a satisfactory level of influence and control in these JVs.  The JV in Ukraine, with the configuration 
+F+-SC-OC+-BC, was merged with the JV in Russia with the “No influence, no control” 
configuration, -FC-SC-OC-BC.  Because of strong disagreements with its co-partners, “T” tried to find 
the optimal solution, in order to solve the conflicts and to establish a compromise, although the new 
configuration of controls in the merged JV continued to be -FC-SC-OC-BC, without influence and 
control.  During this period, the top management of “T” also had perceived influence and control, in 
relation to markets where implemented configuration of control mechanisms was not sufficient to 
achieve influence and needed to be “tuned”. Most of these subsidiaries were in the markets with JVs; 
some of the subsidiaries were WOSs (India). During this period, “T” had to find out where it was 
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possible to “tune” the control mechanism packages and where not. Thus, the importance of keeping 
the JV in Russia in the portfolio was considered important. At the same time, the big corruption scandal 
in the subsidiary in Uzbekistan led to substantial “dissatisfaction” and forced “T” to reveal its own 
understanding of the importance of keeping this JV in the portfolio, showing recognition of what was 
necessary. Affected by the understanding that  it was not possible to achieve influence in this JV, and 
experiencing the negative impact from  antecedent conditions on the markets in Russia and Ukraine, 
and on the markets of the former  Soviet Union, such as Uzbekistan, and being deprived by conflicts 
with  the co-partners,  several court cases and the case of the large-scale corruption, which started to 
be known about both in Norway and worldwide, “T” decided to sell this JV from the portfolio, as was 
mentioned in the previous section. The experienced “deprivation of control” was the driving force for 
rethinking, in relation to the new international strategy, and for establishing the “tuning” of the new 
package of controls. 
At the same time, the empirical evidence also illustrated “the chains of dissatisfactions” in WOSs. 
These situations were connected to the issues of increased conflicts with co-partners (cases in India), 
jurisdictional disagreement with the partners in Bangladesh, and cases of corruption in Bulgaria and 
Asia.  
In order to avoid the destructive influence of several “dissatisfactions” in the further development of 
“T” on some markets, “T” faced a decision  to either create a new system of controls or leave the 
markets where all tools that were necessary to use, had been used, and due to the factors that influenced 
the realization of the strategy. Understanding that the failure to achieve the necessary level of control 
and influence, and the recognition of the need to make changes were experienced as “deprivation of 
control” was important for decisions regarding the future strategy. The situation when “T” could not 
further “tune” the package of controls led to the strong reconsideration of the strategy, analyzing the 
situation, and trying to answer the question: Was it possible to change the factors that had an important 
impact on the realization of the strategy?  The changes by “tuning” were made in WOSs and in JVs 
with the scope of controls; the ownership in India was increased to WOS; a strong focus on ethical 
issues was established in the Group, as the results of  understanding  the situation in some markets in 
Asia and Eastern Europe that “deprived” managers of the ability to get what HQ needed, and wanted 
and missed was made up of regulatory and legislative issues, conflicts with co-partners and the 
situations in CSR.  Nevertheless, on some markets (India, Russia), “T” continued to experience 
“deprivation of control” because of the   strong impact from external forces, such as regulation and 
legislation, and conflicts with local partners. In this connection, being further deprived of control, “T” 
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decided to leave the operations, understanding that it was not possible to change the factors needed 
for the realization of the strategy. “Deprivation of control” was both an outcome of the chain of the 
“dissatisfactions” that forced “T” to acknowledge the needs and ability of “T” in order to achieve 
influence, and a driving force for the necessity of changes in international strategy.  The described 
situation showed that “deprivation of control” had a serious impact on the strategic decisions and led 
to consequences for the changes, by “tuning”, in the process of internationalization. 
The empirical findings show that use of Model 8.2.7 of the configuration of the control mechanisms 
as packages can contribute to a better understanding of the implications of the teleological motor of 
process theory and can give the practitioners tools for understanding and action that will be supportive 
in avoiding a negative impact on business. The chain of “dissatisfactions” was the trigger of changes 
in the established and “tuned” packages of the configurations of control in the process of 
internationalization.  The phenomenon of the “deprivation of control” can be an important outcome 
after the “dissatisfactions”, such as recognition of the need to “tune” the inability to achieve influence 
in the subsidiaries, and as a driving force in explanation of the changes in the organization. From a 
control perspective, “deprivation of control” at the same time  is a controlling intimation that will be 
supportive in avoiding a negative  impact on the business results,  when the  wrong strategy or the 
wrong system of control can bring the organization into the modus of an “illusion of control” (Dermer 
and Lucas, 1986; Seal and Mattimoe, 2014)  that  is not implying the process of change. Thus, 
deprivation of control in this connection supports the idea about the strengthen of corporate governance 
and its practice in WOSs, as an important support for a   well-functioning managerial system and the 
system of control mechanisms that will still play the most important role in the HQ achieving influence 
over the subsidiaries.  
We are aware of the limitations of the above-described teleological motor of changes. According to 
Van de Ven and Poole (1995), “The process of organizational change and development are more 
complicated than the ideal types” (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995, p. 526). One of the reasons for the 
complexity of organizational change theories is “the inherent incompleteness of any single motor” 
(ibid., 526). Van de Ven and Poole (1995) argue that theories of organizational change and 
development “seldom include the ideal types in its pure forms” (ibid., 524), underlying the importance 
of the “theoretical practice and … their utility” (ibid., 525).   Having said that, we nevertheless apply 
the presented framework, in which the  teleological motor serves as theoretical primitives and the 
complexity of the developmental process, and  can be analyzed  as the interplay among these primitives 
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(ibid., 532), which offers us  the possibility to examine such interplay, using “theoretical practice”  
(ibid., 525), and utilize it as the foundation for empirical research (ibid., 533).  
At the same time, Van de Ven and Poole’s (1995) extended framework of the changes in an 
organization based on the teleological approach, where the phenomenon of “deprivation of influence 
and control” has been included, and supported by the model of the configuration of controls related to 
influence, can contribute new knowledge  about the  process of  how to  achieve  influence  and 
establish an  adequate system  of control mechanisms  in the process of the internationalization of an 
MNC. 
Dissatisfaction, as a consequence of perceived influence adjusted by “tuning”, is a trigger for 
changes.  
The findings of the study demonstrate that the design of control mechanisms, and how these 
mechanisms worked in different situations, affected by antecedent conditions, and the international 
strategy based on these conditions, are connected to the matter of influence   and have an impact on 
how controls are perceived (Tessier and Otler, 2012). Thus,  following the stream in the research 
domain, which suggests that managerial perceptions of controls influence managerial judgment of how 
the control system affects the relationship between organizational performance and  beliefs  and the  
goals the organization has, the empirical findings confirm  that,  when managers experienced a state 
of mental “discomfort”  with the control outcomes, they introduced changes in the control system 
configuration or design (Bourmistrov & Kaarbøe, 2013). From the first-order findings, it becomes 
evident that the system of management control mechanisms established by HQ towards the subsidiaries 
was changed by “tuning” during the process of “T”’s internationalization. One of the reasons for the 
changes, according to the empirical findings, supporting the knowledge from the   research domain, 
happens when the manager’s perception of “discomfort” is characterized by a higher level of discontent 
because of the noncompliance of the decided goals (Bourmistrov & Kaarbøe, 2013). That can develop 
the substantial redesign of the management control system (Kira and Korpelainen, 2012; Bourmistrov 
and Kaarbøe, 2013). Using the framework of process theory, the definition that is described in research 
literature as “discomfort” will be nuanced as “dissatisfaction” (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995), focusing 
on and underlying the “purposiveness” of the process connected to situations with perceived influence 
and control. This means that, in this study, researching the empirical findings illustrated the impression 
of “dissatisfaction” describing the situations where the expected influence and control were not 
achieved, but, at the same time, were managed by the envisioned goal.   
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Based on the empirical findings, the role of managers experiencing a state of mental “discomfort” 
(Bourmistrov and Kaarbøe, 2013) or “dissatisfaction” (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995) can be argued as 
starting the changes in an organization and system of control. The empirical findings demonstrate that, 
in some situations, the managers’ perception can prevent changes in the system of control, and this 
happens because managers overestimate the degree of the control system’s contribution to the 
achievement of the organizational outcomes (Seal and Mattiome, 2014). In the research literature, this 
situation is termed an “illusion of control” (Dermer and Lucas, 1986; Seal and Mattimoe, 2014). The 
empirical evidence described that,  in some subsidiaries (especially in countries where the business 
culture differs greatly from the Norwegian business culture),  managers can develop a link to the  
managerial perceptual failure to recognize that the established control mechanisms used by subsidiaries 
do not control the actual behavior, and this leads to the  “illusion” of the perceived situation.  Analyzing 
the empirical evidence and using the discussion in the research domain about the “illusion of control”  
and perceived control, it can be mentioned that, in the case studied in this research, managers from HQ 
did not have the situation of the “illusion” of control” but  perceived control, which led to the  wish to 
change the situation. “Illusion of control” does not encourage changes, as long as everything is “under 
control” (even though it is not) and provides little incentive to change. In terms of “illusion of control” 
literature, managers of the MNC “T” seemed to have had few of illusions that they experienced lack 
of influence because of the different imperfections of control mechanisms.   In terms of Seal and 
Mattimoe (2014), “the illusion of control” can be understood as the situation when a “T” manager, 
having an illusion, did not have the intention of changing anything, as in Phase 1 of “T”’s 
internationalization.  Nevertheless, this disillusion did not help “T” in its struggle/search to design an 
appropriate configuration of control systems that would secure an appropriately high level of influence.    
Thus, using the teleological process as a theoretical lens it is important to say that the mindset, 
“deprivation of control”, based on “dissatisfactions”, forced managers to search for a better system of 
influence and configurate/re-configurate the package of control mechanisms. The story of “T”’s 
internationalization shows 1)  analyzing and taking into consideration “dissatisfactions” that can be 
considered as “triggers” of change; 2) the willingness of “T” to really change  by “tuning” the strategy 
and the configuration of control mechanism packages, based on a recognition of the need to change, 
as “deprivation of control” is an outcome of “dissatisfactions”; 3)  “deprivation of control” functions 
as a driving force for change, underlining the recognition  of absence of  what is needed to 
change/“tune”;  4) empirical evidence illustrates that “deprivation of control” can function as an 
indication  and controlling mechanism as an intimation, forcing managers  to start  revealing the 
existing strategies,  packages of control and goals.    
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At the same time, achieving full influence and control over subsidiaries and avoiding “deprivation of 
control” is probably another “illusion” – an impossible act − and therefore it is important to define 
what is good and acceptable enough. The empirical findings show a number of “dissatisfactions” 
during the process of internationalization, as “T” could not manage to achieve what it wished: to 
establish in time a managerial system, combining the scope of the controls, suitable for the antecedent 
conditions and based on its international strategy.  Some of the important processes of change, such as 
“tuning”,  in “T”,  happened  after  perceived  influence and control  was realized, and the intimation 
of “dissatisfaction” and  “deprived control” was strong, which  forced “T”  to  make the necessary 
changes,  by “tuning” both the strategy and the configuration of the control mechanisms, aiming to 
establish the most efficient and suitable system of control, in order for the HQ to achieve influence 
over the subsidiaries. At the same time, the empirical evidence shows that the “deprivation of control” 
happens, despite the “tuning” released by “dissatisfactions”. Why was “tuning” not successful and 
resulted in deprivation and dissatisfaction? The factors, described both in the previous section and 
above in this section, that impacted on the realization of the strategy (the factors of perceived influence; 
see Model 3.1.1)  had a strong effect on the “tuning” of the control mechanisms, which released the 
mode of “deprivation” and, further, the mode of dissatisfaction that triggered the next step in the search 
for the most efficient configuration of the control mechanisms, in order to achieve influence in the 
subsidiaries. Hence, the combination of “tuning” of the control mechanisms and “deprivation of 
control” led to the new turn of the “wheel”, presented in Model 3.1.1. Thus, the processes of 
“dissatisfaction” and “tuning” and the phenomenon of “deprivation of control” are closely connected 
and are important parts of the  so-called “Wheel of Change”, presented  in Model 3.1.1 , when several 
processes are happening one after another as a constant rotation, affecting each other  and aiming to  
achieve influence  from HQ toward subsidiaries in “T”’s internationalization.   
In these terms, “deprivation of control” had important consequences for the company, as “T” had to 
reconsider its investments and leave some of the markets. Hence, “T” had to exit some important 
markets, realizing that it was not possible to have influence and control over the factors that had an 
impact on the realization of the decided strategy when they started to be an impetus, after they had 
been latent in the market and/or inside the company. This described situation highlights the careful and 
serious focus on both antecedent conditions and impetus factors   that impact the realization of the 
strategy that can trigger “deprivation of control” and lead to negative consequences for the company. 
Thus, “deprivation of control” can both mobilize changes in the organization and, at the same time, be 
an important intimation of the need to change, in terms of a pragmatic and realistic attitude to the 
antecedent conditions and factors affecting the strategy.  
257 
 
Summing up the discussions about the process of change in the process of internationalization  and 
answering the question how have managers and employees perceived and initiated changes to those 
controls and  why the control mechanisms were changed during internationalization, the chain of 
dissatisfactions was described as a trigger of changes by “tuning”, and deprivation of control is the 
outcome of chains of change processes in control mechanisms and the driving force of the process of 









Chapter 9. Conclusions, contribution, implications and further research 
The study has investigated the phenomenon of influence in the process of the internationalization of 
the Norwegian MNC, aiming to find out how has the internationalization of “T” happened; what 
control mechanisms were in place during different phases of internationalization and how have 
managers and employees perceived and initiated changes in those controls.  
This study contributes to the scholar literature in a number of ways, more specifically, the study makes 
three major contributions. 
 Firstly, the study contributes to literature on control mechanisms in internationalization settings by 
describing use of mentioned above controls mechanisms related to ownership (Chalos and O’Connor, 
2004; Al Farooque et.at, 2010); related to the role of BoD : (Bisbe and Otley, 2004; Bijman, Hendrikse, 
van Oijen, Aswin, 2012; related to  the role expatriates: (Delios and Bjorkman, 2000; Chalos and 
O’Conner, 2004); related to the corporate rules: (Kurucz et al. 2008; Chow, Shileds and Wu, 2010) 
and the role of CEO of HQ:  Watson S., Weaver G. R. 2003; Collings, Morley and Gunnigle, 2008), 
and reveals that  these controls are interplaying with each other as the configuration of control 
packages.   
Secondly, the study shows how the configurations of controls as packages have been changed by tuning 
during the process of the internationalization aiming to achieve the high level of influence in 
subsidiaries. 
By examining how the internationalization of “T” happened and how and why the managers in the HQ 
of an MNC, during different phases of its internationalization process, used different control 
mechanisms and how and why these mechanisms can be changed during internationalization, in order 
to enhance headquarters’ (HQ) influence over subsidiaries in the process of internationalization the, 
current study contributes with new knowledge about the phenomena of internationalization and control 
in internationalization. The role of control mechanisms in international settings and changes in 
management control systems have been studied over decades, mostly in  accounting and control 
literature ( e.g. Chalos and O’ Connor, 2004;  Wickramasinghe and Hopper, 2005; Ahrens and 
Mollona, 2007; Scheytt et.al., 2010;  Bourmistrov & Kaarbøe, 2013). This study draws on the previous 
research, which enables the author to analyze the mentioned above the scope of controls in the context 
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of internationalization of the Norwegian MNC, as ownership, BoD, the role of expatriates, CCR and 
the role of CEO of HQ.  The empirical findings support knowledge from previous research introduced 
in the literature review in defining that, in to achieve influence, a system of controls is needed. By 
exploring this, the study concludes that influence can be achieved through the implementation of 
interplay of different control mechanisms as, ownership, BoD, the role of expatriates, CCR and the 
role of CEO of HQ. Based on the empirical findings, this study contributes by presenting four 
configurations of different controls – FC: financial control; SC: strategic control; OC: operational 
control; BC: behavior control – as   packages that were utilized for the HQ to achieve influence over 
the subsidiaries (Model 2.1).    The findings in this study differ from the literature on the phenomena 
of influence and the control mechanisms in international settings, in which each mentioned above 
mechanism is explored separately. This study concludes that in order to enhance HQ’s influence over 
subsidiaries in the process of internationalization it is needed to look carefully on the interplay of the 
controls and suggests the configuration of control mechanisms in different packages that illustrate the 
different outcomes related to the level of influence.  The findings of this research thereby provide the 
new knowledge related to the phenomena of influence and control in the context of the process 
internationalization, and contribute to an increasing attention towards extending the literature on 
influence by experiences from different cultural contexts, where  both the antecedent conditions and 
the factors of impacts on the realization of  the defined strategy are linking to the  changes on 
configuration of controls as package and can trigger the reshaping of the packages. In this sense, the 
current research contributes to accounting and management control literature by describing the 
process of “tuning” the configuration of control packages 
The findings in this study show that to achieve influence over HQ’s subsidiaries, it is necessary to use 
several control mechanisms synchronically.  As the empirical findings illustrate that each of the control 
mechanisms presented in the configurated package has been changed or carefully changed by “tuning” 
during the internationalization process.  
Previously, the literature in accounting and control (e.g. Chalos and O’ Connor, 2004; Wickramasinghe 
and Hopper, 2005; Ahrens and Mollona, 2007; Scheytt et.al., 2010) and management literature (e.g.  
Banai et al., 1990; Child and Yan, 1999; Butler and Anchor, 2000; Tahir and Larimo, 2004; Karhunen, 
et al, 2008) has the tendency, to our knowledge, to present the controls mechanisms as a static 
phenomenon. This study differs from the previous studies about the role of the control mechanisms 
and how these mechanisms act and contributes by offering new knowledge to the research domain by 
showing the dynamism in readjustments of the mechanisms of control and the process of changes as 
261 
 
“tuning” in the context of internationalization process. This study presents the process of “tuning” the 
configuration of control packages as one of the important processes in internationalization of “T” (see 
Model 8.2.7) and contributes by that to the research domain in management control and management 
literature in better understanding of the change processes in organizations.  
The Model 8.2.7. gives the status of influence in each presented package, the outcome in relation to 
the international strategy, and the possibilities for change in respect of either increasing the level of 
influence, where it is possible, or leaving the market, where it is not possible. The  study concludes 
that, during all four phases of internationalization, the international strategy has been changed by 
careful “tuning” from  “T”’s existing strategy in each phase of internationalization to a new strategy, 
both  influenced by the antecedent conditions in different markets and corrected by the recognition that 
the influence and control that “T”  wanted to achieve had been lost but was still needed. Thus, the 
process of “tuning” aimed to develop an adequate system of influence from the HQ towards the 
subsidiaries and to establish a matching system of control.  
The study is differing form the previous research and contributing also with 2 important paradigms 
which have been discovered during the research process. The first paradigm is factors that had an 
impact on the opportunity to realize the chosen strategy. This study has  discovered the  following 
factors  are central :  legislation  and  political climate in the markets for investments, especially in the 
emerging markets; established legal systems and practice that were supportive to foreign investors; 
partners in JVs that  “T” could professionally  co-operate with and that had the same understanding of 
corporate governance; a level of qualified knowledge about the international markets in HQ among 
managers and employees, where the investments were made in relation to the technology; national 
culture on the markets abroad;  “bad practice of doing business” as a tradition in the local context;  the 
development  of “maturity” in the central  “institutions”  in HQ, important for international activities, 
such as  whistleblowing, anticorruption policy,  HSE functions, CSR functions,  the Code of Conduct 
and its practice,  institutions connecting to the issue of governance, anticorruption policy; lack of 
capital for the investments.  These factors are often latent, i.e. empirical data shows that it is important 
for the successful investments that the factors are not active and that their negative influence is 
hypothetic.  At the same time, the empirical findings illustrated that the latent factors suddenly can be 
active and influential, representing the considerable threats on the business results for the company. 
Thus, in this case the activity of the latent factors demands from the managers to be taken into 
consideration in order to “tune” the control packages further aiming to achieve the better result. This 
research has demonstrated that it may occur the situations when the “tuning” the configuration of the 
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control mechanisms doesn’t work, because of too strong impact from the factors. That’s why it is 
important to evaluate these factors in advance and include them as issue management for the strategic 
work, as the so called, “unknown -knows factors”. It is important to mention, that the phenomenon of 
latency, has been discovered in this study, but did not researched well, leaving this opportunity for 
further research.  
Thirdly, this research contributes to a renewal of the existing management control literature  by 
examining how the development of a control system as the configuration of control packages is a result 
of top managers’ perceptions of the outcome of control activities (Dermer & Lucas, 1986; Koeing et 
al., 1992; Bourmistrov and Kaarbøe, 2013; Seal & Mattimoe, 2014) , by discovering and presenting 
the phenomenon of “deprivation of control” as a driving force in the changes of the organization.    
In order to understand the mechanism of change by “tuning”, it is necessary to understand how the 
changes are happening, what are the triggers of the changes, the driving force and outcomes that can 
influence both the strategy for investments and de-investments and the way the corporate governance 
is built up and implemented, from a control perspective.  In addressing this, the study is built upon, 
and contribute to literature on changes in management control systems (e.g. Dermer & Lucas, 1986; 
Koeing et al., 1992; Adler and Borys, 1996; Bourmistrov & Kaarbøe, 2013; Seal & Mattimoe, 2014; 
Otley, 2016; Arend et al., 2017).  This literature   emphasizes that the change of control system is a 
result of top managers’ perceptions of the outcome of control activities. At the same time, it is 
necessary to mention this study also is drawn upon psychological research in understanding 
management accounting and control system change (Hall, 2016). There are previous studies that focus 
on how managerial perceptions of controls influence changes in the design of the control system 
(Bourmistrov & Kaarbøe, 2013). In terms of it, the study findings demonstrate that HQ managers 
experienced much “discomfort” (Bourmistrov & Kaarbøe, 2013) or “dissatisfaction” (Van de Ven and 
Poole, 1995) when they described their perceptions of how the use of configuration of control and 
employees had contributed to improving the degree of influence over subsidiaries during different 
stages of internationalization. Based on the empirical findings, this research discovered and explored 
the phenomenon of “deprivation of control”, experienced by the top managers at HQs and employees, 
working abroad in subsidiaries, who could influence the top managers. The findings show that the 
managers of “T” have “tuned” the control mechanisms in order to achieve influence towards 
subsidiaries and were driven by a “deprivation of control”, i.e. the recognition of the lack or low level 
of influence in subsidiaries, obstructing the realization of the established strategy. In this term, this 
study differs from the previous literature and contributes by presenting the new phenomena in the 
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research domain. The new paradigm highlights the new managerial perceptions of controls and gives 
a more nuanced picture of  changes in the organization aiming to achieve influence in the process of 
internationalization, as :1) the role of deprivation of control as an outcome of the change processes in 
control mechanisms that can mobilize change in the organization and, at the same time, be an important 
intimation of the need for change; 2) the role of deprivation of control as the driving force of the 
process of change in the control mechanisms during internationalization.  
In this respect, the empirical data shows that “T” experienced “deprivation of control” and left several 
important markets (India, the cluster of Central Europe), even where a high level of control had been 
achieved. The reason for that can be explained by the fact that HQ experienced deprivation of control 
in relation to the operations because of the recognition of a strong deprivation of control and influence 
over the antecedent conditions on the macro level that “T” wished to solve but could not manage. 
Examples could be the legislation situation in India, cluster refocusing related to the operations in 
Central Europe because of the high level of maturity of the markets and the limited ability to increase 
profitability. In both examples, “T” achieved a high level of influence, the whole scope of the controls 
was presented, and it was not possible to “tune” more.  
At the same time, “T” did not manage to “tune” the impact from the “antecedent conditions", as well 
as the factors that negatively influenced the operations, and left the markets. Thus, when the  
“antecedent conditions” and impetus factors that impacted the strategy started to be a dominating factor 
that it was not possible to control and/or “tune”, and  when these conditions started to be destructive 
for the operation, and the modus of the “deprivation of control” started to be dominant in  the 
consequences for “T”, it was necessary to develop a new strategy  as the outcome. The research 
findings suggest to look at the described above factors of impact on the realization of chosen strategy 
with the lens from the managerial perceptions of controls. These findings conclude that these factors 
explained managers deprived of control and the mindset of top managers in HQ, regarding their 
perceptions of the actual state of the degree of influence they felt the HQ has or should have over its 
subsidiaries, meaning how the implementation of the configuration of controls and its “tuning”  should 
be design or reshaped.   
However, the expressions of dissatisfaction were shown by the fact that, irrespective of what they did, 
HQ managers were never able to achieve a full degree of influence by reshaping stage of 
internationalization presented its own and unique challenge that has never been fully solved by a 
particular configuration of a package of controls.   
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This means that the phenomenon, “deprivation of control”, should be considered as well as intimation 
indicating on the factors that could help to avoid the “illusion of control” - experiences (Seal & 
Mattimoe, 2014; Dermer & Lucas, 1986). The empirical findings and the discussion in the research 
domain showed that the managers experiencing “the illusion of control” mindset often do not   trigger 
the changes, as long as they   do not experience intimations that something is wrong and should be 
changed.  This means that, in the long run, the situation of “the illusion of control”, which in practice 
means the loss of control, can lead to a deprived situation, when the organization can fall into 
“deprivation of control”. 
In this respect, the phenomenon of “deprivation of control” as a driving force of the process of changes 
in “T” during the process of internationalization differ from the previous research and  will contribute 
to the management control and accounting domain and emphasize the new knowledge on the issues of 
the perceived influence and control, with several implications for the theory and practice. 
 At the same time, the study contributes to the process theory literature, precisely to the teleological 
theory with the new knowledge and revealed a more complicated picture of the processes of change in 
organization. The current research extends the teleological motor of changes (e.g. Van de Ven and 
Poole, 1995; Poole et al., 2000),  by including several important perspectives, such as the mode of 
perceived influence and control by managers, the factors explained managers deprived of control, and 
the phenomena of “tuning” and “deprivation of control”.  
This study draws up on the process theory (e.g. Van de Ven and Poole, 1995; Poole et al., 2000), 
aiming to structure and analyze the empirical data related to the process of changes in “T” during its 
internationalization, and highlights  the triggers and driving force  of the changes of the mechanisms 
of influence in the process of internationalization.   
The study extend the teleological theory of changes, including several important perspectives, such as 
the mode of perceived influence and control by managers, the factors explained managers deprived of 
control/ factors of impact on the realization of the chosen strategy, and the phenomena of “tuning” and 
“deprivation of control”. 
As Model 8.3 shows, this perception of “dissatisfaction” was developed and present over time because 
managers experienced incongruence between the internationalization process and its ascendancies, the 
use of the package of control mechanisms and the outcome of the control process itself.  
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Presented in extended Model 3.1, the changes in the process of internationalization of “T” were called 
“the wheel of change”, when the central processes and modes of changes are constant rotating in order 
to achieve the desired level of influence over the subsidiaries.   The phenomenon of “deprivation of 
control” is placed in the center of the “the wheel of change”, underlying that “deprivation of control” 
is, 1.)  both an individual manager’s understanding of a control situation in the internationalization 
settings, when the managers are not being able to design appropriate control mechanisms and, to 
achieve the desired level of influence over the subsidiaries; 2.) and the direct link to the process of 
reconsidering the strategy, which can have important consequences for “T”.  That is why the study 
describes “deprivation of control” as a driving force of the processes of change in “T”’s 
internationalization. 
To summarize, the increased international presence has required the development of a new way of 
thinking about HQ’s actual state of influence over subsidiaries and rethinking the use of the 
configuration of controls. This rethinking process, as interpreted in this study, when analyzing 
narratives of top managers and employees, resembles a search for/a desire to achieve high level of 
influence over subsidiaries by experimenting and “tuning” the configuration of controls as a package 
towards the different contingencies and new antecedences. The study concludes that the driving force 
a driving force of the changes in the process of internationalization is the “deprivation of control”. 
Limitations of the study should be acknowledged 
Firstly, the study is case-based on the experiences of one Norwegian MNC that succeeded in its 
internationalization process. The interviews were primarily conducted with the staff in HQ and the 
employees who worked as expatriates. The results highlight the need to go further in the research in 
relation to the role of control mechanism packages, both theoretically and empirically. In this 
connection, it could be beneficial to conduct the research based mostly on empirical evidence from the 
subsidiaries. That could provide the possibility to look at the mechanisms of influence, not just from 
the HQ toward the subsidiaries but from the subsidiaries towards HQ.  
Secondly, the analysis could pay more attention to the issues of the interplay of different control 
mechanisms in MNCs as a tool of influence towards subsidiaries abroad.  It is an interesting area for 
continued research; the combination of different forms of external and internal control in MNCs, and 
what the role of packages of control would be in this setting, could be furthered explored.  
266 
 
Thirdly, the study did not focus on SME companies86. That can be interpreted as a gap in knowledge 
of how to achieve influence in small-sized subsidiaries abroad.  
Finally, the present research did not pay enough attention to the issue of state ownership and its impact 
on the process of internationalization of the MNC, “T”.  The current active processes of reconsidering 
state ownership in Scandinavia call for more attention on this topic. In this respect, it will be interesting 
to investigate the issue of state ownership from both the empirical and theoretical perspectives. 
Research implications and further research 
Furthermore, in terms of the further research, it is important to acknowledge that   this explorative and 
longitudinal case study is the first attempt to create the broader research within accounting domain to 
bring analyses of processes of internationalization in the Norwegian MNC “T”. More research is 
needed to develop these findings further both in the research domain of the accounting and 
management control, and the management and strategy literature.  
From the findings of this study come several interesting and relevant promising subjects. Thus, the 
results of the study have an implication for how companies, especially in the earlier days of their 
internationalization, need to address their internationalization strategies and the design of management 
systems to control subsidiaries, understanding that the  above described  phenomenon   of “deprivation 
of control” is possibly  invisible but needs to be taken into consideration during the development of 
the management control systems.    The empirical evidence shows that the visibility of “deprivation of 
control” is often connected to the feeling of intimation, meaning the understanding that when managers 
and employees experience and “store” the first signals of “deprivation of control” or perceived 
influence or perceived control, the first action of the consideration of the changes should be evaluated.    
Furthermore, the current study demonstrated the importance of antecedent conditions and factors that 
impact the realization of the decided strategy. The empirical findings described that the factors can be 
latent and, at the same time, an impetus that can seriously affect the business practice and strategy, 
when it will be not possible any more to “tune” the configuration of the control mechanisms, and when 
deprivation of control started to be strong. The phenomenon of latency related to the management 
control has not been investigated in this this study.  It will be interesting to carefully examine the 
                                                 
86 SME - small and medium size enterprises 
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phenomenon of latency in the further research in order to strengthen the knowledge about the 
deprivation of control and tuning. 
In addition, the present study demonstrated the international context of the studied phenomenon of 
influence. Further research, based on cross-cultural aspects in the management control domain, could 
contribute to a better understanding of the interplay of management controls in the cross-cultural 
framework.  
Moreover, the study analyzed the tuning of several control packages and specifically expat control 
during the internationalization process: from “passionate ambassadors” to “consultants” and then 
“professionals”. It will be important to continue research in the field of expatriate management, as long 
as the interest in this topic is not sufficiently developed in the framework of the globalization processes. 
Finally, the study described the new phenomenon, “deprivation of control”. At the same time, the 
literature in the research domain presented the findings described as the “illusion of control”.  Further 
research into the topic of how illusion of control and deprivation of control can link to each other, and 
differ from each other, could contribute to strengthening knowledge in the management control 
research domain.  
Implications for practitioners   
The current study presented interesting managerial implications that are worth noting. The findings 
described the process of internationalization in a Norwegian MNC “T” as a process of constant change 
by “tuning”, the driving force of which was the deprivation of control.  It therefore becomes obvious 
that companies need more knowledge about internationalization in a challenging time of globalization. 
This will give companies important information about the development of strategies and control 
systems for the HQ to use in respect of its subsidiaries, in order to avoid “deprived” situations.  This 
study started to look at the relationship   between processes of “tuning”, “deprivation” and the 
phenomenon which will be explored in the future research, as “latency”.  The collaboration between 
these processes can be useful for the practitioners in terms of better understanding the process of 
changes and decision-making in organizations. Thus, the process of “tuning” the configuration of 
control packages, which describes that managers want to do well by adjusting the system ( e.g strategy, 
control systems, etc.)  not always can lead to the desired changes because of the latent factors. Thus, 
the process can lead to the “deprivation of control”, when the managers will not have the inability to 
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obtain what is considered a necessity. Thus, it is important to pay careful attention on the latent factors 
that can be called as “unknown - know” in order to take the right decisions.  
That said, it will also be important for companies to look carefully at the presented findings in relation 
to the phenomenon of “tuning”; that will bring better knowledge of how changes can occur in 
organizations in order to achieve the best result in careful changing of the control mechanisms and 
strategy.  
The findings of the study illustrate how to increase the understanding of managerial perceptions of 
controls. This is important for the practitioners because those perceptions influence the managerial 
judgment and beliefs about how the control system affects the relationship between the organizational 
behavior and its outcomes. The right perceptions can lead managers form the “illusion of control”. 
Findings related to the role of antecedent conditions and factors that impact the realization of the 
strategy could be beneficial for managers, in order avoid “dissatisfaction” in achieving strategic goals. 
The findings of the study, related to the configuration of the control mechanisms as a package, can 
contribute to better understanding in the business community of the importance of paying greater 
attention to the interplay between different controls in order to develop sustainable business and avoid 
the unnecessary challenges.  
The findings of the study show the necessity to include the issues of the cross-cultural management in 
the managerial processes related both to the operations abroad, and to the operations in HQ that will 
increase knowledge about the context   of doing business in the challenging global environment  
The findings presented in this research show several important processes that can be called “doing and 
learning by practice”. This means that, during the practice of the management control systems, 
intimations that management control does not work well and needs “tuning” in order to avoid 
experiencing “deprivation of control” can be discovered.  Companies can benefit from an 
understanding of such a practice of obtaining and transferring knowledge, related to  the choice of 
ownership for the subsidiaries,  functions and role of BoD, training of expatriates, the process of 
implementation of  corporate rules and the role of the CEO of HQ as the important mechanism in 
achieving influence,   which will increase robusticity in doing business abroad.  
269 
 
Summing up, the study contributes to practitioners by providing a better understanding of the process 
of internationalization and to the renewal of knowledge about the activities of the MNC during 
international expansion, in relation to strategy development, development of the control systems and 
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“T” at a Glance87, as 2015 
“T” was founded in 1855 and builds on 160 years of telecom experience.” (“T”’s web site).” T” is one 
of the world’s major mobile operators with 211 million mobile subscriptions. We have mobile 
operations in 13 markets and in 14 additional markets through our ownership in VCom Ltd.” (Ibid). 
The main revenues of “T” come from its mobile operations that are concentrated in three geographic 
regions: The Nordic, Central and Eastern Europe and Asia. 
“T” Nordics:  
Norway, Sweden, Denmark; “T” is a leading provider of mobile and fixed services in Norway, Sweden 
and Denmark as well as having a strong position in the rapidly growing Scandinavian broadband 
market 4G services have been launched in Norway and Sweden. “T” Group’s core business in the 
region includes T Broadcast, which is among the leading providers of television and satellite 
broadcasting services in the region and operates the national terrestrial broadcast network in Norway. 
“T” Central and Eastern Europe: Hungary, Serbia, Montenegro and Bulgaria. 
“T” Group has a strong position as provider of mobile services in Hungary, Serbia, Montenegro and 
Bulgaria. “T” has an economic interest of 33 % in VCom Ltd., offering mobile services in an additional 
14 markets. (VCom Ltd. offers mobile services in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, 
Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Algeria, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Zimbabwe and Italy).  
Across the region “T” Group is focused on growing data traffic and seizing mobile broadband 
opportunities. 3G services have been launched in Serbia, Hungary, Montenegro and Russia. In Serbia 
“T” also has a license for fixed line operations. 
 
 
                                                 
87 Web site “T”, 2015 
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“T” Asia: Thailand, Malaysia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, India and Myanmar 
According to “T”’s website the company explains its fast success in internationalization as following: 
“Our success is built on combining our global telecoms expertise with regional knowledge transfer and 
local market insight to create value for different segments. We have achieved significant and rapid 
subscriber growth in all markets” (“T” website, 2016). 
Describing the strategy of the company “T” mentioned that the company position itself as “the most 
efficient operator” (“T” website, 2016). Thus, “T” writes: “with diminishing growth in telco revenue 
and increased competition on services from internet players, “T” needs to operate smarter and more 
efficiently. We will accelerate technology efficiency, pursue process simplification and deploy new 
operating models, to significantly reduce costs. We have established a global transformation program 
to drive the implementation of the strategy”. 
Revenue distribution Q2 2016 shows that Asian markets stands for 55% of the total revenue, European 
market stands for 22% and the Norwegian markets stands for 20% revenue that improves the 
international focus for “T”  -   the possibilities for the further grows of the company will come from 
the markets abroad ( see the diagram)  
 




•Strong footprint in Central and Eastern Europe and Asia 
•Leading Nordic position in mobile, broadband and TV services 
•Substantial activities in subsidiaries and joint venture operations 
•One of the top 500 global companies by market value (Financial Times Global 500 2015) 
•More than 36,000 employees worldwide 
•Revenues 2015: NOK 128 billion (“T”’s web site, 2015) 
 
 
“T” Group at a Glance, as 201988 
 
"T" Group connects its 174 million customers to what matters most. Connecting the world has been 
"T"’s domain for more than 160 years and we currently operate across Scandinavia and Asia. We are 
committed to responsible business conduct and driven by the ambition of empowering societies. 
 
"T" Group: 
• Strong footprint in Scandinavia and Asia (Global Impact Report 2016) 
• Leading Nordic position in mobile, broadband and TV services 
• Substantial activities in subsidiaries and joint venture operations 
• More than 20,000 employees worldwide 
• Revenues 2018: NOK 110 billion 
 
"T"  was founded in 1855 and builds on over a 160 years of telecom experience. 
Key figures "T" Group: 
                                                 





                                  Q4 
2018 
                                  Q4 
2017 
                                  FY 
2018 
                                   
 
                                   
 
  
Revenues      28 171      28 678    110 396           
Organic revenue 
growth (%) 
(0.4) (1.0) (0.6)   
Subscription and 
traffic revenues 





(0.7) 2.8 0.2   
EBITDA before 
other income and 
other expenses 
     10 338      10 813      45 319               
Organic EBITDA 
growth (%) 
(2.9) 11.1 3.2   
EBITDA before 




        36.7         37.7         41.1                   
Net income 
attributable to 
equity holders of 
"T"ASA 









                                  Q4 
2018 
                                  Q4 
2017 
                                  FY 
2018 
                                   
 
                                   
 
  
Total Capex      18 619        5 830      31 245               






          0.8           2.2          174                     
"T" Group’s mobile operations 
Nordic 
"T" Norway (in Norwegian) 
"T" Denmark (in Danish) 





















                                                 
89  The new name of VCom from 2017 
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("T"''s website, 2019)  
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Appendix 2.  
 
“T” Way (TW) 
Here is how TW is presented on "T" web site up to the beginning of November 2014: 
 
 
In "T" Group you are encouraged to make your own choices and to find the best approach to your work. 
You have freedom, but you also have a responsibility to act according to the standards we have set. In 
other words, you must know what is valued and what is unacceptable.”         
 
Our Vision (Empower societies) - we provide the power of digital 
communication, enabling everyone to improve their lives, build 
societies and secure a better future for all.; Our mission (We’re here 
to help our customers) - we exist to help our customers get the full 
benefit of being connected. Our success is measured by how 
passionately they promote us.; Our values (Make it easy; Keep 
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promises; Be inspiring; Be respectful) serve as a guide for our everyday work and describe how we should 
serve our customers and work together as colleagues.; Code of Conduct defines the core principles and 
ethical standards by which we create value in our company; Leadership Expectations (Passion for 
business; Change and continuous improvement; Excellent execution; Empower people; Integrity and 
accountability). One of the most important elements in TW is Governing Documents that establish a 
minimum set of formal standards for how work is to be conducted within the "T" Group”.  
The new refocused “T” - TW is in a changing process. 
The new EVP Head of People Development (PD)90 has presented in June 2014 for Group Executive 
Management (GEM) the revised concept of TW and a plan of its implementation that was approved by 
the leadership of “T” The concept has been adopted and published on "T"’s web site in November 2014. 
The reason for the refocusing of TW:   
“We must continue to build a strong culture across all "T" markets as the basis for our long-term success. 
That's why we have now refocused the TWay91," (President and CEO of the "T" Group. "T"’s intranet 
2014).  
The new model of TW (T intranet, the new manuals about TW, November 2014)                                     
 
 
“T”’s website, November 2014:  
“T Way is the foundation for our business”, “standards for how we do business.  
                                                 
90 "T"’s Human Resources – HR 
91 TWay is the same as TW 
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The core of the T Way is our vision, Empower Societies. We bring vital infrastructure, new services 
and products that stimulate progress and change. Every day the opportunities offered by mobile 
technology grow. With our vision, we emphasize "T"’s role in realizing these opportunities. 
With our mission ‘We’re here to help our customers’ we crystallize our customer focus as the 
cornerstone of everything we do. 
Our values spell out how we should behave in serving our customers in all our markets: Make it easy. 
Keep promises. Be inspiring. Be respectful. By delivering on our values we will create relevant, 
tangible customer benefits and a pointed difference in each of the markets where we operate. 
"T"´s ambitions and culture are reinforced by our new Leadership Attitudes. They define the mindset 
expected from our leaders in steering the company to reach our goals. "T"'s leaders explore; they seek 
new lessons and ways of listening to customers. "T"'s leaders engage; they collaborate to find win-win 
and reach great results. "T"'s leaders empower; they share responsibility, build trust and give 
constructive feedback. And "T "'s leaders execute, they deliver swiftly with precision, whatever it 
takes.” 
The new version of TW now includes Vision, Mission, updated Code of Conduct, Values and new 
Leadership Attitudes (4E - Explore=innovation, Engage=Collaboration, Empower=enable team 
members to find the best solution and Execute=retain our strong results orientation). Policies and 
Manuals are no longer part of the TWay. According to "T" “this change was made to simplify the T 
Way ("T"’s intranet, 2014). 
Another adjustment in TW concept is the implementation of 'TWay Commitment'. As it is defined 
by "T" 'T Way Commitment' “spells out what you sign up for when you join "T" and allows all of us 
to reflect on this”.  
The Code of Conduct has been upgraded in order to “reflect the development of "T" business and 
changes in society that requires an even sharper focus on issues such as anticorruption, conflict of 
interest, terrorism, cybercrime and fraud” ("T"’s intranet, 2014). Polices, and Manuals are taking away 
from TW. "T" explains that because of “policies and supporting manuals are relevant in certain internal 
processes or for certain groups of employees” (like a sourcing policy, accounting policy and a brand 
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management policy) it was decided to take them out of the TWay. At the same time, "T" underlines 
that “Policies and Manuals still remain an important part of how we do business and they are easily 
accessible on the WOW (ibid,) as before”.  The essential changers in the new version of TW is that 
"T" admitted that if before the TW was based on the Scandinavian values (“we in 2005 pointed to our 
Scandinavian heritage in our messages”, (ibid), now "T" is an organization where “ideas, practices and 
people flow in many more directions” (ibid.) Without to give a definition that TW is a corporate culture 
TW is placed on the Intranet under the category “Our culture” (together with many other elements, for 
example  with the information about Trade Unions that have nothing to do with the cultural issues: 
Occupational Health Safety, Employees Engagement Survey, etc.). 
"T’s management as well declared that “we are moving from a holding-company approach to a more 
collaborative united force, where we will build a common culture and stimulate best practice sharing 







Corporate governance of “T”92 
Vision, Mission and Values  
“Our industry plays an increasingly important role in people’s everyday lives. Our vision, mission and 
values express where "T" is headed and the role we will play both in transforming people’s lives and 
empowering societies to grow and progress. Our vision:  Empower societies. We provide the power of 
digital communication, enabling everyone to improve their lives, build societies and secure a better 
future for all. Our vision to empower societies is a clear call to action. We bring vital infrastructure, 
new services and products that stimulate progress, change and improvement» 
 
Our mission: We’re here to help our customers 
We exist to help our customers get the full benefit of being connected. Our success is measure by how 
passionately they promote us. 
Our values:  Our values serve as a guide for our everyday work. They describe how we should serve 
our customers and work together as colleagues. 
Be respectful - We acknowledge and respect local cultures and want to be a part of local communities 
wherever we operate. 
Keep promises - We’re about delivery, not overpromising. We’re about actions, not words. 
Make it easy - We don’t complicate things. Everything we produce should be easy to understand and 
use. 
Be inspiring - Everything we produce should look good, modern and fresh. We find new ways to 
improve and create value – for people and society alike”. 
“T” describes as well it governance and the most important principles connected to Governance in «T» 
(all materials are from “T’s website) 
                                                 
92 Materials are from «T» website, 2016) 
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“Corporate governance defines a framework of rules and procedures by which the "T "Group governs 
and controls its business. Good corporate governance is about establishing a sound platform for such 
a framework and applying our values in order to create value for "T" stakeholders. 
We consider good corporate governance to be a prerequisite for value creation and trustworthiness and 
for access to capital. 
Governance principles:  
In order to secure strong and sustainable corporate governance, it is important that we ensure good and 
healthy business practices, reliable financial reporting and an environment of compliance with 
legislation and regulations across the “T” Group. 
The “T” Group has governance documents setting out principles for how business should be 
conducted. These apply to all “T” units. The “T”’ Governance regime is approved by the Board of 
Directors in “T” ASA93. 
Trust and transparency  
We believe good corporate governance involves openness and trustful cooperation between all parties 
involved in the Group: the owners, the Corporate Assembly, the Board and Group Executive 
Management, employees, customers, suppliers, creditors, public authorities and society in general. 
When submitting reports, “T” provides both financial and non-financial information, emphasizing 
transparency so that interested parties may be able to make informed decisions. 
Applying values to create value  
Good corporate governance principles are reflected in our values – Make it easy. Keep promises. 
Be respectful. Be inspiring. By applying our values in what we do as an organization, we create value 
and maintain a healthy corporate culture. 
 
                                                 
93 The official name of “T” HQ  as corporation – the owner of all subsidiaries 
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Rules and regulations  
“T” is subject to specific rules and regulations in all the countries where the Group Conduct business. 
The "T"’ shares are listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange. As an issuer of shares the company must 
comply with rules regarding Norwegian stock exchange and rules regarding public limited companies. 
Compliance with rules and regulations  
The “T” Group has developed a set of governing documents, including the Code of Conduct, as well 
as policies (Group Policies) and accompanying manuals (Group Manuals), to ensure good and efficient 
governance and control. Internal rules are adapted and implemented in all subsidiaries where the “T” 
Group has operational control. 
“T” Group works continuously to ensure that governing documents, training and control mechanisms 
are current and adequate. They should meet our own requirements as well as the justified expectations 
of other interested parties. We work systematically to ensure compliance with rules and regulations. 
In 2011, the HSSE committee was extended and renamed Ethics and Sustainability committee. The 
committee supports the Board in fulfilling its responsibility with respect to ethics and compliance, 
corporate responsibility, HSSE and sustainability in the supply chain. 
Whistleblowing  
Employees who become aware of any kind of infringement are encouraged to report this to their leader 
or the Local- or Group Ethics & Compliance Officer. In fact, failure to do so is itself a breach of T’s 
Code of Conduct» 
“T” has established a Hotline to compliance throughout the Group. The hotline is not staffed around 
the clock, but incidents may still be reported in official local language by phone, e-mail or postal 




“T” does not allow reprisals of any kind against those, who in good faith, report an infringement or 
suspicion of an infringement.  Misconduct that may result in disciplinary actions includes failure to 
promptly raise a known or suspected breach. 
Socially responsible business conduct  
Our efforts to ensure socially responsible business conduct involve more than just good business ethics 
at all levels. They concern the manner in which we treat our employees, our relationship to nature and 
our surrounding environment, our efforts to ensure safe products, as well as a number of other factors.” 





Appendix 4.  
 
About “T”’s Culture – the further developed concept after TW. 
“Our Culture94 
 
"T"’s culture is what binds us together as one company, across all the societies we serve. 
Our strategy spells out what we do; our behaviours explain how we deliver; and our purpose is our 
reason for existence. Being a part of or a partner to "T" means sharing our commitment and passion 
for these key elements that shape our culture. 
Our purpose 
Connecting you to what matters most. Empowering societies. 
Connecting customers to what matters most has been the core of our business for more than 160 years. 
Today internet connectivity impacts nearly every part of our lives, and we believe in making it person-
alized and relevant for our customers. It’s about more than good business; it’s empowering societies.  
 
Our behaviours 
We have four behaviours that guide the way we work: 
• Always Explore. We believe growth comes from learning every day. We’re curious and we 
dare to challenge, test, fail fast and pivot. 
• Create together. We believe diverse teams find better solutions. We seek different perspec-
tives, share, involve and help each other succeed. 
• Keep promises. We believe that trust is key in all our relationships. We take ownership and 
pride in delivering with precision and integrity. 
                                                 
94 From "T"'s website, 2019 
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• Be respectful. We believe in the unique human ability to understand what matters for people. 
We meet everyone at eye level, listen and show that we care. 
In addition to our purpose and behaviours, everyone working with or for "T" are required to commit 
to, abide by and annually renew their signature on our Code of Conduct. 
Our strategy 
"T"’s strategic direction is common across our business units and spells out what we do to fulfill our 
purpose. It is expressed in an operational action plan which is updated annually. 
Our strategic direction is based on four key beliefs: 
• Internet access is the foundation of our business 
• Personalisation will stimulate customer engagement and capture value 
• Efficient operations are prerequisites for sustainable growth and competitiveness 
• Leading digital positions can be taken in our footprint 
Our 2018 action plan expresses our priorities for the year: delivering growth, pushing for continu-
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The list of the most important abbreviations: 
 
Abbreviations Explanation 
BC Behavior control 
BoD Board of Directors 
CEE Central Eastern Europe 
CCR Corporate Common Rules 
CEO Chief executive officer 
CFO Chief financial officer 
COO Chief operational officer 
CoC Conduct of Conducts 
CSR Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
EVP Executive vice president 
FC Financial control 
IB International Business 
IBS International Business 
Studies  
ISM International strategic 
management 
MA Management agreement 
MCA Management control and 
accounting 
MCS Management control 
system 
MMB Mobile management board 
MNC Multinational corporation 
M&A Merging and Acquisitions 
OC Operational control 
PS Political Science 
RQ Research question 
SC Strategic control 
SM Strategic management 
SS Social Science  
TMC Top management support 
TW  T Way  


















1 Former legal director of “T”, 
member of the executive board 
Had experiences from to be an 













2 Former director, member of the 
executive group 
2015 1 -2 h 1,5 h Interview 
3 Former director in international 
operations who had as well solid 
experiences from Norway 
2014 
2015 
1 – 2 h 
1 - 2 h 
3 h Interview 





2 h Interview 
Interview 
5 Member of the Executive Board 




1 - 2 h 1,5 h Interview 
5 Employee in subsidiary  2015 1 h 
 
1 h Interview 
7 Former member of the Executive 













8 CEO 2001-2016 2015 1 h  1 h Interview 
9 Former senior manager worked 
both in Norway and abroad, 





1 – 2 h 
30 min  
30 min  
30 min 




10 Manager in the region Europe 2015 1 h 1 h Interview 
11 Former manager in European 
operations   
2017 1 h 1 h Interview 
12 Former executive worked abroad 
international mobile operations   
2017 1 – 2 h 
 
1,5 h Interview 
13 Employee from subsidiary 2016 1 h 1 h Interview 
14 Former executive   from subsidiary  2012 1-2 h 1,5 h Interview 
15 CCR employee 2015 1 h 1 h Conversation 
16 Employee  2016 30 min 30 min Conversation 
17 Former EVP (worked both with 

















21 Former member of the Executive 
Board, responsible for the 
international operations 
2010 30 min 30 min Conversation 
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22 Former Executive manager 
worked both in Norway and 
internationally, had almost 30 
years career in “T” 
2012 30 min 30 min Conversation 
23 Employee 2017 30 min 30 min Conversation 
24 Former senior manager worked 
both in Norway and abroad, 




















26 Manager worked abroad  2014 1 h 1 h Interview 
27 Former HR manager 2014 1 -2 h 1,5 h Interview 




3 h Interview 
Interview 
29 Manager Norwegian operations 2014 1 h 1 h Interview 
30 Experienced financial manager 2014 30 min 30 min Conversation 
31 Experienced manager 2015 1 h 1 h Interview 













33 Former VP in HR 2014 1 h 1 h Interview 
34 Manager in HQ, had a solid 









35 Former executive manager worked 
both in Norway and 
internationally, had almost 30 
years career in “T” 
2012 30 min 30 min Conversation 
36 Senior manager worked in the 





2,5 h Conversation 
Interview 
37 Employee   from the division that 
had projects with   in the Northern 
part of Russia  
2018 1 h 1 h Interview 
38 Former senior manager, 
responsible for the first 
international projects in “T” from 
1991 
2018 1-2 h 1-2 h Interview 
39 Employee in former Consulting 
division    
2016 30 min  30 min Conversation 
40 Employee abroad 2011 30 min 30 min Conversation 
41 Executive manager who worked in 




30 min  
2 h Interview 
Conversation 
Total: 40 respondents, 57 interviews  
 Respondents from other companies 
1 Executive manager in subsidiary of 
oil company, has solid experience 





2 h Interview 
Interview 
2 Executive manager in shipping 
company which has subsidiaries 
abroad  
2016 1 h 1 h Interview 
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3 Executive manager working 
internationally  
2014 1 h 1 h Interview 
4 Manager working with 





30 min  




5 Executive in a consulting company 
working internationally 
2014 30 min 30 min Conversation 
6 Norwegian having business in 
Russia 
2014 1 h 1 h Interview 
7 Lawyer working with international 
customers and abroad 









Appendix 9.  
 
Appendix to Literature review provides an overview of the analytical framework applied for analyzing 
when overview of reverences related to the literature review, information about the scientific journals 
where the articles have been published, the method applied under the research and the concepts 
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MCA The role of professionals/ 
bureaucratic administrative 
in the management of 
complex organizations that 
can follow to the conflicts  
Sample 







MCA Leadership and control 
system design 
Sample 








MCA Management control systems 
in research and development 





Adler, P. S. 





MCA Tension between creativity 
and control.  
Survey 
Quantitate 






MCA “A conceptualization of 
workflow formalization that 
helps reconcile the 
contrasting assessments of 
bureaucracy as alienating to 
employees or as enabling 












ISM Choice of foreign market 
entry mode: impact of 
ownership, location and 
internalization factors.  
Survey 
Agrawal, A.  
and Knoeber, 






ISM Firm performance and 
mechanisms to control. 
Agency problems between 



















MCA A variety of forms of 
management control in a 
large management 
consultancy entities and 
interface 
 Case Interviews 
324 
 
between different forms of 
control 
Ambos, T. C.,  







IM The traditional role of HQs 
in MNCs as sources of 
knowledge and competencies 
in change.  
“HQs act as a receiver of 











SM The role of the strategic 
planning process and 
influence on the profitability 
that links to negative 










MCA The use of MCS to manage 
CSR, exploring how 
organizations leverage MCS 
indifferent ways in order to 











 IB Staffing in multinational 
corporations' (MNCs') -the 
ethical impact of policies on 
diverse stakeholder groups.  . 
Survey 
Barbosa, N., 






ISM  Ownership in MNCs (cases 
from Greece and Portugal).  
Survey 
Barsky, N. P. 
and Hussein, 
M. E. (1999) 
AAAJ MCA “Compare stakeholder and 
shareholder value models of 
management accountability 
to gain insights into the 
broader economic and 
societal consequences of the 
current financial reporting 
model”.  
Survey 
Bartlett, S. A. 
and Ghoshal, 




ISM Linking organizational 
context and managerial 
action: “the dimensions of 
quality of management”.  
Longitudinal 
field‐study 
Bate K.A, and 
Amundson, 




ISM “Relationship between 
manufacturing strategy and 
organizational culture:  a 
collectivist or group-oriented 
organizational culture with 
coordinated decision making, 
decentralized authority, and a 
loyal work force”. 
Survey 
Beamish, P.W 




MCS Performance of foreign firms 
investing in China, and the 
factors influencing profit 




staffing, ownership structure. 
Challenges for foreign 
subsidiaries in China because 






MCA MMCs across different 
modes of innovation that 
effects the performance.  
How managers attempt to 
“simultaneously balance 
exploration and exploitation, 
which place contradictory 
requirements on firms.” 
Survey 
Bedford, D. 





MCS Configurations of controls - 
how management controls 
operate together as “a 





measurement   
Ben-Amar, W. 






 Finance and MCA Separation of ownership 








MCA Cross-national management 
control research with a focus 
on international management 
control diversity; in the 
“structuring of organizational 
arrangements and forms of 
management practices across 






Birkinshaw, J.  





ISM  How managers need 
“tactical savvy, persistence, 
and luck to break through 
corporate barriers” when the 
local initiatives create the 
new opportunities in MNC. 
Questioner 






MCA “The effects of the 
interactive use of 
management control systems 
on product innovation. 
relationships among 
variables embedded in 
Simons’ framework of levers 














MCS A field study of two MNCs 
using “beyond budgeting” 
ideas - “how change in the 
design principles of 
management control systems 
(MCSs) based on 
implementing the beyond 
budgeting (BB) ideas has 
influenced the transition of 
decision-makers from 













MCA How management 
accounting systems “create 
tensions in a crisis showing 
that top managers respond to 
their perceptions of the crisis 
by tightening the budget 












ISM How post-formation 
processes are interplaying, 
and how they relate to 











Finance and MCS The role of accounting 
information, environment 
and MC in multi‐national 
organizations - “non‐
accounting, “behavior” 
controls” have a special role 
in the foreign subsidiary, 
challenges because of 
placement of U.S. nationals 
in senior management 
positions in the subsidiary. 
Survey 






MCA Management control in inter-
firm relationships with a 
focus on “the lateral 
processing of information, 
transcending legal 




M., Kraus, K. 










MCA “The role of performance 
measurement systems (PMS) 
in managing the co-existence 
of different institutional 
logics in organizations.” 
Different levels of 
performance are important 
“for understanding the 
differences in compromising 
behavior in organizations”.  
Interviews 
Carlsson-Wall, 








MCS Detailed action planning in 
sport events (different 
organizations) “served as the 
backbone in the chain of 
control in each case, 
connecting the evaluation 
based on non-financial 
measures with the budgeting, 
and with policies and 
procedures that were applied 









ISM The coupling of ownership 




























SS Influence, leadership, control 
- social influence “emanates 
from individuals with 
leadership, and not 
necessarily because of the 
position they occupy” 
Survey 





and Society  
MCA “The effects of relative 
partner knowledge and 
specific asset investments on 







and manager performance 
Incentivas) ”. 
Questionnaire 







MCS “The level of information 
system integration fosters the 
four design characteristics 
that make up an enabling 








MCA  Management practices that 
elaborate on HO and 
implications for a horizontal 
dimension to accounting are 
examined. “Complementary 
developments in 
management accounting, and 
how effective practice and 
research have been in 
developing a horizontal 
dimension to management 
accounting.”  The 
innovations in management 
accounting, (such as activity-
based accounting and holistic 
performance measurement 
like balanced scorecards) 




affects on those developing 
ideas related to HO”.  
Child, J. and 





MCA Topic: investment and 
control in international joint 
ventures.  
“Equity share is the major 
lever for the exercise of has a 
direct effect on operational 
control in addition to its 
indirect effect through 
appointments to key 
executive positions”.  
Interviews  
Chow, C. W, 
Shields M. D. 







MCA The effects of national 
culture on firms’ design of 
and employees’ preference 
for MCs. The importance of 
national culture in the design 
of for management controls 
for multi-national operations 
Interviews 
Christmann, 
P., Day, D. 





ISM Country conditions are a very 
important determinant of 
firm performance. Thus, 
subsidiary performance is 
determined mainly by 
conditions outside the control 
of subsidiary management. 
Survey 
Collings, D. G, 







IM International staffing in 
MNC. HCN (host country 
nationals) and third country 
nationals (TCNs) employees 
play a key role in managing 
the subsidiaries investigated; 
focus on a   strong 
centralized control over 
subsidiaries. Use of HCNs 
and TCNs “to staff senior 
positions in new expansions 
within the host country is 
higher where the expansion 
follows a wave of earlier 













MCA Issues of social control and 
coordination in organizations 
– “managerial accounting as 
important aspects of the 
manner in which 











ISM “The headquarters' intended 
strategies are decisive to 
explain role development in 
peripheral host countries, 
though micro-political 
headquarter–subsidiary 













Psychology How “subordinates perceive 
the power of their 
supervisors and the causal 
mechanisms by which these 










 MCS “Co-deterministic 
relationship between 
ownership concentration and 











IM MNC’s HQ’ role in 
subsidiaries’ value-creating 
activities: -this role is 
dependent on” how the 
knowledge situation of HQ is 
conceptualized”. HQ’s active 
role and involvement in the 







   
. 





The MNC 's level of control 
over subsidiaries abroad:  to 
what degree a function 
should be integrated, 
“whereby integration is a 
continuum anchored by the 







 IM A comparative discussion on 
how different change 
management approaches in 
MNCs: how institutional 
environments may influence 
subsidiary competences and 
learning: the country of 
origin or home country 
institutions of the MNC itself 
and the host country 
embeddedness of the 
subsidiaries.  
Interviews 
Geringer, J. M. 






IBS Control and performance of 
international JVs. The paper 
reviews and synthesizes prior 
studies addressing the 
conceptualization and 
operationalization of control 





R., Singal, M.  
and Mu, S. S 





IM Issue of knowledge among 
subsidiaries in MNCs. The 
ties among subsidiaries—the 
key players of MNC 




. for the formation of the 
network and the flow of 
knowledge within the 
organization”. 
Gold, A. H. 
Malhorta, A. 
and Segars, A. 





 IM “Knowledge management: an 
organizational capabilities 
perspective.”  Focus on 
effective knowledge 
management from the 
perspective of organizational 
capabilities suggesting that a 
“knowledge infrastructure 
consisting of technology, 
structure, and culture along 
with a knowledge process 
architecture of acquisition, 
conversion, application, and 
protection are essential 
organizational capabilities or 











 “How firm characteristics 
affect knowledge flows 
within alliances and find 
positive effects due to 
technological, geographic, 










Issue of relationship 
marketing in the context of 
the New Economy. 
Relationship marketing is 
“fundamentally different 
from traditional marketing 
management and that 
successful implementation 
requires new mindsets” 
Survey 
Gupta, A. K. 
and   
Govindarajan, 




ISM Knowledge flows within 
multinational corporations. 
“Knowledge outflows from a 
subsidiary would be 
positively associated with 
value of the subsidiary’s 
knowledge stock, capacity to 




W. (2001)   
Journal of 
World Business 
IM The role of expatriate 
managers in   MNC / MN 
companies via three 
functions:  position filling, 
management development, 
and organization 
development.  Focus on the 
organization development, 
how an informal 




strategy has been used 
“through socialization and 
the building of informal 
communication networks”.  
Harzing, A-W. 








The language barrier and its 
implications for HQ 
subsidiary relationships. An 
integrative model is proposed 
“that consists of two coupled 
vicious cycles: the 
communications cycle – 
composed of the eight 
aspects of the language 












IB The issue of impact of 
culture on the strategy in 
MNC – “the cultural distance 
between the home base of the 
investor and the target 
country (or perhaps political 
risk) exerts a powerful 
influence on ownership of 
subsidiaries, but cultural 
characteristics of the home 




O. and  
Felzensztein 







Control–trust interplays and 
the influence paradox: a 
comparative study of MNC-
subsidiary relationships.  
Interplay and possible 
coexistence of control and 
trust when influencing others 












MCS “Control–trust interplays and 
the influence paradox: A 
comparative study of MNC-
subsidiary relationships”. 
“Intended purpose and 
perceived legitimacy need to 
be considered”, as well as the 










IM Managing international 
business operations in a 
changing institutional 
context.  Case study shows 
the impact of the “change in 
the institutional context from 
a centrally planned to a 
market economy centers on 
the connections of the hotel 
enterprise with public and 
private sector actors”. 
Interviews 
Karhunen, P., 




ISM The relationship between 









operations. The suggested 
model linking two 
“interrelated dimensions of 
foreign business operations 
in transition economies: 
resources committed to the 
entry in terms of ownership, 
and resources committed to 
control the operations”.  









IB Global strategy and MNC’s 
entry mode choice. “The 
importance of global 
strategic considerations in 
choosing multinationals' 















MCA Internal control and inter- 
firm control dynamics and 
power. “The role of power in 
shaping internal/inter-firm 
control dynamics in 
organizations, how the 
combination of resource, 
process and meaning power 





V. and Burton, 







MCA Focus is om the dominant 
owners and performance.  
“The ability to control and 
actual control and whether a 
particular distinct 
shareholder ownership type 
is associated with company 
performance”.  
Survey 








SM The role of the strategic 
interdependence between the 
JV and each partner and the 
environmental uncertainty 
faced by the JV are important 
for the design of coordination 














International HR Variations of corporate 
influence and human 
resource management 
(HRM) practices between the 
start-up and maturity stages 
of a foreign subsidiary. 
The degree of influence over 
HRM practices in MNCs 















The factors for the adaptation 
of organizations and 
practices transferred across 
cultural boundaries.  The 
focus on the organizational 
structure, processes, and 
behavior. The importance of 
“congruent or, at least, 
accommodative relationships 
between the core values 
dominating the local setting, 
and those underlying 
transferred practices for the 
effectiveness of “imported” 
organizational practices”. 
Survey 








International HR Control and co-ordination of 
Japanese subsidiaries in 
China: problems of an 
expatriate-based 
management system. The 
international management 
control (IMC) system that 
Japanese MNCs   use in 
order to co-ordinate the 
activities of their subsidiaries 
in China. It focuses on the 
role of Japanese expatriates 
in this IMC system and 
assesses their performance 
Interviews 
Lucas, J. W. 
and Baxter, A. 
R.  (2012)    
The ANNALS 








Social sciences  This article gives a review of   
literatures on power, status, 
and influence in sociology’s 
group processes tradition. 
Review 







MCS A new typology for MCS is 
provided structure around 
five groups: planning, 
cybernetic, reward and 
compensation, administrative 
and cultural controls. “The 
typology is based on the 
distinction between decision-
making and control and 
addresses those controls 
managers use to direct 
employee behavior”.  
Survey 









MCS Co-ordination and control of 
human resource management 
in multinational firms. It is 
described different strategies 
of HRM control used by 




MNEs. The effectiveness of 
control strategies is 
“influenced significantly by 
the incentive and ability of 
subsidiary managers to 
comply with centralized 
contro”l. 









EU is enlarged and more 
diverted, that increases the 
opportunities for 
“international reorganization 
of production and, with this, 
for ‘coercive comparisons’ 
and efficiency-oriented 







MCA “The role of accounting and 
an intermediate subsidiary in 
the management control 
system in MNCs - how the 
power of accounting can be 
formed on the local level”. 
“The power of accounting 
can be blurred, …accounting 
remains the basis for 
legitimated behavior and is 










IB Condition of experience in 
influencing the ownership 
structure of foreign direct 
investments (FDI). Smaller 
firms, characterized by 
financial and “managerial 
adverse asymmetry in 
information costs, compared 
to their competitors”. This is 
a reason why they are forced 
to act “prudently, minimizing 
risk and thus preferring a less 




W. (2000)  
Strategic 
Management. 
ISM Managing foreign 
subsidiaries: agents of HQs, 
or an interdependent 
network? The practical 
mechanisms used in order to 
manage foreign subsidiaries 
of MNCs. “The mechanisms 
are insufficient for managing 
subsidiaries characterized by 
high levels of intra‐firm 
international 
interdependence, the 
management of which is 
critical to many of today's 









SS The issue of self-
enhancement in order to 
explore phenomena of power 
and influence.  
Several psychological 
processes related to power 
and social influence 
(“escalation of commitment, 
similarity attraction and in-
group favoritism, the 
disinhibiting effects of 
power, and the persistence of 
hierarchical structures”) can 
all be “derived from the self-
enhancement idea, the desire 
to see oneself and one’s 
actions in a positive light”. 
 
Scheytt, T. 
Soin, K. and 







MCA Practice of control across 
cultures: a narrative 
approach.  Use of 
management accounting and 
control knowledge across 
different European countries. 
It should be increased 
awareness about “the 
existence, meaning and 
significance of the 
differences and 











MCS Controlling strategy through 
dialectical management. 
“Controlling strategy has 
been portrayed as a matter of 
managing tensions”. 
Survey 










A conceptual development of 
Simons’ Levers of Control 
framework. Revised 
framework that separates 
“managerial intentions for 
controls and employee 
perceptions of controls”.  
Interviews 
Toh, S. M.  
and DeNisi, A. 






HR management  HR practices of expatriating 
organizations in MNCs.  
Focus should be more on 
“providing more equitable 
compensation for local and 
expatriate employees, 
selecting expatriates who are 
truly worthy of the higher 
pay, and increasing the 
transparency of pay practices 
so that local employees can 
see the linkage between work 
inputs and compensation 











measurement systems (PMS) 
which “being perceived by 
employees as enabling of 
their work, rather than as 
primarily a control device for 
use by senior management”.  
Interviews, 
meetings. 
Yan, Y. and 
Child, J. 
(2004)  
The academy of 
management 
Journal. 
MCS “Investors' resources and 
management participation in 
international JVs: a control 
perspective”.  
“The interactions between 
partner firms’ profiles of 
resource and capabilities that 
are employed in an IJV and 
the deployment of relevant 
control mechanisms 
to safeguard those 
investments”.  
Interviews 
Yang, B. and 








SS  The relationship between 
power and influence in 
organizational political 
contexts is un focus. “The 
relationship between adult 
education practitioners using 
different styles of power and 
influence tactics in designing 
and planning programmers 












MCS Management accounting 
change in a subsidiary 
organization. “The role 
which (local) political, 
cultural and institutional 
factors in a subsidiary play in 
shaping the dynamics and 
change implementation 
parent–subsidiary 
relationships over time, and 
how the new systems and 
practices become accepted 
and take root as values and 
beliefs and how they 
supplement earlier norms”. 
Survey 
Yilmaz, C.  
and Kabadayi, 




IB Issue of trust and relative 
dependence – “which partner 
firms will display the three 
critical unilateral cooperation 
behaviors of flexibility, 
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Globalization of the world economy brought to attention the issue of the process of 
internationalization and influence over investments abroad in a multicultural context 
and forced the need to establish new, adequate systems of influence and control over 
subsidiaries. The management control systems (MCS) literature has long recognized 
the importance of the issue of phenomenon of HQ’s influence over subsidiaries in the 
process of internationalization of multinational corporations MNCs. However, there is 
still not enough knowledge about the kind of mechanisms that enhance headquarters’ 
(HQ) influence over subsidiaries in the process of internationalization; how the interplay 
of these mechanisms occurs; and the way in which these mechanisms trigger the 
development of the process of internationalization;  and more research  is needed in this 
research field.
Using a qualitative framework, in which a case study has been carried out, the current 
research aims  to examine how HQ of  MNC  ”T” has exercised influence and control 
over its subsidiaries in the process of internationalization, how the top managers in the 
HQ have perceived the outcome of the control process, and how those perceptions have 
influenced changes in the design of HQs control mechanism over subsidiaries.
The study makes three major contributions. Firstly, the study contributes by describing 
use of controls mechanisms related to ownership, the role of BoD, the role expatriates, the 
corporate rules and the role of CEO of HQ and reveals that these controls are interplaying 
with each other as the configuration of control packages.  Secondly, the study shows 
how the configurations of controls as packages have been changed by “tuning” during 
the process of the internationalization aiming to achieve the high level of influence in 
subsidiaries. Thirdly, this research contributes to a renewal of the existing management 
control literature  by examining how the development of a control system as the 
configuration of control packages is a result of top managers’ perceptions of the outcome 
of control activities by discovering and presenting the phenomenon of “deprivation of 
control” as a driving force in the changes of the organization.  The study contributes to 
practitioners by providing a better understanding of the process of internationalization 
and to the renewal of knowledge about the activities of the MNC during international 
expansion.
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